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The targeted killing of Gen. Qasem Soleimani set off a chain of events that nearly incited a 
significant international conflict. Spearheaded by the Central Intelligence Agency, this counter-
terror mission sought to eliminate Soleimani on the grounds that he posed an ‘imminent threat’ to 
the United States. Following the strike, the US claimed that it had acted legitimately by citing 
adherence to self-defence under customary international law. However, this justification for the 
preemptive use of force would quickly unravel when it was determined that no such ‘imminent’ 
threat could be corroborated. Further doubt was raised when several US officials confirmed that 
US President Trump had signed what amounted to Soleimani’s death warrant seven months before 
the strike. When it was reported that another Iranian official was unsuccessfully targeted in Yemen 
on the same day as Soleimani, it became clear that there was rather more to the story than what the 
US had disclosed. This dissertation seeks to interrogate some of these issues.  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether the US claim to pre-attack self-defence 
was legitimate. Comprehensive analysis based on process tracing was undertaken deploying 
qualitative approaches. Real-time information on the Soleimani strike was combined with critical 
conclusions extricated from scholarly works on the subject to develop a framework capable of 
ascertaining the Soleimani strike's legitimacy. Thus, this dissertation seeks to contribute to our 
understanding of pre-attack self-defence doctrine by developing a framework capable of 
determining the legitimacy of operations similar to that of the Soleimani strike.  
 
In sum, this dissertation determined that the US strike on Gen. Soleimani did not sufficiently 
adhere to pre-attack self-defence conditions based on available intelligence. This project further 
reaffirms this topic's growing importance and raised further issues for future research, including 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In January of 2020, the international community bore witness to a dangerous political game 
instigated by the United States. Political assassinations were surreptitiously planned and executed 
by lethal drone. Covert missions were entrusted to foreign double agents. Political tensions 
escalated, leading to a barrage of retaliatory missile strikes and a dangerous fog of war. Then came 
the downing of a passenger jet, followed by further cover-ups, protests, and deception, culminating 
in the looming threat of overt—nuclear—war. Perhaps only imaginable by Hollywood, the swift 
fallout that took place in the wake of the lethal US drone strike on Iranian General Qasem 
Soleimani1 served as an unnerving start to the new decade and posed important questions for 
policymakers, lawyers and international ethicists. However, the structure of international law is 
deeply embedded in states as a primary source of legitimacy, and this dissertation critically 
interrogates the justifications offered by the Trump administration in using deadly force against 
the Iranian General. 
 
 Long ago, Sun Tzu warned that ‘all warfare is based on deception.’2 As witnessed during 
the one-term Trump presidency, shifting government statements on the Soleimani strike also 
embodied this principle. The US government touted the killing of the Iranian General as yet 
another success of its counter-terror program. However, critics were not so easily convinced, even 
though both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations had previously contemplated the 
elimination of Soleimani.3 This is because, over the last twenty years, the US counter-terrorism 
programme has become ever more comfortable conducting dangerous and controversial missions 
overseas. Nevertheless, the strike on Soleimani was unlike past US drone strikes. This is because 
he was not just another non-state target readily described as a terrorist. Soleimani was a General 
and an active foreign government official. Moreover, he represented a country that was not at war 
with the United States, and thus by the letter of international law, he should have been afforded 
protected personnel status. 
 
1 See Michael Crowley, Falih Hassan and Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim 
Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces,’ The New York Times, 02 January 2020. 
2 Sun-Tzu and Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
3 Zeke Miller and Julie Pace, ‘US Long Watched Soleimani, But Feared Risks of a Strike,’ AP 





 Still, for the Trump administration, Soleimani was viewed as nothing more than a terrorist. 
This assessment was bolstered by unsubstantiated claims that the Iranian General had been 
engaged in active terror plots targeting the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, this 
classification of Soleimani as an ordinary terrorist, eclipsed his rank as General, thus allowing the 
US to justify his elimination in supposed accordance with the provision of ‘right to self-defence,’ 
afforded under international law.4 As Trump stated, ‘Soleimani was plotting imminent and sinister 
attacks on American diplomats and military personnel, but we caught him in the act and terminated 
him… We took action last night to stop a war. We did not take action to start a war.’5 It should be 
noted that the General’s terroristic affiliations are not a subject of inquiry within this dissertation. 
Instead, it is the line of defence adopted by the US government to justify this operation, which will 
be examined closely. 
 
 At the heart of this doctoral dissertation lies the question of whether, and to what extent, 
the customary international law of pre-emptive self-defence can lend legitimacy to the Trump 
administration’s assertation that the US drone strike against Gen. Soleimani was necessary and 
justified. Over the last twenty years, beginning with the Bush Doctrine, the United States has 
emphasized the pre-emption of national security threats through military force.6 In the case of the 
drone strike against the Iranian General, the US government claimed that it acted in accordance 
with the customary international law of self-defence to prevent an instant and otherwise 
indivertible impending attack—as the George W. Bush administration had done in the run-up to 
the War against Saddam Hussain’s Iraq. However, in the aftermath of the killing of Soleimani, the 
Trump administration was widely seen as providing and using insufficient evidence to establish 
whether the General had indeed posed an imminent threat to warrant his immediate execution. 
Even high-ranking US officials in the ‘Gang of Eight’—eight leaders within the United States 
Congress from both Chambers and parties who are briefed on classified intelligence matters by the 
 
4 Mehrnusch Anssari and Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Compilation of States’ Reactions to U.S. and 
Iranian Uses of Force in Iraq in January 2020,’ Just Security, 22 January 2020. 
5 Donald J. Trump, ‘Remarks on the Death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General 
and Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani of Iran in Palm Beach, Florida,’ The American 
Presidency Project, 03 January 2020. 
6 See National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ 




executive branch, all of whom possess the highest of clearances—were left disappointed by the 
‘weak’ intelligence briefings given by the Trump administration. Several Members of Congress 
stated that the intelligence they examined showed no evidence that the Iranian General posed an 
imminent threat. The revelation that US President Donald J. Trump had signed Soleimani’s death 
warrant seven months before the January 2020 strike7 appeared to only further weaken the US’ 
claim that Soleimani posed an imminent threat at the time of his death.  
 
Predictably, and perhaps in an attempt to quell the domestic uproar incited by the targeted 
killing of an Iranian government official on sovereign Iraqi soil, the US president turned to Fox 
News. In a nationally televised interview, Trump maintained that he ‘believed’ the alleged threat 
was directed at several US embassies in the Middle East.8 This statement was not only 
uncorroborated, but it seemed to be a new piece of information for his administration—many of 
whom were blindsided by the revelation, for neither the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defence, nor the heads of the CIA or NSA knew anything of such threats.9 It should be emphasized 
here that these are career professionals whose role both requires and entitles them to be highly 
informed about national security threats against the United States and, having access to 
compartmentalized sources and raw intelligence, convey relevant information on impending 
national security threats to the White House. Remarkably, several embassy officials confirmed that 
they were similarly unaware of any security risks before the targeted killing of Soleimani.10  
 
The initial concern over the lack of evidence of an impending attack on American 
embassies or its national security more broadly was amplified as an increasing number of details 
about the drone strike on Soleimani emerged. For example, the U.S. chose to carry out the lethal 
strike on Soleimani in Iraq, a third-party state. The killing was carried out without the latter’s 
 
7 See Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube, ‘Trump Authorized Soleimani’s Killing 7 Months Ago, 
with Conditions,’ NBC News, 13 January 2020. 
8 See Alex Pappas, ‘Trump Tells Fox News' Laura Ingraham “Four Embassies” Were Targeted in 
Imminent Threat from Iran,’ Fox News, 10 January 2020. 
9 See Karoun Demirjian, Karen DeYoung, and Shane Harris, ‘Trump’s Team Offers Mixed 
Messages About Imminent Attack from Iran As Justification for Killing Soleimani,’ Washington 
Post, 07 January 2020. 
10 See Kylie Atwood, ‘State Department Security Officials Weren’t Notified of Imminent Threats 




knowledge or consent, and in its aftermath, Iraq voted to expel American troops from its territory. 
How does this violation of another state’s sovereignty sit alongside the US claim to self-defence? 
It is assumed that the US would seek to demonstrate, in some form or another, adherence to the 
customary law of pre-emption. Yet since the strike took place in a foreign country without its prior 
accord, should the Trump administration (in their quest for legitimacy) not also seek to justify its 
decision to violate the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace and, indeed, other aspects of Iraqi national 
law? We might note here that the mission against Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 raised 
similar jurisdictional questions.  
 
 A series of perplexing events related to the Soleimani operation slowly surfaced, raising 
additional questions about the Trump administration's legitimation strategy. Quite simply, 
Soleimani was not the only person the US targeted that day. In Yemen, another Iranian government 
official, Abdul Reza Shahlai, was targeted by a US drone on the same day, and within the same 
timeframe, as Soleimani.11 He narrowly escaped as the drone circled back and then killed the 
wrong man in a case of mistaken identity. The US government has since chosen not to comment 
on this failed mission. Instead, the Trump administration focused on the ‘successes’ of the 
Soleimani operation. What does this say about the decapitation strategy showcased by the 
Soleimani strike? What does the revelation of a failed second-strike cover-up say about the 
reasoning behind the preemptive decapitation counter-terror strategy showcased by the Soleimani 
strike? Was the Iranian General the only one to pose a risk to the US national security? If so, then 
why target the second official in Yemen? Nonetheless, if the second official in Yemen was also 
critical to the supposed ‘imminent threat’ plot that Soleimani was a part of, how can the overall 
operation be viewed as a success when one key player remains alive, and supposedly operational?  
 
 As though lifted from the pages of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, the Soleimani 
strike could easily be defined as an event that keeps getting ‘curiouser and curiouser’ the deeper 
one goes into examining the rationale and legitimation behind the targeted killing. This remains 
unsurprising when we consider the chaotic conduct of national security affairs in the latter half of 
 
11 See Eric Schmitt, Edward Wong, and Julian E. Barnes, ‘U.S. Unsuccessfully Tried Killing a 




the Trump presidency and now chronicled by John Bolton in his recent weighty memoir.12 
However, the main purpose of this dissertation is not to reconstruct historical events or engage in 
process tracing, but instead to examine the lethal drone strike on General Soleimani to determine 
if the US operation was legitimately undertaken in accordance with the legal provisos set forth 
within the customary international law of pre-attack self-defence.  
 
 At the moment, there is a growing need for clarity and objective evaluation on the 
Soleimani strike. Scholars within International Relations, in addition to a broad range of 
international legal experts, government officials, and the media have voiced their concerns about 
inconsistencies regarding the US’s justification for the strike. Despite a growing need for greater 
clarity, academic analyses of the Soleimani strike have remained limited. There is already a 
substantial normative literature around both drones specifically and assassination as a tool of 
statecraft more generally, so this dissertation will not replicate this but instead aim to build upon 
it by providing an objective evaluation of the Soleimani strike. There is already a substantial 
normative literature around both drones specifically and assassination as a tool of statecraft more 
generally, and there seems no need to replicate this. Accordingly, international law will constitute 
the primary prism for the analysis in this dissertation.  
 
 Hence, there are four key literary contributions furthered in this dissertation. Firstly, this 
research will mark the first scholarly attempt to categorise the Soleimani strike under the existing 
legal parameters of pre-attack self-defence. Secondly, this categorization will attempt to put to test 
the assertions of academics who have claimed that the CIA-led US drone programme is slowly 
losing authority and reputation by violating foreign laws or lying about compliance. Thirdly, 
contrary to the current US president's assertions, this project would investigate the prevailing 
scholarly view that (i) evidence of imminence, (ii) sufficient intelligence, (iii) true and credible 
government speeches, and (iv) integrity and diplomacy are all needed to prove the validity of 
attacks justified in accordance with the law of pre-attack self-defence. Fourthly, this dissertation 
will examine how the Soleimani attack differs from conventional drone strikes, particularly those 
 
12 See John Bolton, The Room Where It All Happened: A White House Memoir, (New York: Simon 




undertaken during leadership decapitation operations, in order to assess what future impact this 
could have on the US drone programme. 
 
 Concepts drawn from seminal legal works on the topic will also be employed and combined 
with established texts on pre-attack self-defence customary law. These will then be used to develop 
a framework capable of analyzing the Soleimani strike's legitimacy in a practical and scholarly 
way. As such, the criteria included in this dissertation’s theoretical framework was inspired by the 
prerequisite conditions stipulated in the customary international law of pre-attack self-defence, as 
well as current military practices, and proposals found in the seminal works of Michael W. Doyle, 
Abraham D. Sofaer and Michael L. Walzer.13 Accordingly, the criterions included in the main 
theoretical framework are founded upon an examination of the: (i) nature and severity of the threat 
posed, (ii) potential destruction the threat could cause if allowed to materialize, (iii) the urgency 
of the threat and the probability of the threat materializing as well as the risk in waiting, (iv) 
whether alternatives have been exhausted, and (v) the degree of intelligence disclosure. Further 
elaboration on the framework would be premature at this point as the theoretical framework will 
be introduced and applied in later chapters, following discussion on current literature fields, 
relevant historical counterterror operations, and the comprehensive analysis of the Soleimani 
strike. Thus, only a broad brushstroke on this frameworks’ criteria has been included here. At the 
end of this dissertation, the theoretical framework will be presented in table format. This visual 
aid is included with the goal of improving the clarity and transferability of this framework to 
similar future pre-attack self-defence operations. 
 
It is also worthwhile to note that there are ten established orthodoxies or wisdoms which 
this project seeks to overturn. First is the belief that international law is outdated and therefore 
incapable of addressing, much less constraining, modern armed conflicts. Second is the view that 
counterterrorism operations are beyond the scope or purview of domestic or international law. 
Third, that pre-attack self-defence operations cannot be challenged nor regulated by domestic 
powers. Fourth, that the United Nations and its regulatory bodies, including the UN Security 
Council, should not be consulted when undertaking counterterror strikes as the world is in a 
 
13 These authors, and their respective works, will be discussed and examined in greater detail 




perpetual war with an unrelenting and unpredictable enemy. Fifth, no intelligence, proof, or 
evidence should be required of states who justify their drone strikes in accordance with the practice 
of pre-attack self-defence. Sixth, that the US, by virtue of its reputation and hegemonic power, 
should always be considered right; and its actions be inferred as legitimate, thus given free rein to 
conduct its war on terror as it sees fit. Seventh, that more transparency in covert operations is 
always a good thing. Eighth, that leadership decapitation is an effective strategy regardless of the 
terror organization. Ninth, that state sovereignty can be suspended or infringed upon during 
counterterror operations. And tenth, that diplomacy is no longer a viable nor effective foreign 
policy strategy. 
 
 Accordingly, this project will seek to contribute to the existing literature on pre-attack self-
defence, the US counter-terror drone program, and the new subject of the Soleimani strike, which 
may well become something of a legal precedent. The findings and conclusions contained within 
this dissertation intend to have both scholarly and practical applications. The expectation is to 
provide a normative framework capable of determining the legitimacy of similar future operations 
before their execution, in the hope of curtailing the negative political fallout experienced following 
the Soleimani strike. 
 
 This dissertation has been organized into five main sections. The first will introduce the 
methods chosen for this project. The second will review the relevant available literature on the 
topic. The third will introduce, discuss and analyze the main case study. After this is completed, 
the fourth section will deploy the data from the preceding three sections to develop three 
frameworks. The aim will be to classify the Soleimani strike by comparing and contrasting the 
known information on the strike with the criteria and parameters identified in the three frameworks 
discussed above. The fifth and last section will propose recommendations for similar operations 
to avoid the negative consequences and political fallout that plagued the Soleimani strike. As 
indicated above, the following section will now present the methodology employed in this project 
 
 8 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
Methodological Approach  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify, discuss and explain the methodological approaches 
selected for this dissertation. A discussion of the theoretical framework, design strategies and 
philosophical assumptions underpinning this project will be undertaken to achieve this. One central 
question motivated the creation of this dissertation. This section will introduce this main research 
query, in addition to three additional sub-questions. The primary research inquiry for this project 
is as follows. 
 
(i) Does the customary international law of pre-emptive self-defence lend legitimacy 
to the US drone strike against Gen. Soleimani? 
 
Three additional questions were also considered during the creation of this dissertation. Namely,  
 
(ii) What criteria must be sufficiently demonstrable to ascertain the legitimacy of the 
Soleimani strike?  
(iii) Does legitimacy rely on proof of imminence? 
(iv) Would a lack of available intelligence and an inability to adhere to the criteria 
mentioned above affect the operation's perceived legitimacy, and by extension, the 
broader US UAV counterterror program? 
 
 This dissertation's research questions sought to build upon existing knowledge in the field 
by addressing under-developed or superficial areas in the existing literature. In other words, this 
dissertation's primary purpose was to use the recent Soleimani strike to understand better the 
problems associated with the practice of pre-attack self-defence in a real-world context. Once the 
problem was understood, the goal was to build upon existing knowledge by developing and 




The corresponding purpose for this was to determine whether or not the US drone strike 
on Soleimani was legitimate, as the US government has adamantly asserted. This project sought 
to address the research objectives and questions identified at the onset of this study. These 
questions, which were investigated through qualitative means, were mostly open-ended. This 
question form allows a researcher to gain valuable information or knowledge that was not 
anticipated at the project's commencement. As such, this served as an essential check on the design 
of this project, considering that qualitative research often suffers from researcher bias if the 
research design is too narrowly focused on theory testing. 14 
 
 Additionally, this dissertation was conducted by using available English-language sources 
and resources. Understandably, this gives this dissertation a rather Western perspective. Thus, to 
offer balance, global literature on international laws was employed and referenced to gain a more 
holistic approach to the practice of pre-attack self-defence and the case study undertaken. 
Nevertheless, this project recognizes that the Iranian perspective was much less prominent due to 
the language barrier and the inaccessibility of resources and information. A study of this subject 
from an Iranian perspective would be very welcome, but most likely also rather difficult. 
Nevertheless, this focus on Western perspectives aligned with this project's purpose. Thus, it was 
necessary to fully comprehend current US practices and policies to propose practical ways to 
improve the legality and legitimacy of its existing counterterror program. This included the 
machinations of its legal, political and military structures to understand better what strategies 
needed to conform to the status quo. Thus, a western focus was required for these 
recommendations to be made applicable to the US context.  
 
 A critical realist perspective, grounded in international law, inspired the ontological 
approach taken in this dissertation. Although certain assumptions about the nature of social reality 
may be outdated, particularly when addressing matters of counterterrorism and the advanced 
defence technologies employed within them. International law nonetheless provides an objective 
lens through which to assess and analyze events without the risk of self-serving interpretations or 
 
14 Greg Guest, Emily E. Namey and Marilyn L. Mitchell, Qualitative Research: Defining and 
Designing, in Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied Research (London: Sage 
Publications, 2013), p. 21. 
 10 
skewed narrative constructions. This is of particular importance, especially since this dissertation 
recognizes the existence of multiple realities of legitimacy. So, in order to properly interpret and 
assess whether the reality (narrative) predicated by the US after the Soleimani strike was accurate, 
an enduring, objective and widely respected perspective needed to be taken. 
 
 Once the ontological approach was determined, then an interpretivist view, originally 
espoused by Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, was adopted.15 Considered by many to be the leading 
exponents of interpretive political science in the United Kingdom, Bevir and Rhodes posited that 
an interpretivist perspective ‘may be used to advance the study of governance, high politics and 
public policy.’16 Quite recently it seems, several authors have begun to examine the merit of 
interpretivist approaches on the study of international law. Başak Çali, for instance, reasoned that 
interpretivism may not only be relevant, but it may also be a requisite within normative debates 
about international law. She advised that interpretivism be included in current debates, and 
furthermore recommended that future scholarly work on the subject be undertaken to develop a 
substantive interpretivist account of international law.17 In the years that followed, several 
publications sought to do just that. 
 
 Colin Hay, a professor of politics at the University of Sheffield, conducted his own research 
on the issue, with the goal of gauging ‘the nature, distinctiveness and significance of the narrative 
turn in public administration.’ Inadvertently, it seems, his research resulted in a significant 
ancillary finding which proposed that a broadening of the interpretivist agenda would only really 
be effective if it included a focus on institutional contexts and beliefs. These ‘contexts and beliefs’ 
are formed in part by the actions, influences and ideas of actors within them. Thus, an interpretivist 
examination of international law requires a concurrent analysis of the institutions and actors which 
 
15 See Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and 
Practices,’ Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 08 August 2012: pp. 201-208. 
16 Nick Turnbull, Interpreting Governance, High Politics and Public Policy, Routledge, 2016: pp. 
15-226; see also David Marsh et. al., ‘Two Cheers for Interpretivism: Deconstructing the British 
Political Tradition,’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 73, Issue 3, 23 September 
2014: pp. 340-348. 
17 Başak Çali, ‘On Interpretivism and International Law,’ European Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 20, Issue 3, August 2009: pp. 805-822. 
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bolster them.18 To achieve this within this dissertation, a narrative analysis of individual actions 
within their respective institutions was undertaken. For instance, both the US and Iranian letters to 
the UN Security Council were discussed and analyzed to better understand how each state justified 
their actions in accordance with the customary international law of pre-attack self-defence. Yet 
even an interpretivist examination of such letters raises certain issues.  
 
 Mark Tushnet, a Harvard Law professor, posited that interpretivism is a double-edged 
sword. If used correctly, this analytical lens would allow lawmakers, judges, and even the general 
public to decide the legitimacy and lawfulness of cases based upon their adherence or violation of 
certain laws and norms. However, ‘interpretivism [requires] judges… [to] decide cases in accord 
with the intent of the framers.’ But what if the framers of certain laws could not have envisaged 
certain modern stratagems or weapons which have now become conventional? How could the 
intent of the framers be deduced in those circumstances?19 Ultimately, Tushnet reasoned, 
interpretivism relies on a certain degree of presupposition. This, however, requires an objective 
evaluation to ensure that an interpretivist analysis is not clouded by self-serving ideals, notions or 
conditions.20 
 
 Malcolm D. Williams, a sociology professor at Cardiff University, suggested a safeguard 
for interpretivist analyses. He posited that ‘interpretivism must employ a special kind of 
generalization,’ called ‘moderatum.’ The purpose of this would be to set up limits on 
interpretivism.21 By doing so, presuppositions could not be swayed by minor details in an attempt 
to arrive at subjective, or self-serving conclusions. By generalizing the situation, assessors of 
legitimacy would have to look at the ‘bigger picture’ and ascertain whether the ends truly do justify 
the means. It would be naïve to believe that such evaluations could occur objectively, unhindered 
 
18 Colin Hay, ‘Interpreting Interpretivism Interpreting Interpretations: The New Hermeneutics of 
Public Administration,’ Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 89, Issue 1, 16 March 2011: pp. 
167-182. 
19 See Nick Turnbull, ‘Interpretivism and Practice in Governance Studies: The Critique of 
Methodological Institutionalism,’ British Politics, Vol. 6, 30 June 2011: pp. 252-264. 
20 Mark V. Tushnet, ‘Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles,’ Harvard Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, February 1983: pp. 781-827. 
21 Malcolm David Williams, ‘Interpretivism and Generalisation,’ Sage Journals, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 
01 May 2000: pp. 209-224. 
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by external factors. Given the complexity of modern communication channels, and the voracity of 
media dissemination, our understanding of ‘political reality’ changes frequently and somewhat 
unpredictably.  
 
 Shaul Shenhav, a political science lecturer at the University of Jerusalem, has extensively 
researched how our collective (re)directions of thought influence the creation and perpetuation of 
‘political realities.’ Shenhav argued that parallel narratives, competing realities, and cultural 
differences contribute to these range in perspectives. But, as the author posits, there could exist a 
‘possible coexistence between different political narratives,’ especially if these are rooted, or 
proven to adhere to, greater institutional constructs, like those found within international laws or 
norms.22 To avoid issues associated with malleable political realities, this dissertation, and the 
analyses contained herein, are reliant on international law for this very reason. While international 
law may have played a key role in the foundational aspects of this project, the narrative analysis 
which followed was facilitated by a study of media discourse and public opinion. 
 
 According to William Gamson, a professor of sociology at Boston College, there are two 
parallel, yet nonetheless complimentary, systems of constructing meaning. These narratives are 
facilitated and disseminated through the media, through one or more channels—including 
television reports, newspapers, editorials and syndicated opinion columns. Public opinion is thus 
formed when a certain narrative is repeatedly broadcast. Thus, meaning is constructed when media 
discourse and public opinion intersect.23 However, this is accompanied by certain risks, as 
competing narratives, shifting stories, or even a modicum of public mistrust can raise doubt in 
these constructed narratives, thus undermining their purpose. It is for this reason that narratives 
must be carefully constructed and disseminated, particularly when it comes to matters of foreign 
policy, or cases that have had contentious outcomes.24 The US strike on Soleimani thus serves as 
 
22 Shaul R. Shenhav, ‘Political Narratives and Political Reality,’ International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, July 2006: pp. 245-262. 
23  William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, ‘Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructionist Approach,’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 95, No. 1, July 1989: 
pp. 1-37. 
24 See Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of 
U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 
3, September 1993: pp. 297-320. 
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an interesting case. Despite its international reputation and access to countless media channels, the 
US still failed to construct a strong narrative regarding the necessity and legitimacy of the strike. 
As it will be shown later, strong narratives can have the power to sway public opinion in order to 
confer legitimacy on even the most contentious of circumstances. However, as the US case has 
shown, weak narratives, particularly those plagued by shifting statements, lack of intelligence, 
mounting suspicion, aggressive and confrontational strategies, and a general nonchalant attitude 




Knowledge builds upon existing knowledge. However, the available literature on the US ‘targeted 
killing’ of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani focuses predominantly on the effects this has had on 
American politics or even US-Iran relations. Remarkably, although there is a growing pool of 
literature on the event, it seems as though the need to legally classify the strike (within the 
parameters of the three types of pre-attack self-defence) has been overlooked. This dissertation 
intends to contribute to the increasing depth of literature by offering a new perspective and method 
to evaluate the Soleimani strike's legitimacy.  
 
 This dissertation will compare and contrast available intelligence with the legal 
requirements of anticipatory, preemptive and preventative self-defence, to establish whether the 
US strike on Soleimani was legitimate. In addition to these legal provisos, additional criteria 
derived from the observations, findings, and key scholarly recommendations will also be 
employed. Additionally, the condition of imminence will similarly be examined to determine if 
there was sufficient evidence to warrant a strike in self-defence. The literary contribution of this 
dissertation will be four-fold. First, this project will mark the first scholarly attempt to classify the 
Soleimani strike within the current legal parameters of pre-attack self-defence. Second, this 
classification will seek to test the claims of scholars who have argued that the CIA-led US drone 
programme is steadily losing legitimacy and credibility by infringing international laws or 
dissembling about adherence. Third, this project will further attempt, contrary to the claims made 
by the current US president, to examine the predominant scholarly position that (i) proof of 
imminence, (ii) adequate intelligence, (iii) genuine and reliable government statements, and (iv) 
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credibility and diplomacy, are all necessary to prove the legitimacy of attacks justified as pre-
attack self-defence fundamentally. Fourth, this dissertation will investigate how the Soleimani 
strike contrasts from ‘normal’ drone strikes and even the strategy of leadership decapitation to 
determine what effect this may have on the US drone programme going forward. 
 
 Therefore, this dissertation straddles two fields of literature, both of which are tied to 
international law. These include the scholarly works on pre-attack self-defence and the many 
general studies of the US counterterror drone program. The conclusions realized in this project 
will aim to have both strategic and literary applications.   
  
Several works are of particular importance in positioning this dissertation, proving 
important conceptual waypoints. This project has sought to build upon the philosophical 
approaches, assumptions and conclusions advanced by Michael L. Walzer, Abraham D. Sofaer, 
and Michael W. Doyle. Each scholar was purposely chosen for their significant contributions to 
the fields of preemption, state-sponsored self-defence, and international conflict. These works 
were of particular importance during the creation of this project’s theoretical framework. Each 
scholar, and their respective contributions, will be briefly introduced and discussed below.  
 
 Abraham D. Sofaer worked as a legal advisor to the US Department of State, during which 
time he was responsible for US-Iran negotiations at the ‘Iran/US Tribunal’ in The Hague. Sofaer 
has influenced the framing of this dissertation for four main reasons: (i) he was a legal scholar with 
extensive knowledge of international laws, (ii) he was directly involved in US-Iran negotiations 
and had first-hand experience with practical solutions, (iii) he was American, and therefore more 
aware of bureaucratic operations during his service in the Department of State, and (iv) two of his 
most recent books exclusively examined the Iranian threat and the issue of preventative force. Both 
books proved essential during the research and development stages of this dissertation. In 2010, 
Sofaer published a landmark text which sought to provide a practical guide for scholars studying 
preventative forces and issues resulting from actions taken in this manner. It built upon the findings 
of the Stanford Task Force on Preventative Force and examined the role of the UN in the realm of 
preventative force. The book also addressed the concept of legitimacy and discussed its growing 
importance in foreign policy.  
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Sofaer posited that ‘[e]valuations of legitimacy are ultimately based on the aggregate 
impression of the views of all relevant actors regarding a proposed or implemented action.’25 In 
the absence of a universal definition, legitimacy is therefore conferred by majority opinion. In 
2009, Jeremy Greenstock, former UK representative to the United Nations, addressed legitimacy 
during a discussion on the UK’s involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He concurred and noted 
that although the invasion of Iraq might have been legal, this did not necessarily make it 
legitimate.26  
 
Thus, Sofaer demonstrated the need for greater research on the rather complex concept of 
legitimacy—particularly when examining the issue of preventative force. Accordingly, the 
literature review and theoretical framework of this project include and emphasize the importance 
of legitimacy. Arguably, legitimacy may be more important than the legality.27 Yet, beyond the 
discussion on legitimacy, Sofaer also addressed three critical questions. Namely, (i) ‘are there any 
risks or limitations associated with preventive attacks?’ (ii) ‘can states who do not seek or receive 
the approval of the UN Security Council still have their preemptive actions viewed as legitimate?’ 
and (iii) ‘would a defined set of procedures, standards or policies been able to enhance the 
perceived legitimacy of actions undertaken in pre-attack self-defence?’ All of these questions are 
considered and discussed in this dissertation. However, the last question was given more 
consideration since it accorded most closely with the main research question.  
 
 Sofaer wondered if a set of standardized criteria might regulate the preemptive actions of 
states somewhat better. Presently, there is an increasingly nonchalant attitude towards rules and 
laws since no universal set of conditions has been developed, informing states on the proper and 
legitimate ways to employ preemptive force. Moreover, this question, and its underlying 
suggestion for further scholarly study on the issue, inform the theoretical framework employed in 
this dissertation. Three short years later, Sofaer published another ground-breaking work. This 
2013 publication became a significant point of reference. It was entitled, Taking on Iran: Strength, 
 
25 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Best Defence? Legitimacy and Preventive Force (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2010), p. 107. 
26 See Jeremy Greenstock, ‘Chilcot Inquiry,’ United Nations, November 2009.  
27 See for example the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
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Diplomacy and the Iranian Threat, and examined how different presidential administrations dealt 
with the Iranian regime. The purpose of this historical investigation was to determine which tactics 
might still work at present. Unsurprisingly, the author concluded that several past strategies had 
been unproductive. Sofaer posited that for the US to effectively address the Iranian threat, realistic 
negotiation tactics needed to be undertaken. Using historical-comparative case studies, he 
suggested that the negotiation tactics used between the US and the Soviets in the 1980s might 
prove useful if applied to the current Iranian regime.  
 
 Sofaer also advised the US to involve Iranian government officials in discussions about 
effective counterterrorism policies. In doing so, the regime might feel less ostracized from the 
international community, which might also deter it from forging alliances with non-state terror 
groups. By tracing the historical origins of US-Iran relations, he provided readers with a greater 
understanding of the current state of affairs between the two states, emphasizing Teheran’s long 
memory stretching back to the tumultuous events of 1953. It also provided much-needed context 
to the rising tensions that have manifested in recent years.28 
 
 The second key scholar whose concepts inform this dissertation is Michael W. Doyle, an 
American Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, who previously taught at 
the University of Warwick. During his career, he served as Special Adviser to UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan. These positions allowed him to observe and participate in political issues in 
both a scholarly and professional manner. It should be noted that having both a practical and 
theoretical perspective is critical to effectively analyzing recent counterterror operations. Striking 
First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict is an essential text for those studying 
preemption in international conflict. Legal practitioners and political scholars overwhelmingly 
praised the book. For example, Ian Shapiro, professor of Political Science at Yale University, has 
called it 
the best account that has yet been developed of the conditions under 
which preemptive action against threats to American national security 
 
28 There are many texts on the events of 1953 but see for example: Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's 
Men: The Hidden Story of the CIA Coup in Iran (New York: Wiley, 2003); Mark J. Gasiorowski 
and Malcolm Byrne. (ed.) Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2004). 
 17 
can be justified and of the form such action must take if it is to garner 
legitimacy at home and abroad.29 
 
Others called the book ‘ground-breaking’ and ‘indispensable,’ including scholars like Michael L. 
Walzer, who will be introduced later in this section.  
 
  Doyle also recognized that separately, national security strategies such as the Bush 
Doctrine or legal frameworks such as international customary law would be grossly insufficient to 
constrain or even regulate state behaviour. In turn, this implied that a combination of the two might 
suffice, albeit this seems improbable. This dissertation goes one step further by enlisting a third 
factor: scholarly prescriptions. If existing military doctrine and international law were unable to 
address the issue, perhaps another perspective needs to be considered and applied. Although 
scholarly debate often results in theoretical conclusions, it can also offer strategic and practical 
recommendations. Moreover, US foreign policy, perhaps more than the foreign policy of any other 
state, often turns to international relations scholarship not only for ideas but also for legitimacy, 
signalled by its love affair with high-powered think tanks and the extensive consultancy work of 
leading academics.30  
 
Second, Doyle acknowledged that the lack of defined categories between the three types 
of pre-attack self-defence had afforded the US the opportunity to claim a more favourable 
classification post-operation. Accordingly, the post-strike manipulation of discourse is discussed 
at length in later chapters. This inadequacy of definitional parameters also served as an interesting 
scholarly observation. Accordingly, a table was generated, enlisting international law and existing 
literature, which endeavoured to clarify the differences between each form of pre-attack self-
defence – this is discussed later. Doyle also analyses the importance of the UN in overseeing state-
sponsored actions preemptively undertaken in self-defence. Beyond oversight, the UN Security 
Council, for instance, can enforce international law, regulate the use of preemptive strikes and 
verify the claims of states, thus objectively imparting legitimacy. Subsequently, this fact was 
 
29 As cited in the frontmatter of Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in 
International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
30 Donald E. Abelson, Capitol idea: Think tanks and US foreign policy (Toronto: McGill-Queen's 
Press-MQUP, 2006). 
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incorporated as a criterion within the theoretical framework developed to analyze the Soleimani 
strike. Doyle does, however, recognize that there may be instances in which preemptive action 
might be necessary. However, this is all the more reason to enlist the UN's advice and support to 
ensure that such actions are impartially deemed legitimate. In Striking First, Doyle also suggested 
that more work was needed on the topic of preemption, as there has yet to be a comprehensive set 
of criteria presented which is capable of evaluating such operations. This observation served as an 
essential motivator for this dissertation. In response to this requirement, this project develops a 
framework that could universally determine the legitimacy of pre-attack self-defence operations. 
The recent Soleimani strike served as an attractive case study to determine the framework's 
relevance and suitability.31  
 
 The third scholar whose works were conceptually crucial to this project was Michael L. 
Walzer. He is widely known as the leading commentator on ethics and war over more than half a 
century. His most recognizable work remains his 1977 study, entitled Just and Unjust Wars.32 This 
book informs the methodological and theoretical aspects of this dissertation for several reasons. 
First, it has sought to classify specific themes found in modern military interventions. This 
classification was undoubtedly welcome as it provided significant analytical clarity on a somewhat 
convoluted topic. Walzer organized his book into five categories, specifically (i) the moral reality 
 
31 Doyle, Striking First, pp.12-54. 
32 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed., 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
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of war,33 (ii) the theory of aggression,34 (iii) the war convention,35 (iv) dilemmas of war,36 and (v) 
the question of responsibility.37 Several of these categories discuss in considerable detail how 
preemptive attacks change not only the nature of war but the perceived legitimacy of all those 
involved. 
 
 Second, Walzer charts an interdisciplinary path and employs a wide range of sources to 
develop this book. He interweaved political theory with philosophy, ethics, morality and even 
poetry to demonstrate how unjust wars threaten every aspect of human culture and society. It 
ensured that multiple perceptions of armed conflict and its related concepts could be attained. 
Third, Walzer engaged in a rather lengthy debate about responsibility in armed conflict. Citing 
historical antecedents, he demonstrated the broader societal and cultural implications of claiming 
responsibility for armed conflict (mainly when the actions were somewhat morally questionable). 
This observation served as a starting point for analyzing the role and responsibility of all parties 
involved in the Soleimani strike.  
 
 
33 Moral Reality of War: When one engages in armed conflict, it can be reasonably assumed that 
at some point, an immoral action will take place. Regardless of rank, all participants in an armed 
conflict are equally responsible for any wrongdoing they commit, or are party to committing, 
during a war.  
34 Theory of Aggression: Preemptive attacks in armed conflict complicate this theory. Walzer 
discusses the historical understanding of the theory of aggression, noting the importance of 
affording protection to non-combatants and respecting the boundaries of the battlefield. Still, he 
recognizes how modern conflicts are more concerned with the ends over the means—in essence, 
states are becoming far more comfortable in escalating aggression in the absence of 
physical/discernable threats (as in the case of pre-attack self-defence).  
35 War Convention: Asymmetrical battles, unconventional threats/enemies (including transnational 
terrorism), and civilian casualties complicate the understanding of war and challenge our existing 
legal systems in the prosecuting of resulting violence.  
36 Dilemmas of War: Walzer discusses the changing nature of war, and the shift from honour and 
chivalry to total war hinged on the desire to win at all costs (regardless of whether or not the means 
are moral or legal). Engaging in armed conflict with evermore dangerous weapons, be they 
remotely piloted aircraft or nuclear missiles, also pose unique challenges to our understanding of 
war and our ability to claim morality in said conflicts. 
37 Question of Responsibility: After a conflict ends, how are war criminals apprehended and 
punished? Who is held responsible for immoral/illegal actions? These are just a few of the 
questions Walzer raises. 
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 Beyond substance, Walzer’s book has also influenced the structure of this dissertation. To 
address a challenging and somewhat muddied topic, he opted to structure his book by way of well-
defined categories and terse narratives on tangential cases. By doing so, the themes, topics, criteria 
and issues examined provided the reader with an opportunity to draw connections and map causal 
relationships and patterns which would have otherwise been more difficult to identify. This 
organizational structure was used as a guide for the creation of the theoretical framework within 
this dissertation. Overall, this dissertation builds upon the existing literature published by these 
three distinguished scholars within the field of state-sponsored pre-attack self-defence.  
 
Schools of Thought 
 
‘Pre-Attack Self-Defence’ is a rapidly developing field of legal scholarship, and further work on 
this issue will undoubtedly lead to greater convergence between practitioners and theorists. And 
while these debates are unlikely to produce completer consensus, they might be hoped to raise 
awareness for the problem and indirectly increase pressure on states ‘to be more transparent about 
the aims of self-defence.’ Existing academic debates regarding state claims of pre-attack self-
defence in military action must be examined first. The purpose of this is to determine where the 
scholarship currently stands and how it might evolve. 38 
 
 In the concluding section of this chapter, we will introduce and discuss the three schools 
of thought which mirror the critical tenets of the three types of pre-attack self-defence. Then, 
prominent thinkers, scholars and career professionals within each of these groups above will be 
identified and discussed to ascertain why they belong to these schools and how they represent their 
tenets. For simplicity of reference and saliency, the following schools of thought will be ‘branded’ 
by identifying their key defining principle.  
 
Anticipatory self-defence will therefore be referred to as the ‘Legitimate Threat’ School of 
Thought. Ideas of pre-emptive self-defence will be referenced as the ‘Strike First, Ask Questions 
Later’ School. Finally, preventative self-defence will be termed the ‘Charter is Dead’ School. 
 
38 Christian J. Tams, ‘The Necessity and Proportionality of Anti-Terrorist Self-Defence,’ Vol.45, 
No.1, Israel Law Review (2010), p. 420.  
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Indeed, it is worth observing at the outset that some outrightly oppose all force undertaken to 
justify pre-attack self-defence.39 This rather traditional-minded group of scholars argues that a 
state simply cannot act in ‘self-defence’ unless, and until, it suffers an armed attack.40 Proponents 
of this position argue that the UN Charter's language supports their view—specifically Article 51, 
which states, in unambiguous terms, that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.’41  
 
 Focusing narrowly on the UN Charter, the proponents of this view believe that a state 
cannot claim self-defence if an armed attack has not yet happened. Followers of this philosophy 
include Louis Henkin,42 Ian Brownlie 43 and Philip Jessup44. Simply put, this group of scholars are 
worried that any use of self-defence before an armed attack may cause even more international 
tensions, which could result in states pre-empting preemptive attacks – an endless cycle of pre-
escalation.45 Furthermore, if states continue to justify the use of preemptive force as a form of 
‘self-defence,’ it may end up completely muddling up the exact parameters set in the UN Charter 
regarding self-defence can be justified (i.e. post-attack). Moreover, the use of preemptive force 
might violate UN Article 2(4), which prohibits interstate use of force. A final concern that this 
group raises is the potential minimization of the UN Security Council’s role as a prosecuting 
power.46 Despite the concerns raised by this group, three schools of thought support varying forms 
of pre-attack self-defence.  
 
 
39 For a greater discussion on this, refer to the Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, A/59/2005, para 124 (‘Imminent 
threats are fully covered by Article 51… Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an 
imminent attack as well as one that has happened’). 
40 Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ p. 706 (referring to this as a ‘strict 
constructionist view’). 
41 UN Charter, Article 51. Emphasis added. 
42 See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1990), p. 156. 
43 See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963), p. 278. 
44 See Philip Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (Hemden CT: Archon Books, 1968), p. 166. 
45 Doyle, Striking First, p. 26 (‘Unless all states agree on what constitutes a specific treat…every 
state will be pre-empting every other state’s preventative strikes’). 
46 Doyle, Striking First, pp. 26-27. 
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 The first group to be examined will be referred to as the ‘Legitimate Threat’ School of 
Thought. Responding directly to Henkin, Jessup and Brownlie's traditionalist claims, this school 
takes an ‘anticipatory’ view, believing that it is unfathomable that a state should suffer an attack 
before acting in self-defence.47 Notable supporters of this school include Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
Sir Derek Bowett, Stephen M. Schwebel, Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings, Sir Arthur Watts, Lady 
Rosalyn Higgins Matthew Waxman. The following section will briefly note the similitudes 
between these scholars to illustrate why they have been assigned to this particular school of 
thought. 
 
 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Lady Rosalyn Higgins, Sir Derek Bowett, Sir Arthur Watts, and 
Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings were all British jurists who served for the ICJ or the UN in various 
capacities. Waldock, Higgins, and Jennings had also served as presidents of the ICJ, albeit at 
different times, while Watts was general counsel for the ICJ and Bowett worked as a legal officer 
for the UN. Except for Watts, all were professors of law, with Waldock lecturing at Oxford 
University, Higgins at LSE, and Bowett and Jennings at Cambridge. These four scholars published 
extensively on the importance of international political institutions in the conferral of legitimacy 
and legality in military actions, with Bowett even having written his Ph.D. dissertation on the 
matter of ‘self-defence in international law.’ Jennings and Watts even co-authored ‘Oppenheim’s 
International Law,’ a seminal publication that reaffirmed that the UN and its adjudicatory 
institutions could confer legitimacy through its varying practices and procedures. This belief in 
such institutions' power fits with the ‘legitimate threat’ school of thought. 
 
 Two American scholars were chosen to join the aforementioned group of scholars for a 
rather interesting reason. Both Stephen M. Schwebel and Matthew Waxman are professors of law, 
with Schwebel teaching at Harvard, and Waxman at Columbia. Yet, it is not their professions that 
have garnered them a place in this cohort. Rather, it is the fact that both scholars have been 
 
47 See Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p. 191 (‘It would be absurd to require that the 
defending State should sustain and absorb a devastating [perhaps fatal] blow, only to prove 
immaculate conception of self-defence’); Derek W. Bowett, ‘The Use of Force for the Protection 
of Nationals Abroad,’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), p. 40; and Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive 
Use of Force,’ pp. 14-15. 
 23 
outspokenly critical of the US military, and American foreign policy more generally. Waxman has 
openly criticized the Bush and Obama administrations for certain immoral military activities 
(including the operation of Guantanamo Bay and its documented Geneva convention violations), 
whilst Schwebel has set a historical precedent—becoming the first judge in the history of the ICJ 
to have voted against their own country in favour of international legal provisions.48 These scholars 
have not only demonstrated their support of international law through scholarship, but they have 
done so in practice as well.  
  
All of the aforementioned scholars argue that since states had a right to self-defence before 
the UN Charter was drafted—this customary law proviso should still be afforded to countries 
despite the current limitations set out in Article 51. As a result, this school of thought supports the 
use of anticipatory self-defence, as it considers it to be aligned with customary international law.49 
Beyond merely claiming that self-defence predates the UN Charter, this school points to the 
citation of the Caroline test at the Tribunals at Tokyo and Nuremberg as proof that an 
understanding of self-defence not only predates the UN Charter limitations set in Article 51 but is 
still referred to in international legal settings.50 In other words, they argue that the Caroline incident 
of 1837 permitted ‘a state [to] use force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack.’51 Several 
 
48 Richard Bernstein, ‘American at the Hague Sits in Judgment of U.S,’ The New York Times, 20 
September 1985; see also Pål Wrange, ‘Impartial or Uninvolved? The Anatomy of 20th Century 
Doctrine on the Law of Neutrality,’ The Anatomy of 20th Century Doctrine on the Law of 
Neutrality (2007); Eric A. Posner and Miguel FP De Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of 
Justice Biased?’ The Journal of Legal Studies Vol.34, No.2 (2005), pp. 599-630; Gleider I. 
Hernández, ‘Impartiality, bias, and the International Court of Justice,’ Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law Vol.1, No.3 (2012), pp. 183-207; and Stephen M. Schwebel, 
‘National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice,’ The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol.48, No.4 (1999), pp. 889-900. 
49 Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ p. 711. 
50 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), ‘Judgement and Sentences,’ American Journal of 
International Law, 1947, pp. 172-205; see also ‘International Military Tribunal at Tokyo,’ in Leon 
Friedman (ed), The Law of War: A Documentary History, Vol. 2, (London: Random House 
Publishing, 1972), pp. 1029, 1157-1159.  
51 Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, p. 665. 
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states have resorted to anticipatory self-defence, and this practice has ensured its inclusion into 
customary international law, further validating the claim put forth by this school of thought.52 
 
 The UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has 
reasoned that ‘a threatened State, according to long-established international law, can take military 
action so long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it, and the action 
is proportionate.’53 This school's proponents echo this sentiment, which is precisely why they only 
support anticipatory self-defence—not preemptive self-defence. They believe undeniable proof of 
an imminent, impending, or forthcoming armed attack is necessary for a self-defence claim to be 
valid. This proof is needed to avoid a potential ‘slippery slope’ of self-defence claims by states 
who opt to strike first without sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the threat (i) exists, (ii) is 
imminent, and (iii) is unavoidable.54 Waxman has furthermore suggested that involving a test of 
imminence in deducing the lawfulness of force used in self-defence helps to ensure that a defender 
exhausts other, non-forcible means, and so ‘reduces the likelihood of mistakes, insofar as waiting 
until that point is more likely to expose an adversary’s true intentions.’55 
 
 Moreover, anticipatory attacks do not cover opportunistic acts of aggression. These are 
attacks whose timing is based on the necessity or advantage of striking at a favourable moment, 
‘but for which the underlying motivation is offensive—that is, A attacking B not to forestall B 
from attacking A, but simply because B is especially vulnerable, or to prevent B from interfering 
 
52 This includes Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Franck, Recourse to Force, 
p. 103 (the author notes that Israel’s ‘words and actions [perpetrated in the 1967 strike on Egyptian 
airfields] clearly asserted a right to anticipatory self-defence against imminent armed attack’). 
53 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World, 2004, 63, para 
188. 
54 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ American Society of 
International Law Task Force (2002), p. 8 (‘based on the practice of states…as well as simple 
logic, international lawyers generally agree that a state need not wait to suffer the actual blow 
before defencing itself, so long as it is certain the blow is coming’); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, 
‘American Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense.’ Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy Vol.31, No.1 (2002), p. 43; and Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Terrorist Crime, 
Taliban Guilt, Western Victims, and International Law,’ Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, Vol.31, No.1 (2002), p. 69. 
55 Matthew Waxman, ‘The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,’ Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol.31, No.1 (2009), p. 8. 
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with A’s plans to attack a third party.’ Anticipatory attacks typically signal the beginning of a 
war—and so the decision to resort to these preemptive measures usually requires strategic 
planning, input from the highest levels of government and adherence to relevant national security 
policy. This form of self-defence can result in severe political consequences, especially if the threat 
does not appear imminent to the international community.56 
 
 Additionally, sources of ambiguity in threat assessments can stem from insufficient or 
flawed intelligence and the uncertain nature of the future—no one can accurately predict what will 
happen, so planning for this uncertainty is problematic strategically and legally speaking. 
Anticipatory attacks also require superior intelligence about the intentions and capabilities of the 
enemy. This intelligence must be of superior quality, capable of convincing any objective party 
that the actions undertaken were legitimate and lawful. The international community expects states 
who engage in preemptive strikes to share intelligence, demonstrating why they settled on this 
course of action.57 This requirement motivates states to ensure that their decision to act in this 
matter is supported by substantial, credible and actionable intelligence capable of sufficiently 
convincing impartial states that their actions were lawful and legitimate. States sometimes do this, 
and the extensive display of imagery that accompanied the Cuban Missile Crisis is a much-cited 
example, but such public displays of sensitive capabilities often trigger fierce internal arguments 
within security bureaucracies. 58 
 
 We now need to consider what we might call the ‘Strike First, Ask Questions Later’ School 
of Thought. Here a preemptive attack is launched based on the expectation that the adversary is 
 
56 Mueller et. al., Striking First, pp. 12-35. 
57 This is similar to when the CIA was asked for their intelligence on Israel’s Al-Kibar strike; see 
also Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Al-Kibar Facility: A Test Case for 
the Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence?’ Journal of Conflict & Security Law Vol.16, No.2, 
(2011), pp.  263-291; Shlomo Nakdimon, First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled 
Iraq's Attempt to Get the Bomb, (New York: Summit Books, 1987); Erich Follath and Holger 
Stark, ‘How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor,’ Spiegel Online 11, (2009), pp. 
22-26; Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen. ‘Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications 
for the Non-Proliferation Regime.’ Arms Control Today Vol.38, No.6, (2008), pp. 15-21; and 
Jonathan Spyer, ‘Review of Shadow Strike: Inside Israel's Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian 
Nuclear Power.’ Middle East Quarterly (2020). 
58 Mueller et. al., Striking First, pp.109-110. 
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about to attack and that ‘striking first will be better than being attacked.’ Preemption can 
sometimes refer to striking an enemy before making pre-emption impossible—‘such as mobilizing 
or dispersing forces’ in preparation for an offensive or receiving weapons from (or transferring 
them to a third party). Preventative attacks are motivated, not so much by the desire to strike first 
rather than second, but by the desire ‘to fight sooner rather than later.’59  
 
 It should be clear by now that preemptive self-defence is the most disputed principle in jus 
ad bellum. Still, preemptive attacks do have their benefits—the most evident is being an attacker 
rather than a defender, so in essence, these ‘offensive strategies [are] carried out for defensive 
reasons.’60 Scholars and states who argue that the current law (and even the Caroline test) is too 
restrictive comprise this school of thought. Professors like Michael N. Schmitt and Sean D. 
Murphy are emblematic of this school and its preemptive view. 
 
 Both Schmitt and Murphy are American international legal scholars who currently teach 
law at post-secondary institutions. Schmitt at the University of Reading, and Murphy at the George 
Washington University Law School. These scholars were chosen for their expert knowledge on 
the use of force in international affairs and US military operations' legality post-9/11. Schmitt was 
mainly chosen for his work on US counter-terrorism operations and his considerable analysis of 
their normative legal limits.61 On the other hand, Murphy was chosen for his experience as a legal 
counsellor at The Hague and his prominent publications on the changing nature of US practices 
vis-à-vis international law.62 Several of their scholarly findings informed the writing of this 
dissertation. 
 
59 Ibid, p. 6-8; see also Lawrence Freedman, ‘Prevention, Not Pre-emption,’ The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol.26, No.2 (2003), pp. 105-114. 
60 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption,’ pp. 10, 12; see also Rachel Bzostek, Why Not 
Pre-empt? Security, Law, Norms and Anticipatory Military Activities, (Routledge, 2016); Mary 
Manjikian, ‘Special Problems I: The Question of Preemption,’ The Ashgate Research Companion 
to Military Ethics, (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 79-92; and James A. Green, ‘Docking the 
Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary International 
Law Concerning Self-defense,’ Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol.14 
(2006), p. 429. 
61 See Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, (George 
C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2002).  
62 See Sean D. Murphy, United States Practice in International Law: Vol 2, 2002-2004, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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 In particular, Murphy surmised that 9/11 served as a catalyst in the change in perception 
states have towards the defensive use of force. He spent much of his professional career studying 
the impact of significant events and historical periods on foreign policy and domestic politics in 
the United States.63 Indeed, the 9/11 attacks had an international impact, as allied states began to 
feel similarly (if not more) vulnerable to these ‘invisible’ non-state threats. So, with the beginning 
of the global war on terror, states found it easier to justify more intrusive and legally ambiguous 
practices if undertaken with the legitimate motivation to prevent another 9/11. Schmitt shared this 
view and reasoned that ‘ultimately, the law must be construed in the context in which it is to be 
applied if it is to remain relevant; and in the twenty-first-century security environment, insistence 
on a passé restrictive application of international legal principles to strategies of pre-emption 
would quickly impel states at risk to ignore them.’64  
 
Thus, both scholars represent this school of thought because they advance the notion that 
a response that takes place in the last possible window of opportunity is lawful and more effective 
than waiting for an attack to begin or continue. In this way, the state can address the threat from a 
position of power while ensuring it can effectively defend itself and its population.65 However, to 
identify this ‘last possible window of opportunity,’ a high level of confidence about an attack's 
imminence (and how that threat might manifest) needs to be achieved. This constraint raises new 
questions about what types of intelligence might be needed and ‘what degree of confidence a state 
must have about the accuracy of that intelligence.’66 Unsurprisingly, the United States is amongst 
some nations which consider preemptive self-defence lawful.67 However, other countries that lack 
 
63 Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ p. 745. 
64 Schmitt, ‘Preemptive Strategies in International Law,’ pp. 513, 546; see also Howard M. 
Hensel, The Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and the Customary Law of 
Armed Conflict, (Routledge, 2016); Thomas M. Nichols, Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of 
Preventive war, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and Richard K. Betts, ‘Striking First: A 
History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities,’ Ethics & International Affairs Vol.17, No.1, (2003), 
pp. 17-24. 
65 Schmitt, ‘Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative 
Framework,’ p. 1, 21; see also Kalliopi Chinoglou, Reconceptualizing the Law of Self-Defence, 
(Brussels: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishing, 2008) pp. 334-335. 
66 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption,’ p. 667. 
67 National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ p. 
15.  
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such advanced intelligence capabilities will undoubtedly encounter issues in their available scope 
of action. 
 
 In fact, even the 2002 National Security Strategy advocated for the relevance of preemptive 
self-defence.68 Its authors saw pre-emption as a way of offsetting the decline of American power. 
The strategy asserted that even if uncertainty about the nature of a threat existed, preemptively 
addressing such dangers could keep them from materializing and causing untold devastation—as 
in the case of possible WMD attacks.69 Other countries that echo this sentiment include the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Japan (who argue in favour of preemptive self-defence to stop, for 
instance, terrorists from acquiring WMDs). 
 
 The third school of thought, which some might argue has the most contentious philosophy, 
is aptly named the ’Charter is Dead.’ The views presented herein represent those who ascribe to 
the dogma of ‘preventative’ pre-attack self-defence. To clarify, this position is only controversial 
if the unilateral use of force is undertaken without Council authorization. If the UN Security 
Council authorizes a pre-attack force for self-defence, this decision is widely viewed to be lawful 
and legitimate.70 The Council, however, only allows states to use force against those who threaten 
the peace of the international community.71  
 
 A UN High-Level Panel Report echoes this fact, suggesting that ‘if there are good 
arguments for preventative military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be 
put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to.’72 Thus, the Council 
serves as a ‘jurying or adjudicative process,’ which impartially weighs the evidence and 
 
68 Some scholars believe that the wording in the National Security Strategy may also allow for 
justifications of preventative self-defence. See Doyle, Striking First, p.25; Ivo Daalder and James 
Steinberg, ‘The Future of Pre-emption,’ American Interest, Vol.1 No.2 (2005). 
69 National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ p. 
15 (‘under long-standing principles of self-defence, we do not rule out the use of force before 
attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. When 
the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand 
idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of pre-emption.’) 
70 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption,’ pp. 663, 668. 
71 See UN Charter, Articles 39, 42. 
72 High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, para. 190. 
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determines whether the action in self-defence is necessary against perceived threats.73 However, 
supporters of this type of self-defence often argue against the need for Council authorization. As 
surmised, the US is one of them. For years, the US has even defended its right to use force in the 
face of perceived threats. They did this, ‘even if uncertainty remain[ed] as to the time and place of 
the enemy attack.’74 Suppose a state is restricted or delayed in its ability to act. In that case,75 the 
US government argues that it may cost the victim state the ability to act altogether by missing the 
critical window of opportunity, particularly when the threat comes from WMDs, terrorists, or other 
prevalent transnational issues.76  
 
 Some scholars support the US’s stance on the matter and further argue that the use of 
preventative self-defence is only controversial because the UN Charter is outdated and 
inapplicable to current threats, like transnational terrorism.77 Exponents of preventative self-
defence, who belong to this ‘Charter is Dead’ school of thought, include distinguished scholars 
like Michael J. Glennon and Anthony C. Arend. Both are American and university professors, with 
Glennon teaching law and diplomacy and Tufts University, and Arend teaching government at 
Georgetown University. Glennon was mainly chosen for his 2014 publication, which argued that, 
due to national security concerns, law and democracy have become largely symbolic in the U.S—
making it all too easy for the government to justify unlawful military actions as ‘necessary’ for the 
preservation of national security.78 This theory will be considered and examined in later chapters 
with the examination of the main case study. Arend was similarly chosen for a notable publication 
 
73 Thomas Franck, ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in 
an Age of Power Disequilibrium,’ American Journal of International Law, Vol.100, No.1 (2006), 
pp. 88, 104.  
74 National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ 
p.15; see also UK Attorney General’s speech in the House of Lords, HL Deb, 21 April 2004, 
Vol.660 cols 369-372 (according to the House of Lords, self-defence may be acceptable as a state 
response against terrorist groups who are understood to pose an imminent threat by carrying out 
multiple attacks in a short period of time, even if there is insufficient evidence available about the 
date/time of the potential next attack). 
75 A state would have to wait to hear back from the UN Security Council for judgement and 
authorization. However, the timeframe for such a request is unknown, and many states view this 
as impractical in actual practice—particularly when faced with an imminent threat 
76 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption,’ p. 668. 
77 See Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ pp. 717-19.  
78 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
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in which he examined the use of force by states to determine whether international law was still 
capable of restricting and regulating military operations.79 
 
 For every proponent of this school of thought, there are many more critics who seek to 
challenge its philosophy. Those who oppose the use of preventative self-defence but accept (under 
the right circumstances) the resort to preemptive and anticipatory self-defence believe that ‘the 
risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is 
simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventative action…to be accepted’.80 A key 
example was Israel’s attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981. The international community criticized 
this strike because it appeared preventative—since there was insufficient evidence that Iraq’s 
nuclear programme was advanced enough to pose a threat, much less an imminent one.81 Later, 
Israel’s decision was endorsed after new information was presented, which demonstrated that Iraq 
posed a greater risk than initially thought. 
 
 Yet even those who argue in favour of pre-attack self-defence agree that clear limitations 
must be established to ensure that no state unnecessarily abuses another. Despite this being a 
significant intellectual challenge, some scholarly developments have been made in this regard. The 
following discussion will introduce a list of factors, criteria, and steps proposed by the three 
scholars of focus in this project: Michael L. Walzer, Abraham D. Sofaer and Michael W. Doyle. 
These scholars posited that their conclusions could serve as a practical starting point to ascertain 
the legitimacy and legality of a state’s claim to pre-attack self-defence. To achieve this, the 
following three scholars' proposed criteria were combined and adapted to create this dissertation’s 
theoretical framework.  
 
 
79 See also Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Use of Force (London: Routledge, 
2014); Anthony C. Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond 
the UN Charter Paradigm (New York: Psychology Press, 1993); and Fernando R. Tesón, 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (New York: Transnational, 1988).  
80 High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, paras. 189-190.  
81 Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in 
Cassese, The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986), p.443.; Franck, Recourse to Force, p.108; Terence Taylor, ‘The End of 
Imminence?’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2004), pp. 57-58. 
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 Michael Laban Walzer, regarded as a prominent American political theorist and perhaps 
the leading ethicist of war, has insisted that it is both unrealistic and immoral to expect a state to 
be attacked before allowing it to act in self-defence. He further argued that requiring a state to wait 
for an attack to be imminent before responding is inadequate in the current climate.82 Walzer’s 
view is that a threat should not be expected to be imminent, but rather, ‘sufficient.’ To be 
considered a ‘sufficient threat,’ the following criteria must be met: (i) the aggressor state must 
demonstrate an intent to attack the victim state, (ii) there is a ‘degree of active preparation that 
makes the intent a positive danger,’ and (iii) there is a risk in waiting for the threat to increase. 83 
Walzer argued that states might use military force in the face of threats of war, ‘whenever the 
failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence,’ even if 
there is no evidence to support the claim of imminence. Intent to attack the victim state, coupled 
with a ‘degree of active participation that makes that intent a positive danger,’ should be sufficient 
to warrant preemptive self-defence. 84 
 
 Building on Walzer, in 2003, Abraham David Sofaer, an American District Court Judge, 
proposed four ‘steps’ a state must consider before resorting to preemptive self-defence. These can 
be simply boiled down to (i) magnitude of the threat, (ii) the probability that the threat will occur, 
(iii) the exhaustion of peaceful alternatives, and (iv) the consistency of the act with the UN 
Charter.85 Like Sofaer before him, Michael Doyle, an American International Relations scholar, 
similarly proposed four factors that need to be considered. 86 These include (i) the lethality of the 
 
82 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed., 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 74-85; see also Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order: 
A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression (London: The Lawbook Exchange, 2006); 
Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,’ European Journal of 
International Law Vol.10, No.1 (1999), pp. 1-22; and Antonio Cassese, ‘The International 
Community's “Legal” Response to Terrorism,’ International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly Vol.38, No.3 (1989), pp. 589-608. 
83 Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, p. 65; see also Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp.76-
79; see also Arthur Mark Weisburd, Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II,’ 
(Carlisle: Penn State Press, 1997); and Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-Defense Against the Use of 
Force in International Law, Vol. 23. (Delf: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996). 
84 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 81; See also Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, p. 65. 
85 Abraham Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-Emption,’ European Journal of International Law, 
Vol.14, No.2 (2003), p. 209, 220. 
86 Doyle, Striking First, p. 46; see also Elisabeth Zoller, ‘The Law Applicable to The Preemption 
Doctrine,’ Proceedings of The ASIL Annual Meeting. Vol. 98, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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threat, (ii) the likelihood that the threat will materialize, (iii) the legitimacy of the proposed action 
(compared against just war principles), and (iv) the legality of the target state’s behaviour and the 
victim state’s response. When compared and contrasted, there are common elements found within 
these scholarly proposals.87 They all consider the nature and severity of the threat, the potential 
destruction it could cause, the urgency of the threat, and if alternatives have been exhausted—
including referring the matter in question to the Security Council. 
 
 As illustrated above, scholars have no issue in coming to a consensus on what factors need 
to be considered when examining pre-attack self-defence. However, the issue lies in a 
disagreement regarding how these proposals should be adapted and implemented in real life. One 
way to advance this debate is to encourage ‘wider disclosures of intelligence by the state using 
force (of the type that took place after Israel attacked the Syrian nuclear facility) and less on the 
law.’88 But at what stage should this intelligence be disclosed. Some propose that the government 
‘do what is necessary’ and ask forgiveness later by supporting their actions with claims of necessity 
and righteousness.89 But how might this affect the perceived legitimacy of foreign policy, military 
operations and legal proceedings internationally? It remains essential that there exists a level of 
consensus among scholars. Particularly about what factors need to be considered and adhered to 
for an action carried out in preemptive force to be viewed and lawful and legitimate.  
  
 We might ask, does the doctrine need to be updated if it is so infrequently used? The United 
States justified its invasion of Iraq by citing other Security Council resolutions, not pre-attack self-
defence.90 The US justified its drone strikes against terror groups in multiple countries as part of a 
 
Press, 2004); Stephen A. Gardbaum, ‘Nature of Preemption,’ Cornell Law Review Vol.79, (1993) 
p. 767; Antony Anghie and Charles Hill, ‘The Bush Administration Preemption Doctrine and The 
United Nations,’ Proceedings of The Annual Meeting American Society of International Law, The 
American Society of International Law, 2004; and Paul Wolfson, ‘Preemption and Federalism: 
The Missing Link,’ Hastings Law Quarterly Vol.16, No.1 (1988), p. 69. 
87 See Lubell, ‘The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World.’ 
88 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption,’ p. 675. 
89 Harold Koh, ‘Comment,’ in Doyle, Striking First, p. 117. 
90 William Taft IV and Todd Buchwald, ‘Pre-emption, Iraq, and International Law,’ American 
Journal of International Law, Vol.97, No.3, (2003), p. 557; see also Marieke De Goede, ‘The 
Politics of Preemption and The War on Terror in Europe,’ European Journal of International 
Relations Vol.14, No.1 (2008), pp. 161-185; and Neta C. Crawford, ‘The Justice off Preemption 
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military campaign during ongoing armed conflict.91 Nevertheless, some cases cannot be chalked 
up to ‘ongoing armed conflict' and, therefore, require judgement according to the existing doctrine 
on preemptive self-defence. The clearest, and most widely cited, is Israel’s strike on the Osirak 
reactor in 1981. Admittedly, these cases of apparent preemptive self-defence are quite rare.  
 
 So, if states rarely rely on pre-attack self-defence doctrine, why do they still advocate for 
its expansion and modernization? There are three main reasons for this.92 The first and most 
important is that it serves as a deterrent. Having the option to engage in pre-attack self-defence 
cautions other states from undertaking actions that might be misconstrued as aggressive or 
precursors to an armed attack. The second is that it achieves a strategic purpose of publicity and 
familiarity with the practice of preemptive force. When a government makes public allegations 
about the requirement of a more practical self-defence policy, it may allow for later justifications 
relying on pre-emption to be more acceptable. Lastly, it demonstrates the necessity of this strategy 
in potential future military conflicts. States believe that in the future, technological advancements 
will increase threats, requiring a pre-emption doctrine that will allow them to respond effectively. 
 
 States have ignored or willfully disobeyed laws that they believe leave them more 
vulnerable to external attacks. With the 9/11 attacks fresh in the international community's 
collective memory, many countries (but especially the US) find it easier to defend against potential 
violations of law than deal with the political fallout of another large-scale attack. Thus, a balance 
must be struck between respect for the law and duty to one’s citizens' collective security. In order 
to achieve this, an examination of historical precedents is necessary. 
 
Framework & Design  
 
 
and Preventive War Doctrines,’ from Just War Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
pp. 25-49. 
91 The White House, ‘Remarks by John Brennan, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our 
Values and Laws,’ Office of the Press Secretary, 16 September 2011. 
92 See Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar Facility: A Test Case for 
the Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence?’ Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
2011, p. 276. 
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An ‘open coding’ method was used in the development of the theoretical framework for this 
dissertation.93 This method facilitated the collation of qualitative data derived from selected 
scholarly works, government documents, military policies and pertinent international laws. This 
information was then cross-referenced, allowing for prevalent themes in literature, law and 
government policy to be reworked and presented as critical conditions. These were then assembled 
into a table format, offering a straightforward, standardized method to analyze operations 
undertaken in pre-attack self-defence.  
 
 A theoretical framework is understood as an analytical tool connected to a research aim. It 
also aids in organizing ideas while facilitating the ‘explaining, exploring or describing’ of 
empirical research.94 In doing so, a further peripheral goal was achieved. This project concurrently 
managed the initial groundwork for a standardized set of criteria to evaluate state-sponsored pre-
attack self-defence actions while determining such operations' legitimacy. In essence, this project's 
theoretical framework is innovative. It combines a framework derived from the literary 
contributions of three key scholars with the known parameters of customary international to 
develop a comprehensive set of conditions necessary for determining the legitimacy of state-
sponsored pre-attack self-defence. This dissertation employed a distinctive set of assumptions to 
develop the main theoretical framework, which also served as a diagrammatical representation of 
pre-attack self-defence in customary international law. This framework resulted in a basic set of 
criteria that could, in theory, be used to determine the legitimacy of pre-attack self-defence 
operations.  
 
  In scholarly works, the research objectives, theoretical framework and research design 
form an ideal trinity. Johann Mouton, Professor of Research at Stellenbosch University, claimed 
that a scholar must ‘plan, structure, and execute’ their undertaken research in such a way as to 
 
93 Judith A. Holton and Isabelle Walsh, Classic Grounded Theory: Applications with Qualitative 
and Quantitative Data (New York: Sage, 2016). See also Anne O'Connor, Barry Carpenter, and 
Barry Coughlan, ‘An Exploration of Key Issues in the Debate Between Classic and Constructivist 
Grounded Theory,’ Grounded Theory Review Vol.7, No.1 (2018). 
94 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, 11th ed, 
2007), p. 89. 
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ensure the ‘validity of their findings.’95 In essence, all significant components of a dissertation 
must work together in achieving the aim of the project by answering the research questions posed 
and arriving at verifiable conclusions. In the social sciences, the research design is considered the 
road map or master plan of a dissertation. So, after the relevant philosophical assumptions were 
reviewed in the selected literature, and a set of research questions were developed, the focus shifted 
to practical research design. The aim was to create a design that would facilitate appropriate data 
collection and allow for viable conclusions to be reached for each of the aforementioned research 
questions. This design process was achieved in the following ways. 
 
 As part of the research design, the audience for this dissertation was also taken into 
consideration. It is assumed that scholars, researchers, academicians, government officials and 
law-makers would benefit from the research undertaken in this project. On this chosen topic, there 
is relatively little research so far undertaken. What has been done tends to take a rather legal or 
ethical approach. Alternatively, this dissertation takes a more practical approach: evaluating the 
practice of pre-attack self-defence from a US counter-terrorism perspective and proposing ways 
to make such operations appear more legitimate without compromising on their strategic efficacy.  
 
  Before any empirical research was undertaken, the first step was to recognize that the 
Soleimani strike's legitimacy hinged on its adherence, or perceived adherence, to the customary 
international law of pre-attack self-defence. Thus, relevant legal documents and pertinent scholarly 
sources, tracing back from its origins to its modern application, were gathered and compiled. 
Thereafter, the prerequisite for legitimate pre-attack conditions was highlighted. This included a 
separate discussion on the requirement of imminence. Then, modern challenges and legal 
loopholes in the customary law were introduced, paying particular attention to how these might be 
problematic in the context of the legitimacy of operations executed under the guise of this legal 
provision. When this was achieved, an overview of the main case study, namely the Soleimani 
strike, was presented.  
 
 
95 Johann Mouton, Understanding Social Research (New York: Van Schaik Publishers, 1996), p. 
175. See also W. Webb and C. J. Auriacombe, ‘Research Design in Public Administration: Critical 
Considerations,’ Journal of Public Administration Vol.41, No.3 (2006), pp. 588-602. 
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 The empirical data was chronologically organized in a timeline format96 to offer a clear 
understanding of the events which occurred during and immediately following the strike on 
Soleimani.97 Thereafter, a brief biographical background on Soleimani followed, emphasizing his 
relevant formative experiences, strategic accomplishments, and enduring legacy in the region.98 
This discussion was followed by a section tracking the differing political stances taken by past 
presidential administrations—from Bush to Trump. Then, the uncertainty over leadership 
decapitation strategies was debated. A review of potential alternative actions, from diplomacy to 
deterrence, was then introduced and considered. The last point in the section examined the legal 
ramifications and precedents which arose from the execution of foreign government officials. After 
available relevant information had been gathered from theoretical articles on the subject, policy 
documents, US government press releases and news reports, a theoretical framework was 
developed. 
 
 This framework's criteria were chosen with due attention to the theoretical literature. 
Conditions like imminence, necessity, and intelligence disclosures were included to evaluate, 
analyze, and ascertain the Soleimani strike's legitimacy effectively and objectively. Discrepancies 
in US government claims and actual events were then identified and reported. The purpose of this 
framework was to determine whether or not the Soleimani strike was legitimate and adhered to 
commonly accepted legal parameters and scholarly suggestions. However, there were two 
additional aims in designing this framework.  
 
 The first was to offer a comprehensive framework to evaluate the legitimacy of state-
sponsored pre-attack self-defence operations, like the Soleimani strike. This theoretical framework 
cannot claim to offer a universal standard. However, it does intend to serve as an initial starting 
 
96 Christopher T. Street and Kerry W. Ward, ‘Improving Validity and Reliability in Longitudinal 
Case Study Timelines,’ European Journal of Information Systems Vol.21, No.2 (2012), pp. 160-
175. 
97 Due to the case study's contemporary nature, chaotic daily news reports and vague government 
briefings created a somewhat confusing picture. Hence, it became evident that a timeline might 
help with the analysis of events and their political fallout. This timeline also served to offer an 
additional sense of clarity on the somewhat inconsistent nature of US government statements 
concerning the strike. 
98 Expectedly, in the days that followed Soleimani’s death, discussions and reports focused almost 
exclusively on the drone strike which killed him. 
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point for future scholarly research on the subject. The lack of a comprehensive framework proved 
to be a significant research challenge during this dissertation's writing. Had such a standard of 
evaluation existed, it might have precluded the US government from engaging in risky, illegal and 
unrestrained operations while offering scholars the opportunity to judge the legitimacy of said 
actions dispassionately. The creation of this theoretical framework seeks to provide such an 
objective standard of evaluation, while contributing to the literature on the topic. Accordingly, this 
dissertation has aimed for both a practical and theoretical impact. 
 
 The framework's second aim was to illuminate the shortcomings and operational issues that 
surrounded the Soleimani strike. The purpose of this was to identify the issues that threatened the 
operation's legitimacy to determine how these might be avoided in the future. It could manifest 
itself as an example of states taking the initiative to adhere to the criteria mentioned above to avoid 
said issues or have these criteria be written into law to guarantee abidance. The purpose would be 
to inform similar operations going forward by exposing the mistakes, ramifications, and fallout of 
the Soleimani strike.  
 
The empirical research for this dissertation was conducted by categorizing the known 
elements of the Soleimani strike into the various created categories underpinned by the developed 
theoretical framework. The research was conducted immediately following the Soleimani strike, 
from January 3rd, 2020, until the moment of submission. The medium for information collection 
was both print and online sources.99 Multiple sources were used in the creation of this project, and 
triangulation was employed where possible.100 However, special attention was paid to the 
material's relevance and the credibility of the author(s) of said publications. Sources were not 
chosen for their political inclinations or affiliations. Likewise, there were no preconceived biases 
when embarking on the research for this dissertation.  
 
 
99 Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and ensuing restrictions, data collection became virtual from 
that point onwards. Thus, the dissertation was written in Canada, with supervisory support being 
regularly and consistently given virtually from the UK.  
100 Philip HJ. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview 
Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services,’ Politics Vol.21, No.1 (2001), pp. 73-
80. 
 38 
 Moreover, the methodological approach taken in this dissertation was predominantly 
qualitative and interpretive. The paradigm used in this research was primarily based on Seymour 
Papert’s constructionist paradigm.101 Papert defined constructionism as 
 
a mnemonic for two aspects of the theory of science education 
underlying this project. From constructivist theories of psychology, we 
take a view of learning as a reconstruction rather than as a transmission 
of knowledge. Then we extend the idea of manipulative materials to the 
idea that learning is most effective when part of an activity the learner 
experiences as constructing a meaningful product.102 
 
Many in the social sciences refer to this paradigm as a ‘learning-by-doing’ formula, whereby 
researchers use the information they already know as a starting point from which to understand 
and evaluate a current evolving issue. This formula has been employed in this dissertation. Existing 
information was compiled and used as a starting point for creating a new framework capable of 
better assessing the legitimacy of state-sponsored pre-attack self-defence attacks and addressing 
the questions raised within relevant seminal works on the topic. 
 
 According to Martin Terre Blanche and Kevin Durrheim, Professors of Psychology from 
South Africa, the constructionist paradigm sees society as socially constructed.103 This approach 
was deemed most applicable for this project, as the Soleimani case hinges on the customary law 
of pre-attack self-defence, which itself is a socially accepted practice. Constructionists believe that 
collective perspectives and actions shape society. However, it is interesting to note that, as Michael 
D. Meyers found, these established social, cultural and political norms constrain individuals' 
 
101 Which built upon Jean Piaget’s earlier epistemological theory of constructivism. See M. Cakir, 
‘Constructivist Approaches to Learning in Science and Their Implications for Science Pedagogy: 
A Literature Review,’ International Journal of Environmental & Science Education, Vol. 3, No.4 
(2008), pp. 193–206. 
102 N. Sabelli, Constructionism: A New Opportunity for Elementary Science Education (New York: 
DRL Div. of Research on Learning in Formal and Informal Settings, 2008) pp. 193–206. 
103 Martin Terre Blanche and Kevin Durrheim, Research in Practice: Applied Methods for the 
Social Sciences (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1999). 
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actions.104 Thus, the constructionist theory recognizes that reality is socially constructed at the 
societal level and that these constructions also restrain and regulate individual actions.  
 
 Predictably perhaps, a constructionist model informed the research structure and design 
achieved in the Soleimani strike analysis. First, the accepted societal norms and practices regarding 
pre-attack self-defence were examined by way of gauging international perspectives and opinions 
on the strike-through various sources, including news reports and press briefings. The constraining 
factor, namely the customary international law of pre-attack self-defence, was examined to 
ascertain whether this was sufficiently followed during the Soleimani operation. Lastly, the 
development of a theoretical framework in this dissertation also reflected this constructionist 
understanding. The criteria used in the framework were compiled from existing legal and scholarly 
conceptions, while the framework itself was created to constrain and evaluate the legitimacy of 
such operations.105 
 
 Underlying the constructionist paradigm was a complementary interpretivist approach. For 
conceptual clarity and brevity, Prof. Geoff Walsham’s definition of interpretivism in research will 
be employed here. Walsham posited that since reality is a social construct, researchers and the 
methods they employ are part of this construct. Given that there is no objective reality, some 
researchers' findings cannot be fully replicated by others since reality is subjective and open to 
interpretation. This view was initially inspired by Clifford J. Geertz, an American cultural 
anthropologist who reasoned that the purpose of an interpretivist approach is to acquire a more 
profound understanding or meaning from the discourse or research being undertaken.106  
 
Geertz maintained that the interpretive approach was ‘not to answer our deepest questions, 
but to make available to us answers that others… have given, and thus to include them in the 
 
104 Michael D. Myers and David Avison, Qualitative Research in Information Systems: A Reader 
(New York: Sage Publications, 2002). 
105 This approach has hitherto mostly been preferred by international human rights law, see Hannah 
Miller, ‘From “Rights-based” to “Rights-framed” Approaches: A Social Constructionist View of 
Human Rights Practice,’ The International Journal of Human Rights Vol.14, No.6 (2010), pp. 
915-931. 
106 Geoff Walsham, Interpreting Information Systems in Organizations (Chichester, NH: Wiley, 
1993), p. 5. 
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consultable record of what man has said.’107 Thus, scholarly research, primarily undertaken 
through an interpretive approach, is not concerned with finding or explaining one objective 
reality.108 Rather, it is interested in discovering multiple realities. As Professor of Sociology 
Norman K. Denzin noted, ‘[o]bjective reality will never be captured. In-depth understanding, the 
use of multiple validities, not a single validity, a commitment to dialogue is sought in an 
interpretive study.’109  
 
Data Selection & Collection  
 
As Professor Keith Punch aptly put it, the qualitative method is based on ‘empirical research where 
data is not in the form of numbers.’110 This research method aims to study a phenomenon within 
its real-world context, without intervening or manipulating the studied environment.111 In essence, 
‘qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that 
is, how people make sense of their world and their experiences in the world.’ 112 However, it is 
essential to recognize that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting 
to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring them.113 Thus, 
qualitative research attempts to bridge the gap between the practical and the theoretical to better 
understand a phenomenon.114  
 
107 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), p. 29. 
108 For a greater discussion on these ongoing epistemological debates, see Norman K. Denzin and 
Yvonna Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), 
pp. 769-802; and Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for 
Qualitative Research, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009). 
109 Norman K. Denzin, ‘On Elephants and Gold Standards,’ Qualitative Research, Vol.10, No.2 
(2010), pp. 269-272. 
110 Keith F. Punch, ‘Qualitative Research: Overview, Design and Grounded Theory,’ in 
Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches (London, Sage, 1998). 
111 Irene Korstjens and Albine Moser, ‘Series: Practical Guidance to Qualitative Research. Part 2: 
Context, Research Questions and Designs,’ European Journal of General Practice, Vol.23, No.1 
(2017), pp. 274-279; see also Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
112 Sharan B. Merriam, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation (San 
Francisco: CA, John Wiley, 2014). 
113 Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, p. 3. 
114 For a typology of qualitative analysis techniques, refer to Gery Ryan and H. Russell Bernard, 
‘Data Management and Analysis Methods,’ in Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, pp. 769-802.  
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 Categorization was used to facilitate the search for patterns, meanings, and criteria. A 
systemic organization of crucial information was achieved through a process of inductive content 
analysis. This organization subsequently aided in the ability for criteria to be identified, compared, 
and contrasted. Since qualitative methods are best used to understand, contextualize, and interpret 
information, this method proved especially important when analyzing the reactions and 
perceptions of the media, government officials, and foreign states on the Soleimani strike. A 
qualitative method was used in this project's data collection stage to ensure that multiple 
information sources could be considered.  
 
Moreover, this dissertation also relied upon qualitative document analysis. Simply put, 
information was obtained from existing documents, news reports, government statements, among 
others available in the public domain. Relevant information from these sources was then gathered 
and used to develop the theoretical framework and support particular arguments, positions, or 
claims. There were many reasons why qualitative research methods were chosen for this project. 
For example, discourse analysis of US government statements would not have been considered if 
quantitative methods were used. Discrepancies in government statements, ensuing media criticism 
and political fallout could not be quantified effectively. There was also insufficient information to 
compile concrete quantitative data sets or deploy analytical systems such as NVivo.115  
 
 Scholars have long discussed the weaknesses of customary international law. Some even 
claiming that such legal provisions can neither constrain nor regulate state behaviour. As such, it 
would be impractical to attempt to quantify malleable and obscure elements into a quantitative 
study. Instead, this project relied heavily on scholarly sources while using qualitative methods to 
engage these enigmatic legal conditions peripherally. The goal is to develop a framework capable 
of evaluating the legitimacy of pre-attack self-defence operations.  
 
 
115 Pat Bazeley, ‘The Evolution of a Project Involving an Integrated Analysis of Structured 
Qualitative and Quantitative Data: From N3 to NVivo,’ International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology Vol.5, No.3 (2002), pp. 229-243. 
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 Some might question why interviews were not conducted for this dissertation. Quite 
simply, interviews would have failed to contribute anything new to this project since the raw 
intelligence on the Soleimani strike remains highly classified. Even those privy to such knowledge, 
like US officials in the ‘Gang of Eight,’ found it difficult to obtain intelligence on the strike. Non-
Disclosure Agreements restricted others from officially sharing their knowledge or opinion on the 
topic. Moreover, a forensic historical narrative reconstruction was not the primary aim. 
Accordingly, this project opted to rely on information garnered from secondary sources, which 
reported the information known to some high-ranking US government officials. This is offset by 
the fact that it is customary for cabinet rank officials to share ‘finished intelligence’ or the broad 
contours of analysis quite widely with the media – in other words, we have been told what they 
were told. 116 
 
 Academic works, official government statements, international laws, and news reports 
formed this project's foundation. It would be unrealistic to assume that more information on the 
strike could be better collected or assessed by a different research method since the available 
information was, for the most part, socially engrained. Speeches, statements, reactions, and 
opinions on the Soleimani strike came in the form of written documents—all of which are best 
analyzed and categorized qualitatively. Thus, qualitative research methods were found to be best 
suited for the aim of this dissertation. Still, insight was solicited from US government officials 
throughout this dissertation's writing. Upon learning of this project's topic and aim, many officials 
were quite eager to engage in conversation—provided that information discussed would remain 
strictly confidential and, therefore, would not be directly reported nor quoted in this project. As 




116 Thomas C. Ellington, ‘The Most Transparent Administration in History? An Assessment of 
Official Secrecy in the Obama Administration's First Term,’ Public Integrity Vol.15, No.2 (2013), 
pp. 133-148. 
117 Without divulging identities, these individuals were either part of the US drone programme or 
privy to the intelligence about the January 2020 Soleimani operation. This data might be 
categorized as ‘off the record briefings’ rather than formal interviews.  
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 As noted previously, qualitative methods offered many benefits in this dissertation. The 
most important of which was the ability to put a phenomenon in context—something that 
quantitative data finds somewhat tricky to achieve. Although data may be consistent, and findings 
can be generalizable, the ability to derive meaning from an event or phenomenon is a limitation of 
quantitative research methods. Qualitative research, on the other hand, does not face such an 
impediment. Still, this research method is not without faults. It is necessary to point out that there 
are also some disadvantages to using this chosen methodology. Guest et al. noted that ‘time 
available invariably determines the size and scope of a study.’ 118 
 
As expected, this dissertation's research was highly time-consuming as multiple sources 
were simultaneously releasing information regarding the Soleimani strike. Data collection began 
immediately following the Soleimani strike and proceeded during the entire writing stage of the 
dissertation to keep on top of the wave of information being released. The aim was to ensure that 
information was collected as soon as it became available to curtail the possibility of sifting through 
mountains of data. This real-time information collection also aided in understanding the different 
perspectives of various groups. For instance, there were many cases in which sources were 
conversational. When one source would assert a particular idea or opinion on the Soleimani strike, 
then another would contradict or support the preceding source's statements. This was most evident 
in the case of US government statements. Finding these sources and arranging them in this manner, 
and then triangulating was another reason why the data collection and analysis were time-
consuming. Still, this could not be avoided.119  
 
 In order to mitigate this issue, meticulous planning and a high level of organization were 
utilized. Reading, coding, interpreting and reporting information required considerable energy and 
time. However, this was not a dissuading factor. Since only one central case study was used, a 
‘targeted’ approach could be taken, which assisted the data collection and analysis, as the focus 
 
118 Greg Guest, Emily E. Namey and Marilyn L. Mitchell, ‘Qualitative Research: Defining and 
Designing,’ in Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied Research (London: Sage 
Publications, 2013), p. 19. 
119 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants.’ 
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was made on one particular event rather than a longitudinal study, for instance.120 Another 
disadvantage that accompanied the use of qualitative methods surrounded the issue of potential 
researcher bias. However, being aware of this beforehand allowed for steps to be made to ensure 
that a certain level of objectivity was achieved and maintained.121 Many tactics were therefore 
undertaken, including the diversification of sources. However, in this project, researcher bias was 
not as pertinent as all collected information originated from secondary or tertiary sources. The 
selection of these sources occurred in real-time and was centred on their relevance, with no concern 
given to political inclination. 
 
A contemporary case study, specifically the US drone strike on Iranian General Qasem 
Soleimani, was then chosen as the main focus of this dissertation. The reasoning behind this was 
two-fold. First, the attack happened relatively recently, so its political and strategic military effects 
could be analyzed in near real-time. Second, this operation was highly contested, with the US 
government failing to convince its critics of the necessity or legality of said attack. Some 
journalists had attempted to examine the strike, but they arrived at conclusions through rather 
superficial, irregular and perhaps subjective means of analysis.122  
 
 Since the legitimacy of this case was widely questioned and scrutinized, an opportunity to 
study this operation rather more methodically presented itself. The fundamental goal was to 
develop a means to ascertain the Soleimani strike's legitimacy within a robust set of parameters. 
Thus, to achieve this, a universal framework needed to be developed, which could, thereafter, be 
used to analyze other instances of state-sponsored pre-attack self-defence, not just the Soleimani 
strike. Thus, this project relied on a descriptive and interpretive case study analyzed through 
qualitative methods. A case study approach is useful when analyzing a dynamic event or an event 
that is still in progress. This is because the gathered information from multiple sources offers to 
change information on the event while still maintaining its context.  
 
 
120 Greg Guest, Kathleen M. MacQueen and Emily E. Namey, Applied Thematic Analysis, 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2012). 
121 The potential for researcher bias was lessened by the fact that the author is Canadian—and 
therefore a neutral party examining the political fallout between the US and Iran.  
122 In fairness, this reflects to tight publication timelines in the realm of journalism.  
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 Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis posited that case study research consists of a ‘multiplicity of 
perspectives rooted in a specific context.’123 These multiple sources of data collection are then 
used in conjunction with this case study approach. These can include archival research, interviews 
or observation. For this dissertation, archival research, observations, and document review of 
recent reports and government briefings were selected. These contributed to ‘thick description,’ 
whereas context, meaning and social understanding were garnered through this form of 
observation and data collection. 124 
 
 The purpose of case study research is ‘not to prove but to improve.’ 125 In cases where it is 
difficult to discern the variables of an event from its context, then a case study approach is most 
effective.126 It is perhaps most evident in the case of the Soleimani strike, as government reports 
seemingly shifted with each passing day. There are, however, supposed pitfalls to using a case 
study approach. These may include a lack of statistical generalisability and researcher bias. Still, 
these are common issues that plague the entire qualitative field—and can easily be avoided by 
ensuring that collected data is of high quality, and the interaction with this data remains objective 
and verifiable. Nevertheless, there have been several scholars who have argued that case study 
research can be generalized. For example, Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln suggested that 
‘looking at multiple actors in multiple settings enhances generalisability.’127 Thus, this dissertation 
focused on the main case study with several other peripheral cases for historical context and 
background.  
 
 The data collected in this dissertation also centred around this case study approach. The 
purpose of this was to enhance inquiry validity by narrowing the breadth of the research 
undertaken. Since ‘a qualitative case study examines a phenomenon within its real-life context, 
 
123 Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science 
Students and Researchers (London: Sage Publications, 2003).  
124 Robert K. Yin, ‘Case Study Research: Design and Methods,’ in Applied Social Research 
Methods, Vol. 5, (London: Sage Publications, 2003).  
125 Daniel L. Stufflebeam, George F. Madaus, and Thomas Kellaghan, Evaluation Models: 
Viewpoints on Educational and Human Services Evaluation (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 2nd 
ed., 2000), p. 283.  
126 Yin, ‘Case Study Research: Design and Methods.’  
127 Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
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data are collected on or about a single individual, group, or event.’ The primary purpose is to study 
the case in question, derive an understanding of the phenomenon taking place, and apply this to 
other cases. Thus, inquiry in these types of studies focuses mainly on their defining case features 
and the ‘differences they exhibit from other individuals/events in the larger population… [to] tease 
out what makes them so different and why.’ 128 
 
 Subsequently, the Soleimani case study also served as a relevant event to examine the 
program's legitimacy within which this strike was authorized. This dissertation sought to build 
upon the current knowledge on the subject by determining whether there was a discrepancy 
between what the US claimed to do and what it did concerning its drone counter-terror program. 
Therefore, the Soleimani case embodies and conceptualizes the issues and concerns that many 
scholars have had about the US counter-terrorism program. It also clearly demonstrates the 
political fallout that can ensue due to flawed policies, the catalysts of which can be traced back to 
the drone strike on Qasem Soleimani.  
 
The data collection for this project centred around the Soleimani case study. Sources were 
selected for their relevance, credibility and quality. Preference was given to government press 
releases, official statements, academic articles and legal documents. When these were unavailable 
or scarce, which was understandable due to the event's ongoing nature, reliable reports from 
established media outlets were used instead. In addition to the Soleimani case, several peripheral 
case studies were also employed to provide context, background and support for claims made 
therein. During the analysis stage, significant focus was paid to the triangulation of the information 
collected. Information was provided in a relatively chronological format to achieve this aim—with 
each source responding to (or building upon) the information raised within a preceding report.  
 
 The qualitative research used in this dissertation was both inductive and iterative in its 
analysis. It was inductive because the theories and patterns formed naturally during the research 
and data collection process, rather than being assumed or established ex-ante.129 In other words, 
 
128 Guest, Namey and Mitchell, ‘Qualitative Research: Defining and Designing,’ p. 28. 
129 David Thomas, ‘A General Inductive Approach for Qualitative Data Analysis,’ The American 
Journal of Evaluation, Vol. 27, No.2 (2003), p. 27. 
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the research objectives simply guided this research. This approach is somewhat different from the 
deductive approach taken in quantitative research, where the main goal is to address a hypothesis 
or prove the validity of facts.130  
 
 Furthermore, the research was also iterative, as the data collection process required that 
sources be read and re-read to draw conclusions or identify key themes and meanings. Through 
this method, the philosophical observations and scholarly suggestions of the aforementioned three 
‘scholars of focus’ were discovered, compiled, and used to create the theoretical framework. 
During the research for this project, the steps taken were informed by Terre Blanche, Kelly and 
Durrheim. They argued that an effective project requires a researcher to follow specific steps: 
familiarization and immersion, introducing themes, coding, evaluation, the emergence of story and 
more significant meaning.131 After data was collected and themes were identified, open coding 
was used to break down the different parts of the case study examined into conceptual categories. 
This collection method allowed for the information gathered to be qualitatively observed, 
compared and evaluated. Then, inductive reasoning was used to determine the significance and 
necessity of these conditions in relevant operations. In doing so, this resulted in the fulfilment of 
the last step, as identified by Terre Blanche, Kelly and Durrheim—namely, the ‘emergence of 
meaning.’ 
 
 Finally, establishing research objectives for this dissertation required what might be called 
a process of challenge. It was ‘critical to ensuring data are collected in such a way as to be useful.’ 
The primary study objectives were to identify, explore, describe, explain, assess, and evaluate the 
Soleimani strike's significance in the context of pre-attack self-defence and the general US counter-
terrorism program. Since qualitative research methods were best suited to achieve these objectives 
and answer the main research queries raised in this dissertation, this analysis method was used.132 
 
 There were also several limiting factors encountered during the development and writing 
of this dissertation. For instance, a significant amount of available intelligence on the strike was 
 
130 See for example Jatin Pandey, ‘Deductive Approach to Content Analysis,’ in Qualitative 
Techniques for Workplace Data Analysis (London: IGI Global, 2019), pp. 145-169. 
131 See Terre Blanche, Kelly, and Durrheim, Why Qualitative Research, pp. 271-284. 
132 Guest, Namey and Mitchell, ‘Qualitative Research: Defining and Designing,’ p. 18. 
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classified or not publicly disclosed. Fortunately, this had little impact on the research objectives of 
this dissertation. This project's primary purpose was to determine if the strike could be perceived 
as legitimate and what impact this conclusion might have on the greater US counter-terror 
program. This perception of legitimacy does not, however, require access to full intelligence or 
information.  
 
 Since a significant number of US government officials were also ‘left in the dark’ about 
full intelligence disclosure on the strike, their perceived view of the legitimacy of the operation 
was formed from available information.133 Still, rather than infer the Soleimani strike's legitimacy 
by the degree of available intelligence, this dissertation took a much different ‘bottom-up’ 
approach. A list of necessary conditions (derived from legal and scholarly sources) was developed 
to compensate for this lack of readily available ‘raw’ intelligence. These were then examined to 
determine which conditions were necessary for an operation to be deemed legitimate and lawful 
under the customary practice of pre-attack self-defence. These findings were then compiled into 
table format and compared against the known information from the Soleimani strike. In the end, 
this table provided a logical and effective means from which to assess the legitimacy of the 
Soleimani strike.  
 
 It is important to note here that more information or intelligence regarding the strike could 
have under-pinned a stronger assessment of the strike's legitimacy. However, while this project 
was greatly aided by the fact that this dissertation’s author has deep ties to the counterterrorism 
and intelligence field, resource availability significantly impacted collecting additional primary 
data. Since the author is a Canadian citizen undertaking doctoral studies at a UK institution, 
scholarship and bursary opportunities were extremely limited. The financial strain, alongside the 
Covid-19 pandemic implications, impacted this project's research design, which ultimately 
required to complete the project remotely and without in-person fieldwork, focusing instead on 




133 Arguably, if open-source information was sufficient for high-ranking US officials to determine 
the legitimacy of the strike, then it would subsequently also be sufficient for this project.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
International Law: Origins, Practice and Compliance 
 
International laws are based on voluntary consent and participation. Nations agree to subject 
themselves to the commonly agreed-upon rules of conduct, and if necessary, to account when 
violating them.134 Despite appearances, however, international law—especially customary 
international law, is ambiguous and often inapplicable to modern circumstances.135 In particular, 
since 1945, it has struggled to deal with situations that occupy the mezzanine floor between war 
and peace, including insurgency, terrorism and what Mary Kaldor has called ‘New Wars.’136 This 
can invite commentators to interpret international law in a self-serving manner, proving rather 
problematic in the era of modern low-intensity armed conflicts. 137  
 
How Pertinent is International Law? 
 
Eminent scholars, like Karl P. Mueller, have argued that the flexibility and ambiguity of 
international law are of particular concern. He noted that, at present, international law is 
sufficiently ambiguous to provide countries like the US a legal loophole from which to justify 
preemptive use of force.138 In recent years, the UN Rapporteur on Counter-terrorism has taken an 
increasingly negative view of preemptive action. Therefore, it is unlikely that international law 
will be amended to allow such policies, such as those advocated in the recent US National Security 
 
134 American Law Institute, ‘Restatement of the Law, The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States’ St. Paul Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers (1987), Section 102. 
135 Karl P. Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence: Legality and Legitimacy of Striking First, 
from Striking First: Preemptive and Preventative Attack in US National Security Policy (Santa 
Monica: RAND Publishing, 2006), p. 48; see also Jack S. Levy, ‘Preventive War and Democratic 
Politics: Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, March 1, 2007, 
Chicago,’ International Studies Quarterly Vol.52, No.1 (2008), pp. 1-24; and Colin S. Gray, The 
Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration (Carlisle PA: Army 
War Coll Strategic Studies Inst., 2007). 
136 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, (New York: John 
Wiley, 2013); see also Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of 
Development and Security (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2014); and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ and 
‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?’ World Politics Vol.54, No.1 (2001), pp. 99-118. 
137 Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, pp. 47-48. 
138 Ibid, p. 47. 
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Strategy (NSS). It seems reasonable to observe that, as it stands, if an operation is carried out, 
which appears illegal from the perspective of the international community, this might subsequently 
impact the perceived legitimacy of the state in question.  
 
 For the time being, many scholars believe it might be wise for the US to refrain from 
participating in attacks that are preemptive in nature to avoid the perceived illegality of its actions 
and prevent the numerous negative consequences which accompany it. At least until some clarity 
regarding the legality of pre-attack self-defence is achieved, or unless, of course, the state has 
sufficient evidence to convince other parties that its actions are legitimate by acquiring proof of an 
imminent attack or adherence to current legal criteria.139 The standards of proof required by an 
international court are often high, as witnessed by the UK in the case of the UK SAS shootings in 
Gibraltar in 1988.140  
 
 Michael J. Glennon, a Professor of International Law at Tufts University, has maintained 
that states no longer consider laws that attempt to regulate the use of force as compulsory or 
binding. In Glennon’s view, the international realm is comprised of two parallel, and somewhat 
incompatible, systems—one which he calls de jure, and the other de facto. A system governed by 
laws and ‘illusory rules’ is referred to as the realm of de jure, whilst that characterized by actual 
state practice makes up the de facto system. He argues that the ‘decaying de jure catechism is 
overly schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behaviour, and unrealistic in its 
aspirations for state conduct.’141  
 
 Accordingly, if we follow this line of argument, it is the de facto system that should be, at 
the very minimum, obeyed by all states to ensure perceived legitimacy in its practices. If this is 
not observed, then more significant examination and analysis are necessary to determine whether 
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the action(s) can still be regarded as legitimate or lawful. Herein lies the core matter of this 
dissertation. What of laws which seemingly straddle both systems? For instance, the right to 
preemptive self-defence is a customary legal right that can be categorized as an ‘illusory rule’ 
under the de jure system. However, since no strict defining parameters have been set to outline its 
use within international law clearly, state practice has been historically entrusted with redefining 
it.  
 
 As the recent US drone strike on Gen. Soleimani illustrates, the simple claim to the right 
of pre-attack self-defence in state practice is not sufficient to denote legitimacy. Adhering to these 
‘illusory rules’ by abiding by the criteria of imminence and necessity, tied to the right of pre-attack 
self-defence, must also be evident. If this is not achieved, then a state could risk the potential 
weakening of its perceived legitimacy, among other consequences. 
 
The Increasing US Disregard for International Law 
 
International law requires that civilians be protected, and that military weapons and tactics be 
restricted.142 The first and, some may argue, the most critical aspect concerns itself with the 
protection of civilians and all those who can no longer fight (either as a result of injury or 
surrender). However, as will be examined later in this chapter, the practices of targeted killing, 
signature strikes, and even double-tapping all demonstrate that even this basic consideration is no 
longer afforded. It is worth observing that the issue here is not with the drone itself as a new 
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These increasingly dangerous practices also throw into relief an international legal system 
unable to accommodate these new forms of modern armed conflicts sufficiently. This observation 
brings us to the second requirement. Current international law finds itself unable to address these 
advancements in military weapons and strategies, much less restrict them. Simply banning drones 
is not the answer, despite what some of the more strident critics might argue.143 If practices that 
violated international law happened with drones, it could stand to reason that this could happen 
with other more advanced weapons in the future as well. Instead, the more substantive issue lies 
within the US ‘culture of legal rationalization.’ The Obama administration began this when they 
aimed to establish ‘plausible legality’ for its risky military operations. To achieve this, Rebecca 
Sanders claims that they ‘exploited and manipulated ambiguities and loopholes in the law, 
claiming that enhanced interrogation techniques, targeted killing, and other dubious practices were 
compatible with existing legal rules’—which they were not.144  
 
Philip Alston, a Professor of Law and UN Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights, concluded that the United States is ‘purposefully confusing the lines between military and 
intelligence work and domain… [attempting to evade] responsibility and accountability’ to 
international law.145 CIA operatives are no more formal military combatants than the terrorists 
themselves. As such, their control over the US drone programme poses puzzling legal and moral 
issues. Some have even argued that we are witnessing an action-reaction cycle, with terrorists are 
employing prohibited weapons and increasingly ‘dirty’ war tactics in response to the increasingly 
unaccountable practices carried out by the CIA through their drone war on terror—'otherwise, they 
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[would] be easily outnumbered, outgunned, and vanquished.’146 From the information now 
available about the US drone program, it can be reasonably deduced that throughout the global 
war on terror, as Sanders suggests, American policymakers ‘manipulated the law to permit what it 
should constrain.’147  
 
Moreover, the wider international community is aware that the US drone programme has 
violated customary law, amongst other legal doctrines. However, many states have refrained from 
publicly denouncing these practices for fear of future diplomatic issues. Unconstrained by these 
considerations is the United Nations. There is a growing consensus amongst international legal 
scholars that, within four years, the United States was ‘practically indicted in three separate reports 
of the United Nations Special Rapporteurs’ (2010, 2013, and 2014). These conclusions were 
reached after examining the US methods and strategies in its asymmetric engagements with 
supposed terrorists.148 Despite America’s careful practices of ‘plausible legality’ and its ‘culture 
of legal rationalization,’ the UN reports, as mentioned above, concluded that the US drones strikes 
violated international law and did not adhere to the criteria of self-defence necessary to legitimize 
its continued ‘global war on terror.’149 
 
In response to these UN findings, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on military 
drones in armed conflict, which reaffirmed the need for international actors to investigate drone 
strikes and seek prosecution for actions that violate international laws.150 Lassa Oppenheim, a 
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renowned German jurist, claimed that international law must adapt to the changing nature of 
warfare—‘so long as such adaptation is not inconsistent with the fundamental rules of warfare and, 
in particular, with the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.’151 However, most 
legal scholars argue that instead, the United States must reconcile its drone programme with 
current international law, ensuring that the indiscriminate practices resulting in severe collateral 
damages be avoided.152  
 
Legal Perspectives & Key Areas of Disagreements 
 
Several variables have a direct bearing on the use of force in self-defence.153 These areas include 
(i) vagueness of language in the UN Charter and other legal doctrines, (ii) the debate about whether 
to limit the force a state can use, or allow them to ensure their collective security unrestricted by 
stringent legal parameters (as those found in Article 51 of the UN Charter), (iii) which sources of 
intelligence should be acceptable, and how preconceived notions could influence the conclusions 
drawn from the intelligence acquired (which is problematic due to subjectivity and ability to 
perceive a threat when it might not exist), and lastly, (iv) fundamental differences in state 
practice—some are non-interventionist, others not. Some states will be (as can be historically 
demonstrated) more aggressive than others or have differing military capabilities.154  
 
 It is frequently observed that international law offers more scope for contestation than its 
domestic equivalent. Different schools of thought have different methodological approaches, 
which inevitably lead to differing conclusions. Some of these approaches mean focusing more on 
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state practice or treaty language.155 In summary, as Deeks observes, there still exists disagreement 
on the use of force in situations where an attacks' imminence cannot be established.156 
 
 Legally speaking, there are three central international bodies capable of arbitrating whether 
the US used force lawfully. The first is the UN Security Council, although this particular body 
would probably never pass judgement as the US holds veto power. The second is the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). Like the Security Council before it, the ICJ would also find it difficult to 
pass judgement as the US has not participated in any related treaty, which would offer the prospect 
of compliance. By contrast, the International Criminal Court (ICC) contains some potential.157 The 
ICC deals with several legal issues, but the most experience and breadth of practice is in war 
crimes, making it the most applicable body to judge whether a state used force lawfully in armed 
conflict.158 If a request is received to review an activity that is claimed to have been committed in 
self-defence is sent to the ICC, and its legality is proven, then the actions are not only widely 
viewed as lawful—but legitimate as well.159  
 
 It is the ‘unquestioned legality of an action [which] generally confers legitimacy upon it.’ 
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) served 
as a precursor to this. ICTY was a focused court of law, together with an investigatory apparatus 
set up by the United Nations to prosecute war crimes in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, which 
granted the UN the right and responsibility to determine legitimacy in a particular armed conflict. 
Thus, the use of force can be viewed as legitimate if it is lawfully used in self-defence, authorized 
by the UN Security Council, or investigated by the ICC and deemed adherent to international laws 
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(be they customary or entrenched).160 However, with preemptive force,161 legitimacy could be 
questioned since the legal justification for an attack (that has not yet occurred) is more difficult to 
prove.162 
 
 Although both legitimacy and legality, as aforementioned, are intrinsically linked—several 
essential differences between the two must be identified and discussed. Legality is based on the 
law; thus, any action is assessed based on its adherence or violation of said legal parameters. 
Actions that are deemed legal are subsequently considered legitimate. However, this cause-and-
effect relationship does not go both ways. An action can be viewed as legitimate but may not be 
in accord with the law for a variety of reasons. Perhaps undertaken for moral reasons or obligations, 
these actions can be viewed through a legal lens as unlawful and yet perceived as legitimate by the 
international community. The legality of the war in Kosovo is an event that perfectly illustrates 
this conundrum. Despite obvious infringements on international law, ‘many observers viewed the 
action [of US military intervention] as legitimate largely because the perceived purpose of the 
action was for humanitarian need.’163 
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 According to Mueller, legality is judged by adherence to existing laws, whereas legitimacy 
is determined by a measured debate taking into account the consequences of said actions.164 In 
other words, do the ends justify the means? This is perhaps just one of many questions that, 
although not intrinsically tied to any legal doctrine, still play a significant role in determining a 
particular action's legality at a subliminal level. Therefore, an action can still be viewed as 
legitimate if the outcomes it produces are favourable, even though the initial action would have 
been deemed illegal by the standards outlined in international law. Thus, perceptions of legitimacy 
often stem from this consequentialist perspective.165  
 
 As surmised, legitimacy can be derived from public sentiment. Abraham Lincoln, the 16th 
President of the United States, rather eloquently noted that ‘public sentiment is everything. With 
it, nothing can fail; against it, nothing can succeed. Whoever moulds public sentiment goes deeper 
than he who enacts statutes or pronounces judicial decisions.’166 In Lincoln’s view, legitimacy is 
derived from adherence to the law and public sentiment. In this so-called ‘court of public opinion,’ 
legitimacy on an action or decision can be acquired. Much like the intervention in Kosovo, when 
the law fails to impart legitimacy on the action immediately, it is the public sentiment that often is 
used in substitution to gauge legality.167  
 
 Naturally, the law is not the only element to continuously evolve. Legitimacy, and 
perceptions of legitimacy, also shift over time. For instance, Israel’s preventative attack against 
Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 was firmly criticized by the UN Security Council 
immediately following the incident. Within days, the Council passed a resolution which ‘strongly 
condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel’ and ruled that its actions were ‘in clear violation of the 
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Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.’168 Even the United States, 
along with other members of the Security Council, publicly and unanimously agreed with the 
resolution.169 Most legal scholars at the time also echoed this sentiment and challenged not only 
the legality of the action but also the legitimacy of the strike.170  
 
 A decade later, new evidence emerged which revealed that the Iraqi nuclear programme 
had advanced to a level that would have made it capable of supplying nuclear weapons to Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. With these new revelations, many scholars and states changed their view on the 
Osirak attack Israel launched years earlier—concluding that ‘Israel did the world a great service’ 
by terminating the Osirak nuclear reactor.171 Thus, even a decade later, the legitimacy of Israel’s 
action increased with the introduction of new evidence to prove imminence and the legal concept 
of ‘necessity.’172 Nevertheless, what is clear is that, while related, legality and legitimacy are 
assessed quite differently. Legality is evaluated and inferred by a select group of experts, whereas 
legitimacy is drawn more widely from public perception. Compared to legality, legitimacy is a 
more ambiguous concept influenced by a variety of factors and opinions. As a result, any 
preemptive attack has a somewhat better chance of being considered legitimate rather than legal. 
Although legality is what states aim for when exercising their foreign policy, lawmakers and 
politicians would take legitimacy rather than naught. Indeed, decision-makers are more interested 
in establishing legitimacy than legality in government matters.173 This is the case because, like 
Fareed Zakaria, an American journalist and political scientist, has recognized, ‘legitimacy is the 
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elixir of political power.’174 With it, one can govern with ease. Without it, a sociopolitical backlash, 
both national and international, may abound. 
 
Self-Defence & the Law 
 
Though international laws may seem sensible and straightforward, their origins are frequently 
rather improbable. Precedent-setting cases are often so unorthodox that they were once 
inconceivable in lawmakers' minds that they were left unaddressed. As a result of these exotic 
cases, which are nevertheless precedent-setting, laws are developed or amended over time. The 
legally important ‘Caroline Affair’ is just one such case and is pertinent to this thesis. 
 
 From 1817-1849, the ‘Reform Movement of Upper Canada’ launched a protest against 
British colonial rule in the region.175 William Lyon Mackenzie, a journalist and politician who was 
elected the first mayor of Toronto in 1834, was one of the movement's leaders.176 He had strong 
ideas for reform and sought to make British rule more accountable and less corrupt.177 Mackenzie 
had been repeatedly elected to serve on the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada but had grown 
increasingly disgruntled over the years as his ideas for reform were shot down.178 In 1837, 
Mackenzie realized that change could not come by peaceful means, as the government had been 
unwilling to consider reform options. It was at this point that he considered alternative options.179  
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 In December of 1837, Mackenzie launched the Upper Canada Rebellion against the British 
at the ‘Battle of Montgomery’s Tavern.’180 It ended just as quickly as it started. Mackenzie’s rebels 
were outnumbered and outgunned by the British and were subsequently defeated in an hour. 
Mackenzie then fled to Navy Island in the middle of the Niagara River to establish what he 
declared as the ‘Republic of Canada.’181 He reached the island on board an American ship, the SS 
Caroline. And here, our story begins. 
 
 On the night of 29 December 1837, the Mackenzie rebellion, backed by US citizens,182 
boarded an American ship named the SS Caroline and fled to Navy Island. There they moored the 
ship at Schlosser’s Landing, a small fortification on the shores of Western New York.183 Alexander 
McLeod, a Scottish-Canadian sheriff in the Niagara region, tipped off Sir Allan MacNab, a 
Canadian loyalist, and Andrew Drew, the Captain of the British Royal Navy, as to the activities 
carried out by the Mackenzie rebels.184 The British then acted on this information. They crossed 
into American waters, boarded the Caroline, pulled the ship into the middle of the river, set it 
ablaze and waited for the current to take it over the Niagara Falls.185 In removing the crew from 
the ship, the British engaged the Americans in a firefight—resulting in the death of Amos Durfee, 
an American watchman.186 Five months later, thirteen Canadian and American rebels retaliated 
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against the British. On May 29th, they captured and burned Sir Robert Peel, a British steamer, 
while in US waters.187 Tensions between Canadians, Americans and the British led to a diplomatic 
crisis of sorts. 
 
 Following the Caroline incident, the United States quickly accused the British of having 
violated their territorial sovereignty. However, this allegation was refuted when the British argued 
that their actions were committed in self-defence.188 This dispute over legality resulted in several 
official correspondences between the US Secretary of State Daniel Webster and the British Foreign 
Minister Lord Ashburton. In one particularly memorable exchange, Webster claimed that to be 
considered lawful, self-defence should be limited to cases in which the ‘necessity of self-defence 
is instant, overwhelming, and believing no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.’189 It 
took nearly four years of communications before the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was signed in 
1842, which saw a resolution to the tensions—with both sides admitting partial guilt.190  
 
 The ‘Caroline Affair,’ as it is now referred to, was a precedent-setting case that established 
the principle of preemptive self-defence within customary international law.191 This legal 
precedent holds that preemptive force in self-defence must only be used if the necessity for such 
leaves no other option. This requirement for necessity is referred to as the ‘Caroline Test.’192 As 
such, the Caroline incident was significant in that it resulted in a legal principle that has been 
entrenched in customary international law—permitting states to respond to an assault in progress 
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or not yet completed.193 If an attack (similar to that which occurred during the Caroline incident) 
is underway but not completed, it can be understood as ‘temporally imminent’ and therefore 
warrant a response in self-defence. Thomas Nichols, a professor of international affairs at the US 
Naval War College, has concluded that the destruction of a ship has created a legal precedent on 
the use of force, which still stands centuries later.194 Thus, it was directly due to the Caroline case 
that the claim of self-defence became part of customary international law.195 
 
 The case above illustrates the potential response of a state to an armed attack already in 
progress. But what if an attack that has yet to materialize? Can a state legitimately respond to 
armed attacks that have not begun? To address these questions, scholars developed and categorized 
three types of self-defence possibilities. The first is commonly referred to as anticipatory self-
defence. As the name implies, it refers to self-defence, which precedes an impending attack.196 
The assault in question must be an armed, imminent attack planned by a state or non-state actor, 
and to which the victim state will have to use offensive force to address. The second possibility is 
referred to as preemptive self-defence. It is similar to the aforementioned anticipatory version, but 
knowledge of the attack is not as demonstrable. The attack is likely, and the resort to self-defence 
at this point is because the targeted state feels that it will result in significant harm/destruction—
and targeting the threat before it manifests might be the best option for self-preservation.197 The 
third and final option is referred to as preventative self-defence. It permits the use of force to 
prevent a future armed attack—without confidence in where or when that might be.198 These three 
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terms can all be placed on a temporal scale, ‘with anticipatory self-defence closest to the full 
manifestation of the armed attack and preventative self-defence the furthest away.’199 Now that a 
brief understanding of pre-attack self-defence has been achieved, greater clarification is needed on 
a range of legal terms. 
 
 Article 51 of the UN Charter clearly states that ‘[n]othing in the present charter shall impair 
the individual's inherent right for collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
member of the United Nations.’200 However, states, scholars and legal practitioners all question 
when a state may lawfully engage in self-defence. Can they do so in anticipation of an attack 
(‘anticipatory self-defence’), or do they have to wait to be attacked first before acting?201 
Customary international law, which existed before the UN Charter was established, allowed for 
anticipatory attacks, but only if they were undertaken in self-defence. Article 51, however, does 
not. It cites that states may only use preemptive force in the face of an ‘armed attack,’ not an 
anticipated one.202 Oscar Schachter, a former Law Professor and UN legal aide, argued that self-
defence under customary international law is limited in its usage—only applying to cases where 
an armed attack has already materialized.203 This happens to be the case because the criterion for 
the lawful use of preemptive force is drawn from the Caroline case—a case in which the armed 
attack had materialized. 
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According to Law Professor Noam Lubell, self-defence can be justified in two ways. One 
is covered by international law, and the other is vaguely deduced from textual omissions or 
customary practices. If an attack has occurred or is in the process of occurring, then this form of 
self-defence can be evaluated by the existing legal provisions found in Article 51. If, on the other 
hand, the attack has not begun, then there is the potential that the threat might never materialize 
since an attack is anticipated but not certain.204 Thus, it would be categorized under the territory 
of anticipatory self-defence. The former is addressed more evidently in international law than the 
latter. Although the ICJ has yet to rule on anticipatory self-defence unequivocally, it has declared 
that self-defence cannot be used as a pretense to ‘protect perceived security interests’ beyond those 
identified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.205  
 
 Matters are made much more complicated by the rise of non-state actors. Does public 
international law marginalize non-state armed groups (NSAGs)? Perhaps. Is this ostracization 
helpful to states? Not always. By definition, non-state actors do not have a state, so to attack them, 
one must unlawfully enter a sovereign state in which they are located to attack them.206 This 
becomes problematic, as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter notes that entering into a third-party state 
without its knowledge or prior consent violates that state’s sovereignty and, by extension, 
international law. Unless, of course, there is sufficient justification to warrant such an action. To 
reach the threshold of ‘sufficient justification,’ a relationship between the non-state actor and the 
third state in question must be identified. When this is achieved, sufficient evidence must be found 
that results in one of two outcomes. The first would determine that the non-state actor was acting 
as an agent of the third state. The second would establish that the non-state actor's actions were 
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known to the third state, and it did nothing to address this threat—thereby violating its obligations 
to the international community and rendering external intervention lawful.207 
 
Predictably there is a complex debate around the legal use of force against non-state actors. 
According to the United Nations Charter Article 2(4), states are expected to refrain from using 
force against a third-party state.208 As a UN member state, the United States is bound by this 
legislative body's articles and resolutions.209 However, like many laws—loopholes exist. 
According to the UN Charter, a state may launch an anticipatory attack under two conditions: (i) 
it has been preapproved by the UN Security Council, or (ii) it is done in self-defence.210 
 
 International law is remarkably unclear whether it is permissible to cross into a third-party 
state to attack terrorists preemptively.211 Regardless, some of the basic parameters mentioned 
above are rather more self-evident and have existed in international law for some time. During the 
Cold War turmoil, the UN General Assembly even unanimously passed a resolution in 1985 which 
implored states to continue to abide by international law and refrain from participating, organizing 
or permitting terrorist acts of this kind against other nations.212 UN General Assembly resolutions 
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are not binding.213 However, UN Security Council resolutions are binding to member states. So in 
1992, the Security Council filled in this supposed legal ‘gap.’ Using the exact wording as the 1970 
UN General Council resolution ensured that member states were now bound to the letter of the 
law.214 
 
Pre-Attack Self-Defence: Conditions & Requirements 
 
Since antiquity, philosophers like Aristotle and Plato understood that ‘legitimacy has always had 
a primary importance in political reflection.’215 The topic of political legitimacy was most notably 
examined in ‘The Social Contract,’ wherein Jean-Jacques Rousseau tried to answer what makes a 
government ‘legitimate.’ Since then, many political theorists have studied the concept of 
legitimacy and how it is affected by state actions. Still, few have paralleled the seminal works 
published by Thomas Franck, Seymour Lipset, David Easton, Robert Dahl, W.G. Runciman, Karl 
Deutsch, Lucian Pye, John Schaar and Carl Friedrich.216 
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 Legitimacy has been a topic that has long been debated, both for its theoretical 
shortcomings and unclear practical applications. Fittingly, the current conceptual understandings 
of legitimacy require further examination, as our current definitions are inapplicable, 
unconvincing, biased and weak.217 This can be attributed, in part, to the fact that legitimacy, to 
some degree, is mercurial. Nicolas de Chamfort, the famous French writer, once reasoned that it 
might be easier to legalize an act than to make it appear legitimate.218 For contextual clarity, the 
definition developed by Rodney Barker, a Political Science Professor, is chosen to serve as a 
foundational definition of the concept, upon which further clarifications will be applied. Barker 
reasoned that legitimacy could be understood as the moral obligation subjects feel towards obeying 
their states' command—because they believe in the righteousness of the state and its assumed 
authority.219 
 
 Decades earlier, Peter G. Stillman, a Professor of Politics at Vassar College, recognized 
that a government gains further legitimacy when it ‘behaves itself’ in international affairs.220 
However, this does not necessarily refer solely to adherence to international law. Friedrich, a 
notably eminent political scientist at Harvard who was also working for the CIA at the time, was 
the first to suggest that legitimacy does not imply legality.221 Nor does an action require adherence 
to law for it to be seen as legitimate. Renowned French political philosopher, Raymond Polin, 
argued that legitimacy could also be attained if external states with neither vested interests nor 
personal ties to the nation being evaluated view its action(s) as permissible.222 In other words, the 
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verdict on the legitimacy of a particular state’s action(s) must also include the opinions and 
judgement of external, unbiased states, unbiased at least in the simplistic sense that they do not 
enjoy a direct interest in the contested issue. 
 
 Following the Second World War, the United States drew its legitimacy from four key 
sources—namely, (i) its adherence to international laws and norms, (ii) respect for collective 
decision-making, (iii) reputation for restraint and fairness, and (iv) its association with the 
preservation of peace.223 The international community respected and trusted that the US's decisions 
would be legal (where possible) and just. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US showed a considerable 
disregard for the UN Security Council’s input on its desire to invade Iraq,224 so US military 
operations were being called into question for their legitimacy, legality and morality.  
 
 This ‘strategy of preemption’ proved problematic for the UN, as imminent threats were 
difficult to prove and insufficient justification for attacking for self-defence. The invasion of Iraq 
by the US later proved to be a significant blow to its longstanding reputation and legitimacy. Even 
if WMDs had been found in Iraq, arguably, it still would have been insufficient to demonstrate 
imminence, as countries can possess weapons and have no intention to use them.225 Robert Jervis, 
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one of the world’s leading IR scholars, has argued that one of the most significant issues with 
preemption is the lack of precision of intelligence on either capability or intention.226  
 
 As such, the Bush Doctrine's perceived legitimacy, and indeed the United States more 
widely, was dealt a severe blow when no WMDs were found in Iraq, and no imminent threat could 
be demonstrated. Since the imminence factor could not be fulfilled, the next legitimacy source 
would be to examine its legality. Unfortunately, the Bush administration did not care if its war was 
lawful. It only wanted it to appear to adhere to the strategy of preventive war—to garner legitimacy 
from the public. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration exhibited a 
chariness towards international law. In the late 1990s, John Bolton, who later served as US 
Ambassador to the UN and the US National Security Advisor, claimed that it was against their 
interest to abide by international law because although it may seem beneficial to do so in the short-
term, in the long-term, it would ‘constrict the United States.’227 Immediately following the 9/11 
attacks, President Bush appealed for the support of allied states in his decision to invade Iraq, 
explaining that ‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.’228 Of course, this statement 
was a binary fallacy of sorts. For opposition to the invasion of Iraq did not, in any way, equate to 
support for terrorists or WMD proliferation.  
 
 Nevertheless, Bush used the 9/11 attacks to further his administrations’ longstanding goal 
of distancing itself from international law, and even some would claim domestic law on war 
powers. He proposed a new approach of preventive war, misleadingly referred to as the ‘strategy 
of preemption,’ which replaced the doctrines of deterrence and containment that had ensured peace 
and stability even during the Cold War. The US argued that the decision to go to war against Iraq 
was undertaken with the underlying desire to depose a tyrannical dictator—and that the lawfulness 
of this motivation should be sufficient enough to grant legitimacy to the entire operation.229 
Different motivations were rotated in a manner that was, as at, best confusing.  
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 Prior to the invasion, Colin Powell, the former Secretary of State, implored President Bush 
to seek authorization from the UN Security Council to obtain legitimacy in a last-ditch effort. At 
the UN, the US misleadingly claimed that no decision to go to war had been made and that Saddam 
could still curtail such a possibility if he cooperated. When it became clear that the UN would not 
lend its support for the Iraq invasion, and indeed that the French would likely veto any such 
proposition, the US then publicly declared that it would be launching a war and would appreciate 
the support from a ‘coalition of the willing.’ Thereby signalling that its allies' support in its military 
campaign would be optional, but any support garnered voluntarily would add legitimacy to the 
war.230 
 
 But was this declaration done in self-interest, or was it a legitimate call to arms in the face 
of an imminent threat? Ian Hurd, Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern 
University, noted that the outcomes of an event could determine whether it was undertaken as a 
result of self-interest, or whether it was, in fact, legitimate. According to Hurd, self-interest only 
creates outcomes that are favourable for the party which initiated them. In comparison, legitimate 
action creates outcomes that benefit all those in the broader community.231 
 
 If the community believes that their interests are being considered and respected, they will 
support the government and its relevant actions. If not, the potential for protests, international 
sanctions and legal issues increases significantly. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, distinguished 
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American Law Professors and government practitioners, have argued that international law cannot 
force states to act against their self-interest. Thus, legal doctrines are limited in their powers and 
applications.232 
 
 Alexander Hamilton, one of the United States ‘founding fathers’, maintained that the ‘spirit 
of moderation in a state of overbearing power is a phenomenon that has not appeared, and which 
no wise man will expect ever to see.’233 Unsurprisingly, the international community has started 
to view the United States as an outcast—abiding by international laws only when convenient and 
ignoring them when it is not.234 Fittingly, if the US plans to reclaim its legitimacy, some scholars 
insist that it would have to change its ways and abandon the practices that have threatened its 
perceived legitimacy. The most damaging post-9/11 practices that have significantly eroded US 
legitimacy have included its unlawful Iraq invasion and the resultant problems like the unproven 
WMD threat and the reports of widespread torture and human rights violations perpetrated by 
American soldiers.235  
 
 Although many of these actions cannot be undone, what remains is to ensure that going 
forward, the US adheres (as much as possible) to international law, solicits the advice/input of 
relevant legal bodies, remains truthful about what evidence is informing their decisions all while 
reaffirming a commitment to peace. With the war in Iraq, the US never had a clear end goal. 
However, peace was undoubtedly not one of them.236 Thus, without a clear objective, evidence to 
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prove imminence, or support from the international community—legitimacy is very difficult to 
prove or attain. Moreover, military action authorized during a period of international mistrust 
seems futile. Legitimacy must be demonstrable, not self-declared or drawn from popular 
sentiment. President Trump has frequently cited public approval ratings to convince the public of 
a government actions' legitimacy. However, approval ratings are a categorically inadequate way 
to judge the legitimacy of an action. If public sentiment is the only measure used in a litmus test 
to infer legitimacy, the government which ‘propagandizes most effectively, which socializes most 
efficiently, which manipulates public opinion best,’ will draw a false positive in this regard.237  
 
Current definitions of legitimacy are influenced by Friedrich-esque qualities, like 
evaluating public sentiment. In doing so, and especially in an age of rising popularism, this runs 
the risk of falsely attributing legitimacy to regimes which abuse or confuse their citizenry into 
acquiescence. By this definition, a popular autocratic leader could be falsely perceived as a 
legitimate one. Thus, the theoretical understanding of legitimacy is incompatible with standard 
practice, regardless of how aligned it might be to social science usage.238  
 
 Thus, legitimacy is derived from a messy combination of public sentiment, elite opinion 
and respect for the political and legal systems.239 A delicate balance must be drawn between the 
three political legitimacy sources, namely adherence to norms, respect for existing laws, and the 
degree of public consent. If one source is given precedence over others, as in the earlier discussion 
of legitimacy drawn primarily from public consent, then the resulting judgement can be quite 
deceptive. 
 
The Condition of Imminence 
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Understandably, there has been increasing controversy regarding pre-attack self-defence since it 
is predicated upon probabilities of threats materializing.240 However, probabilities are a variable 
that must be considered since states have used these to garner an ‘illusion of certainty.’241 
Nevertheless, most scholars feel the reliance on this offensive form of self-defence should be 
limited to ‘absolute emergencies’—which is precisely how the concept of imminence should 
constrain the use of preemptive force. During these cases of ‘absolute emergencies,’ preemptive 
force should be viewed as legitimate as it abided fully by the concept of imminence. 242 The US 
has similarly argued that international law must redefine the concept of imminence to consider 
modern adversaries' capabilities.243  
 
 In other words, the US has claimed that preemptive strikes must be legalized to effectively 
apply to new and contemporary threats that do not fulfil the standard criteria for imminence.244 
The following section proceeds on the assumption that pre-attack self-defence may, in some cases, 
be a legitimate form of action—if the imminence of an attack can be established. Two following 
conditions must be satisfied to establish imminence. These are necessity and proportionality. The 
following sections will discuss the origins of the imminence test, its importance in state practice 
and its relevance in the face of modern threats. Imminence is a criterion used to refer to a specific, 
impending future event. It has been customarily used temporally to identify the point at which 
anticipatory self-defence merely becomes self-defence.245 
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 The ‘Imminence Constraint’ is another essential aspect. The wording of the UN Charter 
challenged the customary practice of anticipatory self-defence. When Article 51 was drafted, it 
clearly stated that states might act in self-defence only if an armed attack occurs. That eliminated 
the anticipatory element. However, we might observe that Article 51 still retained the requirement 
of imminence. Debates were therefore triggered as to whether the practice of anticipatory self-
defence should be viewed as illegal, since the UN charter purposely restricted any act of self-
defence to one which is carried out as a response to an initial attack—therefore, not preemptive. 
This is a very contemporary issue, but it also casts a long historical shadow: Hugo Grotius reasoned 
that for anticipatory self-defence to be legitimate, the threat must be immediate.246  
 
 As noted earlier, the Caroline incident became a seminal reference point from which the 
element of imminence became a requirement to demonstrate the legitimacy of an action carried 
out in anticipatory self-defence. 247 In his letter to Lord Ashburton, Daniel Webster admitted that 
exceptions to the law of self-defence could be made only in cases where threats are ‘instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’248 Still, necessity 
is a difficult thing to prove, particularly when an attack has not occurred.249  
 
 In turn, the condition of necessity in pre-attack self-defence simply requires that all 
possible alternatives be exhausted before resorting to force. These include diplomatic negotiations, 
economic sanctions, or referring the issue to the UN Security Council. As such, force should only 
be used if all other alternatives have been exhausted, and the threat still has not been deterred.250 
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Additionally, the ‘triggering event’251 in question must an ‘armed attack,’ which poses an 
imminent threat and is reasonably understood to occur in the immediate future.252 However, issues 
arise when these requirements are applied to modern threats like non-state terrorism and cyber-
attacks. It has to be conceded that neither the international community nor the global college of 
international law scholars has yet tackled these issues in-depth.   
 
 Nevertheless, Josef Kunz, a prominent law professor and jurist, has claimed that Article 51 
was insufficient in stating when an attack may be imminent—leaving room for interpretation and 
opportunity for potential pre-attack self-defence justifications.253 In his view, states are granted a 
tacit opportunity to infer their actions' legality by deriving their interpretation of the law. But 
should the law be open to subjective inferences? Is not the purpose of the law to provide objective 
judgement and direction on how states should act?  
 
 The late Sir Derek W. Bowett, an academic and lawyer by profession, contended that 
although the wording of Article 51 may not completely restrict the customary practice of 
anticipatory self-defence if an imminent danger is present, it does, nonetheless, force states to wait 
for an armed attack to occur.254 The UN itself has seemingly recognized this discrepancy between 
law and practice. Ironically, even though the UN has omitted direct reference to anticipatory self-
defence in its Charter, it supported publishing a report that argued in favour of a limited form of 
anticipatory self-defence. The report in question was published in 2004, entitled Report of the 
Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. In part, it argued that 
a state could act in self-defence if it feels threatened, but only if the threat is real, and the response 
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abides by the Caroline test requirements.255 In this report, imminence is a restriction, requirement, 
and determining factor of whether an action taken in anticipatory self-defence was legitimately 
undertaken.  
 
 Nonetheless, imminence is not the only constraint on anticipatory self-defence. According 
to scholars and legal practitioners, two other elements are necessary to ensure legitimacy in 
offensive self-defence. Necessity and proportionality, both derived from just war theory, are 
considered fundamental conditions necessary to prove the legitimacy of any claim to self-defence, 
not only anticipatory action.’256 However, these conditions privilege recognized states while 
marginalizing non-state armed groups. 
 
The imminence of a threat may be used as a test to determine the legitimacy of a state’s 
response. The elements of proportionality and necessity can be measured to determine whether a 
resort to anticipatory pre-attack self-defence was lawful.257 Hence, imminence can be both a test 
and criterion (in addition to proportionality and necessity) in determining legitimacy.258 According 
to Lubell, imminence remains a condition separate from necessity. For instance, an armed attack 
could be imminent, but self-defence need not be the only alternative as many non-forcible 
responses could preclude the need for violent action. Conversely, and controversially, one might 
argue that there is a necessity to act in self-defence against a future attack that is not imminent. 
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The latter argument is at the heart of some of the most contentious areas of anticipatory self-
defence.’259  
 
 Accordingly, a growing number of scholars believe that preemptive action can be used 
legitimately as a form of self-defence if the imminence test is passed.260 According to Sir Daniel 
Bethlehem, barrister and former Legal Adviser to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
scholarly disagreement on the subject have resulted in a ‘doctrinal divide’—with scholars who 
believe states have the power to address threats to their security on one side, and those who argue 
in favour of a more restrictive approach to the customary law of self-defence on the other.261 When 
faced with modern threats like terrorism, the divide between these two positions grows more 
profound as the nature of modern threats is often unlike any previously experienced or potentially 
predicted by the Charter's authors. Undoubtedly, this leads to further muddling of the law. 
Unsurprisingly, the source of this confusion is often technical and goes beyond its mere legal 
interpretation. 
 
 We now need to take a closer look at imminence. It is no wonder that the concept of 
imminence is so widely contested when even the simple definition of the word seems to vary 
depending on the source. The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘imminent’ as ‘about to 
happen,’262 the Cambridge dictionary defines it as ‘coming or likely to happen very soon,’263 and 
 
259 Lubell, ‘The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World,’ p. 3, and section IV; see also 
Lindsay Moir, Reappraising the Resort to Force: International Law, Jus ad Bellum and the War 
on Terror (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010). 
260 Report to the Secretary-General, delivered to the General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005: para 124; 
United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change’; Attorney General, House of Lords, Hansard, 21 April 2004: col 370; Tom Ruys, Armed 
Attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 324-
342. 
261 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defence Against 
an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State Actors,’ American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 106, No. 4 (2017), p. 4; see also Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘The Resilience of the Restrictive 
Rules on Self-Defence,’ The Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2013). 
262 Oxford Dictionary, Definition of Imminent, Retrieved 18 February 2020  
<https://oxford dictionaries.com/definition/english/imminent?region=uk&q=imminent> 
263 Cambridge Dictionary, Definition of Imminent, Retrieved 18 February 2020 
 78 
the Merriam-Webster dictionary describes it as an action or event that is ‘ready to take place.’264 
This divergence in everyday dictionary definitions depict imminence as ranging from something 
inevitable, like Oxford’s definition of ‘about to happen,’ and then gradually lessening in certainty 
with Cambridge’s definition of ‘likely,’ and finally the Merriam-Webster definition of an attack 
being ‘ready to take place’ but with no mention of whether it will materialize and therefore actually 
‘happen.’  
 
When attempting to apply the concept of imminence to the practice of anticipatory self-
defence, ‘both the temporal aspect and the gap between certainty and likelihood, prove to be the 
primary areas of debate and concern.’265 Despite the lack of a clear definition, state practice, legal 
cases, and scholarly debates concur that a threat must be evident, specific and temporal.266 For a 
threat to be considered imminent, a few requirements must be met. Since imminence relies on the 
notion that an armed attack is anticipated to occur in the immediate future, it must therefore go 
beyond vague or abstract suspicions267 of a threat, and a tangible threat must be identified and 
proven—to the degree that this can be objectively recognized and verified. 
 
Imminence is problematic in the context of modern threats. In 2006, John Reid, the UK 
Secretary of State for Defence, pondered whether imminence is even a sufficiently developed 
concept to address modern threats.268 Modern dangers, like the pervasive and transnational threat 
of terrorism, is, at its core, unpredictable.269 Subsequently, these threats pose a severe problem for 
national security and the relevance of imminence in such unprecedented cases. They also present 
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similar challenges to well-worn legal and ethical concepts such as proportionality. Terrorists, for 
instance, can operate covertly and launch attacks within very short timeframes, which can cause 
dreadful harm to the victim state—and the imminence of these particular attacks is very difficult 
to discern due to their non-state nature and covert planning.270 Recently, this modus operandi has 
been adopted by states—like the United States in its targeted killing of General Soleimani. Among 
other contemporary issues, these challenge the validity and applicability of pre-emptive armed 
attack imminence criteria. 
 
 As a result, critics have argued that this inapplicability to modern threats may have 
eliminated the very need for the requirement for imminence—since this potential threat source is 
mostly unknown and unpredictable. How can a state be expected to respond with urgency to a 
concrete threat when terrorism by nature is so fluid? Lubell eloquently presented this view when 
he reasoned that permitting the use of force against unspecific threats risks marking the start of a 
new era in the use of preemptive force.271 At present, the notion of imminence ‘presents a brick 
wall’ which does not allow claims of state self-defence against non-state actors, like modern terror 
groups. So, either ‘such claims of self-defence must fail, or the requirement of imminence must be 
set aside.’ For instance, when presented with actionable intelligence on the threat posed by a terror 
group, the concept of imminence can be applied as if the threat emanated from a state.272 It seems 
the presence of such credible intelligence about an imminent threat posed by a terror group would 
mean the requirement of imminence would not need modification. Instead, it can be applied in the 
same fashion as if the threat came from a state actor. This proof of imminence will always be 
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required to justify a states’ claim to self-defence unless, of course, the imminence requirement is 
scrapped or replaced in the future.273 
 
 When considering other threat sources, for example, those posed by WMDs, the issue 
becomes more about the potential consequences of an attack than about the credibility of the source 
of said threat.274 So, this would stand in place of evidence to demonstrate an impending threat, 
perhaps stressing an enemy attack (should it materialize) would result in the standard of imminence 
(currently required by international law) to be relaxed.275 The threat, or perceived threat, of WMDs, 
further complicates the issue of proportionality. Thus, the emergence of new threats, like non-state 
terrorism and WMDs, will inevitably test the imminence requirement's applicability.276 Perhaps 
developing a ‘sliding scale of gravity’ might illustrate the ‘negative correlation between gravity 
and imminence, whereby the higher the gravity of the impending attack, the weaker the 
requirement of imminence becomes.’277 Further questions are raised regarding the gravity of a 
potential threat. However, in overall terms, it is expected that including gravity as a factor in the 
imminence assessment, it might allow for a more malleable interpretation of imminence than 
perhaps previously endorsed. 
 
 As already suggested, another requirement of imminence is proportionality. The impending 
attack must be proportional to the preemptive attack launched in self-defence for it to be legitimate. 
With all the issues swirling around the applicability and relevance of the imminence criteria, 
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theorists have pondered whether it might be easier to do away with the imminence requirement 
and develop new, more applicable standards of regulating self-defence practices.278 The US 
addressed the issue of incompatible imminence criteria in the face of modern threats within its 
National Security Strategy.279  
 
 Likewise, between 2002-2006, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
published several reports on terrorism, questioning whether the imminence criteria should still 
stand as a useful indicator of legitimacy in light of these new threats. In 2003, the Committee 
advised that the British government attempt to redefine imminence to more evidently apply to 
current threats or develop a new measure (with international consensus) of regulating preemptive 
military action undertaken in self-defence.280 As a result, the remaining bolsters of the imminence 
criteria remain proof of credible intelligence, knowledge of the armed attack's potential gravity 
should it materialize, and adherence to necessity and proportionality principles. Alongside these 
complex debates, we also need to consider the related issue of certainty. For as long as the attack 
in question has not occurred, upon which the practice of anticipatory self-defence is predicated, 
the certainty of an attack cannot be sure until it materializes.281 The greatest challenge lies in 
interpreting the intentions of the enemy. Sometimes even visible preparations for attack do not 
necessarily mean that the adversary will launch an attack.282 As such, the requirement of 
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imminence rests upon the notion of being reasonably confident of an impending attack.283 
However, this vague requirement opens another veritable ‘Pandora’s box.’  
 
 If a state misjudges an action as threatening, it can lead to a false positive of the imminence 
criteria. This error could result in the unnecessary use of force and the potential for further negative 
consequences and increased tensions. On the other hand, underestimating an attack's imminence 
would result in a false-negatives, leading to repercussions like high civilian casualties.284 It is not 
for nothing that Richard Betts has described a surprise attack as the supreme test of a modern 
nation-state's security mechanisms.285 As one would expect, states have a bias towards acting first, 
rather than risk failing to act. A simple assessment would identify that states operate following a 
‘duality of error’ approach, wherein a state rationalizes that it would rather endure a false positive 
than a false negative.286 For the US, the 9/11 attacks will forever remain an ever-present source of 
anxiety, fear and grief. Culturally and historically, they amplify the long shadow of Pearl Harbor. 
Consequently, when evaluating present and future threats to its national security, the US 
government will almost always lean in favour of a false positive—in other words, a worst-case 
analysis. Thus, at least in a counter-terrorism context, the US would instead ask for forgiveness 
for overstepping the mark than confront its domestic population about a repetition of 9/11, an event 
often seen as an intelligence or pre-emption failure.287 
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 Much then revolves around proof of an imminent attack. Reliable evidence seems to be the 
manner through which imminence can be determined.288 When dealing with the practice of self-
defence, a state cannot base its decision to use preemptive force on ‘supposed intention,’289 
‘assumptions, expectations or fear of what is sometimes called a ‘latent’ threat,’290 or ‘state 
propensities.’291 Accordingly, the threshold of evidentiary support must be strict about 
counterbalancing against inherently problematic threat assessments based on fallible conditions.292 
Due to the unpredictable nature of future attacks, there will always be controversy and debate 
regarding the concept of imminence—whether the requirement was satisfied sufficiently or 
whether it should be ignored altogether. To circumvent these quandaries, Lubell argues that a state 
must be sure of its threat assessments before even considering preemptive action.293 There are at 
least two flaws in this plan. First, no one can know, with absolute certainty, what the future holds. 
And second, a state may be reluctant to reveal the specifics of its threat assessments for fear of 
jeopardizing future streams of intelligence upon which its safety depends. In other words, the more 
certain a state is about an imminent attack, the more reluctant it may be to reveal its source of 
certainty.   
 
 So, in the absence of sufficient evidence to demonstrate the imminence of an attack, the 
armed attack's potential gravity could be used as sufficient justification to warrant preemptive use 
of force. Failing to address the threat in question could have severe consequences. Thus, if a state 
can effectively demonstrate the gravity of the potential attack, some legal scholars argue that it 
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compensates for the lack of proof regarding said attack's imminence. Another option, albeit 
unpopular and somewhat dangerous, is to reject the imminence criteria altogether. But this raises 
the very real issue of states potentially abusing the label of anticipatory self-defence for self-
interested purposes. As such, the only answer is to understand and accept the potential issues posed 
by the criteria of imminence when faced with modern threats, but recognize that for anticipatory 
self-defence to be legitimately undertaken, it must be done so (i) in cases of absolute 
emergencies,294 (ii) when the available evidence objectively points to an impending armed attack, 
(iii) when the gravity of not acting outweighs the legal penalty of acting without sufficient 
justification, and (iv) leaving little to no time for the pursuit of alternative diplomatic means of 
addressing the threat.295 Simply put, military action by a state should be used as a last resort—
when this is not possible, the response must be limited and proportional to the threat in question.296 
 
Developments Which Challenge the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defence 
 
Following the attacks on 9/11, world leaders were much more inclined to launch preemptive strikes 
against adversaries who had not initiated hostilities.297 Former US Secretary of State, Donald 
Rumsfeld, argued that the best, and in some cases, the only defence against terrorists, is a good 
offence.298 And immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the international community quickly 
recognized the importance of acting in self-defence, particularly in the face of threats launched by 
non-state adversaries. Shortly after, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1368, which 
 
294 UK House of Commons, ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism,’ Foreign 
Affairs Committee, UK House of Commons, (2004), p.441-I, para 429 (‘limit the use of the 
doctrine to a ‘threat of catastrophic attack.’). 
295 Lubell, The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World, p. 17. 
296 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defence Against 
an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State Actors,’ American Journal of International 
Law, Vol.106, No.4, (2017), pp. 2, 6-8; see also Vivek Bhatt, Constructing a Right to 
Counterterrorism: Law, Politics and the Security Council, Human Rights in Times of Transition 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020). 
297 Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, p.43. 
298 Former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld during a Pentagon Briefing on 18 Sept 2001 
in Response to the 9/11 attacks. 
 85 
categorized the 9/11 attacks as a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and reiterated states' 
right to pursue collective or individual self-defence as specified in the Charter.299  
 
 The international legal community also recognized the need for clarifying how the global 
war on terror should be addressed in the letter of the law. The US, on the other hand, left the criteria 
for anticipatory attacks rather vague. Scholars have speculated whether this was intentionally done 
to allow justifications of questionable actions in the future. There is also deliberate ambiguity in 
US military practices and policies, assumed to be for the same reason.300  
 
 In his 2002 State of the Union address, former President George W. Bush argued that he 
would ‘not wait on events, while dangers gather… [nor] stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.’ 
He also declared that deterrence would not work against dictators, terrorists or those in possession 
of WMDs—so waiting for threats to materialize would be dangerous.301 The 2002 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) explained the US view of offensive self-defence.302 According to the NSS, 
the US can no longer afford to take a reactive posture, given the immediacy of modern threats and 
their potentially destructive nature.303  
 
 Thus, the US will not be deterred from striking first, even if there is a level of uncertainty 
about the threat's nature or timing. 304 The NSS maintains that covert threats exist, which should 
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be sufficient reason to legally allow the practices of preemptive attacks—even if clear evidence 
does not exist.305 Over time, these covert threats provided the US government, and its intelligence 
agencies, with the basis for a claim to pursue questionable practices in the name of international 
security. In other words, covertness, with its implicit evasion of verification and proof, seemed to 
provide a platform for attacks with lower standards of evidence. This was very much an enabler at 
the heart of the drone program. 
 
It is no state secret that former US President Barack Obama nurtured a particular affection 
for his military drones. What remains a secret, however, is how those lethal drone programmes 
operate. It should be noted that the shift from capture and interrogation to lethal drone strikes (be 
they targeted or signature in nature) began in 2006, under Bush and not Obama, partly under 
pressure from Europe. Obama simply accelerated this new direction.306 The longstanding practice 
of secrecy within the CIA-led lethal drone programme had allowed the Obama administration, in 
the view of many academics, ‘to violate the principle of right intention in its targeted killing 
campaigns.’307 The continued killing of low-level insurgents, coupled with secrecy and a general 
lack of transparency, show that this lack of right intention has continued even after the end of the 
Obama administration.308 Without transparency in the program's motivational and operational 
aspects, it becomes impossible to ensure proper regulation and independent oversight.309 
Additionally, this continued aversion to transparency continues to violate the principle of 
legitimate authority.  
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Even today, the US drone programme's lack of transparency still poses a severe oversight 
and accountability problem, especially with CIA-operated drones as opposed to DoD programs. 
This has led many, including close allies, to oppose their use for fear that their strategic value was 
tantamount to a general ambition to operate outside the law. Lesley Wexler, a Professor of Law at 
the University of Illinois, has argued that this lack of oversight and transparency threatens 
democratic values, erodes accountability and incites terrorist recruitment.310 Even if the current 
approach is lawful, many worry that future administrations or other governments may adopt drone 
strikes without sufficient legal justifications. Rebecca Sanders, a political science professor, 
suggested that the US government capitalized on vague legal standards to authorize contentious 
strategies within its CIA-led drone program.311 In other words, a degree of moral panic around 
particular events has been exploited for a strategic purpose.  
 
 Michael J. Boyle, a Professor of Political Science at LaSalle University and, remarkably, 
himself a counter-terrorism advisor to Obama, has written extensively and critically on drone 
warfare. Most notably, in a 2014 article, he claimed that the Obama administration strategically 
employed vague language, in conjunction with a lack of transparency, about people being ‘linked’ 
to an extremist group (while stopping short of explaining what that link supposedly was).312 As a 
result, Boyle concluded that the lethal drone programme had ‘become an anomaly: an 
unaccountable and non-transparent form of democratic warfare.’313 Strategically speaking, the 
CIA benefitted from this ambiguity. It provided the agency with a higher degree of operational 
freedom from which it could continue infringing upon the tenets of international law and the 
principles of just war, without consequence or penalty. 
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 Richard A. Clarke, former counter-terrorism advisor to Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 
and policy-maker by profession echoed Boyle’s observations. Clarke admitted in his 2015 book, 
Sting of the Drone, that the ‘programme got out of hand,’ adding that ‘the excessive secrecy is as 
counterproductive as some of the strikes are.’314 The American government altered the definitional 
parameters of ‘civilian’ and ‘combatant’ to suppress the high numbers of civilian casualties 
artificially. Such changes suggest a dangerous precedent. Even a child killed during a drone strike 
while playing on the beach could be designated by a government as a ‘terrorist planting bombs’ to 
justify and exculpate their actions.315 In a later interview with Democracy Now, Clarke questioned 
whether ‘it is a fair and good policy to get them before they get us?’316  
 
To address the developing debate, the US government commissioned a task force to 
evaluate the lethal drone programs, resulting in the 2014 Stimpson Report. It concluded that 
without proper transparency regarding outcomes and procedures used in drone strikes, the targeted 
killing programme risked undermining US security.317 Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., 
however, disagreed with these calls for greater transparency. As a retired Deputy Judge Advocate 
General of the USAF and current Executive Director of Duke Law School’s Center on Law, Ethics 
and National Security, Dunlap Jr.’s position is chiefly aligned to that offered by the military. In a 
later article, ‘Why Can’t the Media be More Transparent About Drones?’ Dunlap Jr. argued that 
the call for more transparency in drone operations was both histrionic and somewhat naïve. In 
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Dunlap Jr.’s view, greater transparency would put American lives at risk and jeopardize missions 
currently in operation. He maintained that the US was already too transparent and doubted ‘the 
wisdom of this sort of “transparency” as it reveals to adversaries exactly how they need to prepare 
for and counteract an attack.318  
 
In 2014, Ben Emmerson, a British lawyer specializing in European Human Rights Law, 
Public International Law and International Criminal Law, published a report during his time as 
Special Rapporteur on Terrorism for the United Nations. This ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism’ was written in response to the practice of asymmetrical warfare and the entrenched 
practice of secrecy in the US drone program. Emmerson posited that the lack of transparency in 
drone strikes makes it difficult to objectively evaluate precision claims when civilian casualty 
numbers are not made public. He argued that there is an urgent need to ensure that restraints are 
placed on these lethal weapons. Without a reasonable level of oversight and transparency, no 
government can claim legitimacy in its actions nor be held accountable for potential violations.319 
 
 Yet former CIA director Leon Panetta, a relative newcomer to the field of intelligence and 
often thought of a moderate in the realm of national security, has nevertheless consistently (and 
somewhat surprisingly) argued in favour of lethal drone usage—even referring to them as ‘the 
only game in town.’320 The use of airstrikes, according to Panetta, is ‘much worse,’ insinuating 
that the use of lethal drones is more accurate, practical and justifiable in comparison.321 But how 
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can one claim the relative strategic effectiveness of lethal drones when the programme itself is not 
sufficiently transparent to construe fundamental adherence to the rule of law?  
 
The 2014 Stimpson report, which called for greater transparency, also advocated for the 
removal of lethal military drones from CIA control. The authors argued that military officials 
should wield these military weapons—not intelligence agencies who have a proclivity for covering 
up contentious strategies.322 When considering the law of armed conflict (LoAC), both military 
and law enforcement agencies' use of drones becomes a conflicting and dangerous practice.323 
Peculiarly, it signals to the international community that the US authorizes two parallel drone 
programs: one led by the Department of Justice, which has a certain degree of accountability 
assigned to it, and the other operated by the CIA, which is not bound to any meaningful degree of 
oversight or transparency. In other words, it implies (even if falsely so) that the US is running a 
‘dirty war’ behind the scenes with the use of the CIA-run drone program.  
 
It is undeniable that the CIA plays an important, and equally controversial, role in the US 
drone program. Nevertheless, having the American drone programme within CIA control poses a 
problem for both transparency and accountability. Why is an intelligence-gathering agency 
running the show? By definition, they operate covert activities either above or beyond the purview 
of the law. The military does not have such a luxury, so it would have been the most logical choice 
if the government wanted a drone programme that was more accountable and transparent.324 States, 
for the most part, make intentional choices. So, it can be inferred that the US government purposely 
chose the CIA for precisely the reasons criticized in this section—it wanted an agency with 
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experience in covert ops to conduct drone strikes and effectively coverup any unintended 
consequences.  
 
Since the international legal system is quite unable to explicitly address or constrain the 
use of military drones in armed conflict, this matter was expected to be dealt with at a domestic 
(state) level—yet having CIA control over the programme runs the apparent risk of reducing this 
last line of legal oversight. This raises an additional question of drone strikes by other countries at 
the US request or using US target dossiers/intelligence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this has already 
occurred on several occasions. One such example of co-operation between the US and Israel will 
be examined in detail in the next chapter. 
 
 In his 2016 book The Assassination Complex, Jeremy Scahill, a leading American 
journalist and editor of The Intercept, revealed details325 about the secretive CIA-led drone 
program. He contended that ‘drones are a tool, not a policy,’ so how they are used should be made 
public. Scahill observed that while a discussion on the use of technological weaponry in remote 
killing operations is a worthwhile endeavour, the goal should be to examine how states have 
obtained the power to determine who lives and dies.326 In other words, there are broader 
philosophical questions at stake here. 
 
 The irony, Scahill notes, is that President Obama’s administration campaigned on ending 
the unethical treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and later established a targeted killing 
campaign that was similarly controversial.327 These issues stem from a general lack of 
transparency in the CIA-led drone program, preventing oversight committees from regulating and 
restraining these lethal military programs. Does this shift reflect the historical legacies of 
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somewhat antiquated sets of international regulatory frameworks that mean, perhaps somewhat 
accidentally, that targeted killing and assassination are less closely regulated than interrogations, 
incarceration and torture? Have the well-intentioned campaigns of human-right lawyers against 
facilities like Guantanamo resulted in more deaths? Moreover, what are the strategies and practices 
of the CIA-led drone programme? The purpose of this next section will be to ascertain how 
questionable ‘self-defence’ practices within the CIA-led drone programme have challenged the 
legitimacy of the US ‘global war on terror.’  
 
Targeted Killing, Assassination and Extrajudicial Execution 
 
Christian Enemark, a Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, has 
argued that ‘the nature of war is immutable: war, to be war, must be a contest.’.328 Yet targeted 
killing removes this ‘contest’ from war—and creates a unidirectional form of combat or 
aggression. In 2013, Enemark went further and examined the threat of ‘risk-free killing’ and how 
the absence of mutual risk between combatants changes the understanding of war.329 The issue 
boiled down to the understanding of war as a lethal contest within which ‘combatants on one side 
use force in a relationship of mutual risk with those on the other side.’ This mutual risk relationship 
is derived from a ‘‘bargain’ among warriors… that the moral license to kill may be exercised only 
by someone who is in return prepared to die’.330  
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Enemark recognized that when one engages in targeted killing by drone, this ancient 
contest and mutual risk relationship disappears. As such, Enemark maintained that bi-lateral risk 
is an ‘indispensable characteristic of war, and courage is an indispensable characteristic of a 
warrior.’ The practice of targeted killing is problematic because the drone pilot can kill ‘without 
experiencing any physical risk, thus requiring none of the courage that for millennia has 
distinguished the warrior from all other kinds of killer.’331 Conversely, fixed-wing conventional 
aircraft do not suffer from this moral quandary, as the pilot is at risk of being targeted during the 
flight's entire duration. Pilots can be shot down with surface to air missiles or other defensive 
means which cannot, and do not, threaten remote drone operators. Thus, in ethical terms, physical 
risk differentiates a hero or warrior from a killer.  
 
 This issue becomes especially critical when considering the state justification for pre-attack 
self-defence. For how can a state legitimately claim self-defence when the weapon it chooses to 
address a perceived (anticipated) threat is not only remote but poses a risk only to those targeted? 
Should self-defence not demonstrate that the ‘victim’ state is in some way vulnerable? In later 
chapters, this dissertation will examine whether the legitimacy of a state’s claim to preemptive 
self-defence may be impacted by its choice to employ lethal drones. This section will proceed to 
examine the practice of targeted killing.  
 
According to existing scholarly understandings, a targeted killing can be defined as the 
premeditated remote use of lethal force against an individual.332 According to international law, 
this practice can only be justified as a response to an imminent threat. More specifically, Article 
51 of the UN Charter allows for the targeted killing of terrorists if they pose an imminent threat,333 
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therefore ensuring that this combat method's employment adheres to the principle of ‘self-
defence.’334  
 
David Cole, former Georgetown University Law Professor and current National Legal 
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), has argued that the United States has 
used this legal doctrine to expand the definitional parameters of imminence to a point where it is 
no longer capable of restricting any relevant action. Additionally, inadequate and ambiguous 
international laws on the subject have only made targeted killing easier. At this point, the US does 
not even need to demonstrate that an attack will occur in the immediate future. Instead, it coins 
what it euphemistically calls a ‘broader concept of imminence.’335 In the absence of an 
international law explicitly prohibiting the use of targeted killing strategies combat, legal loopholes 
were found, enabling its continued use. Presently, no amendments or legal adjustments have been 
made to limit or regulate the use of such practices. Critics have pointed to the inhumane ways in 
which drones stalk their targets like a predator stalks its prey—waiting patiently to strike without 
warning, virtually eliminating the targets’ right to surrender.336 
 
It is easy to see the parallels that some critics have drawn between targeted killing and 
contract killing. Consequently, this unidirectional form of combat is somewhat indistinguishable 
from civilian homicide since targets are eliminated without trial or any possibility for them to 
defend themselves legally or physically.337 Self-evidently, this factor furthermore violates the jus 
in bello principle of humanity. Former US President Jimmy Carter has even suggested that the US 
will have difficulty claiming moral authority since the American government emphasizes killing 
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targets over capturing them.338 In response, John O. Brennan argued that targeted strikes were 
against specific terrorists—defending the strikes as legal while emphasizing their ‘preciseness.’339 
Unfortunately, this cannot be proven due to a lack of transparency in the program, preventing 
statistics from being impartially examined. And so, the claims of legal adherence lose their 
credibility in the absence of such information. 
 
Moreover, the ACLU determined that the targeted killing programme sets a dangerous 
precedent as the US treats international laws as recommendations rather than mandatory legal 
restrictions.340 This continued practise of targeted killing has contributed to an increase of civilian 
casualties—a fact not even the US government could deny. Former White House Press Secretary 
Jay Carney even admitted that ‘US strikes have resulted in civilian casualties’ but defended this 
by noting that accidental civilian casualties are ‘a risk that exists in all wars.’341 Yet, as Laurie 
Calhoun observes, politicians and the general public remain unaware of such tactics' adverse long-
term effects.342 Critics argue (with data in hand) that targeted killing is usually not as selective or 
precise as the American government would have us believe, and when it does meet this standard 
of precision—it is similar to the assassination. Furthermore, this practice infringes upon US 
Executive Order 12333, subsection 2.11, which states that ‘no person employed by or acting on 
behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.’343  
 
Despite these domestic protocols and legal constraints, the US drone programme not only 
continues to engage in targeted killing missions but has even changed its rules of engagement to 
allow for higher numbers of civilian deaths per strike. According to Tom Vanden Brook, an 
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investigative journalist who has extensively researched the US drone program, the US went from 
opposing drone strikes, which might result in civilian casualties, to establishing targeting areas and 
permitting up to ten civilian casualties per strike.344 Donald Rumsfeld approved one hundred 
percent of over fifty proposed drone strikes in which the estimated high civilian casualty rates 
exceeded thirty (non-combatant) civilian lives.345 These findings contradict US officials who claim 
that drone strikes with an estimated high risk for civilian casualties were only approved in 
‘extraordinary circumstances.’346 By this logic, the American military’s understanding of 
‘extraordinary circumstance’ includes every strike request. These recently released findings not 
only contradict the narrative offered by the Executive branch but also begs the question of whether 
the American government is withholding further controversial information about its lethal drone 
missions. As with all counter-terrorism programs, one wonders what the long-term response of 
terrorists might be. 
 
The high level of civilian casualties caused by targeted killing violates international laws 
by being indiscriminate and superfluous. International law requires that states must assume an 
individual is a civilian and not a combatant if in doubt.347 Unfortunately, this has not been the 
modus operandi of the targeted killing programme wherein civilians can be killed if they are 
intended targets or if they happen to be near an intended target—because the threshold of 
acceptable civilian casualties is seemingly expanding with no end in sight.  
 
Even with significant changes, the US drone programme will not become legally compliant 
overnight. Indeed, without significant international legal constraints, this programme might well 
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become more illegal overtime. US President Donald Trump even revoked Obama’s 2016 
Executive Order requiring intelligence officials to publish civilian casualty statistics from drone 
strikes.348 Instead of moving towards a more transparent and accountable US counter-terror 
program, it seems as though there may be backsliding. The Trump administration largely reversed 
Obama’s attempt at limited transparency in CIA operations. Having such a vicarious practice be 
so carelessly regulated and addressed at both the international and national levels points to the 
urgent need for a legal amendment to protect civilians and restore legitimacy to such operations. 
Still, targeted killing is not the most disputatious practice employed in the US drone program.  
 
We now need to turn to the issue of ‘signature strikes.’ Signature strikes are similar to 
targeted strikes but significantly more problematic. Under the Bush administration, remote 
targeting policy was restricted only to individuals who could be proven to be a high-value target 
(HVT).349 However, under the Obama administration, targets were profiled based on observable 
behavioural patterns.350 The policy of strategic strikes developed under the Obama administration, 
wherein an individual could be deemed a target if they exhibited behavioural traits ‘common’ 
amongst extremist individuals.351 According to the practice of signature strikes, if an individual 
‘looks’ or ‘acts’ like a terrorist (from a distance of roughly 3000ft), they can be justifiably killed 
by a drone strike. Tragically and somewhat predictably, signature strikes have resulted in the 
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misidentification of civilian events like funerals, parties and weddings as ‘terrorist gatherings,’ 
resulting in the slaughter of many innocent people.352 
 
At first, Obama rejected the use of signature strikes, but he came around to the idea in April 
2012 when he authorized their usage in counter-terrorism operations.353 According to journalists 
like Jo Becker and Scott Shane, under the Obama administration, ‘more than 100 members of [the] 
governments sprawling national security apparatus gather[ed] by secure video teleconference to 
pour over terrorism suspects’ biographies and recommend… who should be next to die’.354 Under 
international law, signature strikes are illegal as they cannot distinguish between lawful targets 
and civilians.355 However, the United States is not wholly to blame.  
 
The CIA-led drone program's main goal was to target and neutralize domestic and 
international security threats. With the increase of terror attacks worldwide, the drone program 
was expanded to address this pertinent threat. The underlying problem lies with the lack of 
international constraints surrounding such policies. It is unrealistic to expect a state to objectively 
determine what practices are immoral in counter-terrorism operations when it believes these 
operations' sole purpose is to prevent and thwart terror attacks from occurring.  
 
According to the reasoning offered by the CIA, there really should not be any legal 
constraints/oversight on these operations—because they are going after the ‘enemy.’ Why should 
the CIA adhere to international laws when terrorists do not? Apart from strategic counter-
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productivity issues regarding these targeting policies, this approach indicates a more significant 
problem that has long been debated by public intellectuals. The US must adhere to international 
laws because it is the only thing that distinguishes them from the terrorists. If the US decided to 
continue ignoring and infringing upon existing international laws, it could be viewed as ‘no better’ 
than the terrorists themselves. It is the law, and the respect for such, which distinguishes between 
sides and lends ‘asymmetric warfare’ much of its asymmetry.  
 
The high number of civilian casualties resulting from targeted killing and signature strikes 
is sufficient to demonstrate a violation of international customary law. However, the US drone 
program's increasingly common tactic, called ‘double-tapping,’ 356 proves just how indiscriminate 
the US drone programme is.357 A ‘double-tap’ can be explained as a drone strike that bombs a 
target, waits a period of twenty or so minutes until first responders arrive, then proceeds to bomb 
a second or even third time.358 The tactic of ‘double-tapping’ was initially used in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by US ground troops who wanted to ensure that targeted individuals were dead—so 
they would ‘double-tap’ them (reshoot them) when they were down to make sure they were not 
feigning death.359 This tactic was then adopted into remote targeting policies. It can now be 
understood to refer to a drone attack that targets individuals who have rushed in to rescue or treat 
drone strikes victims.360 A recently leaked video show US pilots engaging in this barbaric 
practice—even double-tapping medical personnel, journalists and children.361 Under international 
law, these ‘targets’ are non-combatants, yet drones routinely and indiscriminately murder them. 
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International humanitarian law should afford protection to civilians, journalists and medical 
personnel. Despite this legal protection, the practice of double-tapping is still very much the norm 
in counter-terrorism operations. There can be zero justification for this practice. For no strategic 
cost should ever be worth deliberately taking innocent lives.  
 
Etymologically, this practice is probably borrowed from the terrorist method of planting 
‘secondary’ bombs for the same purpose. However, by being an official state actor, the United 
States should engage in practices that are somewhat more evolved (morally and ethically) than 
those it seeks to label as terrorists. Targeting first responders post-attack is immoral as it is 
illegal—regardless of who is directing this plan. Even if inadvertently, killing innocents remains a 
morally indefensible consequence of the US drone programme’s practice of targeted killing and 
signature strikes. However, this was easily argued away by noting that it was an unintentional 
consequence occurring in a fog of war. New reports now indicate that there have been instances in 
which the US purposefully and deliberately targeted civilians and medical personnel.362 These 
findings cannot be so easily brushed aside, as the targeting of non-combatants is a clear violation 
of international law. Some legal scholars have noted that this deliberate killing of civilians and 
medical personnel is tantamount to a war crime under the US War Crimes Act of 1996 and a 
violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.363 Additionally, it infringes upon 
Articles 10,364 12,365 and 13366 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the 
principles of distinction, humanity and proportionality.367  
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The engagement in ‘double-tapping’ could be, by these standards, considered a war 
crime.368 However, it is unlikely that the United States will ever be prosecuted for these due to a 
lack of evidence and a secrecy culture within the CIA-led program. Some have even speculated 
that this practice is used to ‘cover-up’ atrocities by drone strike—killing those first on the scene 
who might be able to report on what has happened while deterring others from following.369 Yet, 
this practice, like targeted killing and signature strikes before it, still endures. It is undoubtedly 
aided by the lack of transparency and oversight in the CIA-led drone program.  
 
Combat Drones: Legality v. State Practice 
 
Notably, two prominent British lawyers, Paul Shiner and Dan Carey, published a joint paper in 
2013 examining The Legality of the UK’s Use of Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Although not 
explicitly studying the American drone war, their paper provided an illuminating examination into 
the international laws of armed conflict and identified four principal elements that require 
unwavering adherence if a war is to be considered ‘just’ and ‘legal.’ These principles are necessity, 
humanity, distinction, and proportionality.370 Based upon the original jus in bello concepts, these 
principles are all but immutable and pertinent, not only to the British use of military drones but 
also to the American drone program. Under the principle of necessity, the lawyers argue that 
greater transparency is required to determine each drone strike's legitimacy—since this principle 
is not based on generalities. The second principle of humanity requires that drone programs allow 
the combatant to surrender, or, if the possibility exists, disable or arrest the combatant.371  
 
 
368 Ben Emmerson, Special UN Rapporteur, has even argued that ‘involving a second missile 
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Distinction, which factors in as the third principle, requires that drones accurately 
discriminate between civilians and terrorists. However, Shiner and Carey argue that the principle 
of distinction should be held to a higher standard, especially with weapons that claim discernment. 
Moreover, the identity of potential targets is also an important consideration to make. Are they 
civilians taking part in hostilities or genuine armed combatants? As the lawyers conclude, the 
problem is that an assessment of a combatant is unlikely to change post-strike. If an individual 
were deemed a combatant pre-strike, no amount of evidence during or after the strike would change 
this assessment.372 This issue regarding the ‘combatant’ identity will be discussed later for reasons 
of conceptual clarity.  
 
The last principle, namely proportionality, requires that military action be proportionate to 
said actions of the anticipated outcome. For instance, a lethal drone strike (one which has the 
potential of slaughtering an entire village) could not be deemed proportional since the loss of 
innocents outweighs any potential strategic value of such an action. Again, this is why more 
transparency is necessary for drone programmes together with greater adherence to international 
legal parameters. Shiner and Carey’s paper reveals where and how lethal drone programs 
(regardless of whether American or British agencies run them) fail to adhere to international law 
principles. The four principles they identified therein provide a clear rubric from which to 
determine not only how the current drone programme is failing but what principles need greater 
adherence for the use of such weapons to be considered just and legal. Unfortunately, missing from 
their paper was a detailed examination of the American drone programme more precisely.  
 
Fortunately, Hugh Gusterson, a Professor of Anthropology and International Affairs at 
George Washington University, offers this missing element. Utilizing geographical analysis, 
Gusterson postulated that drones had redefined the battlefield's space due to the paradox of 
closeness and distance. He claimed that it would not be international law that ultimately stops the 
US drone program, but rather the realization that this strategy threatens its democratic values by 
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creating a state of ‘permanent war.’373 Lethal drone usage, according to Gusterson, violates jus ad 
bellum principles wherein a war, to be considered just, must have future peace as its goal and a 
reasonable chance of success.  
 
 Ian G. R. Shaw, a professor based at Glasgow University, seemingly builds upon 
Gusterson’s earlier observations that drones redefine the battlespace. In his 2016 book, Shaw noted 
that drones are a product of our historical fascination with human surveillance and warfare that 
has created innovative tools to further these obsessions.374 These spaces allow for new forms of 
conflict to emerge—facilitated in part by new technological weaponry. Shaw reasoned that drones 
are the new ‘soldiers’ in war—and the honour, courage, sacrifice, and heroism are transferred from 
man to machine. But, he argues, sparing soldiers should not come as a trade-off to endanger 
civilian lives.375 
 
Marcus Schulzke, a Professor of International Relations at the University of York, noted 
that placing mandatory restrictions and regulations on drone usage could mitigate the 
destructiveness of war, protect civilian lives and ensure adherence to international laws.376 In this 
sense, legal constraints can be understood as a conceptual tool capable of resurrecting morality in 
the lethal drone program.377 Yet in 2012, John O. Brennan, former Director of the CIA during the 
Obama administration, gave a speech on ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counter-
terrorism Strategy.’ In it, he strongly argued that the US drone programme had indeed abided by 
international law. En passant, he admitted that the programme should continue to ‘refine, clarify 
and strengthen… the rigorous standards and processes of review in the use of combat drones so 
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that targeted strikes conform to [legal] principles’.378 Refuting the claim of critics, Brennan argued 
that nothing in international law bans the US from using drones to target terrorist organizations 
with which they are currently in armed conflict.379 Brennan essentially sees this activity as akin to 
the relatively unrestricted use of area bombing during the Second World War. Yet without proper 
transparency, lethal drone strikes cannot be accurately verified as adhering to just war principles. 
 
Moreover—what ‘rigorous standards and processes of review’ is Brennan referencing? Is 
the CIA claiming to regulate itself? Independent oversight is necessary to ensure that the drone 
programme adheres to international laws. But this requires a modicum of transparency—
something the CIA-led drone programme is currently lacking and seemingly surreptitiously 
preventing.  
 
Similarly, during a speech at Northwestern University Law School, Eric Holder, who 
served as the 82nd US Attorney General, echoed Brennan's sentiments. In his presentation, Holder 
claimed that ‘[America was at] war with a stateless enemy’ and was therefore permitted to infringe 
specific laws.380 Unfortunately, there is an apparent technical problem with his statement. The 
United States cannot be at war with a terror group. Under international law, it is impossible for the 
U.S, or any nation for that matter, to be at war with a non-state actor.381 This is a problem that 
extends beyond the specific case of drones and applies to so many other US security policy aspects 
since 9/11. One might argue that in practice, the United States has come close to modifying 
international law, and de facto is at war with certain non-state groups. 
 
Sir Christopher Greenwood, a British Judge in the International Court of Justice, noted that 
international law dictates that one cannot be at war with a stateless enemy (which terrorist 
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organizations are); to claim this would distort the law.382 Since 9/11 was a crime and not an act of 
war, it should therefore be treated as a crime—and nothing more. Hence, state claims of 
anticipatory self-defence against non-state terror groups are quite challenging to justify, as specific 
actions executed with this excuse in mind risk being viewed as a violation of current 
(customary/written) international laws.383 
 
The Inefficacy & Incompatibility of Lethal Military Drones 
 
Lethal drones lack a graduated, proportional response. Arguably, their operating characteristics sit 
awkwardly with the changing enemy profile and international law requirements and just war theory 
principles. In 2015, at the G7 summit in Germany, Obama even admitted that the US ‘[did not] yet 
have a complete strategy to defeat ISIL.’ No strategy, but years of trial and error—with civilian 
lives hanging in the balance. The reality may be that the United States has a strategy that it does 
not wish to admit to, namely, to kill terrorists faster than they can be replaced. This is often referred 
to in coded language and often cast up in official circles as a debate between counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency. Yet Richard A. Clarke, a former counter-terrorism czar under the Bush 
administration, has argued that high civilian casualties only serve to incite anger amongst the local 
populations, resulting in a surge of recruitment and radicalization. So instead of eliminating 
terrorists, these policies create them.384  
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A 2016 Intelligence Report, compiled by the Soufan Group, confirmed Clarke’s view. It 
found that there had been an increase in terroristic activities in countries where the US had 
conducted drone strikes—including Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, Iraq and 
Syria.385 Suggesting once more that lethal drone operations in every country where the US had 
launched these strikes was experiencing counterproductive outcomes. 
 
The American government glosses over the disturbing nature of targeted killings. Drone 
strikes are publicized as ‘successful’ for killing their intended target, but the accompanying 
consequences of civilian casualties are rarely if ever, mentioned. Illustrative of this was the 
American government deemed that the drone operation which killed Anwar al Awlaki was a 
‘success.’ Al Awlaki was an American-born jihadist who was accused of leading an aggressive 
jihad campaign, for which he was targeted and killed by a US drone strike in Yemen on May 5th, 
2011. However, the US government neglected to mention the collateral damage this drone strike 
caused in the memo.386 Nine children, including Nawar Anwar al Awlaki (the daughter of Anwar 
al Awlaki), were murdered in the process.387 It was reported that she bled to death in two hours.388 
She was only eight years old. Still, the consequences of covert military programmes do not solely 
affect those on the receiving end of such operations.  
 
 Drone wars are not fought on virtual battlefields with fictional deaths. The only similarity 
with video games is the ability to engage in combat from the comfort of an armchair—wherein the 
operator faces ‘no risk of physical harm as a result of their geographical distance from the 
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battlefield.’389 However, it is important to note that drone operators themselves are not immune to 
the psychological horror generated by drone strikes. Many pilots report suffering severe 
psychological distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), even if their armed 
conflict experience has been limited to what they observed through the camera lens. Beyond 
PTSD, simple human guilt has also played a factor in the mental wellbeing of drone pilots. Richard 
Engel, a chief foreign correspondent for NBC News, examined the mass exodus of drone operators 
and concluded that many leave the programme due to the guilt that weighs on their conscience.390 
Many operators reported feeling helpless and remorseful for their involvement in targeted killing 
missions, in which they were expected to execute individuals without hesitation or 
consideration.391  
 
 Ret. US Gen. Michael Flynn, who served briefly as US National Security Advisor in 2017, 
posited that in the face of recent evidence documenting the negative consequences associated with 
lethal drone strikes, perhaps more significant consideration should be made before instinctively 
resorting to this weapon in armed conflicts.392 Despite Flynn’s claims, adamant advocates of the 
CIA-led drone program, like Charles Dunlap Jr., for instance, maintain that critics' futile 
arguments demonstrate that they offer ‘no alternative.’393 Perhaps the issue here is not to offer an 
 
389 BBC Staff, ‘UN Official Criticizes US over Drone Attacks,’ BBC News, 02 June 2010; see also 
Jeff McMahan, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military (Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
390 Richard Engel, ‘Former Drone Operator Says He’s Haunted by His Part in More Than 1,600 
Deaths,’ NBC News, 06 June 2013; see also Wayne Chappelle, et al., ‘An Analysis of Post-
Traumatic Stress Symptoms in United States Air Force Drone Operators,’ Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders 28.5 (2014), pp. 480-487; and Cherie Armour and Jana Ross, ‘The Health and Well-
Being of Military Drone Operators and Intelligence Analysts: A Systematic Review,’ Military 
Psychology 29.2 (2017), pp. 83-98. 
391 Nicola Abé, ‘Dreams in the Infrared: The Woes of an American Drone Operator,’ Spiegel 
Online International, 14 December 2012; see also Jean L. Otto and Bryant J. Webber, ‘Mental 
Health Diagnoses and Counseling Among Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in the United States 
Air Force,’ Medical Surveillance Monthly Report Vol.20, No.3 (2013), pp. 3-8. 
392 Ibid (Flynn reasoned that if ‘you drop a bomb from a drone…you are going to cause more 
damage, than you are going to cause good,’ In his view, perhaps the best avenue would be to 
pursue a ‘different approach’ to the use of drones in counter-terrorism.) 
393 Charles J. Dunlap Jr., ‘Why Can’t the Media be More Transparent About Drones?’ The Hill, 
21 March 2016; see also Muhammad Idrees Ahmad, ‘The Magical Realism of Body Counts: How 
Media Credulity and Flawed Statistics Sustain a Controversial Policy,’ Journalism 17.1 (2016), 
pp. 18-34; and Graeme Davies, Marcus Schulzke and Thomas Almond, ‘Sheltering the President 
 108 
alternative but rather to ensure that when counter-terrorism missions employ lethal drones, the 
justification for using such in ‘self-defence’ is legitimate, proportionate and necessary. Before 
proceeding to a discussion on international law and the criteria of self-defence, some contextual 
clarity on the technical processes must be achieved. 
 
 The use of drones in war has raised questions regarding their place in international law and, 
by extension, the doctrine of preemptive attacks under Article 51 of the UN Charter.394 Because 
drones offer unparalleled surveillance capabilities, this potentially allows a state to present this 
material as evidence and justify its decision to act preemptively in self-defence.395 This 
improvement in intelligence gathering may also ‘diminish the danger of waiting until the last 
possible moment to act.’396 Despite the many benefits of military drones, such practices raise 
several legal and moral issues. Consequently, what happens when the very weapons we rely on for 
remote war and intelligence collection also facilitate more international law violations? 
 
 Ashley Deeks, a University of Virginia Law Scholar, posits that technological innovations 
will ultimately force international law governing the use of force to modernize. Many scholars 
agree that due to technological and geopolitical issues, the doctrine of preemptive self-defence is 
moving away from Caroline-type principles, and the need to re-examine this principle in 
international relations is growing. The necessity of contributing to the scholarship on this issue is 
 
from Blame: Drone Strikes, Media Assessments and Heterogeneous Responsibility 2002–
2014,’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol.20, No.2 (2018), pp. 477-
496. 
394 See Afsheen John Radsan and Richard Murphy, ‘The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA 
Targeted Killing,’ Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Vol.5 (2012), p. 439, 441; see 
also Jordan Paust, ‘Remotely Piloted Warfare as a Challenge to the Jus ad Bellum,’ from The 
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017). 
395 See William Broad and Mark Mazzetti, ‘Yet Another Photo of Site in Syria, Yet More 
Questions,’ New York Times, 27 October 2007 (includes a statement from a senior US intelligence 
official who confirms that various key Syrian sites had been observed by US spy satellites for 
years). 
396 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Preemption,’ p. 677; see also Richard Murphy and Afsheen 
John Radsan, ‘Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists,’ Cardozo Law Review Vol.31 No.1 
(2009), p. 405. 
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evident when considering the pace of current technological innovations and how rapidly 
inapplicable certain legal doctrines have already become.397  
 
 Apart from legal disagreements, further strain is added to self-defence doctrine by 
emerging technologies and geopolitical issues. Attacks can be more harmful, launched at shorter 
notice, and often covert, perhaps to hide the extent to which AI helps drive targeting. Sir 
Greenwood has also further argued that threats posed by terrorist organizations are far different 
from those posed by regular armed forces—because their timeline for executing attacks is much 
shorter.398 Yet officials often observe that most states have policies against negotiating with 
terrorists. Therefore, exhausting other avenues of diplomacy and negotiations with these non-state 
actors becomes incompatible with the doctrine of self-defence.399 Also, since extremist groups 
have successfully conducted past terror attacks across borders, it becomes increasingly acceptable 
in domestic political terms that states should (considering the historical evidence) be able to engage 
in self-defence against these actors before executing their intended (and possibly covert) plans. 
 
 In light of these developments, the legal restriction preventing states from acting until an 
attack has begun is viewed by national security principals as unrealistic as it is dangerous.400 John 
Brennan has even argued that the US and other states are keen to demonstrate that the concept of 
 
397 Ibid, p. 678; see also Rosa Brooks, ‘Duck-Rabbits and Drones: Legal Indeterminacy in the War 
on Terror,’ Stanford Law and Policy Review Vol.25 (2014), p. 301; and Daniel R. Brunstetter and 
Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, ‘Clashing Over Drones: The Legal and Normative Gap Between the 
United States and the Human Rights Community,’ The International Journal of Human 
Rights Vol.19, No.2 (2015), pp. 176-198; and Tyler J. Black, ‘Over Your Head, Under the Radar: 
An Examination of Changing Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to the 
Domestic Police Drone Puzzle,’ Washington and Lee Law Review Vol.70 (2013), p. 1829. 
398 Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force,’ p.16; see also Doyle, 
Striking First, p.21; see also Milena Sterio, ‘The US Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The 
(Il)legality of Targeted Killings under International Law,’ Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law Vol.45 (2012), p. 197. 
399 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Preemption,’ p. 672; see also Harmonie Toros, ‘We Don't 
Negotiate with Terrorists: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts,’ Security 
Dialogue Vol.39, No.4 (2008), pp. 407-426. 
400 Which were not considered significant threats to warrant inclusion when Article 51 of the UN 
Charter was written. 
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imminence needs to be changed since it currently applies to traditional warfare—and terrorists 
engage in unconventional warfare, making this understanding outdated.401  
 
 Issues also arise because states have not redefined the concept of imminence to address 
more modern technical threats.402 In Greenwood’s view, the concept of imminence would require 
redefinition to address the gravity and modernity of technological weapons and their unique 
delivery systems. Additionally, he calls for more evidence that the aggressor state has the means 
and intention to attack.403 A Chatham House project was developed to address the lack of clarity 
on the concept of imminence in self-defence. It examined the concept of imminence as it applied 
to current threats and posited that imminence could be applied to more modern preemptive self-
defence cases if proof of a threat’s gravity, the attacker's capability and the nature of the threat 
could be sufficiently demonstrated.404 But even as these projects crawl forward at a slow pace, the 
prospect of AI-driven targeting looms on the horizon; indeed, some lawyers suspect it may already 
be here. 
 
 For the time being, in practical terms, altering the criteria of imminence could only be 
legitimately done when addressing obvious rogue states and terror organizations. Before this can 
 
401 Remarks by John Brennan, ‘Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws,’ 
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 16, September 2011; see also James Steinberg, 
‘Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy,’ Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 47, No.4 
(2006), p. 55, 58-59 (regarding inadequacy of relying on the decisions of the Security Council and 
the changing nature of terrorists are reasons why preemptive self-defence, according to the 
President, should be allowed to take a more permanent spot in national security policy), ‘[A]n 
increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the 
traditional conception of what constitutes an ‘imminent’ attack should be broadened in the light of 
modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist organizations.’ 
402 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Preemption,’ p. 674; see also Dapo Akande and Thomas 
Liefländer, ‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-
Defense,’ American Journal of International Law Vol.107, No.3 (2013), pp. 563-570. 
403 Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force,’ pp. 16-17; see also Onder 
Bakircioglu, ‘The Contours of the Right to Self-Defence: Is the Requirement of Imminence Merely 
a Translator for the Concept of Necessity?’ The Journal of Criminal Law Vol.72, No.2 (2008), pp. 
131-169. 
404 Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-
Defence (London: Chatham House, 2005); see also Michael Schmitt, ‘Responding to Transnational 
Terrorism Under the Jus Ad Bellum: A Normative Framework,’ Naval Law Review, Vol.56, No.1 
(2008), p.11.  
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be done, however, a few prerequisites need to be fulfilled. The first is to demonstrate that the 
enemy has access to, and an affinity for, the use of unconventional weapons. The second 
prerequisite requires proof that the adversary has committed and intends to launch attacks in the 
future.405 When states exhibit such behaviour, they are far more vulnerable to having their 
sovereignty violated. Many legal scholars argue that states which possess unconventional weapons 
and have a history of aggressive behaviour (with the inclination to continue this trend) should be 
‘accorded less respect and be considered more violable than that of other states that engage in 
similar behaviour but do not possess such weapons.’ 406 
 
 The key question that attends any legal evaluation of a preemptive strike is, ‘did it take 
place during the last window of opportunity before a certain (or almost certain) attack?’407 Yet 
Greg Travalio and John Altenburg acknowledge that it is increasingly difficult to identify the point 
at which a terror attack is ‘imminent’ [or if it will occur at all]. Regardless of these issues, they 
suggest that the concept of imminence can still be applied to terror organizations in an adapted 
format.408 They argue that a ‘state may legitimately act on the assumption that, given the 
consistently demonstrated unconventional nature and operational methods of certain international 
terrorist organizations, an attack by such organizations is always ‘imminent.’ Some would even 
suggest that if a terrorist organization has committed prior attacks or has explicitly or implicitly 
announced its intention to do so, then any future attack can be considered ‘imminent.’ In other 
words, by considering the history of the enemy and inferring the likelihood of a future attack, it 
 
405 For instance, the Bush administration argued that Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons 
against Iraqi Kurds in the 1980s indicated that he would use nuclear or biological weapons against 
other states if he possessed them (White House, ‘President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks 
by the President on Iraq,’ White House Press Office, (Cincinnati, Ohio: The White House, 2002).  
406 Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, p. 63; see also Kerstin Fisk, Jennifer L. Merolla and 
Jennifer M. Ramos, ‘Emotions, Terrorist Threat, and Drones: Anger Drives Support for Drone 
Strikes,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.63, No.4 (2019), pp. 976-1000. 
407 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Preemptive Strategies in International Law,’ Michigan Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 24, No.2 (2003), pp. 534 – 36; see also Miriam Sapiro, ‘Iraq: The Shifting 
Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense,’ The American Journal of International Law Vol.97, No.3 
(2003), pp. 599-607. 
408 Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, p. 61; see also Todd Landman, ‘Imminence and 
Proportionality: The US and UK Responses to Global Terrorism,’ California Western 
International Law Journal Vol.38 (2007), p. 75; and Elisa Kantor, ‘New Threats, Old Problems: 
Adhering to Brandenburg's Imminence Requirement in Terrorism Prosecutions,’ George 
Washington Law Review Vol.76 (2007), p. 752. 
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would permit the use of preemptive force even if the requirement of imminence is not yet proven. 
This approach is rather like the medieval practice of deeming specific individuals or groups 
‘outlaws,’ outside the protection of the law—indeed, some might observe that this is in practice 
what the United States has done.409  
 
 Meanwhile, a subsequent and connected question arises, namely ‘whether the right to 
exercise self-defence ends once an initial attack has been dealt with, or whether the right to exercise 
self-defence remains operative until the threat has been neutralized.’410 By this logic, does the 
‘global war on terror’ only end when every last terrorist is eliminated, and all perceived threats are 
mitigated? And until then, should laws restricting the use of force slacken, most requests for 
preemptive ‘self-defence’ be viewed as legitimate, and most forms of oversight be disregarded to 
provide states with the ‘necessary’ power to address such ‘imminent’ threats? Following recent 
events, perhaps this no longer exists as a purely hypothetical question. However, one thing remains 
clear: current international laws, especially the customary law of self-defence, remains subjective 
and inapplicable to modern threats and the strategies necessary to combat them. Expectedly, 
countries, like the United States, have embraced this as an opportunity to subjectively interpret 
and claim adherence to existing laws in an attempt to feign legitimacy. Thus, international law's 
subjectivity and the subjectivity of American interpretation and engagement with these legal 
doctrines remains a pressing problem that must be addressed to constrain questionable practices, 




It is widely understood that international law facilitates the analysis of state sponsored pre-attack 
self-defence operations. Still, it is not the only discipline which underpins this subject. Several 
 
409 Greg Travalio and John Altenburg, ‘Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of Military 
Force,’ Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 4, No.1 (2003), pp. 97 – 120, 116; see also 
Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 
September,’ International Relations Vol.16, No.2 (2002), pp. 155-170. 
410 Terry Gill, ‘When Does Self-Defence End?’ from The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force 
in International Law (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2016); see also Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz and 
Esther Salamanca-Aguado, ‘Exploring the Limits of International Law Relating to the Use of 
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overlapping fields of literature thus necessitate consideration, inclusion and discussion. To strike 
a balance between breadth of literature and depth of analysis, only a select group of fields will be 
introduced, each bolstered by scholarly works chosen for their relevance, impact and modernity. 
These intersecting literature fields include policy taboos, norm erosion, covert actions and secrecy 
in statecraft, assassination strategies, legitimacy and post-truth, as well as a brief but necessary 




Taboos are unacceptable actions or practices generally banned or prohibited on the basis of 
morality or taste, or because they are considered profane or dangerous.411 Contemporary taboos, 
like racism, sexism, incest and ethnocentrism, were at one point commonly accepted or 
overlooked. Now, with evolving social customs and standards, these practices are considered 
appalling, thus strengthening the taboos regarding them.  
 
 Two types of taboos exist. The first refers to ones which are widely understood as 
unacceptable practice, while the second are contested but argued to be a ‘necessary evil’. The latter 
justification is one which the United States has leaned towards on more than one occasion. This is 
somewhat ironic, given that the US has always advocated for democratic, legitimate and lawful 
tactics by ensuring that its domestic practices are checked for adherence to international laws. 
Although such policies and practices are flaunted as morally right, some have become ever more 
unethical. Existing laws prohibiting assassinations, for instance, are being disregarded or infringed 
during covert operations to obtain strategic wins.  
 
 Laws like the EO12333, are policy taboos if infringed, but the CIA has violated them on 
numerous occasions. The most recent and public of which was the strike on Soleimani. The US 
 
411Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Taboo,” Merriam-Webster: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/taboo: ‘banned on grounds of morality or taste; banned as constituting a 
risk; forbidden to profane use or contact because of what are held to be dangerous supernatural 
powers; a prohibition imposed by social custom or as a protective measure; something that is not 
acceptable to say, mention, or do; a prohibition against touching, saying, or doing something for 
fear of immediate harm from a supernatural force.’ 
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has tried to circumnavigate this taboo by arguing that they possess classified intelligence about 
threats which legitimizes its actions, however contentious, in order to mitigate the dangers these 
pose. In essence, the US government tried to ‘sell’ its infringement of the taboo as a ‘necessary 
evil’ in order to address a greater evil: terrorism. When this rationalization is deemed 
unsatisfactory, the US redefined practices perfunctorily. In the most contentious of cases, the US 
had chosen to keep such operations, practices or missions covert; keeping them away from the 
prying eyes of those who might seek to question the legitimacy of such actions. The Soleimani 
strike changed this norm, resulting in this policy taboo violation becoming public.  
 
 While the majority of society may view some taboos as universal, and thus criminalize 
them, violations will still occur, thanks in part to motivators like self-interest and self-
preservation.412 These can occur in one of two ways. The first is to seek a redefinition of the 
practice, in an attempt use politically correct euphemisms in order to distance itself from the taboo, 
if only superficially. The US attempted to do this by using the term ‘targeted killing’ to distance 
itself from the practice of execution, or from laws which ban such strategies. The second is to 
avoid the social stigma altogether by covertly or privately infringing these taboos, thus shielding 
itself from public criticism. Regardless of how the violation occurs, there is but one guaranteed 
outcome: shame.  
 
 Despite being demonized for their unwillingness to abide by international laws or 
moral/ethical standards, terror organizations are paradoxically capitalizing on the US’s CT policy 
taboo violations, and its resulting shame, as tools for recruitment and radicalization.413 Shame 
creates a greater ‘us versus them’ divide, one which extremist organizations exploit effectively. 
CT operations which violate international law or result in high numbers of civilian casualties are 
used to kindle the fires of local dissent, resulting in greater numbers of followers and members for 
extremist organizations.414 As evidenced, violating policy taboos is far more harmful for the US 
counterterror program than it is advantageous. Legitimacy and honour are necessary elements in 
 
412 It is as the old proverb goes, ‘forbidden fruit is the sweetest.’ 
413 Matthew Kriner, ‘Tackling Terrorism’s Taboo: Shame,’ from Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 
12, Issue 2, April 2018: pp. 19-31. 
414 Michael Stohl, ‘The State as Terrorist: Insights and Implications, Democracy and Security,’ 
from Journal of Democracy and Security, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 24 January 2007: pp. 1-25 
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order for a state, and its actions, to be viewed as just. Policy taboo violations stain this reputation, 
and the resulting public criticism casts doubt over its lawfulness. 
 
 Counterterrorism operations should not cause more harm than the benefits they intend to 
reap. The response to threats must be proportional, and weapons used must not target civilians nor 
pose a significant risk to their safety. Certain weapons are considered taboo, even in 
counterterrorism operations. These include biological, nuclear and radiological weaponry, whose 
effects cannot be easily contained. Still, there are similarly contentious lethal weaponry which are 
still used by the US (more specifically its intelligence agencies) in such operations. The most 
notable of which are lethal unmanned aerial vehicles. These drones have reaped both favourable 
and unfavourable outcomes. Sometimes these were unavoidable, other times it was due to human 
error and faulty intelligence. The problem is that the CIA is beginning to use lethal drones in cases 
when threat assessments indicate that the risks outweigh the rewards. The motivation for doing so, 
and violating these established policy taboos like remote executions, are derived from the CIA’s 
ambition to defeat terrorism—even if it means resorting to unethical/immoral/unlawful practices 
to do so. The Soleimani strike is just one such example of this. 
 
 The CIA is attempting to turn policy taboo violations into new traditions. It is hunting down 
foreign government officials and executing them for their alleged ties to terror organizations, 
whilst remaining unfazed as to the potential legal or political ramifications such actions may 
trigger. Although this is not the first time the CIA has participated or orchestrated contentious CT 
operations, it does mark the first time that such an operation was made public. Particularly given 
the status of the target, the mode in which he was killed, the location in which the strike was carried 
out, and the lack of intelligence presented to corroborate the claim that Soleimani posed an 
imminent threat warranting his immediate execution.  
 
 The complete disregard for the UN Security Council, Congress, domestic US laws, the 
Gang of Eight and international laws (including the right to territorial sovereignty) created an 
unprecedented setting which brought about a series of increasingly dangerous consequences from 
the downing of a passenger jet to missile strikes on a military base that resulted in hundreds of 
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severe brain injuries, underpinned by a complete disregard for diplomacy in favour of escalating 
threats on social media. 
 
 Perhaps the US is operating under a distorted assumption. How could one fathom it a policy 
taboo to deal diplomatically with a country, but not so to execute one of their generals in a third-
party state? Yet this is not a new phenomenon. The issue of policy taboos, and their violation by 
the US during CT operations, has been examined by several key scholars over recent years. Joseba 
Zulaika, a professor at the University of Nevada, has extensively researched the impact of policy 
taboos on counterterrorism strategies. In 2012, he published an article in the Journal of Critical 
Studies on Terrorism which examined the influence that fantasy, taboos and mystical causation 
have on counterterror operations and their respective outcomes.415 Zulaika has posited that the 
introduction and reliance on remote weaponry in counterterror operations has created a state of 
fantasy, wherein drone operators stalk and eliminate targets on virtual screens, not dissimilar to a 
computer game.416 This devolution of counterterrorism from war to fantasy has created a self-
fulfilling prophecy, evidenced by an increase of terroristic activity in regions where counterterror 
operations had taken place. Years later, he co-authored a book with William Douglass which 
sought to determine how the public perception of terrorism influence our understanding of taboos, 
as well as how they are developed, maintained and perpetuated.417 Zulaika and Douglass found 
that some counterterror programs intentionally violate policy taboos with the intention of 
redefining or restructuring existing norms. This matter has been identified by other scholars as 
well.  
 
 Regina Heller, a senior researcher at the University of Hamburg, has studied the negative 
effects of normative augmentation on counterterrorism policy. She discovered that, since 9/11, the 
US has sought to redefine a host of norms in order to ensure that their agencies have greater powers 
 
415 Joseba Zulaika, ‘Drones, Witches and Other Flying Objects: The Force of Fantasy in US 
Counterterrorism,’ from Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 10 April 2012: pp. 51-68. 
416 Ibid, p. 65. 
417 Joseba, Zulaika and William Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of 
Terrorism, Routledge, 2016. 
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during counterterror operations.418 Heller found that this redefinition of norms in favour of 
counterterror operations came at a price. The priority given to CT resulted in a weakening of 
human rights which, ‘in the long run, may lead to a setback in dynamic hollowing out established 
human and civil rights norms.’419  
 
 This conclusion was researched years later by Andrea Birdsall, a senior lecturer at the 
University of Edinburgh. Building upon Heller’s earlier observations, Birdsall posited that the US 
had become a ‘norm entrepreneur’ that ‘purposefully works to alter prevalent norms related to the 
use of drones in counterterrorism efforts’ with the intention of changing the ‘meaning of a number 
of international legal concepts to justify its policy decisions.’420 It is evident that policy taboos no 
longer constrain nor deter counterterror operations. Rather, they encourage covert action, norm 
erosion and a general redefinition of practices for the purpose of dissociating from existing taboo 




In international relations literature, norms are defined as ‘collective expectations for the proper 
behavior of actors with a given identity.’421 Like policy taboos, these norms are founded on a 
mutual understanding that certain practices remain acceptable, while others remain unacceptable. 
The use of tactical nuclear weapons in armed conflict is considered just one example of these 
norms, although there have been historical incidences when these have been violated by states (i.e.  
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States).  
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 Another example of an important norm in international relations is the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine which was adopted by the UN in 2005. The adoption of this principle is 
‘widely acknowledged to represent one of the great normative advances in international politics 
since 1945.’422 The R2P is understood to be ‘an international norm that seeks to ensure that the 
international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’423 It is founded on three pillars, each one outlining 
the responsibility of states and the international community in ensuring the protection of civilians 
from mass atrocity crimes, and the adherence of state practices to the UN Charter.424 By employing 
unethical and increasingly dangerous strategies and weapons in their counterterror program, the 
United States is violating the R2P norm adopted.  
 
 Yet, little is done to punish, or course correct such programs. As such, these extreme 
practices are becoming mainstream policies with its covert agencies—resulting in operations 
which are difficult to defend legally, morally or strategically. Recent intelligence has confirmed 
that the US drone program is perpetuating crimes against humanity with high civilian casualty 
rates and indemonstrable distinction or proportionality. Thus, remote killing by drone erodes the 
commitment to R2P and demand a reassessment of US foreign policy and covert operation 
stratagems to ensure greater compliance to international law and existing norms, like the R2P.  
 
 The UN is an institution that dictates norms and obligates its members to abide by them. 
However, enforcement has proven rather difficult as some member states, including the US, have 
chosen to ignore the UN Security Council altogether. During the Soleimani strike, for instance, 
the US did not engage in a pre-attack consultation, nor did it send intelligence to justify the strike 
post-op. This disregard for the UN and its governing bodies has resulted in both the erosion of 
 
422 Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in 
International Politics, Routledge, 2011. 
423 For more information, see the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; 
www.globalr2p.org 
424 Ibid: Pillar 1: Every state has the responsibility to protect its populations against mass atrocity 
crimes like genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Pillar 2: The 
wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in 
meeting that responsibility. Pillar 3: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the 
international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. 
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norms, and an erosion of traditional battlefield boundaries. It should be noted that norm erosion 
does not occur suddenly. Rather it comes about at a gradual pace. Eric Posner even presupposed 
that a state ‘could slide into an authoritarian regime without a real crisis ever taking place.’425  
 
 Thus, a simple violation of norms does not immediately result in an erosion of norms. 
Rather it is the consequences of the violation which determine whether or not the norms become 
‘eroded.’ So, if no negative backlash ensues, then the extreme becomes mainstream. However, if 
backlash ensues, this demonstrates that the norm is still viable, and the violation of the norm did 
not weaken nor erode it. Several scholars have researched the issue of norm erosion, and a few of 
their most notable works on the topic will be discussed herein. 
 
 While scholars seek to understand how norms change, few tackle the difficult task of 
determining what a norm is and how it affects foreign policy. One scholar who took on this 
challenge was Tony Nyhamar.426 He sought to do so within the African context and developed an 
empirical way to measure the causal influence of norms in foreign policy. His findings set the 
foundation for further research by scholars like Vaughn Shannon who then analyzed the ways in 
which norms constrain and redefine foreign policy, but also how national interests weaken and 
alter existing norms. Shannon thus examined both norm violations and norm enforcement which 
allowed for an interesting observation to be made. Regardless of the top-down or bottom-up 
approach undertaken, special consideration must be given to ‘how and when foreign policy 
promotes norms and norm diffusion in the broader international community.’427 Timing matters, 
as Shannon observed. The state of affairs at the global level also determines whether a norm will 
survive or slowly erode from subsequent violations by states.  
 
 Nicole Dietelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann were similarly interested in finding out under 
what conditions challenges to norms would decrease their robustness. Their research resulted in a 
 
425 Eric Posner as quoted in Tom McCarthy, ‘Donald Trump and the Erosion of Democratic Norms 
in America,’ The Guardian, 02 June 2018.) 
426 See Tony Nyhamar, ‘How Do Norms Work? A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of African 
International Relations,’ The International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 2000: 
pp. 27-43. 
427 Vaughn Shannon, ‘International Norms and Foreign Policy,’ Oxford University Encyclopedia 
of Politics, 28 June 2017: p. 2.   
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rather interesting but similarly disheartening conclusion. They found that the international 
obligation to observe and respect norms was diminishing, and that this could be attributed in part 
to the fading power of institutions like the UN who are tasked with enforcing them.428 Although 
this observation is important, the degree to which the strength or robustness of a norm changes 
becomes an important point to investigate. Elke Krahmann did just that.  
 
 In her 2013 article, she examined four variables which could be used to measure the change 
in international norms. Krahmann posited that it would be possible to empirically ‘investigate 
possible changes in the strength and meaning of norms [through an analysis of] modifications in 
state behaviour, state responses to norm violation, the promulgation of varying interpretations of 
the norm in national and international laws and regulations and changes in norm discourse.’ She 
concluded that the US is not only influencing international norms, particularly those which deal 
with armed conflict, but that these recurrent violations are resulting in a self-serving redefinition 
of such norms.429 
 
 But why do great powers, like the United States, seek to violate international norms? Could 
they not simply advocate for their reform? Scott N. Romaniuk and Francis Grice found that 
violating norms or advocating for their reform reach the same outcome, but at different speeds.430 
In cases of urgency or national security, states will therefore favour the former option regardless 
of its perceived ethicality. It is for this reason that legal limits on executive powers should be 
pursued. To avoid the potential of increasingly regular norm violations, scholars like Tiberiu Dragu 
and Mattias Polborn suggest that liberal institutions should be restructured to focus on the new 
social objective of terrorism prevention.431 Incentives for norm abidance should exist alongside 
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430 Francis Grice and Scott N. Romaniuk, ‘Norms, Norm Violations, and IR Theory,’ E-
International Relations, 15 November 2018. 
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more stringent punishments for norm violators. These could help curtail the potential of norm 
erosion, or at the very least make it less likely to occur.  
 
 Since the UN can no longer constrain state actions nor punish violators effectively, norm 
erosion must be tackled multifacetedly. Institutions, as Dragu and Polborn noted earlier, must also 
be factored into the equation. According to John Hardy, it is a complex of circumstances which 
are collectively contributing to norm erosion. However, the most evident of which are American 
unipolarity, the Bush Doctrine and the diminishing powers of the UN. Thus, these issues must be 
dealt with in tandem if the problem of norm erosion is to be addressed effectively.432 Otherwise, 
the negative consequences from norm erosion will continue to compound. These will continue to 
include, as Rosa Brooks found, the erosion of traditional battlefield boundaries during armed 
conflicts until distinctions between civilian and hostile areas are completely eroded.433 This is 
particularly problematic when considering the ease with which the US launches remote drone 
attacks in foreign lands with little hesitation, and far less oversight.434 
 
 Norm erosion remains a real threat in international relations. However, as some scholars 
have found, there are ways to mitigate this threat and ensure that violations are prevented, or at the 
very least punished effectively. Likewise, a focus on institutions in the context of this problem 
may also allow for a more robust system of norm enforcement. Still, there are some scholars who 
believe that the current perspective on norm erosion is too limited and ‘fails to grasp such 
incremental processes in that it tends to limit its analytical view to single, narrowly defined norms 
and over emphasizes external shocks.’435  
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 Mathias Großklaus has posited that greater analysis of ‘meta-norms’ may be the way to go, 
particularly since state-sponsored assassination is moving towards normalization. Großklaus also 
maintained that there is a dire ‘need for a more comprehensive account of normative change that 
highlights the surrounding meta-norms that are able to connect single norms to their larger position 
within the international order.’436 This is because the evolution of a norm is just as important as its 
potential erosion. To avoid the negative backlash associated with norm erosion, some states have 
chosen to conduct contentious activities covertly. The following section will examine this field of 
literature to show the intersectionality with this thesis and the fields examined thus far.  
 
Covert Action & Secrecy in Statecraft 
 
According to the US Department of Defence, a covert operation is defined as ‘an action of activity 
that is planned and executed to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible deniability by, the 
sponsor.’437 The objectives and motivations behind such missions are usually unknown, but they 
can have political, military, strategic or even financial implications. The US has employed its 
intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, to direct covert or clandestine operations around the 
world with the purposes of gathering intelligence, influencing foreign policy or undermining 
enemy forces.438  
 
 But covert operations are not new. The use of spies has ancient origins but, as Michael 
Warner points out, covert action has since become ‘the secret supplement to war and diplomacy, 
employed at the margins of conflict to shift patterns of trust and allegiance.’439 This ‘third option,’ 
between diplomacy and war fighting, was also analyzed by Loch K. Johnson. He reasoned that 
covert meddling in the affairs of foreign governments was a foreign policy objective that the US 
has relied upon more than any other state. Despite its lack of ethicality, the effectiveness of 
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clandestine operations has ensured that this practice is employed regularly in a range of aggressive 
initiatives from ‘secret propaganda operations to political and economic activities, as wells as (at 
the extreme) paramilitary attacks and assassinations.’440  
 
 By virtue of being covert, such operations require little, if any, justification. Plausible 
deniability thus shields all those involved—especially those who authorize such activities—from 
any potentially negative consequences. This is especially true of directors and several chief 
executives of US intelligence agencies who, as William J. Dougherty examined, have rebranded 
the practice of covert action from a convenient strategy to an overused foreign policy tool.441 
Warner found that to be effective, ‘covert action should remain plausibly deniable for a crucial 
time period, making it akin to wartime operational secrecy for military planners and 
commanders.’442 The less people know about an operation, the better. 
 
 Eminent scholars, like Richard J. Aldrich, have studied how clandestine agencies seek to 
influence the world by unseen means—as if by a ‘hidden hand,’ which, over time, creates a 
‘religion of secrecy.’443 But what if some of these clandestine operations are more than just one-
sided? This process of secret negotiation between parties who are not officially supposed to be 
talking is referred to as clandestine diplomacy.444 Len Scott, a professor at the University of 
Aberystwyth, found that intelligence agencies have chosen to engage in clandestine diplomacy as 
a way to negotiate terms and acquire valuable intelligence without the threat of public scrutiny.445  
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 The old US adage of ‘never negotiating with terrorists,’ may not be completely true after 
all. In fact, as later chapters will examine, the US has chosen to covertly negotiate with those whom 
it has deemed ‘mortal enemies’ for the purposes of negotiating mutually beneficial terms. 
Soleimani being one of them. However, if such negotiations do not go as planned, or do not favour 
both sides, they degrade into more traditionally understood forms of unilateral covert operations. 
Although the lawfulness of such operations rests on shaky ground, the reliance on such strategies 
still endures.446 It is when such operations result in extreme outcomes, like assassination of foreign 
government officials or the undermining of elections, that this tolerance of covert state activity is 
once more brought into question.447 To avoid these issues, secrecy in statecraft becomes vitally 
important.  
 
 According to Austin Carson, secrecy in government affairs is sometimes beneficial. This 
view challenges the established perception that ‘secrecy is a plague on peace,’ and instead posits 
that the curtailment of public knowledge may in fact prevent the dangerous escalation of matters.448 
Moreover, Carson reasoned that ‘covertness and collusion may help adversaries reach a better 
understanding’ by eliminating the public, which serves as a third-party observer or critic. Thus, 
when states choose to participate in overt wars, they signal their intentions and provide the 
adversary with little option but to engage in the same manner. When launching a covert war, more 
options exist for the adversary to respond, with clandestine diplomacy being just one example of 
such.449  
 
 Still, issues of ethicality and transparency remain a challenge for international law and 
domestic foreign policy when such diplomatic activities are carried out covertly.450 As such, a 
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balance must be struck between secrecy and transparency in order for a proper level of oversight 
and accountability to exist. Otherwise, covert action will degrade the element of domestic 
accountability which is of paramount importance in democratic societies. Although covert action 
may be strategically important, it remains nonetheless dangerous. For even authoritarian leaders 
like Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin still ‘exercised a surprising degree of cautions statecraft through 
the covert sphere.’451 
 
 Covert action can be effective—if used in moderation. This is because the overreliance on 
policies of concealment, obfuscation, denial and deflection can backfire quickly. The British 
became particularly skilled at this practice of ‘statecraft by stealth.’ According to Steven B. 
Wagner, the British intelligence state came about from a series of clandestine operations which 
resulted in policy-making strategies that struck the perfect balance between transparency and the 
strategic benefits accrued during covert action. The UK has since ‘devoted considerable attention 
to intelligence gathering and analyses,’ in addition to regulating the use of secrecy in statecraft.452  
 
 Other states have not been so fortunate. The US, for instance, has chosen to expand its 
policy of secrecy in statecraft without ensuring proper limitations or oversight, and has since 
suffered significant negative consequences. The Trump presidency also had a proclivity for 
fabricating intelligence and misconstruing facts, which also served to undermine the accountability 
of the US government in cases where its covert practices were revealed. Ben Worthy and Marlen 
Heide discovered that in addition to the ‘lies’ spewed by the Trump White House, there was also 
an ‘unintentional openness’ which also served to undermine the presidency, and by extension, all 
covert actions it had authorized.453  
 
 This issue was compounded by the fact that the US president held a strong aversion to 
transparency—both domestically and internationally. In May 2020, President Trump announced 
that he would withdraw from the ‘Open Skies’ Treaty. This agreement had been established in 
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2002 with the goal of promoting military transparency in nearly three dozen nations. Yet, in 
November of 2020, Mike Pompeo announced that the US had formally withdrawn from the treaty. 
Their alleged reason for doing so was in response to Russia violating the terms of the treaty, a 
claim which Putin strongly denied.454  
 
 The increasing reliance on covert action and secrecy in statecraft, necessitates that a system 
of oversight and appropriate transparency be upheld in order to ensure that the democratic concept 
of accountability is respected. Without this, state actions can degrade into evermore intrusive, 
dangerous, unethical and illegal forms. Accordingly, there is a need for greater study on these 
practices to offer a level of oversight which is, at present, sorely lacking.455 The following section 
will briefly examine how assassination, like secrecy, has also been used as a tool of statecraft.  
 
Assassination as Tool of Statecraft 
 
The deliberate killing of a high-value target(s) is a strategy that has been relied upon for centuries. 
Though the motivations and methods with which this is achieved changes, the act of assassination 
still remains the same. In traditional wars, assassination was frowned upon as it was considered a 
dishonourable way to kill one’s adversary, void of courage and integrity. With the advance in 
military technologies, however, such strategies were reconsidered. What was once deplorable now 
became strategically vital.  
 
 Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin have written extensively on assassination and preventative 
killings. In a 2005 article, the authors explored the role that assassination played in the framework 
of counterterrorism. They found that although ethical principles do not permit assassination to be 
used as a strategy, the practice can be used as a tool under certain circumstances.456 So, the authors 
reason that assassination as a tool in limited cases can be permitted if sufficient oversight is given, 
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but its existence as an enduring strategy in the military arsenal of states remains morally 
objectionable. This is because assassinations are politically risky operations which can result in 
consequences that have unimaginable global implications.457 The assassination of one man, 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, provoked the first world war which claimed the lives of around 40 
million people.458 Hence, the US assassination of the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani could have 
resulted in a similar fallout. However, the fallout from this strike was quickly eclipsed by the start 
of a global pandemic.  
 
 Could assassination ever be viewed as an ethical tool of statecraft? According to Tamar 
Meisels and Jeremy Waldron, believe that this question is useless as the practice has already 
become commonplace. Yet, they do caution against allowing assassination to become a norm as 
‘it proliferates quickly,’ especially in operations which already lack proper oversight and 
accountability. Killing terrorists by drone, the authors argue, can be permissible in cases where no 
other option exists.459 Still, a rather deep line is drawn in the sand when it comes to this reasoning 
as well. Due to ethical and legal concerns, and perhaps drawn from the cautious tale of the first 
world war, scholars like Ward Thomas believe that assassinations should remain ‘off limits as a 
policy option, especially when the target is a national leader.’460 Some states recognize the 
potential dangers associated with assassinating foreign leaders or high-ranking officials, but they 
do it anyway. 
 
 The United States has launched many assassination campaigns since the start of the ‘global 
war on terror.’ Yet, as Laurie Calhoun has found, there is a general ‘lack of public discourse 
surrounding drones’ in the US. Ignorance, indifference or gradual desensitization may be to blame 
as there has yet to be any significant public outcry or protest in response to the sordid details leaked 
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on haphazard clandestine assassination operations the US has authorized internationally. Even the 
strike on Soleimani garnered a few minutes of primetime attention was quickly replaced by 
coverage of the ‘Megxit’ scandal brewing in the UK. Blessed with the fortune of an uninterested 
public, the US drone program has turned assassinations by drone into its standard operating 
procedure.461 It is no longer just a tool in statecraft. Now, it is the first option considered by those 
heading the drone program. This is problematic in that an overreliance on assassination violates 
international law.  
 
 Thomas M. McDonnell reasoned that it may be permissible to eliminate known terrorists 
who find themselves within the boundaries of an established battlefield, or within the territory of 
a failed state (to avoid the potential of territorial sovereignty infringement). However, the 
tolerability towards this tool of statecraft should only granted in extreme cases. Justifying 
adherence to international law, by arguing abidance to current parameters or declaring that all 
programs undertaken (including those employing assassination strategies) are necessary and 
discriminate, is no longer enough. The US has become a master at spinning narratives to suit their 
interests post-op.462  
 
 Claiming adherence to international laws or maintaining that the use of assassination 
strategies is employed in limited cases of ‘targeted killing’ is therefore no longer credible. The 
US’s flimsy relationship with the truth, and the subsequent impact on its perceived legitimacy and 




In 2016, Oxford Dictionaries named ‘post-truth’ word of the year.463 The timing was quite 
indicative of the political culture at the time with the policies and practices of the Trump 
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administration having had a significant impact on the whole of political culture. Abetted by the 
use of social media platforms and perpetuated by the domestic coverage of an engrossed 24-hour 
news cycle, this dogmatic shift took hold and signified a new era in politics. Although it could be 
argued that post-truth politics came about as a result of the behaviour of the President Trump and 
his administration, it undoubtedly had a striking effect beyond the territorial borders of the US. By 
2018, most democratic nations had adopted the term, and used it to reference events like the US 
presidential election and the Brexit referendum.464 
  
 To provide conceptual clarity on this topic, it is necessary to first present an adequate 
definition. According to David Roberts, the man who initially coined the term, post-truth politics 
can be understood as ‘a political culture in which politics (public opinion and media narratives) 
have become almost entirely disconnected from policy (the substance of legislation).’465 These 
disconnects can be purposefully made to ensure that real truths, ones which might harm existing 
political or governmental order, are not made public. Or, even if they are, these would be stifled 
by the mass of information already disseminated in the political arena. In extreme cases, however, 
post-truth politics can fuel conspiracy theories.466 
 
 Some scholars have reasoned that post-truth politics, or fake news as it has also been 
referred to, can be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Jonathan Rose found that ‘fake news 
often tries to reinforce sincerely held beliefs while providing a supplementary narrative that the 
authorities or the mainstream media do not want you to know about.’ The political climate, one 
founded on the existence of well-demarcated sides, poses a significant challenge. This, in addition 
to the ease with which information can be shared online, allows such mistruths to grow at a viral 
rate.467 Stewart Lockie studied the issue and made a rather interesting observation. He posited that 
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the content of post-truth claims may not matter as much as previously thought.468 Instead, audience 
opinions may be the most important element in the equation. Thus, he determined that it does not 
matter 
 
whether the claims of politicians can be proven true. What matters is whether 
those listening to those claims would like them to be true—truth being judged 
not by evidence but by consistency with listeners’ existing beliefs and values. 
Politicians may long have been among the least trusted members of our 
societies, but the idea of post-truth politics suggests there is an important 
qualitative difference between the post-truth politician and the spin doctors of 
yore. The post-truth politician does not simply pick-and-choose among 
relevant facts, offer questionable interpretations or avoid inconvenient 
questions. The post-truth politician manufactures his or her own facts. The 
post-truth politician asserts whatever they believe to be in their own interest, 
and they continue to press those same claims, regardless of the evidence 
amassed against them.469 
 
There were several circumstances, including the widely publicized Soleimani strike, which 
challenged the post-truth claims echoed by the Trump administration. However, the public was 
equally split along partisan lines—with loyalist Republicans firmly touting the views of the 
president. This blind allegiance was indicative of the post-truth climate. Before the era of Donald 
Trump, American political parties were far less estranged. News outlets reported stories in similar 
ways, and politicians, government officials and even the office of the president was scrutinized by 
those from both side of the aisle when the circumstances called for such.  
 
 Yet, the emergence and salience of fake news and post-truth created an environment of 
uncertainty and suspicion.470 As the Trump era progressed, news outlets became evermore 
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polarized, catering stories to suit the partisan views of its audience. Fox News became a 
Republican mecca, hosting Trump regularly and facilitating his ability to spin narratives, spread 
misinformation and perpetuate the post-truth culture. Scholars like Rhys Crilley have argued that 
the Trump era thus marked an epochal shift ‘from an age of reason and facts to an age of emotion 
and lies.’471 But if facts no longer drove the narrative in the political sphere, what did? 
 
 According to Jason Hannan, the answer might lie online. The advance in communication 
technologies, particularly those offered by social media platforms, has driven the dissemination of 
these post-truths. In the cyber realm, the practice of trolling has only exacerbated the situation. 
The popularity of trolling has ‘gone mainstream, shaping politics and even legislation.’472 As such, 
greater research and scholarly investigation is necessary to determine how post-truths are formed, 
circulated and understood.  
 
 In 2018, Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans published ‘Assembling Credibility: 
Knowledge, Method and Critique in Times of Post-Truth.’ In the article, the authors explore the 
critical approaches taken in security studies and the methods and practices used in analyzing post-
truth validity. They suggest that the concept of validity needs to be included in analyses in order 
for ‘critical security studies and international relations to displace epistemic disputes about ‘post-




Post-truths affect more than just public perception. They also impact the legitimacy, or perceived 
legitimacy, of a state and its affairs. In some cases, corruption, denial and post-truths, can lead to 
a legitimation crisis which could result in an erosion of legitimacy. Thus, legitimacy becomes an 
important concept to examine, particularly following the widely publicized Soleimani strike.  
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 But what is legitimacy? Since the concept is quite mercurial, there exist debates about every 
facet of legitimacy—from its definition to its applications and validity.474 Yet, in order to develop 
a solid foundation upon which the following discussion and analysis will be built, a definition of 
legitimacy must be presented. Chosen for its popularity, scholarly impact and enduring relevance, 
Peter G. Stillman’s definition of the concept of legitimacy will be referenced. Stillman defined 
legitimacy as ‘the compatibility of the results of governmental output with the value patterns of 
the relevant systems, that is, those affected by these results (especially the value pattern of the 
society, but also of individuals, groups, and other societies).’475 Unfortunately, values and value 
patterns are malleable and subjective concepts.  
 
 It is for this reason that Christopher Thomas believes the concept of legitimacy is misused, 
under scrutinized and misinterpreted. In an attempt to address the issue, Thomas proposes that 
there are three forms of legitimacy (social, moral and legal), each with its own challenges, 
requirements and applications.476 Yet, despite the type of legitimacy examined, he argued that each 
form is comprised of three major components which remain unchanged. These include the object, 
the subject and the basis. Simply put, Thomas argues that the obfuscation of the concept of 
legitimacy, regardless of the type, might be attributed to the uncertainty regarding the 
aforementioned components.477 This uncertainty might be due to the ‘language games’ used 
throughout the conceptual history of legitimacy. Shane P. Mulligan examined this issue at length 
within his article on ‘The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations.’ He found that although 
the concept of legitimacy has always been intertwined with politics, it has only recently been 
closely examined as a critical measure of the health of international relations and foreign policy.478 
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Despite its obvious cruciality in political thought, legitimacy has not been the topic of focus or 
analysis in international relations literature.479  
 
 Researchers, like John Fraser, have tried to fill this gap by developing ways to measure the 
concept of legitimacy in order to make it easier to observe, and therefore study.480 But attempting 
to measure a precarious concept has proven rather difficult. Yet, this still has not deterred scholars 
like M. Stephen Weatherford from attempting to develop a formal measurement system capable 
of quantitively ascertaining the degrees of legitimacy through an identification of certain 
indicators.481 Although this research is far from being applicable to the current political climate, it 
is nonetheless an important step forward. The indicators Weatherford identified, however, do not 
focus on the important role that the public plays in the concept of legitimacy.  
 
 Sarah B. K. von Billerbeck and Birte Julia Gippert arrived at the same conclusion, and thus 
they decided to investigate what other elements in the legitimacy equation might be missing. In 
their 2017 article examining the role of legitimacy in conflict, the authors determined that there 
are three main areas of focus which must be considered in order for legitimacy to be properly 
assessed. These include a focus on the sources of legitimacy, the targeted audience, and the means 
by which the purported legitimization is achieved.482 The analysis, however, was by no means 
comprehensive. This is because it did not examine the motivations of states.  
 
 There are reasons behind every decision made—especially in politics. Diplomacy is a 
policy-driven practice, rather than relationship-based, so legitimacy plays an integral role in the 
process. Without it, the reputation of a state would degrade, negatively affecting its ability to 
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engage in such activities with the same power of authority.483 So, determining the motivations of 
states to conduct themselves in a legitimate matter becomes an important point to examine. Ian 
Hurd suggested that there are three main motivators which compel states to follow the rules. He 
proposed that states are either motivated by coercion, self-interest or the desire to appear 
legitimate. But he noted that the most important of the three is legitimacy. This is simply due to 
the fact that legitimacy ‘signals the presence of a legitimate authority’ within the international 
system, thus resulting in greater influence, power and respect, all things that states greatly desire.484 
However, legitimacy must be earned or conferred, not claimed. 
 
 Born out of necessity, some scholars have developed conceptual tools to aid in the study 
of legitimacy in covert action. Loch K. Johnson, for instance, made a rather important contribution 
to the field. Initially, he was interested in evaluating covert operations, but realized that such an 
assessment would be ineffectual if the levels of covert action were not first defined and 
categorized. Johnson proposed that legitimacy depends on a delicate balance between the nature 
of the threat and a state’s response to the perceived danger. So, in order to determine the balance, 
both legitimacy and covert action must be fully understood. As such, in his article, ‘On Drawing a 
Bright Line for Covert Operations,’ Johnson developed a ‘ladder of escalation’ which categorized 
a state’s strategic intelligence options from ‘routine operations’ like the sharing of low-level 
intelligence, to ‘extreme options’ like the reliance on assassination plots and the pinpointed 
retaliation of non-combatants.485 He reasoned that covert action should only escalate if there is an 
observable, documented threat to justify such a decision. In the event that the threat is not aligned 
with the covert action authorized, the balance between the two is thrown off, making legitimacy 
much more difficult to claim or prove. Thus, states should ‘draw a bright line against excessive 
covert operations.’486  
 
 
483 Jian Wang, ‘Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: 
Public Diplomacy Revisited,’ Public Relations Review, Vol. 32, Issue 2, June 2006: pp. 91-96. 
484 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,’ Journal of International 
Organizations, Vol. 53, Issue 2, Spring 1999: pp. 379-408. 
485 Loch K. Johnson, ‘On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations,’ The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 86, No. 2, April 1992: pp. 284-309. 
486 Ibid, p. 299. 
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 Still, this ladder of escalation was not the only contribution Johnson made. He also 
examined the ethical, practical and philosophical issues of evaluating covert ops, once again 
realizing that this was hindered by the lack of a comprehensive set of guidelines. Fittingly, Johnson 
also suggested a way to address the issue—by employing a legitimacy checklist, one which he 
developed, to objectively and comprehensively evaluate covert action. The checklist is comprised 
on eleven guidelines. They are as follows:  
 
(1) whenever possible, shun covert operations in favor of diplomatic resolution 
of international disputes; (2) keep covert operations in harmony with publicly 
stated policy objectives; (3) conduct only those covert operations which, if 
exposed, would not un- duly embarrass the United States; (4) consult with 
intelligence analysts and other experts, not just covert- action specialists, before 
proceeding; (5) never bypass established decision procedures, including 
reporting requirements (which, except in times of acute emergency, ought to be 
prospective, not merely retrospective); (6) never violate the laws of the United 
States (short of the rare Lincoln-esque need to save the nation in a time of 
desperation); (7) against fellow democracies eschew all but the most routine 
covert operations; (8) even against nondemocratic regimes, remain at the lower, 
less-intrusive end of the escalation ladder, applying the just war rule of 
proportionality and rising upward only in despair; (9) reject arrangements for 
information sharing or other intelligence activities with any nation practicing, or 
allowing within its territory, a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights; (10) in almost all cases, reject secret 
wars, coups d'etat and other extreme measures, for if America's interests are so 
jeopardized as to require major forceful intervention, properly authorized overt 
warfare-ideally, multinational in nature and at the invitation of a legitimate 
government or faction- is a more appropriate and honorable option; (11) in 
considering covert operations, always remember above all the im- portance to 
the United States of its longstanding tradition of fair play.487  
 
 
487 Ibid, p. 305. 
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Although Johnson’s checklist was certainly detailed, it’s applicability inevitably weakened with 
the passing of time. It is for this reason why this checklist was insufficient for the purposes of this 
project, thus necessitating a new theoretical framework capable of better addressing the research 
objectives set forth in this dissertation. For instance, Johnson argued that a state could only use 
covert action in preemptive self-defence for threats of genocide and weapons of mass 
destruction.488 So where might the Soleimani strike fit it? Would the omission of threats alternative 
threats, like terrorism, mean that they cannot be legitimate reasons to act in self-defence? Johnson 
developed his checklist 28 years before the Soleimani strike. It can be reasonably assumed that 
there were some things the author did not consider or even imagined, and thus the need for a new 
legitimacy checklist arose.  
 
 The theoretical framework developed for this project differed from Johnson’s in a number 
of ways. For brevity, only three main differences will be briefly noted here. First, it took a broader 
focus on threats which might permit pre-emptive state action. Post-9/11, the threat of terrorism 
became an unrelenting fear for states, which permitted greater flexibility in previously rigid 
military policies, with the purpose of thwarting plots and preventing extremist violence. Second, 
it took a multidisciplinary approach, by including conditions proposed by international law, 
scholars, and even military doctrine. And third, it focused on covert operations reliant on 
unmanned aerial vehicles, and considered the ethical, strategic and legal consequences of such.  
 
 Yet, even though Johnson’s legitimacy checklist was not as applicable in 2020 as it was in 
1992, several of his observations are still very much applicable today. In particular, he posited that 
the ‘excessive use of highly intrusive intelligence options has done much to discredit the West, 
making its secret services sometimes seem little different from that of its erstwhile enem[ies].’489 
Fast forward nearly two decades, and this observation still holds—even if the weapons used, 
strategies employed, and threats feared are markedly different. Yet, even despite its limitations, 
Johnson’s article is still considered a seminal text for its theoretical contributions and original 
suggestions for further research—all of which paved the way for further scholarship on the topic. 
 
488 Ibid, p. 303. 
489 Ibid, p. 309; see also John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert 
Operations Since World War II, William Morrow and Company, 1986. 
 137 
 
 Hardly a year since Johnson published his seminal text, yet another important scholar 
sought to examine whether ‘Covert Action Can Be Just.’ This article was originally intended to 
remain in private circulation within the CIA, but it was later deemed too theoretically important to 
conceal its findings. The author was James A. Barry, the Deputy Director of the CIA’s Center for 
the Study of Intelligence, whose position had undoubtedly contributed to his long-held belief that 
covert action was an unparalleled strategic tool for US intelligence agencies.  
 
 Despite his support for the covert action, he was nonetheless concerned with the 
increasingly unethical and unlawful activities being authorized during such operations. As such, 
his article employed Just War Theory, the Doolittle Report, and key lessons learned from 
intelligence operations during the 1960s-1970s, to propose a different intelligence approach for 
the 1990s. Barry argued that 
 
The United States would be well-served by establishing a policy process 
modeled after the just-war criteria. To do this, the current procedures should be 
revised so that, at each stage in the covert action approval process, difficult 
questions are asked about the objectives, methods, and management of a 
proposed operation. It is equally important that they be answered in detail, with 
rigor, and in writing—even (perhaps especially) when time is of the essence. 
Covert operators are reluctant to commit sensitive details to paper, but this is 
essential if the United States is to meet high standards of accountability when 
the easy rationalization of fighting [terrorism] is no longer available.490 
 
Accountability must be an internal motivator, a goal which is set, regulated and achieved by the 
intelligence agency authorizing the covert action(s). There already exists a standard set of seven 
prerequisites which the CIA is supposed to be following. The Covert Action Review Group, which 
provides internal oversight on the CIA’s covert operations, requires that these be investigated 
during the initial approval process, before approval can be granted. These prerequisites include 
 
490 James A. Barry, ‘Covert Action Can Be Just,’ Orbis, Vol. 37, Issue 3, 1993: p. 386. 
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proof of just cause, just intervention, proper authority, last resort, probability of success, 
proportionality, and discrimination and control.491  
 
 Proof is the operative word. According to Barry, the days of covert action being based on 
‘sweeping generalities’ should have ceased with the end of the cold war. Subsequently, covert 
actions abroad should have also decreased, and those which were approved, would need to be 
approved on a case-to-case basis using rigorous standards of justification. To ensure this, Barry 
suggested ‘adopting a covert action management system… [that] would move the process 
substantially in this direction.’492 Even if this system is not effective, meaning that it does not stop 
unethical or illegal activities during covert operations, reform is still important because it would 
‘signal that the United States is concerned—even in secret activities—with issues of right and 
wrong and not merely with power.493 It would promote openness and accountability and 
underscore that we firmly reject the repugnant philosophy of the Doolittle Report.’494  
 
 This is because perception matters. Not just for legality and ethicality, but also for 
legitimacy. For how could a state claim to be legitimate without demonstrating adherence to a 
defined set of ethical standards of operation? Barry’s article addressed many of the shortcomings 
in Johnson’s publication, but it still did not focus on the use of drones in covert actions, and how 
the nature of the weapon might impact the perceived legitimacy of the operation as a whole. This 
gap in the scholarship was only just addressed in 2016. 
 
 Larry Lewis and Diane M. Vavrichek published an article with the objective of ‘Rethinking 
the Drone War,’ but more precisely, its role in national security, legitimacy and the greater US 
counterterrorism program. They began by outlining the differences between the legal and doctrinal 
 
491 Ibid, pp. 386-388. 
492 Ibid, p. 389. 
493 See also Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., ‘The Legitimacy of Covert Action: Sorting Out the Moral 
Responsibilities,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 
1990: pp. 525: ‘The key question, then, is not whether the United States should have the capability, 
but how to ensure that the Executive Branch executes covert actions in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution. An important part of the answer lies in the constitutional role played by Congress 
in exercising its proper oversight functions. A lack of oversight can weaken the process of good 
government; so can an excess of that oversight.’ 
494 Ibid, 390. 
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definitions of covert actions.495 This distinction is an important one to make, especially when 
trying to determine when and how constraints should be placed on covert actions. Then then made 
recommendations on how to reform existing international norms to make them better able at 
addressing current US practices (including a focus on remote weaponry).496 These proposals were 
suggested with the intention of making existing institutions within the US, including its 
intelligence agencies, more accountable to IHL.497  
 
 Building off of the conclusions made in Barry’s article, Lewis and Vavrichek then engage 
in a lengthy dialogue regarding the need for the CIA to ensure that its covert actions abide by IHL 
rules, norms, laws and guidelines. Whether this means including relevant IHL doctrine among the 
prerequisites of the Covert Action Review Group, was not specified. However, the authors did 
note that agencies, like the CIA, must commit to conducting independent reviews to ensure that its 
covert operations abide by international law. In doing so, it demonstrates a level of accountability, 
which as Barry and Johnson suggested before, will improve ‘the legitimacy of the United States 
and its partners… [which] provide a path for improving long-term national security and 
international stability.’498  
 
 In cases of questionable state actions, there is perhaps an even greater need to fully 
convince the public of the necessity of the action undertaken—thus attaining legitimacy.499 It is 
similarly important to recognize that making noise in the political arena does not result in 
legitimacy. This becomes especially true in the case of the Trump administration which attempted 
to obfuscate the legality of the Soleimani strike by offering more lies rather than evidence. These 
practices have undoubtedly contributed to the normative turn in foreign policy, a phenomenon 
which will be examined more closely in the following section. 
 
Normative Turn in Foreign Policy  
 
495 Larry Lewis and Diane Vavrichek, ‘Rethinking the Drone War,’ Marine Corps University 
Press, 2016: p. 217. 
496 Ibid, p. 206. 
497 Ibid, p. 203. 
498 Ibid, p. 207. 
499 See Michael Hechter, ‘Legitimacy in the Modern World,’ American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 
53, Issue 3, 12 October 2009: pp. 279-288. 
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Since 2014, there have been several important works published by scholars regarding the role 
narratives play in international relations and foreign policy. These will be briefly introduced and 
discussed to determine how the narrative turn came about, what role it played after the Soleimani 
strike, and how this affected the perceived legitimacy of the US government.  
 
 Jelena Subotić, a political science professor at Georgia State University, researched the 
role that narratives play in security and foreign policy change. She revealed that narratives could 
have the power to change state policy, rather than merely influence its course. During times of 
great turmoil or crisis, Subotić posited that threats would selectively activate certain narratives to 
‘provide a cognitive bridge between policy change that resolves the physical security challenge, 
while also preserving state ontological security through offering autobiographical continuity, a 
sense of routine, familiarity, and calm.’500 This means that narratives can become dominant at 
different times, depending on the circumstances affecting a state.  
 
 Ronald Krebs, a professor at the University of Minnesota, confirmed Subotić’s 
conclusions. Yet, he went one step further, claiming that narratives might be able to change more 
than just foreign policy. If there exists a high degree of consensus, dominant narratives, like those 
regarding the War on Terror, could shape national security policy and even international law.501 
This is because discourse consensus, according to Krebs, creates strong narratives. If this 
consensus weakens, then the narrative will collapse. There is, however, an interesting irony to this 
relationship. Krebs found that following military victories, narratives tend to weaken or fall as 
there exists free time for reflection, criticism and self-improvement.502 The reverse is true 
following military defeats. So, if discourse has a considerable impact on narratives, which in turn 
directly influence or change foreign policy and security, then it might serve as an effective means 
of analysis.  
 
500 Jelena Subotić, ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,’ Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Volume 12, Issue 4, October 2016: pp. 610–627. 
501 Ronald Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, Cambridge University Press, 
2015.   
502 Ronald Krebs, ‘How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the 
Cold War Consensus,’ International Organization, Vol. 64, Issue 4, Fall 2015: pp. 809-845. 
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 Kai Oppermann and Alexander Spencer sought to determine what effect narrative 
constructions have on foreign policy, particularly during events branded as ‘fiascos.’ They found 
that discourse could serve as an analytical method capable of measuring the social construction of 
policy fiascos.503 But they were not alone in this observation. Around the same time, Carina van 
de Wetering was researching US-India relations in the post-Cold War period. Despite having a 
different focus on analysis due to the case study she was examining, she likewise concluded that 
discourse influences established security policies and foreign relations.  
 
 Underlying discourse, van de Wetering argued, may explain why US foreign policy is 
constrained or loosened depending on the relationship between the states in question.504 Yet, 
discourse may not be the only reason behind this change. Kathrin Bachleitner, a foreign policy 
researcher, posited that collective memory might also play a critical role in state behaviour.505 
Thus, diplomacy may be conducted with ‘memory.’ She cited how countries with a shared 
traumatic past, especially those who may have been adversaries in conflict, might conduct their 
diplomatic affairs from a more guarded position.506  
 
 So, collective memory influences discourse which forms narratives that have the power to 
change policy. The narrative turn occurred when discourse is manipulated by governments or their 
elected officials to change the narrative to permit or justify their actions, often after the fact. 
Following the Soleimani strike, US President Trump used his position of power, and the 
unavailability of intelligence to ‘spin’ the discourse in his favour—thus creating a narrative that 
deviated from the truth and resulted in mounting suspicion which had a negative impact on the 
perceived legitimacy of the US, its counterterror operation, and the mission it authorized against 
 
503 Kai Oppermann and Alexander Spencer. ‘Telling Stories of Failure: Narrative Constructions of 
Foreign Policy Fiascos,’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 23, Issue 5, 18 January 2016: 
pp. 685-701. 
504 Carina van de Wetering, Changing US Foreign Policy Toward India, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016. 
505 Kathrin Bachleitner, Collective Memory in International Relations, Oxford University Press, 
2021: pp. 1-176. 
506 Kathrin Bachleitner, ‘Diplomacy with Memory: How the Past Is Employed for Future Foreign 
Policy,’ Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 15, Issue 4, October 2019: pp. 492-508. 
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the Iranian General. This will be examined in greater detail during later chapters, but it is important 
to note that a manipulation of discourse might change the narrative—but it will also weaken the 
legitimacy of those responsible. The following chapter will examine past counterterror operations 


























Chapter 4: Learning from the Past 
The Failed Fadlallah Assassination 
 
Decision-makers often draw on the recent past when developing both policy and strategy. They 
use analogies to inform their reasoning. In short, lessons are often drawn from past experiences to 
help cope with difficult choices. Using more technical language, social psychologists would say 
that such policy learning implies that schemas will be recalled to explain the phenomenon in 
question. In other words, decisions will be based on target-oriented, history-dependent routines. 
To better understand the current state of affairs, it is, therefore, worth examining the recent past, 
from the inception of the US preemptive counter-terror assassination programme to its first 
operational gaffe.507  
 
 In 1984, the Reagan administration established the National Security Decision Directives 
(NSDD)-138, which set the groundwork for the CIA’s preemptive counterterrorism program.508 
According to Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, the US State Department Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism from 1984-86, was Lt. Col. Oliver North. He, along with National Security 
Advisor Robert C. McFarlane, Rear Admiral John Poindexter, and the Director of Central 
Intelligence, Willian J. Casey, was largely responsible for the foundation and development of the 
preemption program.509  
 
 
507 Dan Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past,’ World 
Politics, Vol.46, No.4 (1993), p. 490. 
508 James Larry Taulbee, ‘Retaliation, Deterrence, Terrorism and the Regan Administration,’ 
Defence Analysis, Vol. 4 (1985), pp. 281-283; Bob Woodward, Veil: The CIA Secret Wars, 1981-
87 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) p. 362; Bob Woodward and Charles R. Babcock, 
‘Antiterrorist Plan Rescinded After Unauthorized Bombing,’ The Washington Post, 12 May 1985, 
p. A-26; see also Uri Fisher, ‘Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values,’ Homeland Security 
Affairs 3.1 (2007); Bruno S. Frey and Simon Luechinger, ‘How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives 
to Deterrence,’ Defence and Peace Economics Vol.14, No.4 (2003), pp. 237-249; Todd Sandler 
and Kevin Siqueira, ‘Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Pre‐Emption,’ Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue Canadienne D'économique Vol.39, No.4 (2006), pp. 1370-1387; and Javier 
Argomaniz and Alberto Vidal-Diez, ‘Examining Deterrence and Backlash Effects in Counter-
Terrorism: The Case of Eta,’ Terrorism and Political Violence Vol.27, No.1 (2015), pp. 160-181. 
509 Richard J. Chasdi, ‘Counterterror Failure: The Fadlallah Assassination Attempt,’ Strategic 
Studies Institute (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2012), p. 308. 
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 In Lebanon, the US preemptive attack programme hoped to ensure stability in the region 
while addressing Islamic revivalist-extremists' terrorist assaults in the Middle East against US 
interests.510 Before the creation of the US preemptive counterterror programme in 1984, Hezbollah 
(under the guise of the Islamic Jihad Organization) planned and executed several provocative 
abductions of Americans during the early 1980s. The abductions most notably included Professor 
David Dodge, the interim President of the American University of Beirut (AUB), taken hostage 
on July 19, 1982; the January 1984 murder of Professor Malcolm Kerr, President of the American 
University of Beirut; the February 1984 abduction of Dr Frank Regier, an AUB Professor of 
Electrical Engineering; the abduction of Reverend Benjamin Weir and Jeffrey Levin of CNN in 
March 1984; and the abduction of Father Lawrence Jenco in January 1985.511  
 
 However, the last straw came with the abduction, torture, and eventual murder of CIA 
Bureau Station Chief William Buckley in March 1984. According to Prof. Richard J. Chasdi from 
the University of Windsor, it was this watershed moment that ‘may have had the most profound 
and lasting implications for the US policy in Lebanon.’512 Hezbollah sent videotapes of Buckley 
under interrogation to the CIA station in Athens. Spurred on by William Casey, a personal friend 
of Buckley, the CIA began hunting Hezbollah and its spiritual leader, Fadlallah.513 So, on March 
8th, 1985, Ayatollah Mohammed Hussayn Fadlallah, the ‘spiritual leader’ of Hezbollah, was 
marked for death by the CIA and Mossad. However, due to a lack of bureaucratic consensus, 
 
510 Chasdi, ‘Counterterror Failure: The Fadlallah Assassination Attempt,’ p. 324. 
511 Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism, 
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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 74; William Claiborne, ‘Shiite Group Issues 
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Operations From World War II Through the Persian Gulf (Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperbacks, 
1996), pp. 379; Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for 
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June 2008; see also Chasdi, ‘Counterterror Failure: The Fadlallah Assassination Attempt,’ p. 326. 
513 Chasdi, ‘Counterterror Failure: The Fadlallah Assassination Attempt,’ p. 326. 
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particularly amongst those at the White House and across several national security agencies, the 
plan to kill Fadlallah was not adequately prepared, considered or communicated.514  
 
Scholars believe this lack of planning, coupled with a misunderstanding of the Lebanese 
political landscape and an inability to address the Hezbollah movement, negatively affected the 
mission effectivity. Furthermore, the absence of a strong National Security Advisor, and a lack of 
consensus found in the upper levels of foreign policy advisors in the executive branch, also 
contributed to the overall confusion about Middle East policy and raised questions concerning the 
counterterror program's competency. Many in the Middle East viewed the Fadlallah attack as the 
US pursuing its interests by force. Administrative inadequacies, particularly in the US National 
Intelligence Officer (NIO) organization, prevented analyses from being considered in Fadlallah's 
policy recommendations. In the absence of such, extreme and risky options were furthered under 
the guise of counterterror strategies. Since ‘there was no proactive effort to gauge Fadlallah’s day-
to-day involvement with Hezbollah's operational side, [it] led American officials to focus… [its] 
attention on Fadlallah rather than on chief tacticians such as Iman Mughniyeh and Hussayn al-
Musawi.’515 
 
It should be noted that, at the time, US foreign policy in Lebanon was primarily ad hoc in 
nature. The Reagan administration had a list of incomplete objectives that conflicted with 
Lebanon's political climate.516 This incompatibility served as the first reason why the foreign 
policy in the region was largely unplanned.517 The second reason pointed to competitive and 
 
514 Ben Bradlee, A Good Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Woodward, Veil. 
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Tragedy (New York: Public Affairs Publishing, 2019); see also Wyn Q. Bowen, ‘Deterrence and 
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corrosive bureaucratic politics within the United States, particularly the lack of a robust National 
Security Advisor. Consequently, it was bureaucratic politics that served as the biggest challenge 
in this mission. Suffice it to say, the plan to kill Fadlallah failed. Although Fadlallah escaped 
unharmed, the car bomb used injured over 200 civilians and killed more than 80 in the Bir al-Abd 
quarter of Beirut, Lebanon. Orchestrated by the CIA under its newly-established preemption 
program, this botched assassination further tarnished the American reputation in Lebanon, which 
fanned the flames of anti-Western sentiments that facilitated the recruitment and radicalization of 
new members within Hezbollah’s ranks.  
 
 This unsuccessful assassination plot marked the initial mistake in the CIA’s 
counterterrorism operations against Hezbollah. Thus, it is a worthwhile episode to discuss for 
several reasons. First, the fallout, which can result from preemptive counterterrorism activities, is 
quite apparent in this case. Although international law affords, under strict conditions, the ability 
to engage in anticipatory self-defence operations, it does not require any risk calculation to be 
made pre-strike. Even if such an evaluation were required by international law, without any 
supranational oversight, this could be easily and subjectively altered by states in their interest to 
allow similar strikes to proceed. Consequently, the fallout, or the potential of destructive 
consequences from preemptive counterterrorism activities, is generally unpredictable. At a 
functional level, the failed assassination attempt on Fadlallah demonstrates quite clearly what 
could go wrong as a result of such activities.518 Civilian casualties, property damage, increased 
recruitment and radicalization, target escape, and regional apathy towards Western involvement 
are just a few such costs. 
 
 Second, the Fadlallah attempt also illustrates how disagreement within the US government 
regarding the use of preemptive strike in counterterrorism operations ‘can reduce its overall 
legitimacy, and thereby, in effect, facilitate vacillation and hesitancy in the policy’s 
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implementation.’519 Unwilling to wait for final US approval, ‘local operatives who were recruited 
for the programme apparently became restless and attempted to independently carry out the 
mission.’520 And third, the tensions and competition between US agencies resulted in a toxic 
bureaucratic environment. As Graham Allison, a Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy 
School noted, the effects of this competitive environment resulted in a ‘pulling and hauling’ 
dynamic wherein the US Department of Defence, the Department of State, the Executive Branch 
and the CIA disagreed about how to approach the threat posed by Hezbollah, and by association, 
Fadlallah.521 Flawed US assumptions about Lebanese politics compounded by naïve expectations 
of their relationship with the Lebanese authorities ‘contributed to a lack of cogent policy direction 
in Lebanon, which was ultimately reflected in the Fadlallah assassination attempt.’522 It also stands 
to reason that an examination of the Fadlallah ‘assassination attempt and the organizational 
dynamics which underpinned it, deserve a careful review because similar dynamics could 
influence more contemporary counterterror choices.’523 Therefore, to understand the long shadow 
of the past and avoid the same consequences of the Fadlallah attempt, it becomes imperative to 
examine the Fadlallah case to learn from its setbacks.524 
 
Distinguished American scholars, like Boaz Ganor, Martha Crenshaw, Roger N. 
McDermott, J. Paul de Taillon, Paul R. Pillar, Ian O. Lesser, Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen 
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 148 
have each independently determined that in the absence of (i) clear foreign policy objectives, (ii) 
basic consideration for international laws, and (iii) a relative level of domestic consensus within 
and among government agencies, CIA-led US counterterror operations will continue to beget 
consequences like those experienced during the Fadlallah stratagems.525 
 
 The United States suffered numerous problems as a result of its involvement in the botched 
Fadlallah assassination. As mentioned earlier, the US reputation in Lebanon and the greater Middle 
East was tarnished. According to James Larry Taulbee, a Political Science Professor at Emory 
University, at the time, many people were angered by the variable nature of US foreign policy.526 
But reputations and sentiments were not the only casualties. Following the Fadlallah affair, anger 
towards the US incited many to participate in attacks and terroristic activities directed at the United 
States and its interests. For instance, shortly after the failed Fadlallah operation, kidnappings 
resumed with the abduction of American journalist Terry Anderson on March 16, 1985.527 A day 
later, two British citizens, Gordon Nash and Brian Levick were kidnapped after being mistaken 
for Americans.528 Two months later, an attempt was made on the life of the Emir of Kuwait.529 A 
month after that, Trans World Airlines Flight 847 was hijacked.530  
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 Those enraged by the various actions and counter-actions (the exact chain is not always 
clear even to those on the ground) resorted to fighting fire with fire. Or, in this case, terror with 
terror. Under the direction of William J. Casey, the CIA's preemptive counterterrorism programme 
began less than a month after Hezbollah attacked the US Embassy in Beirut in 1984.531 As 
Ambassador Oakley recalled, ‘after the Marine barracks and then the American embassy had been 
blown up [in 1983], there was a very strong feeling in Washington; we cannot just sit back and 
wait for them to do it again.’532 Caspar W. Weinberger, the then US Secretary of Defence, was 
quite adamant in his belief that the United States should not, by any means (covert or otherwise), 
participate in assassination or leadership decapitation strategies targeting terrorist leaders or known 
affiliates.533  
 
Weinberger’s senior aide was General Colin Powell, who similarly voiced his disapproval 
concerning the US’ plan to assassinate Fadlallah.534 Aligned with Weinberger and Powell was 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon, who was similarly concerned with the 
strategy. They worried that in killing Fadlallah, they would be violating Executive Order (EO) 
12333, which prohibits assassinations.535 On the other hand, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
William J. Casey, and the CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin stood in complete disagreement 
with Weinberger and McMahon.536 Both strongly advocated for the use of assassination strategies 
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in counterterrorism operations by finding their legal and moral justifications within the 
international customary law of anticipatory self-defence and Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
 
 Jonathan M. Fredman, a lawyer, professor and former chief counsel to the Director of 
Central Intelligence Counterterrorist Center, posited that the confusion around the parameters of 
EO 12333 could be simply disregarded. President Carter’s attempt to make the Executive Order 
stricter by removing the requirement of the term ‘political’ from the boundaries for assassination, 
which was later continued by Reagan, ‘does not apply in this type of situation,’ Fredman claimed. 
Terrorists do not follow the laws of war and should not be considered within the Executive Order. 
Fredman concluded that many covert actions appropriately might be compared to military 
operations, and in those cases, ‘the law of war supplies the terms of reference.’537 
 
 Legally and objectively speaking, the Fadlallah assassination attempt was unlawful. 
Consequently, the US is demonstrably culpable for its participation, especially in providing 
training and the supply of technology in this operation. Even if Mossad or its Lebanese outriders 
ultimately carried out the attack, it was planned and strategized within the CIA’s counterterror 
program—which is technically under US management.538 The fact that the attack was executed in 
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a residential area, using an indiscriminate weapon, is sufficient to demonstrate that the juridical 
norm of distinction was violated. The civilian death toll of 80 and the injury count of 200 
unequivocally reaffirms this fact. Following the botched Fadlallah assassination, Hezbollah 
arrested conspirators, and the international community expressed outrage over the scale of the 
civilian casualties.539 
 
 This operation was ultimately unsuccessful due to a disconnect between policy 
recommendations and implementation. It can be surmised that US officials, in response to the 
murder of their colleagues and the embassy bombings in Beirut, acted per Mile’s Law. This 
bureaucratic policy approach can be summed up as a ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ 
mentality.540 Simply put, those who personally experienced, to a greater degree, the effects of 
terroristic activities were more likely to advocate for the preemptive assassination strategy touted 
by the CIA. The idea that personal position dictated perspective is exemplified by Casey. By being 
close to the action, they experienced the terror that these extremist organizations can inflict first-
hand. Consequently, they were more likely to ‘stand’ with Casey’s position, as this seemed like 
the appropriate strategy from ‘where they sat.’ But it is also quite fascinating that there was no 
single position with the CIA, indeed distinct disagreement.  
 
 For decades, Imad Mughniyeh had been considered a terrorist chieftain by intelligence 
agencies.541 He was behind several terror attacks, kidnappings and hijackings since the early 
1980s.542 According to political science scholars like Mike Davis and Robin Wright, and indeed 
former practitioners like Robert Baer, Mughniyeh operated with Iranian interests in mind, ensuring 
that his legacy was one of sustained support of the Iranian regime.543 Swedish academic and 
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Hezbollah scholar Magnus Ranstorp recognized that Mughniyeh had been targeted not only as a 
retaliatory operation but also for his terror organization role. According to Ranstorp, Hezbollah 
operates as a clan-based system—with its structure, operations and activities being directed by 
‘two [Mughniyeh and Hamadi] clans [which] have been continuously pinpointed by the 
authorities’ as critical to the terror group.544 These clan ties create an important foundation within 
the Hezbollah organization. Baer even discovered that ‘everyone was either related by blood, had 
fought together in Fatah or hailed from the ’Ayn- Al-Dilbah neighbourhood.’545  
 
 If Mughniyeh played such a prominent role in Hezbollah, why not focus the operation on 
him? Well, there is no clear-cut answer. Since 1945, international politics has gradually focused 
more and more on non-state actors. It appears as though, in pursuing these ‘high-level terrorists,’ 
the US neglected to recognize that terror groups like Hezbollah still operate in clan structures—
therefore undervaluing Mughniyeh’s importance in the organization.546 Thus, tunnel vision 
prevented Americans from seeing the ‘broader picture’—the interconnectedness between state and 
non-state actors.547  
 
 This section has sought to discover the US counterterror program's origins by examining 
its initial failed operation—the Fadlallah affair. In doing so, several issues were identified, many 
of which remain unresolved to this day. Still, assassination strikes were absent from American 
policy in the Middle East for more than twenty years after 1985, perhaps suggesting a degree of 
policy learning. Instead, the US often preferred overt displays of force, such as participating in the 
bombing of Libya in 1986. Even here, under what many regarded as a more pro-active Reagan 
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administration, there was much hesitancy and argument.548 In counterterrorism, past operations 
are just as important as future ones as they offer strategic guidance, operational insight and even 
cautionary reminders. To ensure greater efficacy and legality in the future, the US must include 
the lessons it has learned from failed operations, like the Fadlallah affair, to improve the efficacy 
of its counter-terror program. George Santayana’s observed that ‘those who do not learn history 
are doomed to repeat it.’ This saying must be true since the US government seemingly repeated 
the Fadlallah affair's mistakes when they targeted Mughniyeh.  
 
The Mughniyeh Operation 
 
To understand and contextualize the 2020 targeted killing of Soleimani, another covert mission 
that took place twelve years earlier must be presented and examined. Not for its direct connection 
to Soleimani, although one can easily be established, but rather for its insight into the CIA’s 
changing attitude towards state-led assassinations, and the evermore discounted requirement of 
authority and proof of threat before such operations are launched.549 As in mathematics or 
geography, finding two points of reference will allow us to trace the development of the [actual] 
US position on state-led counter-terrorism assassinations over the past twelve years. 
 
The target was Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s international operations chief. He had been 
on the radar of most intelligence agencies following his involvement in several terror plots, 
kidnappings, bombings, hijackings, torture and executions.550 The most notable of which included 
his participation in the ‘embassy bombings in Beirut that killed 63 people, including eight CIA 
 
548 Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: 
Basic, 2005), pp. 159-76.  
549 See also Masoud Kazemzadeh and Gabriel Emile Eid, ‘An Analysis of the Assassination of the 
Lebanese Hezbollah Commander Imad Mughniyeh: Hypotheses and Consequences,’ American 
Foreign Policy Interests Vol.30, No.6, (2008), pp. 399-413; Gary C. Gambill and Bassam 
Endrawos, ‘Bin Laden’s Network in Lebanon,’ Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Bd 3, (2001); 
Iver Gabrielsen, ‘The Evolution of Hezbollah's Strategy and Military Performance, 1982–
2006.’ Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol.25, No.2, (2014), pp. 257-283; Hussain Abdul-Hussain, 
‘Hezbollah: A State Within a State,’ Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol.8 (2009), pp. 68-81; 
and David S. Sorenson, ‘Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel,’ 
Middle East Journal Vol.66, No.2 (2012), pp. 383-5. 
550 Tim Arango et. al., ‘Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue, Built a Shiite Axis of Power 
in Mideast,’ New York Times, 12 May 2020.  
 154 
officers. Hezbollah, supported by Iran, was involved in a long-running shadow war with Israel and 
its principal backer, the United States.’ Since then, some claimed there had been ‘an open license 
to find, fix and finish Mughniyeh and anybody affiliated with him.’551  
 
 Before the mission to kill Osama bin Laden in 2011, this particular covert joint operation 
between Mossad and the CIA ‘marked one of the most high-risk actions by the United States.’ The 
CIA has still chosen not to formally acknowledged its participation in the operation, despite 
evidence to the contrary. Five former US intelligence officials involved in the mission have since 
confirmed that the CIA provided assets to track Mughniyeh and participated in the manufacturing, 
testing, and installation of the car bomb, which eventually killed him.552 However, it is fairly 
obvious why the CIA chose to distance itself from the operation: the killing of Mughniyeh was 
carried out on somewhat shaky legal grounds.553 It was a unique complex of circumstances that 
contributed to this legal uncertainty. For the purposes of this examination, two uncontested 
operational elements will be presented. First, the operation targeted Mughniyeh in Syria—a 
country with which the US was not at war. And second, the method used to kill him was, as some 
legal scholars claim, a violation of ‘killing by perfidy,’ rule number 65 of customary international 
law.554  
 
 Despite residing in Syria, Mughniyeh maintained his position as operational director of 
Shiite militias training in Iraq. Since 2003, these militant groups have been trained to target 
coalition forces, including the US.555 Rather like Soleimani, Mughniyeh was key to Hezbollah’s 
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operational success. Amos Yadlin, who served until 2010 as the head of Israel’s military 
intelligence, confirmed that Mughniyeh held a significant role in Hezbollah. In fact, in the 
organization's hierarchical structure, he was positioned just below Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah 
leader. Mughniyeh was, according to Yadlin, ‘the commander and chief of all military and terror 
operations… [as well as being an] agent of the Iranians.’ In 2008, then-Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Michael Chertoff, reported that Hezbollah made ‘al-Qaeda look like a minor league 
team.’ According to James Bernazzani, chief of the FBI’s Hezbollah unit and later Deputy Director 
of the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center, ‘Mughniyeh and his group were responsible for the deaths 
of many Americans.’556 Although these figures were all inclined to employ slightly hyperbolic 
language, it was nevertheless clear that Mughniyeh was not just another target—he was the target, 
considered by some to be the most powerful terrorist in the region at the time.  
 
 Before proceeding further to analyze a key 2002 meeting between the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) and Mossad, it is important to briefly note this unit's purpose and 
role within the greater US military apparatus. JSOC is understood to be an elite special operations 
force tasked with finding and eliminating terrorists.557 In other words, JSOC is different from 
regular special forces that often undertake security sector reform work or counter-insurgency in 
partnership with local allies. Although its operations and missions are highly classified, in 
exceptional cases, its accomplishments become widely publicized. Examples of this include the 
killings of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which would not have been possible with 
the technology and support offered by this unit.558 
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 Six years before the joint operation, JSOC met with Mossad to discuss counter-terrorism 
operations, goals and proposed targets. To gauge their Israeli counterparts' reaction, JSOC officials 
nonchalantly brought up the idea of a joint mission to target Mughniyeh. No concrete plans were 
borne from that meeting. But both parties reaffirmed their collective desire to eliminate 
Mughniyeh—and so, the initial idea was planted. Former US intelligence officials recount how, 
years later, the Israeli intelligence agency approached the CIA to inquire about what such a joint 
mission might look like—with Mossad even proposing to target him while he was in Damascus. 
The Israeli proposal to launch a joint operation to target Mughniyeh came when both countries 
were closely working to thwart the ‘nuclear ambitions of Syria and Iran… [by] actively trying to 
sabotage the Iranian nuclear program.’559  
 
 A former US official admits that Israel’s reason for targeting Mughniyeh ‘was revenge’ 
driven. The Americans did not worry about underlying motivations, so long as the operation would 
result in Mughniyeh’s death. Yet, despite sufficient evidence to link Mughniyeh to Hezbollah and 
its terror campaigns directly, official authorization was still necessary domestically before the CIA 
could participate in the joint operation. A former intelligence officer involved in the process 
recalled how this required the official authorization from President George W. Bush, the Director 
of National Intelligence, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department, the National 
Security Adviser and the Attorney General.560 Requesting permission for the joint operation added 
an element of legitimacy to the CIA mission. As another former official recalled, the process was 
a ‘rigorous and tedious’ process. First, the CIA had to demonstrate that Mughniyeh ‘was a 
continuing threat to Americans,’ which could not simply rely on his past involvement in terror 
plots like the US embassy bombing in Beirut, which took place in 1983. In short, ‘the decision was 
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we had to have absolute confirmation that it was self-defence,’ not an operation driven by 
convenience, opportunity or revenge.561  
 
 Nevertheless, as a consequence of the September 11th attacks, the CIA’s attitude towards 
state-sponsored assassination campaigns had undergone a full 180º shift. Before 2001, the ‘US 
government often took a dim view of Israeli assassination operations… [going so far as publicly 
condemning] Israel’s botched attempt in 1997 to poison the leader of Hamas, Khaled Meshal, in 
Amman, Jordan. Given that Mossad strikes frequently, it has often been remarkably clumsy in its 
operations. The episode ended with Mossad agents and the Clinton administration forcing Israel 
to provide the antidote that saved Meshal’s life.’562 Yet barely a decade after this intervention, the 
US participated in a joint operation targeting Mughniyeh. This foreign policy shift suggests that 
the American restraint melted away as the CIA began to target figures well beyond defined military 
theatres and the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, where the agency or the 
military have deployed drones against al-Qaeda and its allies.563 
  
 American University College of Law Professor Stephen I. Vladeck has determined that in 
terms of the law, the government has at least some authority to use lethal force in self-defence 
even outside the context of ongoing armed conflict. However, ‘the million-dollar question is 
whether the facts actually support a determination that such force was necessary and appropriate 
in each case.’ Mary Ellen O’Connell, a legal expert and professor at Notre Dame Law School, 
believes that killing using methods preferred by terrorists and gangsters is unbecoming of state-
funded intelligence agencies. In terms of legal implications, the International Law Professor has 
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determined that the killing method furthermore ‘violates one of the oldest battlefield rules.’564 Yet, 
one has to concede that O’Connell’s observations amount to expressions of a sense of decency 
rather than firm legal opinions. 
 
 Despite these qualms, it did not take long for the US government to approve the CIA's 
covert involvement in a joint operation targeting Mughniyeh. It was not a surprise that Mughniyeh 
had been a wanted man, as he had been ‘implicated in some of Hezbollah’s most spectacular 
terrorist attacks.’565 This close intelligence cooperation between Mossad and the CIA further 
confirmed the value of the target. As anticipated, Mossad led the operation. Still, a former US 
intelligence official noted that despite Mossad’s claim over the operation, it was, in fact, the CIA 
who retained the power to ‘object and call it off, but it could not execute.’566 Importantly for 
Washington, since Israel spearheaded the operation, the US government would likely not face 
retribution from Hezbollah—especially if it kept its participation secret.567 So, the mission was 
now a ‘go.’ 
 
 On February 12th, 2008, Mossad agents were able to track Mughniyeh’s location to a 
restaurant in Damascus. A CIA undercover team was tasked to plant a bomb within the spare tire 
of his parked SUV. Then the waiting game began. Mughniyeh finally emerged from the restaurant 
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around 9:00 pm local time—but he was not alone. Soleimani was also with him.568 One former 
intelligence officer recalled how ‘at one point, the two men were standing there, same place, same 
street. All they had to do was push the button’.569 A few sources have corroborated this, recalling 
how agents ‘spotted the Hezbollah commander talking with another man, who they quickly 
determined was [Soleimani]. Excited by the possibility of killing two archenemies at once, the 
Israelis phoned senior government officials. But Prime Minister Ehud Olmert denied the request, 
as he had promised the Americans that only [Mughniyeh] would be targeted in the operation.’ 570  
 
 The joint operation could have resulted in eliminating two terrorists that night—but it did 
not. Neither Mossad nor the CIA had the ‘legal authority to kill Soleimani…[as] there had been 
no presidential finding to do so’.571 So, Israel had to let its arch-enemy, the key coordinator of 
Shiite training camps in Iraq, walk away. So, when Soleimani cleared the area, and Mughniyeh 
was within feet of the SUV, agents in Tel Aviv remotely triggered the controlled explosive and 
killed its intended target. Only one man died that night—the intended target. There was no 
collateral damage and no international backlash. Faced with the temptation to rid the world of two 
terrorists, both agencies demonstrated a commendable level of legal restraint. Without the explicit 
authority to kill Soleimani, neither the CIA nor Mossad acted to eliminate him.572 
 
 From Washington’s perspective, the mission was doubly successful, as Mughniyeh was 
killed, and Israel took the blame. The CIA walked away unscathed, having helped their Israeli 
counterparts eliminate a senior member of Hezbollah. Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the US 
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Avoided,’ The New York Times, 04 January 2020. 
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State Department, noted, ‘[t]he world is a better place without [that] man in it. He was a 
coldblooded killer, a mass murderer and a terrorist responsible for countless innocent lives lost.’573 
As members of the intelligence community can attest to, no operation resulting in a loss of life is 
celebrated. A former official recalled that the mood within the CIA was certainly not jubilatory 
after the death of Mughniyeh was confirmed. There was too much trepidation about where and 
when retaliation and fallout might occur. The operation against Mughniyeh demonstrated that 
although the CIA and Mossad had a chance to eliminate Soleimani easily, they decided not to.574 

























573 Goldman and Nakashima, ‘CIA and Mossad Killed Senior Hezbollah Figure in Car Bombing.’ 
574 For background see Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded 
the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press, 2006); Henry A. Crumpton, The Art 
of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New York: Penguin Books, 
2013). It should also be noted that this operation bears some similarities to previous missions 
planned against Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. For further discussion see Naftali, Blind Spot. 
 161 
Chapter 5: Why Soleimani? Why Now? 
Power, Influence & Legacy 
 
John Maguire, former CIA officer in Iraq, acknowledged that ‘Soleimani [was] the single most 
powerful operative in the Middle East…and no one ever heard of him.’ When his name was 
brought up in conversation, many avoid discussing him further. He appeared to ‘exist in a special 
category, an enemy both hated and admired: A Middle Eastern equivalent of Karla, the elusive 
Soviet master spy in John le Carré’s novels.’575 But who was this elusive character? And why did 
the CIA think his assassination necessary?  
 
 In 1957, Qasem Soleimani was born in the village of Qalat Molk in the district of Rabor, 
Iran. He was the middle child of five siblings and the son of a farmer who suffered most of his life 
under the pressure of severe financial circumstances. To help his father repay these debts, 
Soleimani left his village at the age of thirteen and began work in construction at the Kerman 
Water Organization in the provinces’ capital. It was not long until he joined the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 1979, and because of his obvious intelligence, he quickly 
climbed the ranks.  
 
 At the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, Soleimani was sent to the frontlines to command the 
IRGC's 41st Sarollah Division while still in his early twenties.576 He spent most of the war on the 
battlefield, facing chemical weapons and high casualty rates—comparable only to the First World 
War.577 Soleimani’s vision was shaped by the existential conflict between Iran and Iraq in the 
1980s.578 According to Gershon Hacochen, a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for 
Strategic Studies, Soleimani learned a lot about military strategy during the war. Confronted with 
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a lack of material resources and somewhat archaic weapons systems, Soleimani developed an 
unorthodox guerrilla strategy. In doing so, he ‘spearheaded the advent of Iran’s non-conventional 
conception of war.’579 After the war, Soleimani was sent back to Kerman and assigned a position 
tasked with targeting drug cartel activities in Iran's southeast.580 His successful operations against 
the cartels did not go unnoticed by the supreme leader, who, impressed with his strategic prowess, 
appointed him commander of the Quds force in 1998.581  
 
 These formative experiences provided Soleimani with the ability to approach 
unconventional situations creatively. As he advanced in rank, he became better able to implement 
these strategic operations at a higher tempo and with a notable level of success. Hacohen has 
argued that Soleimani used this knowledge and experience to turn burgeoning terror groups like 
Yemen’s Houthis, Palestine’s Hamas and Lebanon’s Hezbollah into ‘formidable war machines.’ 
He achieved this by establishing an extensive network, which allowed terror cells to communicate 
and collaborate covertly.582 
 
 Meir Dagan, former head of Mossad, recognized that Soleimani was both politically astute 
and very well connected.583 This meant that his influence was not regionally confined. When 
interests were aligned, the US would find a way to communicate and collaborate with Soleimani 
indirectly. Even in the days following the September 11th attacks, Ryan Crocker, a senior State 
Department official, travelled to Geneva to secretly meet with Iranian diplomats who answered to 
Soleimani. Both parties were brought together by their mutual desire to destroy the Taliban. The 
Iranians would provide Crocker with maps identifying the most recent movements of the Taliban, 
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and in exchange, the US would provide Iran with the locations of al-Qaeda sympathizers and 
organizers. 584 
 
 This relationship would be short-lived when in January of 2002, then-President George W. 
Bush gave his famous ‘axis of evil’ speech in which he mentioned Iran alongside enemies like 
North Korea and Iraq. The meetings between Crocker and the Iranians effectively ended with the 
last words of this oration. That ‘one speech changed history,’ Crocker recalled.585 The relationship 
between the US and Iran further degraded following the 2003 invasion of Iraq—when the two 
countries were now considered all but open enemies.586 
 
 Tensions escalated further on January 20th, 2007, when approximately twelve enemy 
fighters entered a government compound in Karbala, Iraq and killed five American soldiers.587 
They were dressed in American-style Army uniforms, carried US weapons and radios, drove in a 
convoy of five sport utility vehicles and passed the guards by confidently barking basic English 
commands. Months later, the US announced that it suspected Iran to be behind the Karbala 
attack.588 Immediately following this announcement, Soleimani sent a direct message to an 
American ambassador. He swore: ‘on the grave of Khomeini I have not authorized a bullet against 
the US’.589 But the Americans did not believe him. Despite calling Soleimani ‘truly evil,’ General 
Petraeus maintained covert communication channels with Soleimani for years—even during and 
after the Karbala attack. As leaked diplomatic cables reveal, Petraeus was collaborating with 
Soleimani through high-ranking Iraqi leaders to negotiate deals, exchange relevant information 
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and even secure a ‘cease-fire between radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia and the US-
backed Iraqi government.’590 
 
 In April of 2008, Soleimani became nervous following the offensive actions of Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki towards the south of the country. Filkins recounted how Soleimani 
anxiously began reaching out to US leaders via text messages to ask for support in addressing the 
Maliki matter, reasserting that the US and the Iranian government had a similar interest in ensuring 
that Iraq had a strong and stable government. With the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq 
(ISIS), the mutual desire to quash this common enemy brought the US and Iran to the (covert) 
bargaining table.591  
 
Soleimani was also very charismatic. Some even go so far as to attribute much of 
Hezbollah's power to Soleimani’s cult of personality. This is not difficult to believe, especially 
when considering the leaked 2009 video recording of his visit to Paa-Alam Heights. Standing on 
a hilltop overlooking the barren land, which once was the scene of a dreadful battle over the al-
Faw Peninsula, Soleimani recalled war stories while a soundtrack of soft music and prayers played 
in the background. During this romanticized storytelling, Soleimani notably referred to the 
battlefield as a unique paradise—a place ‘in which morality and human conduct are at their 
highest.’592 To Hezbollah, Soleimani was more than just a strategic leader; he was also their 
spiritual advisor.  
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 Yet, with respect comes power. Soleimani knew this well. And he was willing to use 
adventurous means, including the strategic manipulation of certain terror groups, to further the 
Islamic regime's regional ambitions. He even went so far as to delegate the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard to train Hezbollah’s paramilitary units.593 However, it did not mean that the IRGC was in 
charge of Hezbollah. That duty was always kept with Soleimani. Generally speaking, the Iranian 
regime’s control of Hezbollah was always makeshift and incomplete and, as a result, certain 
Hezbollah cells had a considerable capacity to operate ‘in an independent fashion.’594 This is not 
surprising since proxy groups often develop an independent life over time. So, Hezbollah put 
Soleimani before the IRGC. Perhaps this was partially due to the fact that Soleimani was the 
principal financier of Hezbollah, lending his strategic, financial and operational support throughout 
the decades.595 Whatever the reason, this ranking was evident when, at the time of his death, 
Soleimani was considered its sole strategic leader, answering only to Hassan Nasrallah, its 
Secretary-General. 
 
 Still, Soleimani did more than just train and fund Hezbollah. He also took advantage of the 
political climate in the greater Middle East. Tamir Pardo, former director of Mossad, suggested 
that Soleimani led a double life of sorts. Publicly, he was a military force commander in Iraq, 
Lebanon and Syria—but this was partly a cover to mask his secret involvement with a terror 
organization operating cells in those states.596 Other scholars also noticed that Soleimani used his 
status in the region to exploit the Arab Spring movement to create a ‘Shiite Crescent’ in the Middle 
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East.597 Thus, Soleimani was eager to involve himself in political and military affairs in the region, 
should there exist an opportunity to manipulate matters favouring the Iranian regime. 
 
Although Soleimani is known for having directed campaigns in several major wars in Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon, the apotheosis of Iranian intervention in the region was Yemen.598 At the 
height of this intervention, weapons, tactical training and financial resources were supplied by 
Hezbollah and Soleimani’s Quds Forces to the Houthi movement. The purpose of this was to 
establish a proxy war—a necessary proxy war. Soleimani knew that ‘winning the battle in Yemen 
[would] help define the balance of power in the Middle East’ by establishing ‘a Hezbollah-like 
militia in Yemen to confront Riyadh’s hostile policies.’599  So, he launched a crusade to incite 
Saudi Arabia, which had at that point ‘openly dubb[ed] itself the Middle East’s ‘Sunni protector’ 
in the face of Iran’s ‘Shi`a meddling.’’600  
 
 The conflict between Yemen and the Saudis resulted in a humanitarian crisis and an ever-
growing sectarian rift.601 However, this conflict, and to some extent, its fallout, played right into 
the hands of Soleimani. He had previously allied with former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, who had himself once been a prisoner of the Saudis.602 Soleimani planned to over-extend 
the Saudi’s by drawing them into a lengthy and expensive air bombing campaign, a sort of modern-
day war of attrition. According to Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and US counter-terrorism 
expert currently serving as a senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, the 
Saudis spent ‘at least $5-6 billion a month’ attacking Iranian and Houthi targets, which were either 
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non-operational, low-tech or abandoned.603 The financial costs incurred by the Saudis was 
immense, at a time when the oil revenues to the Kingdom looked increasingly precarious, while 
Soleimani’s losses ‘cost... pennies.’604 But Yemen was not the only country where Soleimani 
helped developed Iranian proxy groups.  
 
 Beyond the prominent examples of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, and the Houthi 
Movement/Ansar Allah Rebels in Yemen, Soleimani also managed to establish proxy groups in 
Iraq with the Asaib Ahl al-Haq Badr Organization, and in Syria with the Fatemiyoun Division 
(Afghan unit) and Zeynabiyoun Brigade (Pakistani unit).605 But Soleimani’s impact is much more 
complex than starting strategic proxy wars. His legacy is woven into the very fabric of international 
foreign policy. For the purposes of this section, only a few of Soleimani’s most significant legacies 
will be examined.  
 
 Soleimani is generally recognized for having created a Shiite power axis in Iran and the 
Middle East.606 Still, his establishment of a ‘starkly sectarian atmosphere’ may be one of 
Soleimani’s most enduring legacy. To maintain Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon, Soleimani 
reignited a Sunni-Shiite conflict that experts believe may endure for a very long time.607 But due 
to a confluence of events, this regional conflict was put on hold and tensions were directed at the 
United States after the targeted killing of General Soleimani. 
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 In Israel, Soleimani directed Hezbollah in their effort against Israel’s south Lebanon 
military occupation during the 1990s.608 Together with Hezbollah’s military commander, Imad 
Mugniyah, Soleimani led a successful ‘guerrilla warfare campaign, combining ambushes, roadside 
bombs, suicide bombers, and targeted killings of senior Israeli officers and attacks on Israel 
defence posts.’609 In May 2000, Israel could no longer fend off Hezbollah—and Soleimani with 
his Quds Force and Hezbollah scored a major victory at the Battle of Khiam.610 With support 
[from] the Quds force, Hamas was able to ‘dominate the Gaza Strip, capable of firing rockets that 
can reach into most Israeli territory.’611 Nevertheless, Soleimani did not rely exclusively on proxies 
or covert manipulation tactics. The Iranian government had been moving plotting Israel for 
decades, evidenced by its financial and tactical support for Hamas and Palestinian Jihad.612 
Regardless of the means, Soleimani found himself in a favourable position; able to use his proxies 
to obtain new victories for the Iranian regime. 
 
 Despite initial appearances, Soleimani’s legacy is not comprised simply of a series of 
sequential victories. He faced quite a few setbacks as well. In 2003, for example, following the 
Iraq invasion, Soleimani was worried that once the Americans overthrew Saddam Hussein, they 
would look to Iran as the next country in need of regime change. When the time came in 2011 for 
Iraq to negotiate a deal to allow the Americans to stay in the region after the deadline, Soleimani 
urged the Iraqi government to reject the deal. Instead, offering greater financial and military 
support to Iraq (through Iran and its numerous proxies). Once the Iraqis rejected the American 
offer, Soleimani ordered a roadway connecting Tehran to Lebanon, where his Hezbollah 
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supporters were based. Iran used that road to send in supplies and military aid to Iraq. In some 
ways, the road was a metaphor for his regional vision, but it proved to be uneven at best.613  
 
 Iran-Iraq relations remained troubled. Ryan C. Crocker, former American ambassador to 
Iraq, recalled how, for Soleimani, ‘the Iran-Iraq war never really ended.’ If Soleimani could not 
establish a strong Iranian influence in the region, then the next best thing would be to ‘create and 
influence a weak Iraq.’614 Thus, Soleimani’s offer to the Iraqi government had an unspoken goal. 
Iran wanted to ensure that Iraq remained weak so that this conflict could never restart, or if it did, 
Iraq would find itself at a significant disadvantage. But Baghdad suspected this. Although the US 
supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, it subsequently benefited Iran greatly at the time.615 
Like Iraq, Syria was another of Soleimani’s vital allies.616 For years, Soleimani worked tirelessly 
to ensure President Bashar al-Assad remained in power. He recruited militia forces from across 
the Middle East, the majority of whom came from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They were 
trained in Iran by the IRGC or by Hezbollah in Syria.617  
 
 Soleimani’s well established communication channel with US officials also served him 
greatly. Yet, Soleimani was not just a messenger or negotiator. As he once noted in correspondence 
with American officials, he considered himself the ‘sole director of Iran with respect to Iraq, 
Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan.’618 Thus, his influence and control in Iran, compounded with his 
establishment of a covert communication channel reaching both allies and enemies alike, marks 
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another of his legacies. In 2014, when IS occupied roughly a third of Iraq, Soleimani offered more 
than just advice and resources. He went to the battlefield to lend his knowledge and expertise. In 
the battle against IS, Soleimani enlisted Hezbollah and the Quds Force to fight alongside the Iraqis 
and drive them out of the region. Remarkably, despite declaring Soleimani a terrorist in 2005,619 
the US fought alongside him and with him against a common enemy—IS.  
 
 So, while the US was leading air campaigns, Soleimani was directing ground forces. Tamir 
Pardo recalled how:  
 
[f]rom the shock that befell the Middle East following the rise of IS, 
[Soleimani] was changing course… [becoming] a regional kingpin 
player, knowing with great talent how to exploit the secret infrastructure 
he has established for so many years, to achieve non-covert 
objectives—to fight, to win, to establish a presence.620 
 
But such favours often require repayment. And although Iraq was not quick to forget Soleimani’s 
contribution in the fight against IS, it knew that Soleimani would not wait long to cash in his 
reward. Later that year, Soleimani requested permission to enter Iraqi airspace by visiting with 
Bayan Jabr, the Iraqi transportation minister at the time. He expressed his desire to deliver aid to 
Assad’s government and explained the need to cross over Iraq’s airspace. Despite urging from the 
Obama administration to reject this request, Jabr accepted. 
 
 Despite the respect Soleimani received from Jabr, Soleimani was embroiled in several 
domestic rivalries between his Quds Force and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. They criticized 
his involvement in Iraq and the Sunni population's victimization as ‘weakening Iran’s long-term 
 
619 Griffin and Tomlinson, ‘Quds Force Commander Soleimani Visited Moscow.’ 
620 Arango, ‘Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue’; see also Michael Knights et al., 
‘Soleimani Is Dead: The Road Ahead for Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq,’ CTC Sentinel 13, 
(2020); Shiva Sadeghi and Somaye Solati, ‘Study of the Authority in the Discourse of Haj Qasem 
Soleimani Relying on the Semiotic Structures: Examples Lecture by Trump,’ Islamic Revolution 
Studies Vol.1, No.1, (2019), pp. 54-76; and Danny Postel, and Nader Hashemi. ‘Playing with Fire: 
Trump, the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry, and the Geopolitics of Sectarianization in the Middle 
East,’ Mediterranean Yearbook, (2018).  
 171 
interests in the region.’ Cables sent between the rivalling agencies documented the fear that Iran's 
Ministry of Intelligence had towards Soleimani's ‘policy of Iran in Iraq, [which] has allowed the 
Americans to return to Iraq with greater legitimacy.’ Other cables reflected the views held by 
military officials that Soleimani was a conceited and self-centred general who engaged in a conflict 
which would ‘bolster his potential political aspirations in the future.’621 Although not a pleasant 
legacy, it is certainly one he left behind in Iran. According to sources, these domestic tensions 
between the Quds Force and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence continue.622 
 
 In April of 2019, the Trump administration declared the entire Quds Force a terrorist 
group.623 Indeed, this was not anything new, and in the United States, Soleimani, Hezbollah and 
the Quds Force were all widely considered terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, any chance of a 
diplomatic rapprochement was quashed when President Trump threatened the Iranian president.624 
In response, Soleimani stated that ‘it is beneath our president's dignity to respond to you. I, as a 
soldier, respond to you,’ then disconcertingly warned the US that, ‘we are near you, where you 
cannot even imagine.’625 It once again demonstrated the power and influence that Soleimani held 
in Iran—going beyond mere regional politics, to obtain a powerful position from which he could 
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623 President Donald J. Trump, ‘Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic 
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624 Donald J. Trump via Twitter on 22 July 2018:  
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Iran,’ Testimony Submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Washington Institute 
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Operations Forces: Why Relationships Differ,’ International Journal of Intelligence and 
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 After Soleimani’s death, Iran experts warned of a potential ‘regional mayhem,’ which 
might ensue from rising tensions in Iraq and Syria.626 It is for precisely this reason that earlier 
American administrations had refrained from directly striking Soleimani as they estimated it 
‘could destabilize the region further and lead to all-out war between the United States and Iran.’627 
Additionally, as a result of the strike on Soleimani, any prospect of revived diplomacy with the 
United States, perhaps being quietly negotiated through backchannels like Japan and France, was 
effectively dead.  
 
 The talk was now of revenge, not negotiation. His close friend, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
vowed harsh revenge against the perpetrators of the US strike that killed Soleimani.628 Uzi Rubin, 
an Israeli Defence Analyst, noticed that notwithstanding a few fractional domestic rivalries, in 
general, Soleimani, ‘who did not suffer from an excess of humility,’ was a media darling in Iran 
and widely admired as a national hero. And although Soleimani’s ‘demise did not take place on 
Iranian soil; the country’s leaders declared the killing an act of aggression against Iran itself.’629 
This was because, as Doron Itzchakov, Professor of Iranian politics at Tel Aviv University, 
recalled, Soleimani dedicated his entire life to the Iranian regime. He was considered the Supreme 
Leader’s ‘ultimate confidant,’ pursued the creation of an ‘axis of resistance’ in the Middle East, 
and never faltered in his support for Iran and its people.630 Ali Vaez, director of the Iran Programme 
for International Crisis Group, reported that Soleimani was not the only thing to die in the strike—
alongside him died the opportunity of a future Iran deal and any potential diplomatic relationship 
in the region.631 
 
 During his career, Soleimani obtained the highest military honours and distinctions, 
including the prestigious Order of Zolfaghar. When Ayatollah Khamenei presented the medal to 
 
626 See Michael Knights, ‘Back into the Shadows? The Future of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s 
Other Proxies in Iraq,’ Washington Institute, 2020. 
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631 Arango, ‘Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue.’ 
 173 
Soleimani in February 2019, he made a rather ominous and prophetic statement, saying, in part, 
that ‘the Islamic Republic needs him for many more years. But I hope that in the end, he dies as a 
martyr. In the end, Soleimani did die as a martyr. But it was not before becoming a revered political 
hero within Iran, a powerful foe regionally, and a dangerous enemy internationally. In death, he 
became a martyr and a catalyst for future political vengeance, the effects of which have yet to be 
seen.632 
 
Plotting & Planning 
 
In early January 2020, Robert O’Brien, the White House National Security advisor, announced 
that Soleimani had recently returned from Damascus, ‘where he was planning attacks on 
Americans, soldiers, airmen, Marines, sailors and… diplomats.’633 The only evidence of this 
supposed plot remains US government statements (unsupported by any evidence or intelligence) 
and a news article based upon these unsubstantiated government statements. For reasons of 
objectivity, most available information, regardless of how contentious or unsubstantiated, is 
presented and reviewed here to ensure that the resulting narrative is as complete as possible given 
available open-source material. 
 
 To recapitulate, Iran learned two critical lessons from the Iran-Iraq war.634 Firstly, their 
enemies were not just located geographically in the Middle East. And secondly, covert operations 
are often more effective than direct hostilities. Soleimani took both lessons to heart and imparted 
this knowledge to his followers. In May 2011, at a theological seminary in the city of Qom, 
Soleimani addressed his students, reminding them that ‘Iran’s victory or defeat no longer takes 
place in Mehran and Khorramshahr. Our boundaries have expanded, and we must witness victory 
in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. This is the fruit of the Islamic revolution.’635 
 
632 Ibid, see also Shahram Akbarzadeh, ‘Why Does Iran Need Hizbullah?’ The Muslim 
World Vol.106, No.1 (2016), pp. 127-140; and Ioan Pop and Mitchell D. Silber, ‘Iran and 
Hezbollah’s Pre-Operational Modus Operandi in the West,’ Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism (2020), pp. 1-24. 
633 Michael Georgy, ‘Inside the Plot by Iran’s Soleimani to Attack US Forces in Iraq,’ Reuters, 03 
January 2020. 
634 See Filkins, ‘The Shadow Commander,’ 2013. 
635 Hacohen, ‘Qassem Soleimani’s Unique Strategic Significance,’ p. 14. 
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 For years, Soleimani believed that Iran’s long-term stability depended, in part, on the 
survival of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Accordingly, he was determined to keep 
Assad in power.636 Assad’s potential loss of power threatened Soleimani’s influence in the region. 
Additionally, ‘[f]or Soleimani, saving Assad was [also] a matter of pride, especially if it meant 
distinguishing himself from the Americans.’ As a former Iraqi official recalled, Soleimani 
reasoned that ‘[w]e are not like the Americans. We do not abandon our friends.’ For Soleimani, 
abandoning Assad would require ‘abandoning the project of expansion that had occupied him for 
fifteen years.’ For nearly two decades, Soleimani had supplied Assad with a trained militia because 
his soldiers ‘would not fight—or, when they did, they mostly butchered civilians, driving the 
populace to the rebels.’ Soleimani once even vented to an Iraqi politician, noting that ‘[t]he Syrian 
army [was] useless!’637 
 
 In October of 2019, Soleimani lived up to his moniker of Shadow Commander. He called 
his Shiite militiamen to meet him at a compound near the Tigris River—overlooking the US 
embassy in Baghdad. There he allegedly concocted a plan, a way for the Iraqis to stop protesting 
Iranian intervention and instead shift their displeasure elsewhere, to a common enemy—the 
Americans. For months, Iraq had been marred by protests, as citizens ‘accused [their] government 
of enriching itself and serving the interests of foreign powers, especially Iran, as Iraqis languish in 
poverty without jobs or basic services.’ Soleimani knew that he needed to quell tensions and 
redirect this animosity to a different target—a common enemy, the United States. At the Tigris 
compound, he asked the attendees to fracture into smaller groups hoping that their presence would 
go unnoticed by the Americans. Then he instructed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, his most important 
 
636 See Abbas William Samii, ‘A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-
Iran-Syria Relationship,’ The Middle East Journal Vol.62, No.1 (2008), pp. 32-53; and Rola El 
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Quarterly Vol.31, No.5 (2010), pp. 803-815. 
637 Filkins, ‘The Shadow Commander’; see also Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. 
Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 
2002); and Sherko Kirmanj and Abdulla Kukha Sadq, ‘Iran's Foreign Policy towards Iraq and 
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ally in Iraq, to coordinate with other senior militia heads in the area to ‘step up attacks on US 
targets in the country.’638 
 
 Soleimani was supposedly planning to attack US forces in Iraq to provoke an American 
response in the area. The overall purpose of this was a distraction—to shift focus away from the 
Iranian presence in Iraq and ensure that Iraqis would begin to protest the US—thus, taking pressure 
off Iran, and by extension, Soleimani. Doing so would remind Iraqis that their enemy was not Iran, 
but rather, the United States. He chose Hezbollah to direct the attacks against US targets in Iraq 
‘because it had the capability to use drones to scout targets for Katyusha rocket attacks… [and 
owned] a drone Iran had developed that could elude radar systems.’639 In his 2004 book New Rules 
of the Game, Daniel Sobelman, an Assistant Professor of International Relations at The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, argued that ‘[o]ne decisive feature of Hezbollah’s strategic weapons—
Katyusha rockets and long-range rockets—is that their deployment could produce grave 
consequences. Therefore, other than a deterrent role, their actual use would be very problematic 
for Hezbollah and is reserved, in the meantime, for worst-case scenarios’.640  
 
 Thus, if Sobelman’s reasoning is correct, then the plan would have been as destructive as 
it was simple. Despite this simple strategy, the plan never reached the launch stage, as Soleimani 
was executed. A day before the strike on Soleimani, Mark Esper, the US Defence Secretary, 
advised that ‘the United States might have to take preemptive action to protect American lives 
from expected attacks by Iran-backed militias,’ noting that ‘[t]he game has changed.’641 It is 
important to note at this stage that the information regarding Soleimani’s supposed compound 
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meeting, as well as the alleged plan to attack the US, is derived from a singular report—written by 
one author who has declined to disclose how he came upon this information or the validity of his 
sources. While one unsubstantiated report is insufficient to demonstrate, or, for that matter, prove 
that Soleimani was plotting to attack US forces, for objectivity, this information (however knotty) 
was included to present both sides of the argument. According to the US government and the 
above-referenced news report, Soleimani was executed before putting his plan in motion. Whether 
this plan existed or not, it is nonetheless clear that the covert operations and strategic manipulations 
Soleimani had engaged in over the years have earned him the moniker of ‘The Shadow 
Commander.’ He operated in the shadows for years, directing the most sensitive aspects of Iranian 
foreign affairs in the region and taunting former US presidential administrations with his 
seemingly untouchable status.  
 
Hunting Soleimani: From Bush to Trump 
 
January 2020 marked the start of a new decade and a new chapter in the US drone program. The 
targeted killing of Soleimani was the first time the US had deployed drone technology to eliminate 
another country’s senior military commander on foreign soil. Since assuming office, President 
Trump has expanded the boundaries of lethal drone strikes to countries like Somalia and Yemen—
with which war has not been declared.642 
 
 Remote assassination campaigns had progressed in an escalatory manner since the George 
W. Bush administration. During the Obama years, drone strikes proliferated as a way of fighting 
the counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan ‘without risking military personnel on dangerous 
air missions.’643 But now, President Trump extended the use of drones as a favourable medium to 
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carry out state-sponsored assassinations.644 As Allegra Harpootlian, a contributor to the Truman 
National Security Project, so eloquently put it, we are just barely ‘into the new decade, and it is 
somehow already a bigger dumpster fire than the last.’ By his second term, Obama had authorized 
some 528 strikes, with resulting deaths reaching somewhere between 380 and 801 civilians in 
Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen alone. As soon as President Trump took office, he began to 
quietly undo the safeguards placed on the CIA-led drone program by the previous Obama 
administration.645 
 
 When Obama gave his Nobel Prize speech, he claimed that the thing that separated the US 
from its enemies was the dedication to protecting civilian lives.646 Yet when he gave the speech, 
US airstrikes were killing ‘more civilians than the Taliban.’ These strikes had hit wedding parties, 
farmers, pregnant women and small children. In Somalia, drone strikes decimated entire 
communities, destroying lives, crops, homes and livelihoods. And as the new decade began, 
President Trump not only carried out a drone strike so drastic and rare that many experts believed 
it was a straightforward declaration of war, teetering on a war crime as the US president threatened 
to bomb non-military targets (‘cultural’ sites), a move generally considered ‘a war crime under 
international law.’ Some American commentators observed that, if anything, ‘Trump’s escalating 
drone war should remind us all of just how dangerous it is when a president claims the legal 
authority to kill in secret and no one can stop him. Maybe this decade, we will learn our lesson.’647  
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Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), noted how the Soleimani strike was ‘a very different level of 
escalation.’ When targeting extremists, the US faces a minimal threat of retaliation—perhaps a 
few sporadic attacks or intensified fighting. In the case of Soleimani, the reprisals could be 
launched with the full force of the Iranian regime behind it. According to Barbara Slavin, the 
Director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council, Trump is ‘trying to do a victory 
lap here and beat his chest and somehow show this is like killing Baghdadi. But it is not. It is much 
more serious.’ The Soleimani and Baghdadi killings are in no way similar. In Baghdadi's case, the 
US killed ‘a leader in the context of an organization against an extremist movement that did not 
have a major state sponsor.’ Soleimani, on the other hand, was ‘recognized throughout the Gulf 
region, for good or bad, as a figure sponsoring groups and supporting countries with a great deal 
of popular support.’ 648 
 
Obama and Bush Jr. reflected at length and then decided against killing Soleimani. Both 
administrations ‘reasoned that killing the most powerful general in Iran would only risk a wider 
war with the country, alienating American allies in Europe and the Middle East and undermining 
the United States in a region that had already cost plenty of lives and treasure in the past two 
decades.’649 By contrast, Trump threw caution to the wind and decided to go after Soleimani. But 
why now? The Trump administration has yet to provide any proof that unequivocally demonstrates 
that something did change to warrant his immediate execution. After all, Gen. Soleimani had been 
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targeting Americans since 2003. He had always posed a threat to American lives. So, what 
changed? 
  
 According to Mark Bowden, one of America’s long-time commentators on Iran, both bin 
Laden and Soleimani were ‘deadly enemies of the United States’ responsible for attacks on 
Americans, perpetrated in ‘foreign lands without the approval of local authorities.’ The 
assassination of bin Laden was ‘a powerfully symbolic statement about America’s resolve, and a 
damaging blow to Al-Qaeda, a small stateless terrorist group with which the United States was 
formally at war—duly authorized by Congress.’ But according to Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard Law 
Professor who served in the White House under Bush, ‘[t]here is a large legal difference between 
the president using force in self-defence in an ongoing authorized conflict and the president 
initiating a conflict, not authorized by Congress, for largely non-self-defensive reasons.’650 
 
 Another difference was the bin Laden was on the run, whereas Soleimani was not.651 There 
‘was never any doubt about the identity and location of Soleimani. He made little effort to hide, 
presumably because he understood that killing him would gain America little in the short term. 
Whereas, in the long term, it would undermine its own goals. Presidents George W. Bush and 
Obama chose not to pull the trigger, despite ample opportunity, for precisely that reason.’652 
Ultimately, he did not need to be ‘hunted’ like past terrorists—as he was not in hiding.653 
 
 Unlike Obama and Bush before him, Trump had chosen to campaign on promises of 
resurrecting the practice of torturing captured foreign fighters.654 He argued that waterboarding is 
a ‘minor form’ of torture, and he would not only bring it back—but that he would also be in favour 
 
650 Mark Bowden, ‘Comparing Trump’s Assassination of Soleimani to Obama’s Killing of bin 
Laden,’ The Boston Globe, 09 January 2020. 
651 See also Madiha Afzal, ‘Around the Halls: Experts React to the Killing of Iranian Commander 
Qassem Soleimani,’ Brookings Institution, 03 January 2020. 
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of torture methods that were ‘a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding.’655 In effect, he reasoned 
that if the enemy does not play by the rules, neither should the United States. ‘We have an enemy 
that doesn’t play by the laws,’ Trump said during an interview with CBS’s Face the Nation, ‘You 
could say laws, and they’re laughing. They’re laughing at us right now. I would like to strengthen 
the laws so that we can better compete.’656 Make no mistake, by ‘strengthen,’ President Trump 
suggested that evermore contentious and shocking torture methods should be permitted to better 
compete with those used by terror groups.657 
 
 It is irrefutable that Trump has garnered significant public support for this hard line. As 
long as he is addressing threats to national security, even if they are perceived threats, Americans 
will continue to stand by the decisions made by their President. According to Charles Dunlap, 
Americans believe all US national security threats should be addressed—regardless of whether 
they violate laws or outrage the international community.658 This ingrained American 
pragmaticism has enabled Trump to maintain an aggressive foreign policy stance, going so far as 
to even announce that the United States is ‘going to have to do things that we never did before. 
And some people are going to be upset about it, but I think that now everybody is feeling that 
security is going to rule.’659 
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 If this were not troubling enough, Fernando Cutz, an assistant to the US National Security 
Advisor, made a rather interesting observation. He noticed how, for some reason, Trump seems 
fixated on former US President Barack Obama—trying to outdo his policies and surpass his 
strategic victories. Cutz has raised an important point. According to a recent fact-checking analysis 
completed by Daniel Dale, a CNN analyst, this fixation can be quantitatively measured. Trump 
‘mentioned Obama 537 times in the first ten months of 2019—a 36 percent increase from the same 
period in 2018 and up 169 percent from that time frame in 2017.’ As Rice University historian 
Douglas Brinkley points out, Trump is not unique in nurturing an anxiety about his predecessor's 
record. Presidents like Roosevelt and Reagan have similarly gone to significant lengths to undo 
the achievements of the administrations before them. Roosevelt changed the name of the Herbert 
Hoover Dam to Boulder Dam, and Reagan removed the solar panels installed at the White House 
by Jimmy Carter.660 
  
 During his administration, President Obama, with his chief counter-terrorism advisor John 
Brenan, institutionalized the use of drones and systematized the process of adding targets to a ‘kill 
list’ and methodically eliminating them. Obama’s drone policies were passed as executive orders, 
making them relatively easy to undo.661 When Trump became president, he immediately reworked 
all of Obama’s drone policy executive orders, giving more authority to the CIA over its drone 
operations, expanded the boundaries of the proverbial battlefield, scrapped the required civilian 
casualty reporting, and even established a new drone base in Niger which extended the CIA’s reach 
much further into Africa than ever before.662 Trump’s executive order did not, however, overturn 
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the Congressional requirement for the military to continue reporting its strikes and resulting 
collateral damage. An unnamed Trump administration official maintained that this was a 
bureaucratic move done for the sole purpose of increasing efficiency and eliminating ‘superfluous 
reporting requirements.’663 
 
 Dr Rita Siemion is not convinced by this statement. Siemion, who serves as international 
legal counsel for Human Rights First, has argued that the Trump’s administration’s actions are ‘an 
unnecessary and dangerous step backwards on transparency and accountability’ for covert 
missions that result in civilian casualties.664 Rep. Adam Schiff, the Democratic Chair of the House 
Intelligence Committee, also deemed the rule ‘an important measure of transparency’ and noted 
that ‘there is simply no justification for cancelling it.’665 And so, secrecy not only continues under 
the Trump administration—it is escalating out of control.666 With virtually no bureaucratic 
oversight nor institutional motivation for accountability, this new decade may see the worst 
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Chapter 6: Striking the Shadow Commander 
 
The Soleimani strike is a unique case in that it offers a contemporary, near real-time look into a 
counter-terrorism operation directed by the United States government. Ongoing international press 
coverage on the strike has garnered a vast amount of information available from a myriad of 
sources. This has been further supplemented and corroborated by unprecedented input by a sitting 
US president. Historically speaking, Presidents have rarely chosen to provide real-time unedited 
input on a developing event. However, with the advent of social media, information dissemination 
has become a more effortless and somewhat more attractive means of communicating. Even legal 
experts like Mary Ellen O’Connell have admitted that President Trump’s tweets, statements and 
remarks offer scholars an extraordinary amount of insight and information necessary for a legal 
and political assessment.668 
 
Furthermore, this particular case study involves several controversial and contemporary 
issues—from targeted killings by drone to the law of preventative self-defence and the condition 
of imminence. Thus, the Soleimani strike will be studied in detail to determine whether this 
counter-terrorism mission violated international law. This will be achieved by examining whether 
or not the imminence requirement was sufficiently fulfilled to denote credibility and legitimacy to 
the US counter-terrorism programme as a whole. Subsequent discussions on the practice of killing 
foreign political figures by drone, the use of an unwilling third-party state as a battleground, and 
the issue of intentional intelligence obfuscation by US officials, will also be undertaken.669  
 
 For comprehension and clarity, this section will analyze events chronologically over the 
ten days which followed the US drone strike that killed Gen. Soleimani. As one might expect, not 
 
668 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Killing of Soleimani and International Law,’ European Journal of 
International Law, 6 January 2020. 
669 For the sake of brevity and relevance, tangential discussions on secrecy and assassination tactics 
were purposefully limited. To address the research objectives of this dissertation, the 
aforementioned literature was intentionally omitted in favour of greater analysis on the customary 
law of pre-attack self-defence and the Soleimani case study. It would have been irrelevant and 
frivolous to gloss over these topics in a superficial manner for the sake of inclusion if these would 
not serve a greater purpose for the objectives and trajectory of this project. Thus, this dissertation 
recognizes these related literatures, but has chosen to intentionally omit them as they did not serve 
a direct purpose to the topic being examined. 
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all events during the selected timeframe can or will be presented. Instead, the most relevant and 
publicized occurrences will be included if they can be reasonably understood to directly correlate 
with the initial drone strike that killed the Iranian General. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
situation, multiple sources of information were used to compile the following timeline. These 
included, but were not limited to: press releases from the US government, televised media 
interviews with officials and political analysts, breaking news stories—and of course, tweets. 
Wherever possible, policy documents and theoretical articles were used to substantiate these 




It was a daring mission with a singular objective: eliminate Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani. This 
operation relied on meticulous planning, timing and coordination. For the CIA to track Soleimani’s 
whereabouts, informants were needed to provide live intel, so spies and operatives in five countries 
were enlisted to ensure that things went according to plan.670 Ultimately, Soleimani was killed, 
and the mission was rendered a success. But was it as successful as the US claims? 
 
For decades, Soleimani had been on the radar of various foreign intelligence agencies. He 
quickly became known as ‘Iran’s most powerful military commander and leader of its special-
operations forces abroad.’671 The US even designated Soleimani a terrorist in 2005, in response to 
his support for terror groups like Hezbollah, whom he funded and trained.672 However, fearing an 
international and diplomatic backlash, most states, including the US, who had previously 
contemplated pursuing Soleimani, had instead opted against targeting a man who also held an 
 
670 Several intelligence sources have confirmed that US operatives were planted in Syria, Iraq, 
Iran, Yemen, and Qatar in anticipation for the strike on Soleimani. Additionally, local Iraqi and 
Syrian cells were established to further facilitate the acquisition of intelligence. 
671 John Hudson et al., ‘On the Day US Forces Killed Soleimani, They Targeted a Senior Iranian 
Official in Yemen,’ The Washington Post, 10 January 2020. 
672 Jennifer Griffin and Lucas Tomlinson, ‘Quds Force Commander Soleimani Visited Moscow, 
Met Russian Leaders in Defiance of Sanctions,’ Fox News Archive, 06 August 2015 (‘Soleimani 
was first designated a terrorist and sanctioned by the US in 2005 for his role as a supporter of 
terrorism.’) 
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official government position. For killing an active foreign government official could most certainly 
start a war.673 After all, wars have started over much less.  
 
Trump probably opted for the strike around the last day of December 2019. It appears to 
have been a somewhat whimsical decision. Reportedly two of President Donald Trump's closest 
advisers, both hawks, tried to dissuade him from ordering the military strike that killed Soleimani 
and brought the countries to the brink of war in January 2020, at least according to Bob Woodward, 
the most respected factual chronicler of Washington’s beltway battles. South Carolina Republican 
Senator Lindsey Graham, one of the most robust Republican senators, reportedly warned Trump, 
‘Mr. President, this is over the top.’ Characteristically discussing this on Trump’s golf course, 
Lindsey likened this to going from ‘playing $10 blackjack to $10,000-a-hand blackjack.’ He added 
that with the election coming, he should not risk a ‘major war.’ Mick Mulvaney, Trump's chief of 
staff at the time, had made an ‘urgent request’ for Graham to intercede and had ‘almost begged’ 
Graham to find a way of stopping all this talk ‘of hitting Soleimani.’674 
 
It is hard to know what intelligence Trump was focusing on, but it was clearly SIGINT. 
Notoriously Trump was an indifferent consumer of intelligence, moving the Presidential Daily 
Brief from its traditional early morning slot to lunchtime and, in practice taking little interest. 
Trump told Lindsey, ‘He deserves it’ and added that ‘We have all these intercepts showing that 
Soleimani is planning attacks.’ But according to Graham, the intercepts were not especially 
compelling or unusual, so Graham pushed back, retorting that Soleimani has ‘always been doing 
that.’ Nevertheless, four days later, Trump ordered the strike. And despite Graham's reported 
reservations about the strike, he publicly supported the president's decision. Graham mixed private 
criticism with public support. Days later, he told Fox News that ‘the intelligence was very strong 
that Soleimani was orchestrating chaos in Iraq at our expense and throughout the region,’ adding 
that Trump was informed of these potential attacks, and so ‘he acted.’ 675 
 
673 Peter Baker et al., ‘Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed US and Iran to the Brink of 
War,’ The New York Times, 11 January 2020. 
674 Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020). See also Julian Borger, 





Soleimani knew that a strike was a possibility. Some had argued that Soleimani revelled in 
his untouchable status; others claimed he had become more paranoid. Having both powerful allies 
and enemies, Soleimani took all possible precautions when travelling. He chose not to travel 
commercially, and as an Iraqi security source confirmed, even ‘avoided using his private plane 
because of rising concerns about his security.’676 His name was never listed on any manifest, and 
the airline crew rarely knew if he would be travelling on their aircraft in advance of him arriving.677 
Perhaps this paranoia is what drove him to travel by private plane on the fateful night of January 
3rd, 2020.678  
 
It was 12:32 am local time when the Airbus A320 Cham Wings flight carrying Soleimani 
touched down at Baghdad International airport.679 He had travelled from Damascus, where his 
plane was delayed for two hours before finally taking off.680 Several intelligence contacts have 
confirmed that this delay was manufactured.681 The MQ-9 Reaper drone used in the mission was 
scheduled to depart Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar earlier that night.682 However, the AGM-114 
Hellfire missiles onboard683 were reportedly experiencing system glitches, amongst other 
unforeseen technical issues. Creech Air Force Base in Nevada quickly coordinated with operatives 
at Damascus airport to manufacture a delay that would allow these problems to be resolved and 
the mission to proceed as planned—if only a few hours out of the original target window.  
 
676 Anna Palmer and Jake Sherman, ‘Will Impeachment Matter in 2020?’ Politico, 10 January 
2020. 
677 Ken Dilanian and Courtney Kube, ‘Airport Informants, Overhead Drones: How the US Killed 
Soleimani,’ NBC News, 10 January 2020. 
678 See also Reuters, ‘Exclusive: Informants in Iraq, Syria Helped US Kill Iran’s Soleimani—
sources,’ Reuters, 09 January 2020.  
679 See Suadad al-Salhy, ‘Tracked, Targeted, Killed: Qassem Soleimani’s Final Hours,’ Middle 
East Eye, 04 January 2020; see also Agbada S. Agbada, ‘Is the Killing of Qasem Soleimani by the 
United States of America Legal Under International Law,’ SSRN, 07 January 2020. 
680 Reuters, ‘Exclusive: Informants in Iraq, Syria Helped US Kill Iran’s Soleimani—sources.’  
681 For confidentiality, both sources have requested to remain anonymous as they are still active 
senior White House officials. 
682 Russ Read, ‘World’s Most Feared Drone: CIA’s MQ-9 Reaper Killed Soleimani,’ The 
Washington Examiner, 03 January 2020; see also Arab News Staff, ‘Reaper Drone Launched from 
Qatar Fired Missile That Killed Soleimani,’ Arab News, 05 January 2020. 
683 See also Joshua Rhett Miller, ‘A Look at the Deadly Capabilities of the MQ-9 Reaper Drone 
That Took Out Gen. Qassem Soleimani,’ The New York Post, 03 January 2020. 
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 Soleimani disembarked the plane and was quickly ushered into one of two awaiting 
vehicles.684 Like a huge carbon fibre vulture, the MQ-9 Reaper patiently and silently circled 
overhead. As soon as the CIA confirmed Soleimani’s location, they provided this actionable 
intelligence to President Trump, who immediately authorized the strike.685 Once both vehicles had 
reached the access road at the exit of the airport lot, the drone locked onto both target vehicles.686 
At 12:47 am, the MQ-9 Reaper fired two AGM-114 hellfire missiles—destroying the vehicles and 
engulfing them in flames. All ten occupants in the vehicles were killed on impact.687 Among the 
dead were Gen. Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Apart from being the Iraqi leader of the 
Kata’ib Hezbollah militia group, al-Muhandis also held the position of deputy commander of 
Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs).688 Despite not being the intended target, he had 
nonetheless been declared a terrorist by the US more than a decade earlier689—marking his death 
a bonus for the operation. Although it would take days before Soleimani’s remains could be 
positively identified, operatives on the scene were able to tentatively confirm his identity by a ring 
found on a severed hand near the wreckage.690  
 
 
684 See Gal Perl Finkel, ‘The Killing of Soleimani and the Deal of the Century,’ The Jerusalem 
Post, 16 February 2020. 
685 In fact, President Trump had signed Soleimani’s death warrant seven months prior to the drone 
strike—which raises further questions about the supposed imminence of the threat posed by the 
General. See Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube, ‘Trump Authorized Soleimani's Killing 7 Months 
Ago, with Conditions,’ NBC News, 13 January 2020; and Lt. Col. James G. Zumwalt, ‘The Unique 
Weapon That Took Out Soleimani,’ The Hill, 20 February 2020. 
686 Martin Chulov, ‘A Defining Moment in the Middle East: The Killing of Qassem Suleimani,’ 
The Guardian, 03 January 2020. 
687 Agnes Callamard, ‘The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani: Its Lawfulness and Why it 
Matters,’ Reiss Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law, 08 January 
2020; see also Michael Crowley et al., ‘US Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of 
Iranian Forces,’ The New York Times, 02 January 2020; and Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Zeina 
Karam, ‘Iran Vows Revenge for US Attack That Killed Powerful General,’ Associated Press, 03 
January 2020. 
688 Callamard, ‘The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani.’ 
689 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to 
Stability of Iraq,’ United States Department of the Treasury, 07 February 2009. 
690 TOI Staff, ‘Four Hellfire Missiles and a Severed Hand: The Killing of Qassem Soleimani,’ The 
Times of Israel, 03 January 2020. 
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Immediately following the strike, investigators at the Baghdad airport apprehended all staff 
present at the time of the attack. Airline staff on the Cham Wings flight, which flew Soleimani to 
Baghdad, were also detained.691 Agents from Iraqi national security then confiscated cell phones 
and held hours-long interrogations with every individual—regardless of whether they came into 
contact with Soleimani or his officials that night.692 Every text, call and in-person contact was 
examined, analyzed and scrutinized. One employee recalled how his interrogation lasted upwards 
of 24 hours, during which time the agents ‘asked [him] a million questions’ before being cleared 
and allowed to return home.693 
 
Iraq’s National Security Agency announced that they found ‘strong indications that a 
network of spies inside Baghdad Airport was involved in leaking sensitive security details.’ The 
head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Falih al-Fayadh, who also served as the Iraqi 
National Security Advisor, led the investigation.694 Fayadh chose to liaise with Iranian proxies and 
Shiite militias, as their close ties with Soleimani would ensure that any potential suspicions about 
the investigation's conduct would be quashed due to their involvement.695 According to another 
Iraqi security official, the ‘[i]nitial findings of the Baghdad investigation team suggest that the first 
tip on Soleimani came from Damascus airport.’696 More specifically, the Syrian cell at the 
Damascus airport was tasked with tracking Soleimani and noting the tail number of his plane, 
while the ‘job of the Baghdad airport cell was to confirm the arrival of the target and details of his 
convoy.’697 Throughout his life, Soleimani always had a hand in Syria—a life-long obsession with 
keeping Assad in power. In the end, it was spies from Damascus who had a hand in his death. Akin 
 
691 TOI Staff, ‘Network of Syrian, Iraqi Spies Said to Have Helped US kill Soleimani,’ Times of 
Israel, 09 January 2020. 
692 Omer Ozkizilcik, ‘Soleimani’s Death Proves the US Has Friends in Syria, But It’s Not the 
YPG,’ TRT World, 16 January 2020. 
693 Michael Georgy and Brian Thevenot, ‘Informants in Iraq, Syria Helped US Kill Iran’s 
Soleimani: Report,’ Reuters, 10 January 2020. 
694 See Dilanian and Kube, ‘Airport Informants, Overhead Drones.’ 
695 Ozkizilcik, ‘Soleimani’s Death Proves the US Has Friends in Syria.’ 
696 Georgy and Thevenot, ‘Informants in Iraq.’ 
697 Ryan Morgan, ‘Iraqi, Syrian Informants Helped US Track Soleimani Before Strike,’ American 
Military News, 10 January 2020. 
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to a Shakespearean tragedy, Syrian involvement in Soleimani’s assassination was both poetic and 
tragic. Perhaps the old proverb is true, ‘those whom you do not let die, will not allow you to live.’698 
 
 Shortly after the strike was confirmed as a success by the CIA, the US Department of 
Defence released an official statement. It noted in part that the drone ‘strike [which killed 
Soleimani] was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.’ According to the announcement, 
Soleimani was targeted and killed because he ‘was actively developing plans to attack American 
diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region.’ However, no reference was 
made to any ‘imminent’ threat evidence which would warrant such swift action. 699   
 
 Hours later, from his Mar-a-Lago Resort, President Trump held a press conference on the 
Soleimani strike. He reaffirmed that that strike was ‘aimed at stopping a war, not starting one.’ 
Citing that the drone strike was necessary since ‘Soleimani was plotting imminent and sinister 
attacks on American diplomats and military personnel.’ Later Trump claimed that the US caught 
Soleimani ‘in the act and terminated him.’700 However, these assertions are inherently flawed since 
imminence is defined as something that has not yet occurred. So, stating that they ‘caught 
[Soleimani] in the act’ does not logically follow. Either a threat has materialized, or it has not. 
Trump later claimed that the drone strikes were also in response to the Hezbollah rocket attack on 
a military base in Kirkuk, Iraq, which killed a US contractor.701 Once again, baffling the 
international community as to the true motivations behind the drone strike. Was it really to stop 
Soleimani from carrying out an impending attack? Or was it in response to an earlier Hezbollah 
strike? Or perhaps there was another unknown motive. Uncertainty in politics is unfavourable. In 
matters of international diplomacy, it can prove precarious.  
 
 
698 Romanian proverb: ‘Pe cine nu lași să moară, nu te lasă să trăiești.’ Directly translated to 
English as: ‘Whom you do not let die, will not allow you to live.’ 
699 US Department of Defence, ‘Immediate Release: Statement by the Department of Defence,’ 
United States Department of Defence, 02 January 2020 
<https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/statement-by-the-
department-of-defense/>. 
700 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani,’ White House 
Press Office, Mar-a-Lago Resort in Palm Beach, Florida, 03 January 2020. 
701 John Hudson et al., ‘On the Day US Forces Killed Soleimani, They Targeted a Senior Iranian 
Official in Yemen,’ The Washington Post, 10 January 2020.  
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 Expectedly, Robert O’Brien, a US National Security Adviser, defended the president. He 
remarked that Trump was within his legal right to use drone strikes against Soleimani.702 He 
bolstered this position by claiming that the strikes were in self-defence against the ongoing threat 
posed by Soleimani, and therefore justifiable under the 2002 Authority for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) against Iraq.703 Like O’Brien, Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, also expressed 
his support for the strike. However, when reporters pressured him further, he had difficulty 
answering questions about the imminence of the threat in question. Finally, he admitted that it was 
‘an intelligence-based assessment that drove [the] decision-making process.’ Declining to discuss 
the purported imminence of the threat posed by Soleimani at the time of his death, Pompeo instead 
opted to say that Soleimani ‘was actively plotting in the region to take actions, a big action, as he 
described it, that would have put dozens if not hundreds of American lives at risk.’ In the days 
which followed, US government officials would be faced with a barrage of reporters' questions, 





The next day, reporters questioned Pompeo about a rumour that had begun circulating in 
Washington. They had heard that some senior government officials in different departments and 
agencies had become skeptical of the motivations behind the strike on Soleimani. They cited 
limited intelligence on the supposed imminence of the threat, which Pompeo vehemently denied. 
According to him, no ‘skepticism’ was present in the US government about the mission.705 He 
 
702 Rob Crilly, ‘White House Says Trump Used Iraq War Authorization to Kill Qassem Soleimani,’ 
Washington Examiner, 03 January 2020 (‘The President exercised America’s clear and inherent 
right of self-defence to counter this threat.’) and (‘It was a fully authorized action under the 2002 
AUMF and was consistent with his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to defend our 
nation and our forces against attacks like those that Soleimani has directed in the past and was 
plotting now.’) 
703 See Eugene Kiely, ‘Trump Administration’s Shifting Statements on Soleimani’s Death,’ 
FactCheck.org, 15 January 2020. 
704 US Department of State, ‘Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With John Berman of CNN New Day,’ 
Interview Transcript, US Department of State Archives, 03 January 2020. 
705 David Smith, ‘Pompeo Scrambles to Defend Trump Claim Killing Suleimani will Save US 
Lives,’ The Guardian, 05 January 2020. 
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further asserted that the government's intelligence assessment had concluded that Soleimani posed 
an ongoing risk to the US as long as he was alive. Thus, killing Soleimani ‘reduced risks.’706 But 
where is this intelligence? And what risks were mitigated with the targeted killing of a senior 
Iranian official? The Trump administration’s explanations have raised many questions for which 
there exist few answers. The next day would not shed any light on these concerns. 
 
A joint press conference was scheduled to address intensifying public criticism on the 
Soleimani strike. US Defence Secretary Mark Esper, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Mark A. Milley, led the session. Facing pressures by reporters, many of whom were left 
dissatisfied with Pompeo's answers just a day earlier, the topic of intelligence was quickly raised. 
Reporters once more posed questions to which they had not yet gotten a response. What 
intelligence was available? Who provided the intelligence? Was it credible, viable and actionable? 
Instead of receiving concise answers to these questions, Esper and Milley touted the line and 
attempted to obfuscate the situation. Milley concluded that the intelligence they had allowed them 
to know more than just Soleimani’s history—but also his future.707 Unless Milley received his 
intelligence through a crystal ball, this statement does not do much in the way of providing proof 
for the necessity of the strike.  
 
Hours later, during a press briefing at the Pentagon, Milley continued to reaffirm the White 
House position—noting that the US would have been ‘negligent if [it] did not respond… [as] the 
threat of inaction exceeded the threat of action.’708 Ultimately, even those in Washington who take 
issue with how Soleimani was killed cannot say that his death was unwarranted. Mary Ellen 
O’Connell might challenge him on this claim. Since news of the strike became public, O’Connell 
 
706 Conor Finnegan and Adia Robinson, ‘World is Safer because of Iranian Commander’s Death: 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,’ ABC News, 05 January 2020 (‘The intelligence assessment made 
clear that no action, allowing Soleimani to continue his plotting, his planning, his terror campaign 
created more risks than taking the action that we took last week. We reduced risks.’) 
707 Army Gen. Mark A. Milley during a joint press conference on Monday January 6th, 2020 (‘We 
know his history. Importantly we knew his future.’) 
708 Gen. Mark A. Milley as quoted in Ibid; see also William James Stover, ‘Preemptive War: 
Implications of the Bush and Rumsfeld Doctrines,’ International Journal on World Peace (2004), 
pp. 3-14; Chris Bordelon, ‘The Illegality of the US Policy of Preemptive Self-Defense Under 
International Law.’ Chapman Law Review, 9 (2005), p. 111; and David B. Rivkin Jr, ‘The Virtues 
of Preemptive Deterrence,’ Harvard Journal of Public Policy, 29 (2005), pp. 85. 
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has been quite vocal that the customary right of preemptive self-defence does not permit 
assassinations. The United Nations Charter is quite clear on this matter, defining self-defence as 
an option only in response to an armed attack that has already taken place. Still, it seems as though 
US government officials, for the most part, remain unbothered by this legal qualm. An unnamed 
US State Department official has admitted that Soleimani’s death would probably not prevent 
future violent terror plots from materializing, but it does prevent such plots from being as 
ingeniously orchestrated as they were under his command.709 
 
Confronted with mounting suspicion and a general call for the release of information 
surrounding the strike, the Trump administration sent Gen. Mark Esper to deal with the press—
again. It had been less than 24 hours since Esper had spoken at the joint press conference, but this 
time he had something more concrete to offer reporters. He announced that the Trump 
administration would share classified intelligence about the strike that killed Soleimani with the 
Gang of Eight. This elite group included Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Minority 
Leader Chuck Schumer, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and 
Reps. Adam Schiff and Devin Nunes, and Sens. Mark Warner and Richard Burr. The group would 
be collectively briefed on, as Esper put it, ‘[t]he exquisite intelligence that we are talking about 
that led to the decision to… strike Soleimani’.710   
 
 The briefing was given on the afternoon of Tuesday, January 7th, 2020. Esper was quick to 
point out that only these eight individuals would be given this detailed intelligence brief. All other 
congressional members would ‘not have access’ to all classified intelligence—and would instead 
receive a less detailed brief the following day. Esper reaffirmed that the US did nothing wrong 
because Soleimani was not an innocent man, but a terrorist leader who ‘was a legitimate 
 
709 Kathy Gilsinan, ‘It Wasn’t the Law that Stopped Other Presidents from Killing Soleimani,’ The 
Atlantic, 04 January 2020; see also Charles Pierson, ‘Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom,’ Denver Journal of International Law 
and Polciy, 33 (2004), p. 150; Sophie Clavier, ‘Contrasting Perspectives on Preemptive Strike: 
The United States, France, and the War on Terror.’ Maine Law Review, (2006), p. 566; and Elaine 
M. Bunn, ‘Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?’ Strategic Forum. No. 200, 
National Defense University, 2003. 
710 US Department of Defence, ‘Press Briefing by Secretary of Defence Mark T. Esper,’ US 
Department of Defence Archives, 07 January 2020. 
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target…[whose] time was due.’ Still, he admitted that the US ‘should expect that [Iran] will 
retaliate in some way, shape or form,’ either through their forces or proxies. Adding that the United 
States is ‘prepared for any contingency…and will respond appropriately to whatever they do.’711 
 
 Hours later, at a press conference in Washington, Trump was questioned by reporters about 
what intelligence had led to his decision to kill Soleimani. At this point, the Gang of Eight had 
received their ‘classified brief,’ yet reporters were still struggling to piece together vague, 
confusing and often contradictory statements given by officials over the last few days. So, Trump 
began to list off the intelligence he had. The list was quite short, beginning and ending with: 
‘number one, I knew the past. His past was horrible. He was a terrorist.’712 A list with only one 
point. One irrational and incongruent point. Having a ‘horrible past’ does not warrant targeted 
killing by a drone strike in an unwilling third-party state. Moreover, how is ‘horrible’ defined? 
And what is the benchmark for being labelled a ‘terrorist’? Scholars know all too well that the 
typology of a terrorist is quite malleable and contentious. Thus, Trump’s answer raised more 
questions, which instigated further public outrage.  
 
As promised a day earlier, remaining congressional members of both the US House of 
Representatives and the Senate were given their slightly less detailed brief. Many emerged from 
the meeting less than impressed. Some Democratic members immediately voiced their concern 
with the lack of intelligence presented during the briefing.713 But they were not alone. It is also 
important to note that despite the seemingly ironclad unity of the Republican party, this 
intelligence brief divided even Trump’s most loyal supporters. Republican Sen. Mike Lee of Utah, 
 
711 Ibid, see also Timothy Kearley, ‘Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United 
Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent,’ Wyoming Law Review Vol.3 (2003), p. 663; Ryan 
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who was visibly upset upon exiting the meeting, noted that it was overall ‘insulting and 
demeaning’… ‘probably the worst briefing I have ever seen, at least on a military issue, in the nine 
years I have served in the United States Senate.’ Republican Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky 
echoed his view, stating that ‘[w]hat [we] heard was less than satisfying.’714 
 
 When reporters brought this to Esper’s attention, he reasoned that only the Gang of Eight 
received the full classified intelligence, and therefore ‘knew the whole picture.’ Thus, he 
misleadingly reasoned that the dissatisfaction with the intelligence brief was not caused by the 
intelligence presented, but rather by the intelligence omitted.715 Unfortunately, Esper’s reasoning 
was quickly dismantled when days later, Adam Schiff, a member of the Gang of Eight, would call 
into question the credibility of the classified intelligence presented to his group and voiced his 
concerns regarding the ‘increasing prospect of war with Iran.’716 His concerns would be proven 
valid as Mohsen Rezaei, a senior Iranian military officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, had 
vowed ‘vigorous revenge’ against the US for killing Soleimani.717  
 
Since President Trump pulled out of the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal, animosity between 
the two states has steadily increased. Therefore, this has led many to believe that the potential for 
war with Iran is not an impossibility.718 Knowing the political tension between their nations, 
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Trump still engaged in a rather belligerent tit-for-tat with Iran, promising that he would strike key 
areas and cultural sites if Iran chose to escalate tensions any further.719  
 
In the White House foyer, mere hours after congressional members emerged perplexed by 
the brief they received—Trump chose to do what he arguably enjoys most: verbally attack another 
nation. Directly addressing Iran, Trump vowed to impose different sanctions on the regime and 
use its ‘great [US] military and equipment’ to get Iran to comply.720 Rather than use the time to 
clear up some issues voiced by congressional members, or answer pressing questions about the 
Soleimani strike, Trump chose to threaten Iran once more—this time with sanctions. All in all, it 
proved to be a somewhat ironic speech, seeing that the only foreign policy the US has had with 
Iran, after the dissolution of the Iran deal, was rooted in lethal drone strikes and sovereignty 
infringing clandestine operations. 
 
That same afternoon, Kelly Craft, the US Ambassador to the UN, penned a letter to the 
United Nations in which she stated that the US’s decision to kill Soleimani was a clear form of 
self-defence—as set out under Article 51 of the Charter. Craft argued that the United States ‘has 
been a target of a series of escalating threats and armed attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ 
and these threats only further demonstrate that the US acted in adherence to the UN Charter and 
well within their right of state self-defence. 721 
 
Just like the US, Iran also sought to justify its actions to the United Nations. So, Iranian 
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif wrote a letter to the President of the Security Council 
 
719 Trump’s threat to target Iranian cultural sites violates international law; see Agnes Callamard, 
‘The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani: Its Lawfulness and Why it Matters,’ Reiss Center on 
Law and Security at New York University School of Law, 08 January 2020. 
720 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump on Iran,’ White House Press Office, 08 January 
2020 (‘[t]he civilized world must send a clear and unified message to the Iranian regime: Your 
campaign of terror, murder, mayhem will not be tolerated any longer. It will not be allowed to go 
forward…[t]he fact that we have this great military and equipment, however, does not mean we 
have to use it. We do not want to use it. American strength, both military and economic, is the best 
deterrent.’) 
721 Kelly Craft, ‘Letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council,’ United States 
Mission to the United Nations, 08 January 2020. Accessed at 
<https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6609717/Art-51-Letter.pdf>. 
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and Secretary-General of the United Nations. He claimed that Iran not only acted in self-defence 
as dictated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, but it had done so proportionately.722 Zarif concluded 
the letter by noting that Iran does ‘not seek escalation or war’ but will defend itself against any 
aggression.723 So, while attempting to justify their drone strike within existing international law, 
Iran began following through on its promise to retaliate 
 
Operation Shahid Soleimani 
 
The killing of Soleimani made Iran look defenceless against US aggression, so the regime sought 
to reaffirm their power—especially in the eyes of their citizens—by vowing vengeance against the 
United States for the killing of Soleimani. Respect, perceived power and an unchallenged 
reputation are all vitally important to the Iranian regime. So much so that the ‘Achilles’ Heel of 
the Islamic regime [became]… its dignity in the eyes of its subjects.’ 724 
 
 Fueled by outrage and public calls for revenge, ‘Operation Martyr Soleimani’ was initiated. 
According to Gen. Amir Hadjizadeh, IRGC Air Force commander, ‘[t]he proper revenge for the 
blood of (Soleimani and the other persons killed in the US strike) is the expulsion of the Americans 
from the region.’725 It began with Iran launching twenty-two missiles on two joint-US bases in 
Iraq—one in Ain al-Assad Base and another in Erbil.726 The Iranian missile strikes were, according 
to Hadjizadeh, only the beginning. Although Iran had only fired 13 missiles, he boasted that it was 
‘prepared to fire several hundred more in the first hour or two after the strike’ if the situation had 
escalated. According to the general, Iran planned for a ‘limited campaign’ which would, at most, 
last a week. It turns out this was somewhat of an exaggeration as Operation Shahid Soleimani only 
 
722 Majid Takht Ravanchi, ‘Letter No.13259 to the United Nations, Permanent Mission of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations,’ PBS News, 08 January 2020 
<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ENzf2JzX0AABPCD.png>. 
723 Ravanchi, ‘Letter No.13259 to the United Nations, Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the United Nations.’ 
724 Uzi Rubin, ‘Operation Shahid Soleimani: Iran’s Revenge,’ Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
Studies, Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University, February 2020, p. 19. 
725 IRGC Air Force commander as quoted in Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
726 Al Jazeera, ‘Iran Launches Missile Attacks on US facilities in Iraq,’ Al Jazeera, 08 January 
2020; see also Ahmet Berk Binkaya, ‘Causes and Effects of the Assassination of Qasem Soleimani: 
A Political Perspective,’ The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies, Vol.1 (2020), pp. 159-166. 
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lasted a day. Iran claimed it was ‘to preserve missile stockpiles for later action,’ but the likelihood 
was that the action was more an attempt to save face than anything else. 727 
 
Yet, in the days following the Iranian retaliatory strikes, diplomatic relations with the 
United States were tense, unfocused and uncertain. It also did not help that US statements about 
these retaliatory strikes seemingly differed by the hour and failed to mention any concrete 
information about potential damage or injuries incurred. In press briefings, Trump downplayed 
severe brain injuries suffered by US soldiers as ‘headaches.’ He also failed to mention that one of 
the missiles severed critical communication lines with Creech Air Force Base, causing operators 
to lose control of seven predator drones that were armed, and in mid-flight. These facts only 
became public after soldiers on base explained them to local reporters. It seems as though the 
Pentagon, and even US forces in Iraq, were unaware of the CIA’s intention to kill Soleimani at the 
time and in the manner it did. As such, they were left unprepared for the fallout, which ensued.728 
 
 Hadjizadeh maintained that Iran’s Operation Shahid Soleimani was a brilliant success. He 
claimed that the United States was a ‘paper tiger,’ a bully, which only attains success when it 
attacks weaker nations. Hadjizadeh noted that Operation Shahid Soleimani was not only a matter 
of vengeance. It was ‘merely the first instalment in a comprehensive operation that will eventually 
expel the US from the entire region, from Afghanistan in the east all the way to North Africa in 
the West.’ For this to be achieved, Iran planned to request help from its allies and proxies in 
Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Countries currently hosting the US military will need their political 
officials to request that they leave, then, ‘local militias will take over and drive the Americans 
out.’729 It seems like a logical plan, but this has yet to take form at the time of writing. Tehran may 
have stopped short of pursuing this plan, but this does not mean that it did not succeed in its 
objectives. 
 
727 IRGC Air Force commander as quoted in Rubin, ‘Operation Shahid Soleimani: Iran’s 
Revenge,’ pp. 16-17; see also Maysam Behravesh, ‘Qassem Soleimani’s Assassination and Iran’s 
Pledge of Severe Revenge,’ Inside Arabia, (2020); and Ahmed Salah Hashim, ‘Iranian General’s 
Killing: How Will Iran Respond?’ RSIS Commentaries, 005-20 (2020). 
728 Ibid, pp. 17-19; see also Akpan Nse Etim and Nebeife Chigozie Joseph, ‘After Soleimani: Iran’s 
Proxy Networks and Its Implications for Stability in the Persian Gulf,’ Interdisciplinary Journal 
of African & Asian Studies, Vol.6, No.2, (2020). 
729 Ibid, pp. 17-18.  
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 If America is a paper tiger, then so was the Iranian operation to avenge Soleimani – indeed 
puzzlingly so. As Rubin has recognized, Operation Shahid Soleimani was ultimately more of a 
demonstration than a decisive strike, which did nothing to deter the US from launching future 
attacks against the regime or its interests. What it did do, on the other hand, was reaffirm its self-
respect in the eyes of its citizens and regional allies—perhaps quite courageously, given the 
difference in military capabilities between the two states. This operation also had another, perhaps 
more subtle, victory. While the US was domestically dealing with the fallout and engaging a 
deceptive, contradictory and aggressive messaging, Iran exhibited a robust and united front. From 
the position of ‘the cognitive battlefield,’ Rubin concluded that, ‘the US administration… showed 
a lack of control over information… [which] stood in sharp contrast to the focused, fluent, and 
forceful messaging of the Iranians.’730  
 
 Modern conflicts are fought on multiple fronts—the most important of which are the 
physical and cognitive battlefields. Public opinion, perceptions of legality, operational legitimacy 
and international support are just a few of the factors which are fought over on the latter front.731 
Thus, it is this cognitive battlefield that ultimately decides the victor. The United States may have 
tactically won on the physical battlefield, but the resulting political fallout may have cost them 
more than they gained strategically. Nevertheless, it has to be conceded that the substantial 
escalation that even Trump’s closest friends, including Graham, warned him of, did not occur. 





730 Ibid, p. 20. 
731 See Richard A. Falk, ‘What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?’ The 
American Journal of International Law Vo.97, No.3 (2003), pp. 590-598; Ramesh Thakur, ‘Law, 
Legitimacy and United Nations,’ Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol.11 (2010); 
Thomas G. Weiss, What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix it, (John Wiley & Sons, 
2016); Shashi Tharoor, ‘Why America Still Needs the United Nations,’ Foreign Affairs, (2003), 
pp. 67-80; Vaughan Lowe, et al., eds. The United Nations Security Council and War: The 
Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and 
Simon Chesterman, ‘Reforming the United Nations: Legitimacy, Effectiveness and Power After 
Iraq,’ SYBIL, (2006), pp. 59. 
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Although no Americans died due to ‘Operation Shahid Soleimani,’732 there were other 
unintentional victims that day. After the twenty-two missiles hit their intended target, the Iranian 
military was on high alert—expecting some form of American retaliation or military engagement. 
Tragically, this increased anxiety, tension and uncertainty would claim its first victim.733 The 
Iranian military misidentified a Ukrainian passenger jet as a potential US cruise missile flying over 
Tehran and intercepted it. In doing so, they killed all 176 passengers on board.734 In one irreversible 
moment, that plane and its passengers became the first victim. In the first few days following the 
plane crash, Iran blamed engine failure and mechanical issues. But as international calls for 
investigation mounted, and amateur video of a large fireball in the sky began circulating on social 
media, the regime found it ever more challenging to keep up the political smokescreen.  
 
Iraq was undoubtedly the second victim. As Osama Bin Javaid, a reporter for Al Jazeera, 
pointed out, Iraq’s worst fear had materialized. It had once again become a ‘theatre of 
confrontation between world powers’—an unwilling battlefield.735 A place where nations carry out 
dangerous clandestine operations, exercise their military might and engage in aggressive revenge 
missions. The whole region held its breath, with Iraq especially fearful of what new attacks might 
play out in its territory. 
 
Pressured by his ministers, Iraq’s caretaker Prime Minister Abdel Abdul-Mahdi, called 
Mike Pompeo to ask the US to pull out its troops, citing that US forces had killed Soleimani by 
entering Iraq and its airspace without permission.736 Pompeo declined the request. However, it 
should be mentioned that in 2008, the US had formally agreed to respect Iraqi sovereignty. The 
 
732 BBC World News Staff, ‘Iran Missile Attack: Did Tehran Intentionally Avoid US Casualties?’ 
BBC World News, 08 January 2020 < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51042156>. 
733 This dissertation is written in memory of Mansour Esfahani and Marzieh Foroutan who were 
tragically killed onboard the downed Ukrainian flight. 
734 Ben Gilbert, ‘Iran's Military Knew It Accidentally Shot Down A Passenger Plane Moments 
After It Happened, And A Stunning New Report Details How It Was Covered Up—Even from 
Iran's President,’ Business Insider, 26 January 2020. 
735 Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Iran Launches Missile Attacks on US Facilities in Iraq,’ 08 January 2020 
(‘[t]he worst expectation that Iraq had, that it will again become a theatre of confrontation between 
world powers seems to be coming true again… as Iraq was the place where the US chose to take 
out Soleimani and Iraq again is the place where the Iranians chose to attack US forces’) 
736 Al Jazeera Staff, ‘US Rejects Iraq Request to Discuss Troop Withdrawal, US-Iran Escalation,’ 
Al Jazeera News, 10 January 2020. 
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understanding was that the US would cease using Iraqi territory as its ‘point for attack’ against 
other countries.737 With the strike on Soleimani, the Iraqi Prime Minister rightfully argued that the 
US violated the deal's terms. It had not even been four months since, in August of 2019, Abdul-
Mahdi, with direction from Defence Ministry spokesperson Yahya Rasool, announced that the US 
would need permission from Iraq before flying in its airspace or dropping bombs. Not an 
unreasonable request, seeing that Iraq is a sovereign state. 738 
 
Iraq, like the US, is a nation-state whose sovereignty is protected under international law. 
It is also a member state at the UN, has defined borders, and thus implied authority over activities 
within its borders. The US has become all too comfortable in combating terrorism in the Middle 
East that it has forgotten that the countries in that region have never forfeited their sovereign rights 
to its government. The US can lawfully target a group like the Islamic State because it is a self-
proclaimed non-state caliphate with no borders, no UN membership, no international recognition 
or protection by its laws. As such, it has no sovereignty to claim nor forfeit. Still, this does not 
give any country free rein to chase IS, or any target for that matter, insouciantly with complete 
disregard for international laws and individual state sovereignty. The Iraqi government warned in 
late 2019 that those who failed to acquire this permission would be ‘deemed to be hostile aviation 
and handled immediately by our air defences.’ 739 
 
That did not exactly happen, for it was less than six months after Abdul-Mahdi’s statement 
that Iraq would be dealing with the fallout of a targeted drone assassination on its territory, and a 
fear that future armed assaults between Iran and the United States would continue to take place 
within their borders.740 Following the unproductive call between Abdul-Mahdi and Pompeo, Iraq’s 
 
737 Archit Shukla, ‘The Killing of General Soleimani—A Blatant Violation of International Laws,’ 
The Jurist: University of Pittsburgh Press, 14 April 2020. 
738 Kareem Khader, ‘Iraq Parliament Speaker Says US Strike Was “Flagrant Violation of 
Sovereignty”,’ CNN, 03 January 2020 (Abdul-Mahdi also added that ‘exclusive approval of the 
General Commander of the Iraqi Armed Forces, or his authorized representative’ would be 
required by all those wishing to fly in Iraqi airspace) 
739 Tom O’Connor, ‘US Now Needs Iraq’s Permission to Drop Bombs There,’ Newsweek-World 
News, 16 August 2019. 
740 The author recognizes that these exchanges may have been orchestrated shows of defiance for 
public consumption. Yet, for the purpose of providing the perspective of all relevant parties, this 
exchange was included. It is important to note that the Iraqi government cannot run Iraq without 
 201 
top Shia leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, condemned the US's actions for confronting Iran 
on Iraqi soil. He argued that it would be ‘plunging an already war-ravaged country and the wider 
middle east into deeper conflict.’ Al-Sistani argued that it was Iraqi’s who would suffer from this 
potential escalation—and argued that ‘no foreign powers should be allowed to decide Iraq’s fate.’ 
It should be noted that Al-Sistani, ‘who wields huge influence over public opinion in Iraq, only 
weighs in on politics during times of crisis, and is seen as a voice of moderation.’ Despite his calls 
for peace and non-intervention, neither Iran nor the US has heeded the call. 741 
 
 It was now January 10th, exactly one week after the Soleimani strike. Still, no answers. 
Instead, there was growing outrage about the details, which had slowly become public over the 
last week. The only clear thing was that the US had invaded sovereign Iraqi airspace to carry out 




In an interview with Fox News, Mike Pompeo reaffirmed that Soleimani posed an imminent threat. 
When questioned further about what that ‘imminent threat’ entailed, Pompeo admitted that the 
administration knew Soleimani was dangerous but had no way of knowing when or where a threat 
might materialize. He was quoted as saying that ‘[t]here is no doubt that there were a series of 
imminent attacks that were being plotted by Qasem Soleimani. We do not know precisely when—
and we do not know precisely where—but it was real.’ This statement fueled further media 
backlash and growing pressures to clarify the ‘threats.’742 
 
 During a White House event, Trump announced the real reason behind the US 
government’s decision to kill Soleimani. According to Trump, Soleimani was involved in a terror 
plot to blow up the US embassy in Baghdad.743 When prompted to provide more details on the 
 
US air power, so it cannot give orders in this manner, and would not do so as this would ultimately 
be counterproductive in the long run. 
741 O’Connor, ‘US Now Needs Iraq’s Permission to Drop Bombs There.’ 
742 Kevin Breuninger, ‘Mike Pompeo: We Don’t Know Precisely When or Where Soleimani 
Planned to Attack,’ CNBC, 10 January 2020. 
743 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump on Proposed National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations,’ White House Press Office, 09 January 2020 (‘because [he was] looking to blow up 
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supposed embassy plot, Trump declined. Instead, he said the evidence was ‘obvious,’ citing the 
protests in Iran's streets as evidence.744 Hours later, at a political rally in Ohio, Trump stated that 
multiple embassies were the intended targets—not just in Baghdad.745 In light of these new off the 
cuff revelations, several Democratic senators signed a petition demanding that the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence provide them with the intelligence which corroborates President 
Trump’s claim that Soleimani was planning an imminent attack.746  
 
In an interview with Laura Ingraham, President Trump made another bombshell revelation. 
He claimed that not one but ‘four US embassies’ would have been targeted had his administration 
not eliminated Soleimani.747 Had he not been the President of the United States, his claims would 
not have been given much thought, especially without any proof to corroborate them. Yet, given 
his position, these assertions were given a certain credence level—if only illusory. Still, in the 
absence of any concrete evidence to substantiate these claims, the international community found 
it difficult to accept Trump’s version of events.748 Iran, in particular, was growing furious with the 
 
our embassy [in Baghdad]. We also did it for other very obvious reasons. Somebody died—one of 
our military people died. People were badly wounded just a week before. And we did it. And we 
had a shot at him, and I took it, and that show was pinpoint accurate.’)  
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-proposed-national-
environmental-policy-act-regulations/> 
744 Ibid (‘No, I think it was obvious, if you look at the protests.’) 
745 Shane Harris, Josh Dawsey and Seung Min Kim, ‘Trump Now Claims Four Embassies Were 
Under Threat from Iran, Raising Fresh Questions About Intelligence Reports,’ Washington Post, 
10 January 2020 (‘Soleimani was actively planning new attacks and he was looking very seriously 
at our embassies and not just the embassy in Baghdad.’) 
746 US Senate, ‘Van Hollen Joins Murphy, Democratic Senators in Requesting Classified Briefing 




747 Alex Pappas, ‘Trump Tells Fox News' Laura Ingraham “Four Embassies” Were Targeted in 
Imminent Threat from Iran,’ Fox News, 10 January 2020 (Trump: ‘I can reveal that I believe it 
would have been four embassies. And I think that probably Baghdad already started. …Baghdad 
certainly would have been the lead. But I think it would have been four embassies, could have 
been military bases, could have been a lot of other things too. But it was imminent, and then all of 
a sudden, he was gone.’) 
748 See for example Ryan Schildkraut, ‘Where There Are Good Arms, There Must Be Good Laws: 
An Empirical Assessment of Customary International Law Regarding Preemptive 
Force,’ Minnesota Journal of International Law, Vol.16 (2007), pp. 193; and Mark Totten, 
‘Preemption and the War on Terror: Morality, law, and the Use of Force,’ (2006), pp. 1379-1379. 
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actions taken by the US government. Threats, calls for ‘revenge’ and protests in the streets put the 
US on high alert for the potential of escalated violence between the two nations. To curb this risk, 
the Trump administration settled on the way to control and suppress Iran from afar—by imposing 
the sanctions the President had alluded to just days earlier. 
 
 The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and the Secretary of the Treasury, Steven 
Mnuchin, announced in a joint briefing that sanctions on Iran would be applied to force the regime 
into behaving like a ‘normal nation.’749 However, during the question period, reporters were more 
interested in the Soleimani drone strike's motivations than the proposed sanctions announced in 
the briefing. Attendees intensely questioned and criticized the lack of intelligence behind the 
strikes and demanded to hear the administration’s imminence definition. Unprepared and visibly 
anxious, Secretary Pompeo felt pressured to defend once more the drone strike that killed 
Soleimani. In the end, he argued, in part, that the evidence to prove the imminence of an attack 
was irrelevant.750 Admitting that although the administration did not ‘know exactly which day it 
would have been executed,’ Soleimani was involved in planning an imminent terror plot against 
the United States. Pompeo then attempted to redefine imminence as something that might put 
Americans at risk.751 This definition is inherently problematic as it could justify any military 
action—as risk is somewhat of a subjectively interpreted condition. Nevertheless, Pompeo 
concluded by saying that the government ‘would have been culpably negligent’ had they not killed 
Soleimani and instead allowed this attack to have materialized. 
 
 
749 White House, ‘Press Briefing by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of the Treasury 
Steven Mnuchin on Iran Sanctions,’ White House Press Office, 10 January 2020. 
750 See Dominika Svarc, ‘Redefining Imminence: The Use of Force Against Threats and Armed 
Attacks in the Twenty-First Century.’ ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 13 
(2006), pp. 171; Gregory E. Maggs, ‘The Campaign to Restrict the Right to Respond to Terrorist 
Attacks in Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and What the United States Can Do 
About It,’ Regent Journal of International Law, Vol.4 (2006), pp. 149; Francis Grimal, Threats of 
Force: International Law and Strategy, (Routledge, 2013); and Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten, and 
Alexandra Hofer, eds., The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-based Approach (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018). 
751 See also Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan, ‘Surveillance and Violence from Afar: The Politics 
of Drones and Liminal Security-scapes,’ Theoretical Criminology Vol.15, No.3 (2011), pp. 239-
254. 
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 Unsatisfied with the briefing information, reporters tried their luck with a different 
approach. They asked Pompeo about Trump’s recent remarks concerning the plot headed by 
Soleimani to ‘blow up’ four US embassies. Pompeo asserted that the US government did have 
‘specific information on an imminent threat, and those threats included attacks on US embassies.’ 
Questioned further about the inconsistencies in his use of the term ‘imminent,’ particularly after 
previously declaring that they did not know precisely when or where an attack would materialize, 
Pompeo offered a rather annoyed response: ‘Those are completely consistent thoughts! I did not 
know exactly which minute. We do not know exactly which day it would have been executed. But 
it was very clear: Qasem Soleimani himself was plotting a broad, large-scale attack against 
American interests.’752 If so, where is the proof?753 
 
 On the other side of the world, Iran would be facing similar public backlash—but for a 
much different reason. Two days after the downing of Ukrainian Airlines Flight 752, Iran finally 
conceded that human error resulted in a missile being launched, which intercepted the plane and 
brought it down.754 Iranian President Hassan Rouhani admitted on Twitter that the plane's downing 
was a ‘disastrous mistake’ that they ‘completely regret.’755 However, as Mohamad Javad Zarif, 
Iran’s Foreign Minister points out, Iran may not be the only one to blame for this accident. Zarif 
noted that it was a mix of both ‘human error at the time of crisis caused by US adventurism that 
led to disaster.’756 Trump initiated hostilities, and Iran reciprocated, resulting in a fog of war that 
claimed innocent lives. Following this public admission of guilt, thousands of Iranians took to the 
 
752 White House, ‘Press Briefing by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of the Treasury 
Steven Mnuchin on Iran Sanctions.’ 
753 See Michael Poznansky, ‘Revisiting Plausible Deniability,’ Journal of Strategic 
Studies, (2020), pp. 1-23; Victor Marchetti, John D. Marks, and Melvin L. Wulf, The CIA and the 
Cult of Intelligence (New York: Knopf, 1974); Roger Z. George, Intelligence in the National 
Security Enterprise (New York: 2020); Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, 
Counterespionage, and Covert Action (London: Routledge, 2019); and Chris Whipple, The 
Spymasters: How the CIA Directors Shape History and the Future (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2020). 
754 Farnaz Fassihi, ‘Iran Says It Unintentionally Shot Down Ukrainian Airliner,’ New York Times, 
10 January 2020. 
755 Hassan Rouhani via Twitter on 10 January 2020. 
< https://twitter.com/HassanRouhani/status/1215856679423823872?s=20>. 
756 Javad Sarif via Twitter on 10 January 2020.  
<https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1215847283381755914?s=20>. 
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streets to protest the regime.757 Unexpectedly, it was the Iranians who would be first to admit guilt. 
The US was still sticking to their guns758—claiming that the strike on Soleimani was both morally 




If four US embassies were targeted by Soleimani, as Trump and his administration have claimed, 
then most likely, the Gang of Eight would have been informed of this during their classified 
briefing only days earlier. It was now January 12th, so the chances of obtaining new information 
were slowly diminishing with each passing day. The Trump administration had either succeeded 
at keeping pertinent intelligence under lock and key—or no such intelligence existed.  
 
 Adam Schiff, a member of the Gang of Eight and the chairman of the House Intelligence 
Committee, appeared in an interview on CBS’s ‘Face the Nation.’ He confirmed that there was no 
mention of embassy targets, much less four targets, in the detailed intelligence briefings given to 
the Gang of Eight.759 Margaret Brennan, the host of ‘Face the Nation,’ later questioned Esper why 
the Gang of Eight was not given the information about embassy targets in their classified 
intelligence briefings. Esper said it was because he did not have any intelligence that indicated that 
embassies were to be targeted. He furthermore claimed that Trump might have been merely 
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expressing his belief that there ‘could have been attacks against additional [US] embassies’ without 
the intelligence to support this claim.760  
 
Brennan shot back at Esper, pointing out that the president’s belief ‘sounds more like an 
assessment than a specific, tangible threat with a decisive piece of intelligence.’ Despite this lack 
of evidence, Esper nonetheless managed to reiterate his support for the president, noting that he 
shared the president’s belief on the matter, a view which he not only trusted but took as substantive 
evidence of the threat in question.761 This illogical reasoning is akin to an—'I believe, he believed’ 
scenario…wherein speculations and nontruths are relied upon in the absence of facts. Trump’s 
choice of language may indicate this, but Esper’s continued support for the president’s statements 
is alarming in the absence of any proof. 
 
 As US Defence Secretary, one would expect Esper to have a thorough knowledge of the 
intelligence behind the events leading up to, and following, the strike on Soleimani. If he did not 
know of any threat to any US embassy, then who else did? Where is the evidence to support 
Trump’s claim of a plot to ‘blow up’ not one, but four embassies? These shifting statements and 
explanations have damaged the credibility and legitimacy of the US operation in the eyes of its 
citizens and the international community. Rob Goodman, Assistant Professor of Politics at 
Ryerson University, added that the Trump administration's shifting explanations somewhat mirrors 
the claims of ‘imminent threat’ used by the George W. Bush administration in 2003 to justify 
launching the global war against terrorism. The problem is that Bush claimed imminence without 
proof. There were never any weapons of mass destruction found to justify the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. Might the Trump administration’s strike on Soleimani be a similar example of claiming 
imminence without proof? In 2003, Americans did not question the administration as they were 
still grappling with the aftermath of 9/11. Fast forward to 2020, where the American public is 
much more war-weary762 and hesitant to enter into another international armed conflict. Goodman 
 
760 Transcript, ‘Defence Secretary Mark Esper on ‘Face the Nation,’ CBS News, 12 January 2020.  
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-mark-esper-on-face-the-nation-january-12-2019/>. 
761 Ibid (Esper: ‘I didn’t see one with regard to four embassies. What I am saying is I share the 
President’s view that probably—my expectation was that they were going after our embassies. The 
embassies are the most prominent display of American presence in a country.’) 
762 It should be noted that at the time of writing, no data is available from which to analyze the 
American public’s response to the Soleimani strike. Despite the Trump administration’s attempt 
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argued that a change in rhetoric is insufficient to appease the public. Instead, the Trump 
administration’s approach to foreign policy is what needs attention.763 
 
It had been ten days since the Soleimani strike, and no further information had been 
provided to the public. After countless shifting statements by US government officials, President 
Trump finally set the ‘truth’ straight—on Twitter. However, instead of addressing the questions 
raised by reporters and prominent US officials, Trump decided to attack those making these 
inquiries. He insulted reporters by calling them ‘fake news media’ and accused Democratic 
congress members who had raised concerns about the intelligence briefs they received as being in 
alliance with fake news outlets. Still, the most concerning part of the tweet came when Trump 
disregarded the attempt by Democrats to determine whether the Soleimani strike was imminent. 
Instead, he claimed that his team ‘agreed’ over the fact that it was imminent, and that should be 
enough proof. He then sought to reason that if no proof of imminence was ever discovered, 
Soleimani’s ‘horrible past’ should be sufficient reason to warrant his death.764 In essence, Trump 
affirmed that proof of imminence or plot of attack does not matter because Soleimani’s ‘horrible 
past’ was enough to justify killing him.765  
 
Jon Lindsay, Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global 
Affairs and Public Policy, noted that ‘[i]t’s hard to know what the real reason [for killing 
Soleimani] is because we have heard several different reasons provided to both the public and to 
 
to paint the strike as ‘war stopping,’ rather than ‘war starting,’ the public nonetheless voiced their 
disdain for the strike in a myriad of ways—from street protests to trending social media tags 
regarding the strike. Thus, Goodman’s view and the comparison contained within his article was 
therefore largely predicated upon his appraisal of public sentiment. 
763 Maham Abedi, ‘Soleimani Killing: A Look at the Trump Administration’s Evolving 
Explanations,’ Global News Toronto, 13 January 2020 (Goodman added that: ‘[i]t sounds as if no 
one in the Pentagon or the US armed forces ever imagined that the president would select the 
option of escalating conflict to this height. And the fact that he did it sent a lot of people 
scrambling…I just think that is no way to make foreign policy.’) 
764 Donald J. Trump via Twitter on 13 January 2020.  
765 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Mitsotakis of the Hellenic 
Republic Before Bilateral Meeting.’ (‘The Fake News Media and their Democratic Partners are 
working hard to determine whether or not the future attack by terrorist Soleimani was ‘imminent’ 
or not, & [sic] was my team in agreement. The answer is both a strong YES., [sic] but it doesn’t 
really matter because of his horrible past.’) 
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Congress.’766 And all of these reasons were either baseless claims, hearsay or supposedly ‘super 
top secret’ intelligence—so secret that not even those with appropriate security clearances were 
given access. The Soleimani strike was the initial spark that ignited a series of events that almost 
caused a third world war.  
 
Legality & Fallout 
 
Agnes Callamard, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Executions, argued that without a 
declaration of war between the US and Iran, Soleimani could not be a legitimate target. Trump 
tried to compare the killing of Soleimani to that of Osama bin Laden during the Obama 
administration, but that parallel failed to convince the UN. According to Callamard, Soleimani 
‘was the representative of a state, and that is a very different situation.’767 Most historians and Iran 
experts would argue the opposite. Since the US and Iran had been fighting IS, a common enemy, 
there has been no evidence to claim that these states are in an existing armed conflict.768 
Additionally, Congress has neither authorized nor recognized that the US and Iran were in armed 
conflict. 
 
 Hina Shamsi, the Director of the National Security Project at the American Civil Liberties 
Union, has called the Trump administration’s justification for killing Soleimani ‘weak.’ In an 
interview with CNN, Shamsi maintained that ‘the very limited circumstances in which use of force 
might be permitted under either domestic or international law quite simply haven’t been met.’ The 
United States has always been careful to distinguish between those it chooses to eliminate during 
targeted killing campaigns. With the strike on Soleimani, this distinction has been muddled.769 
 
766 Abedi, ‘Soleimani Killing: A Look at the Trump Administration’s Evolving Explanations.’ 
767 Tim Lister and Eve Bower, ‘Growing Doubts on Legality of US Strike that Killed Iranian 
General,’ CNN, 06 January 2020. 
768 Samuel M. Katz, No Shadows in the Desert: Murder, Vengeance, and Espionage in the War 
Against ISIS (New York: Hanover Square Press, 2020). 
769 See also Marc R. DeVore, ‘Reluctant Innovators? Inter-organizational Conflict and the USA’s 
Route to Becoming a Drone Power,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol.31, No.4 (2020), pp. 701-
729; Asfandyar Mir and Dylan Moore, ‘Drones, Surveillance, and Violence: Theory and Evidence 
from a US Drone Program,’ International Studies Quarterly Vol.63, No.4 (2019), pp. 846-862; 
and Milena Sterio, ‘Lethal Use of Drones: When the Executive is the Judge, Jury, and 
Executioner,’ The Independent Review Vol.23, No.1 (2018), pp. 35-50. 
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 Karen Greenberg, the Director of the Center on National Security at Fordham University 
Law School, has reasoned that the US drone program's unchecked power began with the Obama 
administration and their expansion on the concept of imminence and the geographic boundaries of 
the battlefield. The Trump administration only compounded these issues with the most recent 
justification (or lack thereof) for the targeted killing of Gen. Soleimani. Greenberg recognized that 
the Soleimani killing crossed a line that even the Obama administration would not dare approach. 
The United States cannot, according to Greenberg, ‘take aim at an official inside a government 
and say that is not a war… [the Trump administration] crossed a threshold, and the significance of 
that cannot be overstated.’ Robert O’Brien, the US National Security Advisor and staunch Trump 
supporter, would care to disagree. O’Brien even told reporters that the targeted killing of Soleimani 
was ‘fully authorized’ under the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). But 
this law is 18 years old and was designed and written with Saddam Hussein in mind—not 
Soleimani or Iran.770 
 
 Greenberg admitted that something needs to change in the US government urgently. 
Oversight and a system of checks and balances need to be applied. There needs to be ‘some form 
of authorization for this war, and it cannot be our continually-expanding-without-oversight drone 
policy that has guided us for the last ten years. This constant redefinition of terms to push aside 
legal restraints has come to the point we all feared it would. “It’s not assassination. It’s targeted 
killing.” Or, “it’s not war, it’s just the way we’re doing business these days.”’ Shamsi would agree 
with Greenberg’s view, as she also has recognized that there has ‘been a years-long trend of US 
presidents claiming ever more expansive authority to kill and engage in conflicts that are not just 
legally incorrect, but dangerous from the perspective of peace and security.’ Callamard argues that 
these precedents set by subsequent presidential administrations are only exacerbating the issue. 
Arguing instead that the root cause needs to be addressed. ‘What kind of institutions and rules will 
best protect people around the world, and do we think that kind of strike is conducive to an 
international rule of law?’ 771  
 
770 Lister and Bower, ‘Growing Doubts on Legality of US Strike that Killed Iranian General.’ 
771 Ibid, see also Marko Divac Öberg, ‘The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security 
Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ,’ European Journal of International 
Law Vol.16, No.5 (2005), pp. 879-906. 
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 Many lawyers argue that as a result of the Caroline case, the pre-requisites of necessity and 
proportionality emerged as necessary criteria that must be fulfilled for a state’s claim to self-
defence to be viewed as legitimate under customary international law.772 In the presence of an 
imminent threat, customary international law allows states to respond preemptively in self-
defence.773 Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter states that ‘[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.’774 
 
 Restrictionist scholars argue that Article 51 of the Charter applies only to cases in which 
an armed attack has already occurred. As the law currently stands, a state would be required to 
wait until it is attacked before responding with military force.775 Counter-restrictionist scholars 
sharply contest this view, further claiming that the wording in Article 51, namely that states have 
an ‘inherent right of self-defence,’ implies that states could operate under the customary 
understanding of self-defence which has been practiced since antiquity, and which allows a limited 
form of legitimate preemptive self-defence.776 As such, politicians and states are not the only ones 
divided on the practice of preemptive self-defence.  
 
 Scholars have also long debated the legitimacy of pre-attack self-defence operations. The 
resulting lack of consensus has resulted in several cases being presented at the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). The most notable occurred on the 27th of June 1986, which involved an ICJ 
judgement on Nicaragua v. the United States of America.777 This judgement found that the 
 
772 Anthony Clark Arend, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,’ The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 256, No.2 (2003), pp. 89-103. 
773 See Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ pp. 699-748.  
774 UN, Charter of the United Nations, (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), Article 2(4). 
775 For greater discussion see David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and 
Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum,’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No.1 (2013), 
pp. 235-282; and Arend, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,’ pp. 89-
103. 
776 Agbada, ‘Is the Killing of Qasem Soleimani by the United States of America Legal.’ 
777 ICJ, ‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,’ p. 14; see also Thomas 
Buergenthal, ‘Lawmaking by the ICJ and Other International Courts,’ from Proceedings of the 
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customary understanding of state-sponsored self-defence does coexist with the currently held UN 
Charter, specifically Article 51. The ICJ ruled that: ‘On one essential point, this treaty itself refers 
to pre-existing customary international law; this reference to customary law is contained in the 
actual text of Article 5l, which mentions the ‘inherent right’ (in the French text the ‘droit naturel’) 
of an individual or collective self-defence, which ‘nothing in the present Charter shall impair’ and 
which applies in the event of an armed attack. The Court, therefore, finds that Article 51 of the 
Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of self-defence, 
and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content 
has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter.  
  
 Moreover, the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not go on 
to regulate all aspects of its content directly. For example, it does not contain any specific rule 
whereby self-defence would warrant only measures proportional to the armed attack and necessary 
to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law. Moreover, a definition of 
the ‘armed attack,’ which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise of the ‘inherent right’ of self-
defence, is not provided in the Charter and is not part of treaty law. Therefore, it cannot be held 
that Article 51 is a provision that ‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law. It 
instead demonstrates that in the field in question, the importance of which for the present dispute 
need hardly be stressed, customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law.’778 
 
 The ICJ may have recognized the customary legal right of state-sponsored self-defence, 
but it did not refer to the legality of preemptive self-defence. In its official report, the ICJ admitted 
that ‘the possible lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of an armed attack has not been 
raised. The Court has, therefore, to determine first whether such attack has occurred, and if so, 
whether the measures are allegedly taken in self-defence were a legally appropriate reaction as a 
matter of collective self-defence.’779 Despite this omission, the ICJ judgement made a remarkable 
 
ASIL Annual Meeting, Vol. 103 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Gerald M. 
Steinberg, ‘The UN, the ICJ and the Separation Barrier: War by Other Means,’ Israel Law Review 
Vol.38, No.1 (2005), pp. 331. 
778 ICJ, ‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,’ pp. 94-96. 
779 Ibid, p. 94; see also Charles S. Milligan, ‘Alternatives to the Use of Force and the Role of the 
United Nations.’ Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Vol.20, No.1 (2020), pp. 7; and 
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observation. While the legality of preemptive self-defence still requires an official concrete legal 
inclusion, the ICJ judgement ‘gives credence to the argument that the customary international legal 
right of self-defence was merely recognized by Article 51 and not abolished. This supports a 
plausible conclusion that the right of preemptive self-defence survives Article 51 and can be 
exercised where there is an imminent threat of armed attack.’ Since the adoption of the UN Charter, 
states have irregularly applied the customary right to self-defence. Some opting to practice 
preemptive self-defence, arguing that it is an entrenched part of customary law. Others have chosen 
to abide by the current legal provisions outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Expectedly, this 
confusion and inconsistency go beyond state application. The UN Security Council rulings have 
also shown a lack of consensus during events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Osirak attack and 
even the Six-Day War of 1967.780 
 
 The famous German jurist, Samuel von Pufendorf, developed a rather detailed moral and 
political philosophy that still has a bearing on this matter today. Building upon his predecessors' 
works, Grotius and Hobbes, Pufendorf compiled a textbook advising states on their ‘natural rights.’ 
In the case of Soleimani, for the US strike to be viewed as legitimate and lawful, the attack would 
have to fulfill the imminence criteria. Pufendorf noted that  
 
when a man, contrary to the laws of peace, undertakes against me such 
things as tends to my destruction, it will be a most impudent thing to 
demand of me that I should his person violate, that is, that I should 
sacrifice my safety so that his villainy may have free play… It is 
reasonable for a man who is about to suffer some dread event to defend 
himself rather than to accept it. Otherwise, the victim of misfortune is 
accused of cowardice.781  
 
 
Pieter Kooijmans, ‘The ICJ in the 21st Century: Judicial Restraint, Judicial Activism, or Proactive 
Judicial Policy,’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.56 (2007), pp. 741. 
780 Agbada, ‘Is the Killing of Qasem Soleimani by the United States of America Legal.’ 
781 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae Et Gentium Libri Oct, Vol. 2 (New York: Oceana 
Publishing, 1964), p. 265; see also Fred Aja Agwu, United Nations System, State Practice and the 
Jurisprudence of the Use of Force (New York: Malthouse Press, 2005), p. 48. 
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Similarly, Agbada S. Agbada, a Lagos-based international lawyer, recognized that it is simply 
unrealistic for any legal institution to expect a state to stand by and endure a violent assault if they 
can preemptively attack first. If the Soleimani strike did occur due to knowledge of such a threat, 
then the response would be justified under the law. However, Agbada notes that the strike would 
have to be deemed unlawful and illegitimate in the absence of such evidence.782 
 
 Despite the unpredictability of long-term effects, the Soleimani strike did have some 
immediate legal and political costs. Raffaello Pantucci, Director of International Security Studies 
at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), predicted that Soleimani’s death would heighten 
tensions, confrontations and perhaps even proxy attacks directed by the regime against Western 
nations and their interests. Although, as yet, the material signs of this have been limited, perhaps 
Teheran is biding its time.783  
 
Additionally, Eytan Gilboa, Professor of International Affairs at Bar-Ilan University, 
surmised that although ‘[i]t is extremely difficult to forecast what will happen next… [t]he future 
could entail a major war, negotiations, or several scenarios in between, including an American 
withdrawal from the Middle East.’ He reasoned that while the short and long-term ramifications 
of the US strike are challenging to foresee, what can be reasonably expected is that if ‘Tehran 
pursues harsh revenge, Trump would have to respond in kind.’ Even though these two adversaries 
may rank differently in military strength, an escalation in tensions between the two states would 
create an unstable political environment internationally. This tension might manifest into several 
outcomes, from the Iran deal's neutral renegotiation to the undesirable potential for war or even 
eventual US withdrawal of troops from the region.784 
 
 
782 Agbada, ‘Is the Killing of Qasem Soleimani by the United States of America Legal.’ 
(‘impractical to expect states to stand by without taking preemptive action in response to imminent 
threats of armed attack. Therefore, provided that there was an imminent attack from Soleimani, 
his preemptive killing is lawful and justified. But if no such imminent threat existed at the time of 
the killing, the killing constitutes unlawful use of force by the US’) 
783 Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Soleimani’s Assassination: Could Jihadist Groups Benefit?’ Counter-
Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2020), p. 11. 
784 Eytan Gilboa, ‘Why Did the US Kill Qassem Soleimani?’ Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2020, pp. 9-12. 
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  Gilboa concluded that ‘the main lesson for the US should take away from the recent 
exchanges of fire, is to avoid mixed messages and confusing actions that can lead to misperceptions 
and miscalculations.’785 This becomes especially true since the targeted killing of Soleimani by 
the CIA resulted in a domino-effect of consequences, including, among others, (i) the Iranian 
missile strikes against US bases in Iraq, (ii) the accidental Iranian downing of a civilian passenger 
jet, (iii) vows for revenge against the US from Hezbollah, Iran and Iraq, (iv) the threat of outright 
(possibly nuclear) war between the US and Iran, (v) the violation of Iraqi sovereignty, (vi) 
international and domestic protests against the strike, (vii) legal challenges regarding the 
legitimacy of the strike, and (viii) disagreement and tension within the US government regarding 
the necessity, true motivation, and unproven evidence of the imminent threat posed by Soleimani 
to warrant his execution by targeted strike rather than pursue other available diplomatic means.  
 
Therefore, greater clarity and discussion became necessary to circumnavigate these 
muddled US statements and legally determine precisely what form of pre-attack self-defence the 
Trump administration relied upon when authorizing the Soleimani strike.786 Meanwhile, it has to 
be conceded that the background of international law against which they might be working remains 
confused with limited scholarly consensus. 
 
The Dominant Political Narrative 
 
Winston Churchill was correct in advising diplomacy over military action.787 But, with the advent 
of social media, it seems as though communicating through such mediums has become an unlikely, 
yet increasingly acceptable, form of diplomacy.788 Platforms like Twitter have provided states and 
 
785 Ibid, p. 11; see also Robert D. Williams, ‘(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence 
Collection, and Covert Action,’ George Washington Law Review, Vol.79 (2010), pp. 1162. 
786 See also John Prados, The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA’s Heart of Darkness (New York: 
New Press, 2017); and Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, and Michael S. Goodman, ‘The Development 
of CIA Covert Action,’ in The CIA and the Pursuit of Security: History, Documents and Contexts, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020). 
787 Churchill famously noted that “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war”. 
788 Constance Duncombe, Social Media is an Important Tool for Public Diplomacy, from Soft 
Power and Diplomacy, New York: Greenhaven Publishing, 2020: pp. 112-118; and Stephen D. 
Collins, Jeff R. DeWitt and Rebecca K. LeFebvre, Hashtag Diplomacy: Twitter as a Tool for 
Engaging in Public Diplomacy and Promoting US Foreign Policy, Place Brand Public Diplomacy, 
23 February 2019: pp. 78–96. 
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their elected officials with an unparalleled opportunity to communicate—elevating diplomacy to 
a more casual, yet increasingly public, setting. The informality of this, however, can result in its 
misuse and abuse, as has been observed most notably during the Trump administration.789  
 
 The approach taken by the US president has detached completely from the customary 
practice of diplomacy, as Trump’s fondness for aggressive, misleading and threatening tweets 
directed at foreign states has resulted in a number of repercussions from an increase in tensions 
among states to widespread public backlash.790 However, when used correctly, social media 
platforms like Twitter can serve as powerful tools which significantly improve the speed and 
accessibility of disseminated information. This certainly has its advantages. Among them is the 
increase in public attention to pertinent issues, the ease of communication and collaboration with 
foreign states or officials, and a control over the construction of dominant narratives.791 Whilst it 
may have failed at mastering the practice of diplomacy, the US has instead mastered its control 
over the narrative.  
 
 Shortly following the Soleimani strike, the Trump administration was quick to put out a 
statement praising their ‘successful’ mission in eliminating a known ‘terrorist.’ Less than an hour 
later, President Trump took to the podium to recount how the mission went, and why the death of 
the Iranian General necessitated celebration. In this case, the narrative was constructed by the 
Trump administration, and gained traction through its numerous press briefings and speeches—
some led by the President, others by key high-ranking government officials. For the most part, the 
stories aligned. But as the days went by, and more information about the strike (acquired from 
more objective international sources) was revealed, the narrative advanced by the White House 
was brought under more scrutiny. Perhaps aided by the status of those leading the press briefings 
 
789 Duncombe, 2020: pp. 112-118; See also Saif Shahin and Q. Elyse Huang, Friend, Ally, or 
Rival? Twitter Diplomacy as ‘Technosocial’ Performance of National Identity, International 
Journal of Communication, University of Southern California, Vol. 13, 2019: pp. 5100-5118. 
790 Maja Šimunjak and Alessandro Caliandro, Twiplomacy in the Age of Donald Trump: Is the 
Diplomatic Code Changing?, The Information Society, Vol. 35, Issue 1, 10 January 2019: pp. 13-
25; see also Alexandra Homolar and Ronny Scholz, The Power of Trump-speak: Populist Crisis 
Narratives and Ontological Security, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 32, Issue 
3, 20 March 2019.  
791 Collins, DeWitt and LeFebvre, 2019: pp. 78–96. 
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or bolstered by the supposed reputation of the US as a principled combatant of terrorism 
worldwide, the narrative repeated by the White House became the dominant one. At least, for a 
little while.  
 
 The US narrative about the Soleimani strike began to weaken under international and 
domestic scrutiny regarding the necessity of the strike and legitimacy of the target. Trump had 
initially claimed that the mission was necessary, lawful and founded on intelligence demonstrating 
that Soleimani posed an imminent threat to the safety and security of the US and its allies. 
However, the Trump administrations’ once dominant narrative seemingly weakened with the 
onslaught of shifting statements given by several key officials. On a seemingly daily basis, press 
briefings were held at the White House to address criticisms raised the previous day. Often led by 
the Secretaries of Defence and State, these briefings would quickly degrade into hour long 
screaming matches. Reporters who justly asked for greater clarification on the motivations for the 
strike, or the intelligence that warranted it, were given deflective answers which only further 
muddled the situation.  
 
 Following these briefings, the President would often take to twitter to reaffirm the 
legitimacy of the strike, without providing any evidence to substantiate such claims. In the 
evenings, Trump was often a guest on Fox News or another conservative network. When not on 
tv, radio or social media, he would hold impromptu speeches at the White House or Mar-a-Lago, 
praising his decision to authorize the strike. In essence, Trump tried to supplement the lack of 
intelligence with a barrage of noise. Yet, noise does not equal legitimacy. 
 
  As the days went on, the once dominant narrative weakened under new assertions by the 
President. In an interview, Trump revealed that he was justified in striking Soleimani because the 
Iranian General had a ‘horrible past.’ When this justification was met with criticism, Trump then 
claimed that Soleimani posed an imminent threat as he was actively planning to strike four 
embassies. Once again, no intelligence or evidence of this claim was ever presented. Moreover, 
this revelation came as news to the Director of the CIA, the Secretaries of State and Defence, and 
even the ambassadors stationed at the embassies in question. How did Trump hear of such a 
massive terror plot before these high-ranking intelligence officials? Shouldn’t he be the one who’s 
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informed of such matters? These questions still remain unanswered. However, when hearing of 
the President’s revelation, some officials responded insinuating that the embassy plot threat was 
false by claiming that they believe the President ‘believed’ that the threat was real. Subjective 
language in lieu of concrete intelligence does nothing to advance the public’s confidence in the 
US’s narrative.  
 
 Constructing a dominant narrative requires a solid foundation of truth, accountability and 
resolute statements. The absence of such creates a post-truth environment that erodes away at the 
dominant narrative, the public confidence in state claims, and the perceived legitimacy of the 
operation in question. Such was the fate of the US narrative on the Soleimani strike. It was 
permitted dominant status by virtue of the reputation and standing of the United States and the 
power of the executive office. Yet, this narrative weakened due to the White House’s shifting 
statements, the lack of intelligence presented to corroborate assertions, and a general post-truth 
environment which made domestic lawmakers just as suspicious of the true motivations behind 
the strike as the rest of the international community. Thus, the US’s dominant narrative on the 
Soleimani strike eroded until it was viewed as a questionable saga. 
 
US Foreign Policy: Historical Idiosyncrasies 
 
Prior to the Soleimani strike, the US had chosen to keep their involvement in similar foreign 
assassination operations a secret. Plausible deniability in both the Mughniyeh and Fadlallah 
missions shielded the US from any political fallout. The Soleimani strike changed this historical 
narrative. Although the US successfully eliminated Soleimani, its public declaration of 
involvement in the strike gave way to an unprecedented level of legal, political, and national 
security consequences—emanating from domestic and international sources. Coupled with a lack 
of evidence to demonstrate the US’ claim that Soleimani posed an ‘imminent threat,’ the fact that 
the mission was carried out in Iraq (a third-party state that did not have knowledge or grant 
permission for this operation), and the knowledge that the target was an active foreign government 
official—the operation became even more contentious than the previous historical operations in 
which the US had strategically chosen to keep their involvement a secret. In doing so, the 
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Soleimani strike set a precedent for US involvement in foreign operations—one which has broken 
with a norm abided by many past presidential administrations.  
 
There have been notable idiosyncrasies in US drone strike policies over time. The US had 
been previously unwilling to target Soleimani, seen most notably in the Mughniyeh operation in 
2008. Instead, the US opted to have the CIA covertly plan, strategize and participate in foreign 
operations—stopping just short of partaking in the execution of such missions. Instead, foreign 
intelligence agencies were aided by the CIA until the day of the operation—then their involvement 
would cease.  
 
The following table was created to clearly show when and how the US chose to participate 
in the three operations discussed in this chapter. The outcomes of these missions, and their 
respective fallout, is also presented. As expected, the Soleimani strike marks the first public 
revelation of planning and completing a foreign assassination, which has also resulted in the only 




Figure 1: Idiosyncrasies in Previous US Drone Strikes 
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Chapter 7: Red (White and Blue) Herring 
Killing Soleimani: Assassination, Killing or Execution? 
 
Predictably, Soleimani’s death has also raised many interesting legal questions. This section will 
attempt to determine how the strike ought to be classified or categorized. Was it an example of 
‘Political Assassination’ due to Soleimani’s Iranian government position? Or might it have been 
‘Execution’ because he was killed without trial? Or perhaps a vaguely defined ‘Targeted Killing’ 
as a blanket term offering any number of justifications? 
 
 Both Britain and the United States carried out multiple assassinations of leaders, including 
generals during the Second World War.792 Yet even during times of war, political assassination 
has been viewed as an unacceptable practice. It was arguably prohibited under the Hague 
Convention of 1907 and the Rome Statute of 1998, which specified that the International Criminal 
Court would prosecute such hostilities. During times of peace, this type of killing is illegal and a 
violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.793 Subsequently, 
countries usually try to avoid any operations which might be misconstrued as political 
assassination unless the justification to do so seems legally sound and internationally supported 
and authorized. The incurred damage to this perceived legitimacy or reputation simply outweighs 
any potential benefits derived from political assassination. Few countries will engage in, nor admit 
participation in, political assassination unless the conditions mentioned above are sufficiently met. 
There is, however, no such hesitation to launch the more ambiguous category of targeted killing 
campaigns.  
 
 Despite the novelty of the term, the practise of targeted killing has been around for quite a 
while. The United States has employed this practice on numerous occasions for the past few 
decades, most notably within its counter-terror campaigns. Despite the change in terminology, this 
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practice is a form of extrajudicial execution.794 This term simply refers to the killing of nonstate 
actors in a foreign country, often without the prerequisite of a trial nor the requirement of evidence 
to justify such recourse. According to Professor Charli Carpenter, ‘the term “targeted killing,”… 
implies that US counter-terrorism strikes are something different—something not covered by 
norms’ and therefore beyond the scope of existing laws.795 However, arguably this notion is 
incorrect.  
 
 Despite US attempts to legally muddle the situation by renaming the practice, existing laws 
are quite capable of addressing extrajudicial killing in times of war and peacetime. For instance, 
only combatants can engage in such practices during war times—but only with other combatants, 
and only on a mutually declared battlefield.796 Additionally, further rules exist even in these 
scenarios. In interstate wars, only the armed forces of warring enemy states may engage in 
premeditated killing. Even here, there are restrictions. For example, if an enemy soldier has 
surrendered, been injured or imprisoned, they are no longer valid targets for this form of killing 
and must be protected.797 In international wars, the same provisions are respected, however, with 
an additional caveat. A country can only target and kill individuals of enemy states which are 
actively participating in hostilities.798  
 
794 David Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or 
Legitimate Means of Defence?’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No.2 (2005), pp. 
171-212. 
795 Carpenter, ‘Assassination, Extrajudicial Execution or Targeted Killing—What’s the 
Difference?’ 
796 Michael L. Gross, ‘Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement,’ Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2006), pp. 323-335; see also Oliver Kessler and Wouter Werner, 
‘Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No.2 (2008), pp. 289-
308; and Michael L. Gross, ‘Killing Civilians Intentionally: Double Effect, Reprisal and Necessity 
in the Middle East,’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 120, No.4 (2005), pp. 555–579. 
797 Carpenter, ‘Assassination, Extrajudicial Execution or Targeted Killing—What’s the 
Difference?’; see also Michael Byers, War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed 
Conflict (New York: Open Road Publishing, 2007), pp. 115-224; William H. Boothby, Weapons 
and the Law of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 90-91, 206-207; and 
ICRC, ‘Practice Relating to Rule 47. Attacks Against Persons Hors de Combat, Section B: Specific 
Categories of Persons Hors de Combat,’ IHL Database, (1977) 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule47_sectionb>. 
798 ICRC, ‘Practice Relating to Rule 6. Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack, Section A: Direct 




 But at what point does a combatant become a civilian, or vice versa? Is it when they leave 
the battlefield? When they lay down their weapons? These questions all have different answers, 
depending on which conflict is being analyzed. Scholars have admitted that some uncertainty 
exists surrounding this particular condition in an era of insurgency, terrorism, and intra-state war. 
This is especially pertinent when considering the age of remote drone wars.799 Does the operator 
count as a combatant only when operating the drone? When seated in the chair? When they leave 
the airbase? Many questions are still left unanswered, but the main point is that laws do exist which 
address extrajudicial killing as a practice. Simply calling extrajudicial killing ‘targeted killing’ 
does not exempt such operations from legal challenges.800  
 
 Conversely, in peacetime, human rights govern the protection of all individuals. Even those 
guilty of heinous crimes and terror activity must first be given the right to legal counsel and 
provided with a fair trial before being sentenced.801 Organizations like Amnesty International, the 
United Nations Office of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary 
Executions, and Human Rights Watch have all been quite firm in their view that all forms of 
targeted killing violate international law—and more specifically, international human rights law, 
by not providing ‘targets’ with the opportunity to counsel or a fair trial. 802  
 
 Regardless of wartime or peacetime, targeted killing is considered illegal by many both in 
the United States and internationally. This strategy's ambiguity arose following the September 11th 
attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York. Following the attacks, under the Bush Jr. 
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administration, the United States maintained that ‘the ban on assassination applied only to political 
leaders and only in peacetime.’803 The first victim of this policy came in 2002, with a US drone 
strike in Yemen, which killed Qaed Salim al-Harethi, an al-Qaeda member with links to the 
bombing of the USS Cole.804 More broadly, many of the actions taken by Bush after 9/11 stemmed 
from a broad and expanding concept of the powers of the president in wartime. Some of these 
interpretations were advanced by lawyers who genuinely believed them, but others were 
opportunists who wished to push back against what they saw as years of erosion of executive 
privilege in the realm of national security.805    
 
 The Obama administration, which was no less sensitive to issues of presidential powers, 
continued with this same programme but broadened the scope of the battlefield to any state known 
to harbour (or be unwilling and unable to detain or prosecute) extremist individuals.806 At one 
point, this newly defined conflict area encompassed most of the Middle East.807 Obama greatly 
expanded this understanding, which initially began as Bush attempted to remove some prohibitions 
of assassination by declaring that political officials could be targeted if they were known to aid or 
abet terrorism. Obama secured this by declaring that conflict zones existed anywhere that terrorists 
were located, especially in regions where governments were unable or unwilling to arrest them.808 
This conceptual broadening was legally important and was not limited to the understanding of the 
geographical and spatial scope of the battlefield but also extended to the temporal realm.  
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 Imminence was, therefore, conceptually ‘adapted’ and applied to the new technological 
war the US was fighting in the name of counter-terrorism.809 In particular, the imminence 
requirement was relaxed to include any individual who would have participated in a terror 
organization at one point or another.810 Their membership and affiliation ensure that they always 
remain a threat, even when unarmed. Osama bin Laden, for instance, died unarmed in his 
Abbottabad compound on May 2nd, 2011.811 An international search was launched post-9/11, 
which lasted nearly a decade—during which time he was considered the most dangerous terrorist 
in the world.812 However, as Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions stipulates, no one should be 
killed if surrendering, injured or ill, unarmed or not engaged in active hostilities.813  
 
 If viewed through a legal lens, the bin Laden operation was technically unlawful under 
international conventions. The reasoning behind this conclusion is simple: Osama bin Laden was 
unarmed and, therefore, not engaged in active hostilities while inside the compound. To ensure 
adherence to current international law, the US should have attempted to extract Osama, put him 
on trial and then dole out punishment under the law—as the Nuremberg trials once did for war 
criminals following World War II. Anything less than this cannot be deemed lawful under the 
current standards of international law. However, US national security law has been diverging from 
these understandings for more than a decade. 
 
 Moreover, current international law forbids lethal action against persons who are not 
actively participating in hostilities. Still, the United States had repeatedly, and nonchalantly, 
bypassed this prohibition through their use, and reliance on, lethal drone strikes. The most notable 
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violation occurred in 2001 with the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.814 From an operational standpoint, 
the US strike was successful in that it eliminated an al-Qaeda propagandist.815 Legally speaking, 
however, this strike also violated a host of international (and also potentially domestic) laws.816  
 
 Yet, perhaps the most troubling example of this was the murder of Tariq Aziz in Pakistan. 
Aziz was a 16-year-old Pakistani anti-drone activist who had recently ‘volunteered to learn 
photography to begin documenting drone strikes near his home.’817 Three days before his death, 
the young boy met with a reporter, Pratap Chatterjee, to discuss his plans to document civilian 
casualties perpetrated by US drones.818 In his remote village, however, knowledge of technology 
was quite uncommon. So, access to, and familiarity with, cameras and computers made him a 
perfect candidate to document and report civilian drone casualties online.819  
 
 For context, it is worthwhile to note that, according to the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, Pakistan is considered a hotbed of illegal drone activity. Since the start of drone strikes 
in 2004, there have been a minimum of 430 confirmed strikes, which have killed roughly 4,000 
people. Of these, 950 were later confirmed to be civilian casualties, 207 of which were children.820 
Once described as an avid soccer fan, Tariq Aziz was executed by a US drone just three days after 
attending an anti-drone seminar. Along with his 12-year-old cousin, Waheed Khan, Aziz was on 
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his way to bring their aunt home from a wedding.821 Chatterjee later wondered, ‘whether the CIA 
is really attempting to identify people before they kill them.’ In cases like this, ‘it would have been 
so easy for the CIA and the [Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan], to come question these kids, 
to have taken them aside, even put them in jail or interrogated them… But instead, they chose to 
kill them.’ Chatterjee argued that the CIA’s decision to kill Aziz does not make any sense. Why 
‘would a terrorist suspect come to a public meeting and converse openly with foreign lawyers and 
reporters, and allow himself to be photographed and interviewed?’ The details simply do not add 
up. The boys were not in hiding, so it would have been possible to arrest, detain and interrogate 
them to determine if they were involved in these alleged ‘terroristic activities.’ Rather than pursue 
this avenue, the CIA chose instead to murder two innocent children by drone.822   
 
 These cases raise two essential and perhaps theoretical questions. Does international law 
need to change to better address the modern strategies used in counter-terrorism operations? Or, 
do these strategies need reforming to adhere to the existing norms and expectations outlined in 
international law? The US has endeavoured to redefine the legal concepts of the battlefield, active 
combatants, and the concept of imminence to better suit their drone programme and their national 
interests. But this has focused on national regulation, often taking the form of classified 
instruments and findings that constitute strange, parallel world of White House legality.823 Perhaps 
most damaging of all has been the apathetic attitude the US has taken to the requirement of 
proportionality.824 As discussed earlier, proportionality is a criterion, along with others like 
distinction and imminence, which determine if an action can be ruled as ‘just’ under international 
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law.825 Unfortunately, proportionality is one of the least abided concepts by the US and its drone 
program.826  
 
 Firmly entrenched in international law and precedent, proportionality is a check on military 
operations, requesting that each action be measured in terms of their strategic effectiveness and 
the potential risk to civilian populations.827 If the former outweighs the latter, then the operation 
may proceed with caution. If the latter outweighs the former, then the action can be viewed as 
unlawful if it proceeds. Both scenarios require an evaluation of the situation at hand, but this 
constant balance between risk and recompense is what international law would expect from such 
military operations. As aforesaid, the US has rarely undertaken this risk assessment during its 
drone led counter-terrorism efforts. If more care would have been afforded to this proportionality 
criterion, perhaps the tragedy that occurred in October 2006, wherein 69 children were killed, 
would not have happened.828 Unsurprisingly, with each subsequent presidential administration, the 
rules become ever less applicable. As Professor Carpenter has identified in her research, the rate 
of ‘civilian casualties [as a result of US drone operations] has risen under President Donald 
Trump.’829 
 
 Carpenter is not the first scholar to make this discovery. Stephanie Carvin and Jennifer 
Carson, political scientists and criminologists by profession, have both extensively researched the 
effect of targeted killings in counter-terrorism operations. They concluded that the results do not 
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indicate that there is any merit in targeted killing operations.830 This strategy might be 
counterproductive—furthermore undermining the principle of proportionality.831 Carpenter has 
found that ‘[t]he language of targeted killings implies precision and accuracy, but in reality, an 
estimated 90 percent of the deaths they cause are among civilians.’832 
 
 Simon Pratt, a political scientist, pointed out that Obama was quite successful in spinning 
rhetoric during his speeches to effectively distinguish between targeted killing and assassination—
when in actuality, no such distinction can be made.833 Regardless, Americans began to view 
targeted killing as a more effective and lawful form of counter-terrorism, with a 2015 poll even 
reporting that most Americans supported targeted killing practices.834 With the targeted killing of 
Soleimani, however, this overwhelming domestic support quickly collapsed.835 Perhaps this is 
because Soleimani should have been arrested and brought to trial as a government official, or 
perhaps people simply feared retaliation.  
 
 An international lawyer might observe that at the United States' request, an international 
legal body would have had the authority to order Soleimani to stand trial. Surely the evidence 
which compelled the United States to launch the lethal drone strike against him would be sufficient 
to convince the ICC, for instance, to bring him to trial. It is commonly understood to be unlawful 
for an individual to be hunted down and killed without trial. Add into the mix the fact that it was 
not on an active battlefield, the target was a foreign government official, and his purpose in the 
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third-party country in which he was executed was not demonstrated as constituting an imminent 
threat worthy of immediate elimination.836 The United States would probably respond that the 
chances of arresting Soleimani and bring him before the ICC was, in practical terms, slim. 
Moreover, the subsequent requirement to make intelligence available to secure his conviction 
would further imperil American lives. These sorts of debates attempted to secure convictions in 
the ICTY during the 1990s.837  
 
 Unsurprisingly, the military action taken against Soleimani escalated tensions with Iran.838 
It demonstrated that the strategy of targeted killing could result in secondary consequences by 
providing countries with an unchecked opportunity to eliminate adversaries without due process 
covertly. The assassination of political leaders has been prohibited during times of war to protect 
‘the leaders of powerful states against harm by weaker adversaries, who may be tempted to deploy 
assassination because they could not defeat more powerful armies in the field.’839 Following the 
strike, the United States claimed that it acted in self-defence against the imminent threat posed by 
Soleimani.840 But as Ian Hurd, Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, points 
out, when states claim ‘self-defence,’ they are doing so in a self-serving manner.841 They have no 
real motivation to adhere to the concept set forth by international law legally. They are just 
declaring this to maintain a certain air of legitimacy. Michael Byers, a Canadian legal scholar, has 
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also taken this view. Byers has argued that self-defence has become more of a political justification 
than a legal claim to the right to engage in war.842 Although the Trump administration would like 
the international legal community to submit to its justification as to why it ordered a drone strike 
on Soleimani, the evidence reveals particular concerns that the US government has yet to address 
appropriately. The White House may say that it acted lawfully, in accordance with a form of 
anticipatory self-defence. But the evidence, or lack thereof, tells a different story.  
 
 The strike could also be perceived as a war crime. The only form of self-defence that could 
be sufficiently fulfilled is preventative self-defence, which is the most contentious form. Some 
might even reason that this, in and of itself, is sufficient to prove that the strike was illegitimate 
and subsequently illegal. It is difficult to legitimately claim self-defence when delivering a lethal 
strike against a perceived enemy—remotely, via drone. At the present moment, the matter of 
whether the US legitimately resorted to a preemptive strike in self-defence is still under 
deliberation. This section merely seeks to suggests that out of the three terms—political 
assassination, execution or targeted killing, the available information suggests that the US strike 
on Soleimani would be best categorized as a form of execution. This distinction is essential to 
make, as terminologies and definitions delimit acceptable action parameters—as under 
international law. To escape or broaden these parameters, the US has spent a significant amount 
of time attempting to find loopholes and developing new terms for actions presently denounced in 
international law. Therefore, identifying these three potential categories and cross-examining them 
with available information on the strike has allowed for a preliminary classification to be made.  
 
 In truth, targeted killing is a vague and slippery term that has permitted the US to distance 
itself from what the practice is—remote, extrajudicial execution by drone.843 In the end, a choice 
had to be made. Should the Soleimani strike be classified as a political assassination or 
extrajudicial execution? Since, at the time of writing, there is no definitive evidence to tie the failed 
Yemeni assassination attempt844 (which will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter) to 
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the ‘successful’845 Soleimani strike, the decision was made to tag the Soleimani strike as an 
‘execution’ scrupulously.  
 
 Suppose in the future there is intelligence presented which ties both drone strikes together, 
suggesting that the US attempted to bring about regime change within Iran. In that case, the current 
categorization of the Soleimani strike might well be upgraded from ‘execution’ to ‘political 
assassination’—as the motivation behind both drone strikes had an underlying political agenda. 
Until then, this dissertation argues that the Soleimani strike was, in fact, a relatively uncomplicated 
execution. Despite these reservations, what is nonetheless certain is that the strike on Soleimani 
was not simply a case of ‘targeted killing,’ as the US has consistently maintained.  
 
 The term ‘targeted killing,’ it will be argued, means little as nothing distinguishes it, 
strategically or operationally, from extrajudicial killing. The term was coined by the US who found 
an opportunity to rebrand its drone operations by renaming its lethal strikes as ‘targeted killings,’ 
subsequently distancing itself from the negative political connotations associated with the term 
‘execution,’ and similarly attaching some element of legitimacy to the strikes—by inferring that 
they were more precise than other military tactics.  
 
Soleimani’s Death Authorized Months Earlier 
 
The timing of the Soleimani strike has also been highly contested. According to five current and 
former US government officials, President Trump's killing of Soleimani was authorized seven 
months before the strike, which eventually killed him.846 However, one condition was placed on 
this authorization: the trigger had to be an Iranian action that resulted in an American death. On 
December 27th, 2019, this condition was fulfilled when Hezbollah launched upwards of 30 
rockets, which killed a US contractor and wounded four US soldiers at an Iraqi air base in 
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Kirkuk.847 Despite Hezbollah denying involvement in the K-1 Air Base attack, the US viewed the 
incident as a fulfilment of their singular precondition.848 And so, the hunt for Soleimani began. 
But not before the US retaliated against Hezbollah by launching airstrikes against its weapons and 
command sites in Syria and Iraq.849 In response, Iranian-backed militiamen stormed the US 
Embassy in Baghdad. In other words, on the ground, the conflict between US and Iranian proxies 
controlled by Soleimani was escalating.850  
 
 Defence Secretary Mark Esper proposed several response options to the president.851 As a 
senior Trump administration official confirmed, ‘[t]here [had] been a number of options presented 
to the president over the course of time.’852 However, it was Trump’s National Security Advisor, 
Robert O’Brien and the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, who strongly advised the president to 
retaliate against Iran by approving the proposed plan to assassinate Soleimani.853 
 
 For years, Pompeo had advocated for a more aggressive position on Iran and Soleimani.854 
He had been especially animated about an Iranian attack on the UK embassy, and several months 
before the January 2020 attack, Pompeo even presented Trump with intelligence demonstrating 
that Soleimani was involved in ‘very serious threats that didn’t come to fruition,’ and advocated 
for his elimination in the interest of both national and international security.855 However, certain 
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high-ranking government officials were left unconvinced by these assertions and found Pompeo’s 
proposed ‘aggressive stance’ towards Iran disconcerting. Conversely, Robert O’Brien’s 
predecessor, Bolton, advised the president to ignore these ‘liberal objections’ and approve 
Pompeo’s plans. This recommendation was undoubtedly associated with his long-held policy 
beliefs. Bolton had long advocated in favour of military strategies capable of bringing about regime 
change in Iran. Among colleagues, he was characterized as a ‘long-time Iran hawk.’856 Bolton was 
the one who pressed Trump to declare the entire Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist 
organization.857 Iran quickly responded, designating the entire US military as an extremist group. 
The reality was that both the Quds force and US Special Forces were sponsoring a range of groups 
on the ground that they did not always fully control.858  
 
 After some deliberation, Trump approved a CIA plan to kill Soleimani in Baghdad.859 The 
plan in question was the one that played out on January 3rd, which sought to capitalize on the 
opportunity of targeting Soleimani during off-peak hours at Imam Khomeini International Airport 
in Baghdad—therefore posing a decreased risk to civilians.860 To be fair, this was not precisely a 
rushed decision, and there had been much deliberation down the years. It was thirteen years earlier, 
in 2007, when the Bush administration declared the Quds Force to be a terror organization. Then, 
in 2011, Obama announced further sanctions on senior Quds Force officials to participate in an 
‘alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the United States.’861 Soleimani often found 
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himself among officials who had been identified by these sanctions.862 Yet, no previous 
administration saw it as urgent or indeed sagacious to eliminate him.  
 
As Eric Edelman, a former diplomat and senior US Defence Department official who 
replaced Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, recounted, that ‘[t]here were a lot of us who thought 
[Soleimani] should be taken out. But at the end of the day, they decided not to do that… the danger 
of escalation and the danger of having a conflict with Iran while we already had our hands full 
with Iraq.’ Unless he posed an imminent threat, no past administrations saw it necessary to waste 
time chasing Soleimani. That is, however, until Donald Trump became president. The targeted 
killing of Soleimani ‘marked a break from past administrations, which have never publicly claimed 
responsibility for killing senior figures from the Iranian regime or its proxies.’ The claims of five 
government officials who state that Trump authorized the killing of Soleimani in mid-2019 raises 
questions about the true purpose behind his targeting. However, the ‘timing could undermine the 
Trump administration’s stated justification for ordering the US drone strike that killed Soleimani. 
Officials have said ‘Soleimani…was planning imminent attacks on Americans and had to be 
stopped,’ but this new revelation challenges this cleanly presented reasoning about necessity and 
imminence.863 Now we know that the Trump administration not only killed Soleimani but 
authorized his assassination seven months earlier—dismantling the American claim to imminence, 
raising further questions about the legality and legitimacy of the entire operation. 
 
Conjecture & Speculation: Intelligence in the Trump Era 
 
The Trump administration has maintained that Soleimani posed an imminent threat—a threat so 
urgent that their only option was to eliminate him.864 But when asked to provide evidence of the 
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threat in question, ‘Trump has instead provided his own guesses.’865—creating a ‘mess’ of the 
whole situation. Unsurprisingly, this was not the first time that the White House had issued 
conflicting and self-contradictory statements.  
 
 This increasingly casual relationship with facts, often termed ‘post-truth,’ was repeated in 
the Trump administration’s briefing on the casualties and damage caused by Iran’s ‘Operation 
Shahid Soleimani.’ At first, Trump claimed that no US troops were injured in the strikes. Then, he 
said eleven soldiers were being treated for minor headaches. Ultimately, the truth was revealed by 
medical sources who confirmed that over one hundred soldiers were being treated for severe 
injuries, including traumatic brain injuries. Glenn Carle, the former Deputy National Security 
Officer, responded to the Trump administration’s handling of the Soleimani strike by calling the 
‘releasing of information… almost an overstatement. What they have done is respond to pressure 
with momentary comments and dissembling.’ In support of this position is Aaron David Miller, a 
senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has similarly pointed out the 
‘woefully inadequate’ intelligence and government statements which have accompanied the US’s 
post-strike explanations.866 
 
 It is as though ‘[w]e are all wandering in the dark here,’ Miller explained, ‘They really 
have not made a case in a compelling way to justify why they needed to do this now, [which] has 
raised a number of serious questions about the administration’s motives.’ Conversely, Michael 
O’Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, clarified that the 
unsuccessful means by which the US has justified the strike does not mean that it was illegal. It 
merely means that their explanation, analysis and presentation of evidence left too many gaps—
preventing those without full access from drawing a definitive conclusion from the information 
that was being presented.867 But when questioned further, some administration officials brushed 
off calls to release information, while others began overtly attacking those who challenged their 
 
865 Aaron Blake, ‘Trump’s ‘Four Embassies’ Claim Utterly Falls Apart,’ The Washington Post, 13 
January 2020.  
866 Joseph Stepansky, ‘Timeline of Trump’s Shifting Justifications for Soleimani Killing,’ Al 
Jazeera, 19 February 2020. 
867 Ibid. 
 236 
statements and reports. Expectedly, we find Trump himself in the latter category. On Twitter, the 
US President has explicitly attacked Democrats who questioned him.868 
 
No one denies that Soleimani was involved, both directly and indirectly, in terroristic 
activities that had resulted in the death of American soldiers. However, this had been the status 
quo since 2003, so the obvious question is ‘why now?’ There has still been no intelligence 
presented that clearly and definitively demonstrates that Soleimani posed an imminent threat 
(either to the US or its interests) at the time of his death. If this fact cannot be established, then the 
strike cannot be deemed lawful under international law. Again, there is a widening gap between 
international law and US national security law for, according to John B. Bellinger III, a State 
Department lawyer, under domestic US law, President Trump does ‘have the legal authority to 
strike under the Constitution whether or not there was fear of an imminent attack.’ Under 
international law, things get more complicated. The United Nations Charter stipulates that the US 
‘cannot use force in another country without its consent or the Security Council's authority except 
in response to an armed attack or a threat of an imminent attack.’ Bellinger correctly observes that, 
‘under international law, the attack on Suleimani [sic] would not have been lawful unless he 
presented an imminent threat.’869 
 
 Therefore, the Trump administration sought to spin the narrative to categorize the strike as 
legal, domestically speaking. Doing so at the international level would take much more effort and 
significantly more exaggeration. It was for this reason that Pompeo, immediately following the 
strike, claimed that Soleimani posed an imminent threat to the United States. According to him, 
the imminent attacks would have cost ‘hundreds of American lives.’870 Public skepticism quickly 
followed since there had been no attack, or threat of attack, since the early days of the Iraq war, 
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which even remotely matched the US casualty estimates Pompeo mentioned. This is simply 
because military bases, embassies and joint compounds in the region are heavily protected. Later, 
an unnamed State Department official admitted privately that Pompeo erred when he used the 
word imminent, ‘because it suggested a level of specificity that was not borne by the 
intelligence.’871   
 
Robert O’Brien then attempted to downplay the administration’s earlier claims of imminent 
embassy attacks. Stating that ‘it is always difficult, even with the exquisite intelligence that we 
have, to know exactly what the targets are.’872 Mark Esper, the US Secretary of Defence, echoed 
this sentiment, furthermore ‘clarifying’ that the administration ‘knew there were threats to 
American facilities, now whether they were bases, embassies—you know it’s always hard until 
the attack happens.’873 Blake reported how Trump had  
 
repeatedly suggested that [his claims were] based on actual 
intelligence, even though Esper now says it was not. And in the 
process of explaining Trump’s comment, Pompeo suggested that the 
attack on multiple embassies were in the intelligence shared with 
Congress. Esper now claims that the multiple embassies are not in the 
intelligence, but that even the information that Soleimani was 
prepared to strike one of them was not shared with the broader 
Congress. What will the next explanation be?874 
 
 Without knowledge of intended targets, how far along could the ‘imminent plot’ have 
been? If one were to ask General Mark A. Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
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Gina Haspel, the Director of the CIA, both would vehemently argue that the attacks were 
impending. But is Milley and Haspel’s support for the strike, and by extension the Trump 
administration’s justification for the operation, genuine and therefore derived from the 
intelligence, or was it based upon a need to please the man who hired them? Trump-appointed both 
Milley and Haspel to their current positions. Many have even pointed out that both are professional 
‘career officials without a political history.’875  
 
 The extent to which intelligence has been politicized under Trump is not yet clear and will 
be debated by scholars for a long time to come. Yet many have witnessed the autocratic-style 
support Trump demands from his political appointees and corporate cronies—the constant 
changing of his National Security Advisor is the most obvious example.876 Perhaps this is not mere 
supposition, considering Haspel was seen enthusiastically clapping during Trump’s 2020 State of 
the Union address—an act seen by some as unbecoming of an official appointed to a non-partisan 
position.877 General Michael Hayden, former CIA Director, recounted how he never clapped at the 
State of the Union address because it would be improper for an official elected in a non-partisan 
position to favour one party. Even the mere presence of a CIA director at a State of the Union 
address is relatively uncommon. As former CIA directors like John McLaughlin and John Brennan 
have confirmed, attendance is not mandatory and not encouraged.878 To attend takes personal 
initiative. To clap at the address illustrates a degree of personal support. If Haspel has forgone the 
traditional protocol limiting public displays of support for presidential administrations, would it 
be such a stretch to assume that this has similarly occurred in private?  
 
 Another adamant supporter of the strike was William Barr, the US Attorney General. Barr 
went so far as to claim that killing Soleimani was not only ‘a legitimate act of self-defence’ but 
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that the requirement of ‘imminence is something of a red herring.’879 If proving imminence was a 
distraction, and intelligence was unimportant—upon what did the administration base their 
judgement? McLaughlin even admitted that even if the Trump administration did not have the 
intelligence to warrant a response against Soleimani, this does not necessarily answer why a strike 
(which could have provoked more aggression) was chosen as the most appropriate course of action.  
 
 Lisa Monaco, a former FBI official and Homeland Security advisor to President Obama, 
has reasoned that if the strike on Soleimani was in response to a credible threat, then why is the 
Trump administration not showing this intelligence to the public, or at the very least, to Congress? 
Choosing to keep silent has only negatively affected the legitimacy of the strike and, by extension, 
the perceived credibility of the administration. Irrespective of committed ‘Make America Great 
Again’ (MAGA) supporters, the American public has been the most difficult to persuade. Since 
the US invaded Iraq on faulty intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction, the American 
public has since had a rather tricky time believing unsubstantiated statements made by the 
government, and this has been underlined by the lack of public support for airstrikes against Syria 
in the context of government ‘intelligence’ on chemical weapons.880 
 
 Consequently, persuading the American people of the necessity of the Soleimani strike was 
difficult. The challenge was also derived from the fact that officials could not corroborate their 
claims with the supposed classified intelligence they had (but could not share), which pointed to 
an imminent threat (they could not discuss) on targets (they could not identify). The immediate 
fallout, which resulted in ‘escalated tensions with Iran, aggravated relations with European allies 
and prompted Iraq to threaten to expel United States forces,’ also did not help the situation.881 
Claiming that the intelligence was sufficient to launch an attack was certainly not the conclusion 
reached by many congresspeople privy to this same intelligence level.  
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 For some time, there had been an abiding and widely shared opinion amongst Congress 
members who worked the national security beat that Soleimani posed a threat to the United States. 
However, the partisan divide seemingly widened following the strike on Soleimani. Democrats 
criticized the lack of intelligence and the shifting statements by officials. At the same time, 
Republicans argued that Soleimani posed a real threat to the US and had to be taken down—going 
so far as to claim that their disapproval of Trump blinded Democrats from seeing the genuine 
national security value behind the operation.882 There were, still, several Democrats, as well as 
some Republicans, who have argued that the intelligence they were given was insufficient and did 
not show any evidence of an imminent threat or indeed of the supposed embassy plots.883 Embassy 
plots are a sensitive issue given the considerable controversy generated by the deadly attacks on 
American compounds in Libya during the previous decade.  
 
 The Trump administration has not backed down, despite challenges to its narrative. Instead, 
it has repeatedly characterized the Soleimani strike within their right of self-defence. Sharing in 
their fellow citizens' sentiment, several government officials have also voiced their opinions on 
the strike. Following ‘classified briefings on Capitol Hill, numerous lawmakers from both parties 
claimed that the administration had failed to present direct evidence of an ‘imminent threat,’ even 
when they asked repeatedly and directly.’884  
 
Several Democratic and Republican lawmakers ‘expressed dissatisfaction with the 
administration’s briefing on the strike against Soleimani.’ Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren 
of Massachusetts simply replied ‘no’ when asked if the evidence presented during the intelligence 
briefing convinced her. She further claimed that there was inadequate evidence to show that 
Soleimani had in fact posed an imminent threat to the United States.885 Similarly, Representative 
Gerald E. Connolly expressed his concern with the lack of adequate intelligence surrounding the 
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strike. During an interview on C-Span, Connolly called the intelligence presented in the Iran brief 
as ‘sophomoric and utterly unconvincing.’ He has since been unwavering in his belief that the 
Trump administration is ‘after the fact trying to piece together a rationale for its action that was 
impulsive, reckless and put this country’s security at risk.’886 
 
But he was not alone. Democratic Representative Pramila Jayapal echoed the same 
sentiment, going further to state on record that there ‘was no raw evidence presented that this was 
an imminent threat.’887 Notably, Democrats were not the only ones to blow the whistle. Following 
the intelligence briefing, Republican Senator Mike Lee of Utah still found it difficult to ‘ascertain 
specific details of the imminence of the attack.’ Noting that he believed ‘that the briefers and the 
president believed that they had a basis for concluding that there was an imminent attack…but 
[that] it [was] frustrating to be told that and not get the details behind it.’ 888 In the absence of this 
intelligence, the administration politely responded to these feelings by telling them, in other words, 
to ‘get over it.’  
 
 Robert O’ Brien told Fox News that congressional members who disapproved of the brief 
should just ‘trust the administration.’ In an interview with Fox News, O’Brien called the 
intelligence ‘very strong’ but confessed that as much as he ‘would love to release the intelligence 
and show the American people… I can tell you they can trust the administration on this… 
Unfortunately, we do not want to lose that valuable stream of intelligence that will allow us to 
protect Americans going forward.’889  Instead, it seems they would rather lose the ‘invaluable’ 
stream of legitimacy and trust afforded to them by the public and their congressional 
representatives. 
 
 Rukmini Callimachi, a journalist for The New York Times, reported that the available 
intelligence presented to US government officials regarding the potential imminent threat 
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Soleimani posed was ‘razor-thin.’890 Going further to reveal that one of her sources, a high-ranking 
US government official, views ‘the reading of the intelligence as an illogical leap.’891 Several 
anonymous intelligence officials have similarly revealed that there ‘was no single definitive piece 
of information about a coming attack. Instead, CIA officers described a “mosaic effect,” 
[comprised of] multiple scraps of information that came together indicating that General Soleimani 
was organizing proxy forces around the region, including in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, to attack 
American embassies and bases.’892 
 
 These ‘scraps,’ however, were not enough to convince House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. On 
ABC’s ‘This Week,’ she revealed that she did not think ‘the administration [had] been straight 
with Congress’ about the motivations behind the drone strike that killed Soleimani.893 Pelosi was 
the first to accuse the administration of possibly lying to Congress and the American people. 
However, she would not be the last. Shortly after her statement, Adam Schiff, Chairman of the 
House Intelligence Committee, accused the President and his administration of ‘fudging’ the 
intelligence to justify their actions after the fact. Noting that he believed that the Trump 
administration was ‘overstating and exaggerating what the intelligence shows. In the view of the 
briefers, there was plotting, there was an effort to escalate being planned, but they didn’t have 
specificity.’ 894 
 
 These observations, though harsh, were somewhat warranted. For ten days following the 
strike, the Trump administrations’ explanations for why they decided to kill Soleimani seemingly 
‘shifted by the day, and sometimes by the hour.’895 Dr William Inboden, Executive Director of the 
Clements Center for History, Strategy, and Statecraft at the University of Texas, has suggested 
that Trump’s ‘casual’ relationship with the truth is seriously impairing the administrations’ 
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credibility. So much so that even when Trump makes the right policy choice, his shifting 
statements end up widening the credibility gap.896 Inboden, therefore, raises the possibility that, 
given the general confusion of the Trump White House, they may have some sort of case to make, 
but presented it poorly, reflecting the abiding chaos ‘in the room.’  
 
 Curiously, the White House sent an unclassified memo to Congress defending the 
president’s decision to kill Soleimani. In part, it noted that ‘[t]he purposes of this action were to 
protect United States personnel, to deter from conducting or supporting further attacks against 
United States forces and interests, to degrade Iran’s and Quds Force-back [sic] militia’s ability to 
conduct attacks, and to end Iran’s strategic escalation of attacks.’ But the memo made no mention 
of imminent threats or the calculated risk of fallout in assassinating an active government official 
of a foreign state. Eliot Engel, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, referred 
to the memo as ‘directly contradict[ing] the president’s false assertion that he attacked Iran to 
prevent an imminent attack against United States personnel and embassies.’ He concluded that 
‘[t]he administration’s explanation in this report makes no mention of any imminent threat and 
shows that the justification the President offered to the American people was false, plain and 
simple.’897 It seems like this memo was one of the rare instances where Trump’s extrapolations of 
the truth are not permitted—and the truth, sadly enough, does not stand up to even the weakest of 
challenges. 
 
 Depending on the venue, the strike's justifications were twisted to better appeal to those in 
attendance. According to some press reports, Trump’s statements have ‘muddied the waters, 
putting officials on the defensive as they seek to explain his decision. At times, top officials have 
oscillated between suggesting the strike was in retaliation for Iran’s escalatory behaviour in the 
region and pointing to an ‘imminent’ threat to American lives—but without providing many 
details.898 According to Jennifer Rubin, a conservative political columnist, the ‘ever-shifting 
explanations for Trump’s conduct are emblematic of how his utter lack of credibility in the national 
security realm has come back to haunt him. He has gone from smearing the intelligence 
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community, to praising it, to inventing intelligence.’ Since being elected, Trump has had ‘a 
consistent pattern of misleading the public and out-and-out lying.’ She adds that he has ignored 
uncontroverted intelligence, ‘hyped false allegations and now given what seems like a false 
justification for launching offensive military action without congressional authorization.’ 
 
Arguably, Congress must also address this issue in the context of war power, an area 
neglected since 9/11, leading to increasing confusion about what is in fact ‘war.’ For instance, by 
US law, Congress must approve military force unless in a demonstrable self-defence case.899 The 
1973 War Powers act, reacting to revelations about the Tonkin Gulf, attempted to restrain the 
president's power. But following the September 11th attacks, these constraints were generally 
relaxed. As a result of these inconsistent official statements and rising tensions with Iran resulting 
from the Soleimani strike, the House passed a non-binding resolution on January 9th 2020, to limit 
the President's ability to launch an attack against Iran without the knowledge and approval of 
Congress900—which Trump quickly vetoed.901 Although ‘habitual lying is rarely impeachable, it 
should prompt a heightened oversight in national security, including a full accounting of the 
president’s and secretary of state’s misstatements…Congress can deny funding for purely 
offensive action against Iran absent appropriate consultation with the Gang of Eight.’902 Perhaps 
this is the next step unless, of course, Trump vetoes this as well. Nevertheless, Trump cannot 
change the perceived illegitimacy of his administrations’ actions against Soleimani.903  
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 Shifting statements and a refusal to present intelligence have raised more questions than 
they have answered.904 So, was there evidence of an imminent attack? Did Soleimani identify four 
embassies as potential targets for such attacks? Or is this another case of Trump crying wolf? 
Perhaps we might never really know. However, what is certain is that the Trump administration 
has become quite limber at bending the truth. 
 
The Inconvenient Truth: Evidence of a Larger Op 
 
According to US officials, Soleimani was not the only Iranian official to be targeted on January 
3rd, 2020. In Yemen, Abdulreza Shahlai, a senior Iranian military official, was targeted by US 
drone, but survived the attack.905 Predictably, following the failed attempt on his life, Shahlai went 
into hiding.906 Notably, the attack on Soleimani was not a deviation from the norm, as the United 
States has targeted several officials in Iraq. The operation which sought to eliminate Shahlai in 
Yemen, however, was entirely unexpected. For years, the Pentagon had chosen to refrain from 
meddling in conflicts between Yemeni rebels in the Houthi forces and those supported by the 
Saudi-led coalition. However, with the United Nations applying more significant pressure to 
attempt and quell the violence in Yemen, the US saw it as one of the last remaining opportunities 
to strike during a time of uncertainty and general chaos.907 During peace, this operation would 
have been unlikely to be authorized as there would have been the potential of greater attention and 
scrutiny to their actions. 
 
 Shahlai was a commander in Iran’s Quds Force in Yemen and a financial backer of the 
Iranian regime, who had also been linked to the 2007 kidnapping and assassination of five 
American soldiers in Karbala during the US occupation in Iraq.908 Mick Mulroy, the former 
 
904 Stepansky, ‘Timeline of Trump’s Shifting Justifications for Soleimani Killing.’ 
905 James Gordon Meek et al., ‘US Tried to Kill Iranian Commander in Yemen Same Night as 
Soleimani Strike: Officials,’ ABC News, 10 January 2020. 
906 Alex Emmons, ‘US Strike on Iranian Commander in Yemen the Night of Suleimani’s 
Assassination Killed the Wrong Man,’ The Intercept, 10 January 2020. 
907 Hudson, Ryan and Dawsey, ‘On the Day US Forces Killed Soleimani, They Targeted A Senior 
Iranian Official in Yemen.’ 
908 Katherine Zimmerman, ‘Iran’s Man in Yemen and the al Houthis,’ American Enterprise 
Institute on Foreign and Defence Policy, 16 January 2020. 
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Mideast policy, reported that ‘Shahlai was a close 
confidante of Soleimani and an operational commander responsible for commanders in key 
countries—Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. Those commanders would then carry out attacks in 
those countries.’ He was also responsible for Iran’s operations in Yemen, including the flow of 
weapons to Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, according to a former counter-terrorism official. Mulroy 
added that ‘as a Quds commander [Shahlai] also carried out Soleimani’s campaign in Iraq in the 
mid-2000s that killed hundreds of Americans.’ 909 
 
 In 2007, the US Department of Treasury offered a $15 million reward under its ‘Rewards 
for Justice’ programme for Shahlai’s capture. It accused him of ‘a long history of targeting 
Americans and US allies globally,’ which included the targeting and assassination of US soldiers 
in Iraq. The relatively ‘unsuccessful operation against Shahlai may indicate that the Trump 
administration’s killing of Soleimani… was part of a broader operation than previously explained, 
raising questions about whether the mission was designed to cripple the leadership of the IRGC or 
solely to prevent an imminent attack on Americans as originally stated.’910  
 
A year later, in 2008, he and Soleimani were sanctioned by the US for their alleged 
involvement in a plot to assassinate Adel al-Jubeir, the former Saudi ambassador to the US, while 
he was at a restaurant in Washington. Immediately following the strike, the US penned a letter to 
the UN Security Council, justifying its actions taken against Soleimani. In it, the US noted that it 
had ‘undertaken certain actions in the exercises of its inherent right of self-defence,’ which 
‘include’ the strike on Soleimani.911 The plural form of ‘actions’ implies that there was more than 
one operation that night. The letter also does not solely refer to the Soleimani strike. Instead, it 
mentioned it as an example. The letter's deliberate wording suggests that the Soleimani strike was 
one of at least two significant missions undertaken that day. The second could be understood as 
the failed strike on Shahlai. But was there a third operation? Or a fourth? These revelations 
 
909 Meek et al., ‘US Tried to Kill Iranian Commander in Yemen Same Night as Soleimani Strike: 
Officials.’ 
910 Al Jazeera Staff, ‘US Targeted Iranian Official in Yemen in Failed Strike,’ Al Jazeera, 10 
January 2020.  
911 Emmons, ‘US Strike on Iranian Commander in Yemen the Night of Suleimani’s Assassination 
Killed the Wrong Man.’ 
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continuously erode the US claim that Soleimani was targeted legitimately under the US right of 
preemptive self-defence.  
 
 The failed strike raises questions about the true motivations behind the targeted killing of 
Soleimani. Was it genuinely to thwart an imminent plot orchestrated by key senior Iranian officials 
in multiple countries, or were the attacks designed to debilitate the Iranian regime and perhaps 
provide a catalyst for internal protests and an eventual coup? If Soleimani was killed in self-
defence, as the Trump administration vehemently claims, then why was Shahlai targeted in the 
same manner on the same day? Did he play a role in the ‘imminent threat’ referred to by the US 
government? If so, doesn’t this threat exist as long as Shahlai is still alive? 
  
 This view is shared by Suzanne Maloney, an Iran scholar at the Brookings Institution, who 
argued that the targeting of two senior Iranian officials ‘suggests a mission with a longer planning 
horizon and a larger objective, and it really does call into question why there was an attempt to 
explain this publicly on the basis of an imminent threat.’ The failed strike on Shahlai effectively 
challenges the US narrative. If both individuals were targeted on the same day, in the same manner, 
it would stand to reason that both posed the same level of threat, which would therefore warrant 
their coinciding executions. However, if one was killed, but the other survived, would the threat 
Shahlai posed not continue? It could even be argued that the threat would increase as the surviving 
target would use the martyring of his compatriot as additional motivation from which to launch 
attacks or, at the very least, increase the recruitment of sympathizers.912 
 
 Alex Emmons, a National Security Reporter for The Intercept, recounted how the Trump 
administration had ‘contemplated killing Shahlai for three years, as a means of deterring further 
Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen.’ Yet, it is ‘the attempt to assassinate him on the night 
of January 2 [which] seems to undercut the government’s stated rationale for killing Soleimani, 
whom US officials have repeatedly described as posing ‘an imminent threat’ to US forces in 
Iraq.’913 In response to the failed strike, Representative Ro Khanna (D-Calif) tweeted that 
 
912 Hudson, Ryan and Dawsey, ‘On the Day US Forces Killed Soleimani, They Targeted A Senior 
Iranian Official in Yemen.’ 
913 Emmons, ‘US Strike on Iranian Commander in Yemen the Night of Suleimani’s Assassination 
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‘Congress needs answers. What was the full extent of the Trump administration’s plans to kill 
Iranian officials? How does the attempted killing in Yemen have anything to do with an imminent 
threat?’914 Since Congress has yet to authorize any US military action against Iran, officials may 
seek to question the legal basis for the second strike against Shahlai.915  
 
 Despite calls for answers emanating from all levels of government, the Trump 
administration has been less than willing to answer them. As a matter of both policy and necessity, 
the US has chosen to keep its ‘operations in Yemen, where a civil war has created the world’s 
worst humanitarian crisis’ shrouded in secrecy.916 Furthermore, US officials have ruled the 
operation against Shahlai as highly classified, silencing its officials from divulging details 
regarding the operation or its motivations.917  
 
 Additionally, the Pentagon had refused to refer to the Shahlai strike when it reported the 
‘successful’ Soleimani targeted killing.918 In the absence of official confirmation, what remains 
certain is that, on the night of January 3rd, the US sent drones to Yemen and Iraq to eliminate 
Soleimani and Shahlai. One operation was successful, while the other was not. Did these 
individuals threaten the peace, security or interests of the United States? Or did they serve as prime 
stress points from which to cripple the Iranian regime? Had both strikes been successful, senior 
military officials at the Pentagon would have announced them together. Despite both operations 
being simultaneously launched, only the successful Soleimani mission was reported.919 
 
From Prevention to Deterrence  
 
914 Ro Khanna via Twitter, 10 January 2020  
<https://twitter.com/RepRoKhanna/status/1215702675108564993?s=20>. 
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Killed the Wrong Man.’ 
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The US has conceptually muddled the understanding of ‘imminence.’ It has now become clear that 
the Trump administration uses it more as a rhetorical device than a temporal legal concept. 
Imminence traditionally refers to a threat that is already underway, requiring a rapid response to 
address the incoming attack (already in progress or at a late stage of preparation). The US has 
reconceptualized it to mean that a response is immediate, even if the likelihood of a threat 
materializing remains unknown. In the Soleimani case, the threat he posed could not have been 
imminent (even in a causal sense) since there was no proof that Iran had decided upon any 
particular course of action.920 
 
 According to Professor Marko Milanovic from the University of Nottingham School of 
Law, the United States would have a rather difficult time meeting the criteria necessary to prove 
that the attack on Soleimani was legitimate. At present, there remain ‘serious doubts that there 
even was an imminent attack.’ Milanovic has argued that the US has shot itself in the foot by not 
releasing credible intelligence, which casts doubt on the drone programme's validity and 
accountability under CIA control. 921 
 
 If no evidence or intelligence is presented (other than unfounded claims and statements 
made by US officials) to indicate that an imminent attack was in the works, then the US would be 
in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on the prohibition on the use of force against both Iran 
and Iraq. 922 As if the circumstance were not already muddled with shifting statements, unavailable 
intelligence, and unproven imminence, Trump decided to take to Twitter. The President found it a 
worthwhile endeavour to threaten Iran against threatening the United States. In a time of escalating 
tensions, further threats were unnecessary. The tweets were themselves fascinating since, after the 
strike on Soleimani, he tweeted out a direct and unambiguous threat against Iran.923 The original 
 
920 See Marko Milanovic, ‘The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed 
Attack,’ European Journal of International Law, 07 January 2020, pp. 2-5. 
921 Milanovic, ‘The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed Attack,’ pp. 
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923 Donald J. Trump via Twitter on 04 January 2020  
<https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1213593975732527112?s=20>. 
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tweet did not mince words—Trump clearly threatened to target Iranian cultural sites.924 Later, he 
claimed it was a warning addressed at Iran to persuade them against avenging Soleimani, for if 
they did, the US would attack several of their cultural sites. However, despite Trump’s alleged 
motivations for the tweet, its content nonetheless infringes both jus in bello and jus ad bellum 
principles. Trump has since tried to justify the threat, reasoning in part that since Iran has killed 
Americans in the past, the US should be allowed to destroy some of their cultural sites. 925 
Unfortunately for Trump, this is not how international law works. His tweet still violated 
international humanitarian law, and some legal scholars have even argued that it can be categorized 
as a war crime.  
 
 Sometimes it seems as though the Trump administration is living in the past, perhaps in an 
era of gunboat diplomacy. It has threatened Iran with fifty-two missile strikes for each American 
held in Iran for 444 days during the historic Iran hostage crisis from November 4th, 1979 to January 
20th, 1981.926 It targeted Soleimani based on his history as a terrorist, despite the absence of any 
current intelligence supporting this claim. Trump even argued that proving the imminence of any 
plot involving Soleimani was unnecessary as his ‘terrible past’ would be sufficient reason enough.  
 
 Further issues flow from the expected fallout triggered by a state’s pre-attack self-defence 
operation. It is impossible to determine, without concrete knowledge of the future, if preemptive 
self-defence would be useful or detrimental to the goal of mitigating the existing threat. However, 
it may be possible to achieve a certain degree of objective evaluation when a state uses force 
against resources or assets critical to the plot in question. It can be logically deduced that 
 
924 Donald J. Trump via Twitter on 04 January 2020  
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925 Maggie Haberman, ‘Trump Threatens Iranian Cultural Sites, and Warns of Sanctions on Iraq,’ 
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destroying a weapons cache or bombing tanks could prevent an attack from taking place. The same 
cannot be said of targeting individuals. The fallout from such an action can differ considerably, 
depending on the audience. For instance, the targeted killing of Soleimani resulted in different 
reactions from the US and Iran. It is quite evident that ‘Soleimani’s killing has the exact opposite 
effect on Iran’s leadership, which has publicly committed to avenging him.’927 Not all failed 
attempts at preemptive self-defence mean that the decision to engage in such was, as a result, 
illegitimate.928 Instead, the issue is with a state attempting to claim some form of pre-attack self-
defence without knowing whether their action(s) would prevent the imminent threat from 
materializing. If this cannot be adequately demonstrated nor anticipated, then neither the concepts 
of necessity nor proportionality can be demonstrable in this case.929  
 
 This, in turn, leads to the vexed question of open secrecy and implausible deniability. Why 
do states increasingly choose to publicize actions by their covert services? Since the CIA led the 
drone operation that killed Soleimani, why did the US choose to publicize the strike? Why not 
keep the strike under wraps from the public? The supposed threat was eliminated. Why advertise 
it and open the administration up to legal challenge and criticism by domestic and international 
legal organizations, threats of retaliation from the targeted countries and rising criticism from the 
wider international community? Why not focus on a clandestine operation aimed at dismantling 
the plot? Moreover, the use of a drone to underline the US claim of preemptive self-defence is 
equally problematic. If a threat were in fact ‘imminent,’ then Soleimani would have been just one 
facet of a larger plot—so taking him, and only him, out by drone casts ‘serious doubts that the 
method the US chose to resist that supposed attack was necessary under the circumstances.’930 
  
 So then why publicly kill an individual whose political position and supposed extremist 
role would result in his martyring, and that might, in turn, incite anger, calls for revenge, amongst 
other issues like increased recruitment and radicalization? Had the strike been kept secret, the US 
could have sought plausible deniability. It certainly would not be the first case of a covert US 
drone operation, especially considering that the CIA conducts these somewhat regularly. The first 
 
927 Milanovic, ‘The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed Attack,’ p. 4. 
928 See also Arend, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,’ pp. 89-103. 
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error was choosing to strike Soleimani without overwhelming, undeniable evidence demonstrating 
his involvement in an imminent terror plot. The second was choosing to target Soleimani while he 
was in Iraq, a sovereign third-party state. The third was publicly announcing that they engaged in 
this operation. The reasons for this could stem from Trump’s need to match Obama’s execution of 
Osama bin Laden during his term. However, the benefits of publicizing such a controversial and 
legally unstable strike against Soleimani are far outmatched by the negative consequences which 
occurred, and are still transpiring. If Trump wanted to take the credit for eliminating the supposed 
terror threat Soleimani posed, there were other less controversial ways to do so.  
 
 Non-violent alternatives exist. There are quite a few ways to disrupt an imminent attack 
without resorting to violence. Two main methods will be examined here as they could have been 
implemented to target Soleimani. The first method is to target those directly involved and critical 
to the plot in question. The second is to target the resources necessary for the plot to materialize. 
By acting in self-defence against the individuals critical to the plot, it ‘disrupts the attacker’s ability 
to pursue the attack.’ By eliminating their access to resources and assets, it disrupts their will or 
ability to proceed with the plot.931 Some countries denounce the US strike against Soleimani but 
still support the customary international law allowing pre-attack self-defence. So why do countries 
still advocate for pre-attack self-defence if they rarely use it?932 Building upon the earlier 
discussion from chapter three, it seems as though most scholars point to three reasons for this 
position. The first is deterrence. If other countries are aware of your affinity and acceptance of this 
form of self-defence, then they would think twice before attempting to plot any attack against your 
state. Hence, deterrence is achieved. However, due to ‘its enormous potential for escalation, even 
with the constraining influence of necessity and proportionality, the deterrence rationale should be 
categorically excluded from the legitimate scope of self-defence.’933  
 
 
931 Milanovic, ‘The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed Attack,’ pp. 
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933 Milanovic, ‘The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed Attack,’ p. 4. 
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 The second reason relies on desensitization and familiarity. If the public and the media are 
aware of this potential option, then a certain level of acceptance would be achieved. Having public 
acceptance or awareness of such a policy would be invaluable should a circumstance warrant its 
use. The last thing a government would need during an elevated threat level would be public 
backlash for their resort to this form of attack. Lastly, anticipation and preparation for future threats 
is the third reason why countries still support pre-attack self-defence, despite its issues. By publicly 
acknowledging that this policy is an acceptable defence method, then there would certainly be time 
and money spent on further developing and preparing guidelines for its implementation in the 
future, if need be. Thus, ensuring that the state would be prepared for any such future threats.  
 
 For the Soleimani strike to be viewed as legitimate, a few conditions should be met. First, 
the US must demonstrate that Soleimani posed an operational, rather than simply a strategic role 
in an extremist organization that was plotting imminent attacks against their interests and citizens. 
Second, that Iran was involved and determined to have these plots against the US materialize. 
Third, killing Soleimani was the only way by which to disrupt the plot already in progress. Fourth, 
the use of unmanned drones fulfilled both the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Fifth, 
the strike in Iraq was necessary, demonstrating sufficient evidentiary support that no other time or 
place would have been similarly acceptable. It is widely accepted that Soleimani’s role ‘was in 
providing strategic direction and material to Iranian proxies in Iraq, not in the execution of specific 
operations.’ So, while it is possible that Soleimani ‘did have a concrete operational impact on some 
planned attack by Iran, the US has offered no evidence that such was the case.’934 
 
Jon Bateman, a former special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
specialist on Iran, argued that ‘[t]here may well have been an ongoing plot as Pompeo claims, but 
Soleimani was a decision-maker, not an operational asset himself… Killing him would be neither 
necessary nor sufficient to disrupt the operational progression of an imminent plot. What it might 
do instead is shock Iran’s decision calculus,’ to dissuade potential future plots.935 
 
 
934 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
935 Hudson, Ryan and Dawsey, ‘On the Day US Forces Killed Soleimani, They Targeted A Senior 
Iranian Official in Yemen.’ 
 254 
When in Doubt, Go Covert 
 
This section will posit that in the case of the Soleimani strike, the US should have abided by the 
directive set forth by Sun Tzu in The Art of War, which reminded leaders that ‘all warfare is based 
on deception.’ Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, 
we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; 
when far away, we must make him believe we are near.’936 Informed by the findings of Prof. Daniel 
Sobelman, the purpose of this discussion will be to demonstrate that when contentious policies or 
operations cannot be avoided, they should nonetheless be kept covert to avoid the negative 
repercussions which might result from their application. 
 
 Perhaps the United States should consider taking a page out of Hezbollah’s strategic 
playbook. Sobelman discovered that ‘[t]he distinction between Hizbollah’s official, declared 
activity and its covert activity is important since the organization wants to bestow an aura of 
legitimacy on its official activity at the local… [and] international level.’937 Historically, the CIA 
has long engaged in a series of covert operations, many of which were likely morally contentious 
or legally objectionable. However, by keeping such activities secret, the agency avoided the 
negative consequences of more public activities.938  
 
 Yet, despite being conducted by the CIA, the Soleimani strike was then reported to the 
public by the highest levels of the US government—defeating the purpose of having a clandestine 
agency carry out the attack. Following this announcement, the mission's operational successes 
were quickly overshadowed by the fallout which ensued.939 Paradoxically, this has become a 
foreign policy trend that has been adopted by some states, including Putin’s Russia. Professors 
Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich authored an insightful piece in which they examined the 
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historical intersection of covert action and implausible deniability.940 Contrary to common belief, 
plausible deniability has never been a foolproof tool in statecraft. Denying involvement in a covert 
operation has always been problematic and has become even more so in recent decades with the 
ease of media dissemination and anonymous intelligence leaks.941 Still, nations and their leaders 
have continuously chosen to fall back into this habit despite the ambiguity and challenges it fosters. 
In some recent cases, nations that have interfered in other states' affairs have chosen to 
acknowledge their involvement no longer.942 Even in cases where evidence of this meddling exists, 
states have favoured against providing comment on their involvement as there is no credible 
excuse or avenue for denial left that might explain their actions.943 It is for this reason that plausible 
deniability has slowly evolved into implausible deniability.  
 
 In the Soleimani strike, several critics challenged the US operation's motivations, the legal 
justification provided by the Trump administration, and even the strategic efficacy of the strike 
itself. These combined challenges served to publicly degrade the US counter-terror program's 
perceived legitimacy and its drone campaign's reputation. Making the Soleimani strike public was 
one very significant error on the part of the administration. Perhaps Trump decided to announce 
the Soleimani win for other motives, like garnering support for the upcoming election or matching 
his predecessor's strategic ‘wins.’944 Still, if Soleimani posed an impending threat, as the Trump 
administration contends, then the elimination of the general should have served as a sufficient win 
for the national security of the country. Why publicly advertise this?  
 
 
940 Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible 
Deniability,’ International Affairs, Vol. 94, Issue 3, May 2018, pp. 477–494 
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02 March 2020. 
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 Hezbollah, for instance, has opted to conduct most of its business covertly, resulting in an 
improvement in ‘its intelligence and operational ability.’ By publicizing a covert operation, Trump 
threatened the drone programme by potentially opening its counterterror programme to greater 
international legal scrutiny, certainly garnering greater attention from UN rapporteurs. In this case, 
a few moments of publicity cost the US dearly. Israel was faced with a similar situation following 
the operation which eliminated Mughniyeh in 2008. At the time, Israel could have covertly killed 
‘most senior Hizbollah members,’ including the top operations figures. Seasoned observers 
suggest that the fact that such actions have not occurred may indicate that ‘in the profit and loss 
equation, the profit does not exceed and therefore justify the loss.’945 For Israel, even the covert 
elimination of a few Hezbollah leaders was too politically costly to undertake. It seems as though 
the United States did not undertake a measured debate drawing on collective wisdom, and this may 
have been a decision driven more by a few individuals.  
 
 The Trump administration erred in five critical ways. First, they launched a clandestine 
operation, only to later publicly announce it. Second, their selected target was a foreign 
government official. Third, the US did not consult with the UN Security Council, or, at the very 
least, Congress. Fourth, no credible proof was presented to corroborate the alleged imminent threat 
the target posed. Fifth, the operation was executed within a third-party state, without its knowledge 
nor authorization. These are five additional factors that were known before the Soleimani strike 
was authorized. Any of them could have reasonably been understood as posing significant risks to 
the mission objective—therefore warranting, at the very least, a pause for revision on the operation 
in question. 
 
 Israel did not have to deal with these five factors within their risk assessment, and it still 
chose against launching any operations. With these additional considerations, it is still remarkable 
that given the high degree of risk and relative certainty of negative fallout, the Trump 
administration still chose to launch the strike on Soleimani—and later advertise it. The Soleimani 
risk assessment could have been improved had the mission remained covert, and therefore conduct 
the strike under Title 50 authorities.946 Undertaking such an assessment, even if symbolic, would 
 
945 Sobelman, ‘Hezbollah’s Arsenal and Means of Deterrence,’ pp. 84-88. 
946 US Code, ‘Title 10: Armed Forces,’ Cornell Law School, Accessed at: 
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have afforded the US a chance at plausible deniability.947 The Covert Action Statute (CAS), 
preserved under Title 50 of the US Code, defines ‘covert action’ as an activity or activities 
conducted abroad by the US government, intended to remain secret, and therefore ‘not be apparent 
or acknowledged publicly.’948  
 
 This is not the first time that the United States has opted for what might be called overt 
covert action. But by executing the Soleimani strike under Title 10, it made the operation known—
and thus vulnerable to criticism and ensuing political consequences.949 Thus, when in doubt, the 
US would have stood to benefit from keeping their contentious practices and operations covert. In 
going public with the Soleimani operation, the US essentially shot itself in the foot, its drone 
programme in the head, its allies in the back and its legitimacy in the heart.  
 
When All Else Fails: Preemptive Self-Defence  
 
As we have seen, the intelligence presented by the United States on the drone strike, which killed 
Soleimani, is incomplete and somewhat subjective.950 No intelligence has yet been presented, 
which unequivocally demonstrates that Soleimani posed an imminent threat to the United States 
at the time of his death. High-ranking intelligence officials, military personnel and even political 
reporters have all pointed to this issue.951 Consequently, available information from media reports, 
archival discoveries and government statements must be used in substitution.  
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 Comparing and contrasting the criteria of each type of pre-attack self-defence against the 
available intelligence from the Soleimani strike would allow for a preliminary assessment to be 
made as to which form of self-defence the US employed (not claimed to have employed) when 
targeting the Iranian General. The purpose of Soleimani’s presence in Iraq will be discussed first.  
 
Soleimani travelled to Iraq on diplomatic business at the request of the Iraqi Prime Minister 
Abdul-Mahdi, and on behalf of the Iranian government. It has been widely reported and confirmed 
that Soleimani’s purpose for travelling to Iraq was to discuss options to ease tensions between 
Saudi Arabia and Tehran—an issue which would have also been favourable for the United 
States.952 So this aspect has now been established. It, therefore, further substantiates the fact that 
Soleimani was targeted in Iraq. It should be noted that Iraq is a sovereign state, whose control over 
the area in question is accepted by the United States and indeed the international community.953  
 
 No outside powers may interfere or infringe on this legal right. Iraq is also a country 
without any demonstrable involvement in the specific threat that Soleimani supposedly posed. On 
31 December 2019, after a funeral was held for the Kata'ib Hezbollah militiamen, dozens of Iraqi 
Shia militiamen and their supporters marched into the Green Zone and surrounded the U.S. 
embassy compound.954 Despite all of these qualities described above and the knowledge that the 
Iraqi government specifically banned the US from entering its airspace months earlier,955 the CIA 
still found it necessary to invade sovereign Iraqi airspace to launch missiles from an unmanned 
 
952 Kim Sengupta, ‘The Reason Qassem Soleimani was in Baghdad Shows How Complex the Iran 
Crisis Is,’ The Independent, 06 January 2020. 
953See also C. J. Polychroniou, ‘Human Rights, State Sovereignty, and International Law: An 
Interview with Richard Falk,’ Global Policy Journal, 11 September 2018; and Samantha Besson, 
‘Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy,’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
22, No.2 (2011), pp. 373–87. 
954 Tara Law, ‘Iraqi Protesters End U.S. Embassy Siege but Tensions Remain High. Here's a Full 
Timeline’, Time Magazine, 1 January 2020. 
955 Meghann Myers, ‘US Complies with New Rules as Iraq Cracks Down on Use of Its Airspace,’ 
Military Times, 16 August 2019; and Charles Riley, ‘The Middle East Has Become a Nightmare 
for Airlines,’ CNN, 22 June 2019. 
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aerial weapon against an active Iranian government official. In any other circumstance, this would 
be equivalent to an act of war.956  
 
 Hypothetically speaking, if Russia were to target a senior US government official in 
Canada—the consequences would be unimaginable. It can be reasonably understood that since this 
strike occurred in the Middle East, the fallout has been somewhat quelled by a culture of 
desensitization drawn from decades of political and military campaigns in the region. Regardless 
of the target, their supposed crimes or unproven involvement in future plots, all nations' 
sovereignty must be upheld and respected. No country should become a battleground out of 
opportunity or convenience. Thus, the United States violated this legal constraint of sovereignty 
in its pursuit of Soleimani in Iraq. 
 
 The Trump administration has insisted that the only reason they targeted Soleimani in Iraq 
was to stop him from planning and executing an imminent terror attack. Regrettably, since no 
evidence of Soleimani’s involvement in any such plot has been presented, this criterion remains 
unfulfilled. Even now, months following the killing of the Iranian General, no terror plot has 
materialized. If one were imminent, or at a late stage of planning at the time of Soleimani’s death 
(as the US claims), would the terror group not go ahead with the mission to avenge his death? 
Since this has not occurred, the American claim that the terror plot was imminent is weakening by 
the day. More so when considering that the actual US operation that day targeted two key Iranian 
officials—General Soleimani in Iraq, and Commander Abdulreza Shahlai in Yemen.957 One died, 
the other narrowly survived.  
 
 If both men were targeted on the same day, in the same way, it might be assumed that both 
posed the same level of threat to the United States. Since Shahlai survived, then the threat would 
most likely still exist, albeit perhaps in a slightly diminished fashion. The alleged plot would 
continue, and the imminent threat would still exist. But this has not proven to be the case as a terror 
 
956 Jessie Yeung, et. al., ‘Iran’s Top General Soleimani Killed in US Strike,’ CNN, 04 January 
2020; and Julia Wright, ‘The Killing of Soleimani is Tantamount to an Act of War,’ The New 
Yorker, 03 January 2020. 
957 Meek et al., ‘US Tried to Kill Iranian Commander in Yemen Same Night as Soleimani Strike: 
Officials.’ 
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attack, even on a smaller scale, has not occurred. Due to an unsubstantiated claim of imminence, 
as well as nonexistent evidence to demonstrate Soleimani’s direct operational or strategic 
contribution to any terror plot, it can be reasonably assumed that the Trump administration could 
have waited. They could have perhaps arrested or addressed the threat Soleimani posed differently, 
as this perceived threat did not constitute a high risk. Equally, the Trump administration might 
argue that the strike had a secondary, but equally important, deterrent effect.  
 
 There is considerable evidence that points to the possibility that the attack on Soleimani 
was opportunistic.958 Several key figures within the Trump administration sought Soleimani for 
years due to his past involvement with terror organizations. These so-called ‘Iran Hawks’ will 
subsequently be identified and discussed in greater detail. In the absence of available intelligence 
demonstrating Soleimani’s involvement in an imminent plot against the United States, Trump’s 
statement that Soleimani’s ‘horrible past’ made him a lawful target suggests that the strike which 
killed him might have been opportunistic.959 Moreover, Soleimani was targeted in an open-air 
location with relatively few civilians in the area.960 His whereabouts were continuously monitored 
before he arrived at the Iraqi airport via sophisticated satellites and common flight trackers.961 
Furthermore, he was targeted in Iraq, a country where the US considers a comfortable battleground 
territory since its initial invasion in 2003.962 
 
 The political fallout from the Soleimani strike could have been minimized by (i) waiting 
to target Soleimani while he was in Iran and therefore not involve another party, (ii) arrest/detain 
Soleimani by use of military/covert force not requiring his execution or the deaths of numerous 
bystanders, or (iii) refer the matter to the UN Security Council providing all intelligence regarding 
 
958 For further discussion on this topic, see Sultan Barakat, ‘Trump’s Opportunism Could Plunge 
the Middle East into Turmoil,’ Al Jazeera, 04 January 2020; and CR Staff, ‘Killing Soleimani: A 
Tactical Lunge with Strategic Consequences,’ Control Risks Group, 08 January 2020. 
959 For more on this, please refer to the earlier chapter on ‘Imminent Threats and Embassy Plots,’ 
960 Soleimani was targeted at Baghdad airport in the early hours of the morning. Traffic, according 
to reports, was quite slow and there were limited numbers of staff and travellers in the area. 
961 Iraqi officers interrogated all those who were working at the Baghdad airport at the time 
Soleimani was killed. They suspected that a cell of spies was communicating with the US, 
providing intelligence agents with live updates on Soleimani’s whereabouts.  
962 Ariz Kader, ‘Iraq: Battleground or Buffer State?’ Barcelona Center for International Affairs, 
July 2019: pp. 1-5. 
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the supposed threat Soleimani posed to garner legitimacy (and perhaps even support) in a plan to 
stop the plot and detain all those culpable.  
 
 From the analysis of available information on the Soleimani strike, the following points 
have been established. First, no intelligence to demonstrate that Soleimani posed an imminent, nor 
a sufficient threat, or that he was involved in a terror plot that posed an imminent threat to the 
United States or international community has been provided or relayed by high-ranking US 
government officials. Second, there is no evidence to indicate that President Trump’s claims of an 
imminent plot targeting four embassies was ever in active preparation. Third, there were many 
other potential diplomatic avenues that the US could have relied upon to address the supposed 
threat Soleimani posed. The most evident of which would have been to refer the matter to the 
United Nations Security Council.  
 
 The US never sought the UN Security Council's authorization, nor did it send intelligence 
to the Council following the strike to legitimize its decision. Fourth, the threat was perceived as 
‘serious’ by the Trump administration and not by other countries or government officials. Fifth, 
there is no evidence presented, indicating that the international community's peace was threatened. 
Trump specified that four US embassies were likely to be targeted, although little intelligence 
proved this had been provided. Sixth, the weaponry or manner by which the attack would be carried 
out is still left unanswered. Without unequivocal evidence that the threat was from a threat of 
WMD or transnational terrorism, not even the preventative form of self-defence can be fulfilled. 
 
 These observations challenge the Trump administration's assertions that the Soleimani 
strike was legitimately executed in accordance with the customary international law of pre-attack 








Chapter 8: Classifying the Soleimani Strike 
 
So far, it has been argued that a state may choose to resort to three types of pre-attack self-defence 
in response to a perceived threat—namely, anticipatory, preemptive or preventative.963 In the case 
of the US drone strike on Soleimani, the Trump administration claimed they were left with no 
choice but to strike first as the Iranian General posed an ‘imminent threat.’ By claiming that the 
imminence criteria had been fulfilled during their intelligence gathering (despite there being no 
evidence presented to corroborate this), the US had implied that they acted in anticipatory self-
defence—the least contentious of the three.964  
  
 However, in the absence of any presented information to demonstrate the imminence of 
the threat Soleimani supposedly posed, this initial assertion is difficult to accept at face value. The 
purpose of this analysis will be to ascertain which form of pre-attack self-defence the US used, not 
which form the US has claimed to have used. This end will be achieved by a methodical ‘category’ 
style approach against which all available information on the strike will be contrasted with the 
criteria set forth by international law. Two separate analyses will be conducted in this manner. The 
first will be to determine which type of pre-attack self-defence was used, and the second is to 
determine if the imminence condition was sufficiently fulfilled before the strike's authorization. 
 
 The US has sought to suggest that the drone strike that killed Soleimani was legitimately 
authorized and per the international law of pre-attack self-defence. However, the administration's 
statements and reports have been contradictory and unclear about how this conclusion was 
reached. This section will attempt to address this issue. Alas, we have to accept that international 
law is not like domestic law and tends to be somewhat contested territory, and so it has been 
similarly unclear in its description of each type of pre-attack self-defence.  
 
 
963 Refer to ‘Literature Review’ chapter for elaboration. 
964 See for example Donald R. Rothwell, ‘Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International 
Terrorism,’ University of Queensland Law Journal Vol.24, No.2 (2005), pp. 24, 337; and Niaz A. 
Shah, ‘Self-Defence, Anticipatory Self-Defence and Preemption: International Law's Response to 
Terrorism,’ Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 12, No.1 (2007), pp. 95-126. 
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 For conceptual clarity, each type of pre-attack self-defence has been deconstructed into 
three descriptive factors, which will be analyzed separately. These include ‘belief,’ ‘nature of the 
threat,’ and ‘additional requirements.’ The first outlines the main view held by each form of self-
defence, the second defines the features that a threat must possess to be considered part of that 
type, while the last identifies any additional requirements which must be met for the attack to be 
conclusively ruled as belonging to that particular form of pre-attack self-defence. This three-step 
verification strategy will be used to determine which type of pre-attack self-defence the US strike 
used when targeting Soleimani. Thus, an examination of what is already known about the strike 




First, US attitudes towards the practice of pre-attack self-defence will be established. Once these 
are identified, they will then be used to determine which type of self-defence shares this 
interpretation or ‘belief.’ Then, information regarding the ‘nature of the threat’ that Soleimani 
posed will be presented to identify which type of self-defence shares a similar threat analysis. At 
this point, if both the categories of ‘interpretation’ and ‘nature of threat’ are determined to be 
aligned with the same type of self-defence, then the final indicator, namely ‘additional 
requirements,’ will be used to validate this position further. If they differ, then the last category 
will be used as a tiebreaker or decisive marker. After this analysis is completed, the garnered 
information will be used to create a table that elucidates how the US strike on Soleimani compares, 




Since the 9/11 attacks, the US has held the same, unwavering stance on pre-attack self-defence.965 
It remains one of only a few states who have argued against the need for council authorization, 
while also disregarding the customary legal proviso requiring states to consult with the UN 
 
965 Mueller et. al., Attacking in Self-Defence, pp. 44-45. This can be seen in the post-9/11 reliance 
on the US National Security Strategy. For further discussion on this topic, please refer to the 
literature review, subsection ‘The US National Security Strategy,’ 
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Security Council for guidance and authorization on such matters. Instead, it has opted for direct, 
unchallenged action. The US even defended its resort to pre-attack self-defence, ‘even if 
uncertainty remain[ed] as to the time and place of the enemy attack.’966  
 
 Waiting too long to strike may, as the US claims, impair a state’s ability to address threats 
to their national security effectively—which is reasonably problematic when faced with dangerous 
threats like terrorism or WMDs.967 This interpretive position is closely aligned with that of the 
‘Charter is Dead’ school.968 These scholars echo the US claim that the UN Charter is outdated and 
inapplicable to current threats. For this reason, the US believes that pre-attack self-defence should 
be used against any perceived threats without regard for authorization from the UN Security 
Council. In their view, this legislative body is no different from the UN Charter, as both operate 
under the same outdated rules.  
 
 The findings in this section are most aligned with the ‘belief’ criteria associated with 
preventative self-defence. This particular form of self-defence is founded on three fundamental 
principles. The first contends that states need not suffer an attack before being allowed to respond 
in self-defence. The second asserts that non-intervention could be riskier than illegitimate 
preventative attacks. While the third espouses the belief, which is also shared by proponents of the 
‘Charter is Dead’ school of thought, that the Charter is inapplicable to modern threats of terrorism 
and the like, making legal parameters rigidity inapplicable.969 This position also suggests that 
seeking counsel from the UN Security Council is also ineffective and unnecessary as it operates 
based upon the legislation criticized above. 
 
 
966 National Security Council, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ 
p. 15; see also House of Lords, ‘UK Attorney General’s Speech,’ HL Debate, 21 April 2004, 
vol.660 cols 369-372 (according to the House of Lords, self-defence may be acceptable as a state 
response against terrorist groups who are understood to pose an imminent threat by carrying out 
multiple attacks in a short period of time, even if there is insufficient evidence available about the 
date/time of the potential next attack). 
967 Deeks, ‘Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption,’ p. 668. 
968 Refer to earlier discussion on ‘Schools of Thought.’  
969 See Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ pp. 717-719. 
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 If the US had not shared this pejorative view of the Charter, then the remaining findings 
could have been categorized as preemptive. It would not have qualified under the anticipatory type 
as the US has demonstrated its favour for offensive positions in military operations. This section 
demonstrates that the first criteria, namely ‘belief,’ fulfilled by the US view towards the policy of 
pre-attack self-defence, is best aligned with preventative self-defence. 
 
 Nature of the Threat 
 
The US has claimed that General Soleimani posed an ‘imminent threat’ to US personnel and 
interests in the region. Furthermore, the Trump administration has argued that it legitimately 
operated in adherence to the customary legal right of pre-attack self-defence to prevent the threat 
described above from materializing. Using available information, government statements, and 
open-source intelligence, this portion of the analysis will attempt to establish what sort of threat 
Soleimani posed at the time of his death. 
 
 The following five criteria must be fulfilled to be categorized under the most favourable 
type of the three, namely anticipatory self-defence.970 The first is discernible proof that a threat 
exists. Owing to a lack of available intelligence, partly due to the Trump administration’s 
unwillingness to divulge pertinent information on the strike, this criterion cannot be proven. 
Although Trump claimed that Soleimani was involved in a plan to target US embassies in the 
region, this has not been proven. Government statements, without concrete evidence to corroborate 
such assertions, are insufficient to fulfil this condition. Undermined by the fact that US embassy 
officials in several countries in the Middle East have all confirmed that they were unaware of any 
threat.971 Additionally, if such a threat existed, as the US claims, would not Soleimani’s death 
incite the supposed attacks to be launched sooner?  
 
 
970 For greater discussion on this, refer to Murphy, ‘The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defence,’ 
pp. 699-748.  
971 See Atwood, ‘State Department Security Officials Weren’t Notified of Imminent Threats to 
U.S. Embassies.’ 
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 With the failed assassination attempt on Shahlai in Yemen, it is reasonable to assume that 
the threat would still exist as long as he is still alive. 972 And if this is the case, then the alleged 
threat not only persists but might be extrapolated by the martyring of Soleimani and the failed 
assassination attempt on his own life.973 To complicate matters further, it could be that if a threat 
did not exist before the strike on Soleimani and Shahlai, it would undoubtedly be precipitated by 
the US’ aggressive military actions. Of course, we must accept that this chain of argument does 
involve a rapidly increasing range of variables of the sort that are commonly associated with any 
counter-factual argument.974 Given the available information, this criterion was not fulfilled. There 
has yet to be any proof that Soleimani posed an existing and active threat at the time of his death. 
Rather than conclude the analysis here, as this sufficiently demonstrates that the US strike cannot 
be classified as anticipatory, the following four criteria will also be examined to demonstrate 
incompatibility furthermore. 
 
 The matter of imminence was perhaps the most referenced element following the 
Soleimani strike. Thus, imminence becomes the second criterion required to prove that an 
operation fulfilled the necessary factor to be considered anticipatory. Unfortunately, this was the 
most referenced because it was also the most disputed. The Trump administration claimed that the 
threat posed by Soleimani was imminent but stopped short of providing any intelligence which 
demonstrated this. When forced to provide an intelligence briefing to Congress, including the 
‘Gang of Eight,’ the Trump administration was criticized profusely. Congresspeople characterized 
the quality of intelligence presented as ‘weak’ and ‘sophomoric.’975 While others, including Adam 
 
972 For clarity, refer to the earlier section on ‘The Inconvenient Truth: Evidence of a Larger Op’ 
973 See Jesse Paul Lehrke and Rahel Schomaker, ‘Kill, Capture, or Defend? The Effectiveness of 
Specific and General Counterterrorism Tactics Against the Global Threats of the Post-9/11 Era,’ 
Journal of Security Studies, Vol. 25, No.4 (2016), pp. 729-762; Joseph K. Young, ‘Morality, 
Efficacy, and Targeted Assassination as a Policy Tool,’ Journal of Criminology & Public Policy 
Vol.16 (2017), p. 225; and Jack McDonald, ‘Decapitation, Repression, or Cauterization? The 
Problem of Targeted Killings,’ in the Handbook of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Post 9/11, 
(London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019). 
974 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘What's So Different About a Counterfactual?’ World Politics Vol.52, 
No.4 (2000), pp. 550-585. 
975 Transcript, ‘Representative Connolly Reaction to Iran Briefing.’ 
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Schiff, described the Trump administration’s account as ‘just plain wrong,’ in other words, of 
fudging the intelligence, and exaggerating the facts to fit the narrative. 976 
 
 The US Constitution affords Congress, particularly those in the ‘Gang of Eight,’ the 
authorization necessary to view the same intelligence available to the president. Expectedly, this 
brief also included classified intelligence to which the general public does not have access. Even 
so, a noteworthy number of those who were given the brief were left unimpressed and unconvinced 
that Soleimani posed a significant threat, much less an imminent one worthy of immediate 
execution. It is also worth emphasizing that Trump signed the authorization to kill Soleimani seven 
months before the strike that eventually killed him. If Soleimani posed an imminent threat, he 
would have been killed much sooner. It would not have been difficult to find him, as he was not 
hiding like most other targets and terrorists that the US has hunted over the years.977 By virtue of 
being an Iranian government official regularly involved in international interactions, Soleimani 
did not have the ability, nor the inclination, to hide. He had to attend public meetings, go on 
diplomatic missions, and even hold press conferences. Finding Soleimani was not the problem—
finding a justification to kill him, on the other hand, undoubtedly took much longer.  
 
 Furthermore, if the threat Soleimani posed were an imminent one, then the US would have 
been eager to vindicate their actions by providing all necessary intelligence to the press and the 
UN Security Council. Since the intelligence on Soleimani was no longer necessary, as the mission 
objective was achieved and Soleimani was killed, this could have easily been offered—even if 
only to the Security Council. Yet, there has been no convincing intelligence presented to the press 
or US government officials. Instead, the UN did receive a letter within which the US claimed that 
it acted legitimately, in accordance with the international law of pre-attack self-defence, to address 




976 Transcript, ‘Rep. Adam Schiff on Face the Nation,’ CBS News, 12 January 2020. 
977 Schmitt et al., ‘For Trump, a Risky Decision on Suleimani is One Other Presidents Had 
Avoided.’ 
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 The third criterion addresses the degree of active participation that Soleimani played in the 
alleged ‘four embassy plots.’ Both government and embassy officials have questioned whether 
this even existed.978 Apart from US government claims, no objective information has been 
presented to corroborate this assertion. The fourth and fifth criteria, precisely the unavoidable and 
high-risk nature of the threat, similarly remain unproven.  
 
 Could the strike on Soleimani have been avoided by referring the matter to the UN Security 
Council or the ICJ? Soleimani’s position as an Iranian government official gave these international 
legal bodies the ability to put him on trial. Additionally, the requirement that a threat must be 
demonstrably high-risk, which renders waiting unrealistic, is similarly unproven. If this were the 
case, Soleimani would probably have launched an attack within the seven months that it took the 
Trump administration to plan and execute the strike. Consequently, the Soleimani strike does not 
adhere to the criteria presented under the category of anticipatory self-defence. Compared to the 
preemptive category, it also falls short as the threat cannot be proven, as concluded in the 
discussion above. Once again, this requires an evaluation of the preventative type of self-defence. 
According to this classification, threats must not only be perceived as serious, but they must also 
constitute a danger to national or international security.  
 
 Despite the subjectivity of this requirement, the Trump administration fails to demonstrate 
this fully. Government statements alone, regardless of whether they are supported by evidence, are 
insufficient to demonstrate a ‘perceived threat.’ To perceive the seriousness of a threat, one must 
infer this from some form of information or intelligence. Still, no such intelligence has been 
introduced. Thus, the nature of the threat Soleimani posed cannot objectively fulfil the 
requirements of any type of pre-attack self-defence, not even preventative. This analysis now 











Thus far, ‘belief’ has been the only element to have sufficiently aligned with the preventative type 
of self-defence. The ‘nature of the threat’ failed to adhere to any form of pre-attack self-defence. 
When compared to the preventative form, it fulfilled the criteria of being ‘perceived’ as a threat, 
but since no intelligence was available to gauge how this conclusion was reached, this also 
subsequently failed to meet the criteria. As such, the Soleimani strike's available information failed 
to demonstrate that the ‘nature of the threat’ posed by the General aligned with any of the three 
types of pre-attack self-defence. The following subsection examines the additional conditions 
required by each type of pre-attack self-defence to establish whether the Soleimani strike fits 
within one of these three classifications.  
 
 Both anticipatory and preemptive self-defence require that an attack not be executed solely 
for opportunistic reasons. Furthermore, both necessitate intelligence to be unambiguous, superior, 
and convincing. Objective parties who read this intelligence should be convinced of any 
operations' legitimacy and lawfulness resulting from it. Unfortunately, due to the lack of quality 
intelligence on the Soleimani strike, the US operation cannot be viewed as adhering to these two 
types of self-defence. Evidence may also point to the fact that the US strike on Soleimani may 
have been opportunistic—thereby infracting both conditions. He was targeted in a location that 
was open air at a time with relatively few civilians in the area.  
 
 Additionally, his whereabouts were closely monitored before he arrived at the Baghdad 
airport. The target location was also a familiar one since the US has had an active presence in Iraq 
since the early 2000s. Lastly, key figures within the Trump administration had self-admittedly 
been ‘out to get’ Soleimani for years due to his past involvement with terror organizations. In 
addition to Trump’s assertion that Soleimani’s ‘horrible past’ made him a legitimate target, this 
finding suggests that the strike which killed him might have been opportunistic. 
 
 Two forms of pre-attack self-defence have thus been ruled inapplicable to the Soleimani 
strike. Thus, preventative self-defence remains the only one left to consider. However, this type of 
pre-attack self-defence requires one additional condition. Simply put, states must seek 
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authorization from the UN Security Council if they wish their preemptive strike operations to be 
viewed as legitimate. Without this, operations are viewed as controversial. As discussed earlier, 
the US did not, and at the time of writing, has not sought authorization from the UN Security 
Council for their strike on Soleimani or Shahlai. 
 
Once more, this demonstrates an incompatibility between US claims and their observable 
actions. The US has alleged that it had legitimately and lawfully adhered to pre-attack self-defence 
parameters as stipulated in international law. However, available information and intelligence on 
the Soleimani strike paint a different picture. Although US ‘belief’ is aligned with the most 
contentious form of preventative self-defence, it subsequently fails to further align to this type 
when considering the ‘nature of the threat’ and ‘additional requirements.’ It failed to align with 
any pre-attack self-defence criteria. With support from pertinent literature, international laws and 
available intelligence, the following table was created to supplement the above analysis with the 
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Of course, identifying the type of pre-attack self-defence the US relied upon in the Soleimani affair 
does not matter if imminence cannot be proven. If a state must engage in self-defence, as allowed 
under the conditions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, then the condition of imminence must be 
sufficiently fulfilled. To establish imminence, however, two subsequent conditions must be 
satisfied, namely necessity and proportionality.  
 
 Derived from just war theory, as discussed earlier in chapter three, these two conditions 
are fundamental to legitimizing any claim of self-defence, not only anticipatory action. The 
necessity of the strike on Soleimani, and its alleged proportionality to the threat Soleimani 
supposedly posed, will be integrated into the analysis undertaken in this section. The following 
table comprises a set of indicators that were inspired by and derived from selected works of 
Michael L. Walzer, Abraham D. Sofaer and Michael W. Doyle. The purpose of this is to provide 
a methodical way of correlating the circumstances of the Soleimani strike with the legal parameters 
of pre-attack self-defence, as identified by the abovementioned scholars.  
 
 This table also includes an additional factor that scholars have suggested future research 
should include when evaluating the legitimacy of military operations justified as pre-attack self-
defence. This factor is included in the last row, entitled, ‘Degree of Intelligence Disclosures,’ as a 
fifth criterion from which to analyze the Soleimani case study. These findings will then be used to 
ascertain whether the Soleimani strike sufficiently adhered to the pre-attack self-defence criteria 









A legitimacy ‘formula’ was also developed to bolster the findings and analysis of the preceding 
sections. The following table comprises six elements that must be sufficiently demonstrated before 
the question of legitimacy can be answered. These elements include intent, plan, strategy, weapon, 
government response and public reaction. Any military operation, specifically those undertaken 
under the guise of counter-terrorism, derives its legitimacy from the six elements mentioned 
earlier. Was the intent behind the operation justifiable? Did the weapon used in the strike 
demonstrate evidence of proportionality and applicability? What was the public response to this 
operation? These are just a few such questions that must be considered before legitimacy can be 
conferred.  
 
 The legitimacy formula developed for this dissertation will be presented in table format. 
This format was chosen for two reasons. The first is clarity, as all six elements can be observed 
simultaneously, allowing for cross-examination, if necessary. The second is consistency. The other 
figures used in this section are also presented in this same format, which provides an added level 
of coherence, making it easier to compare and contrast the variables between and among all 











Figure 4: Legitimacy Formula 
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 Even if ‘intent’ is only weakly established in place of definite intelligence, the remaining 
five categories provide sufficient information to reach a confident conclusion. Thus, when all six 
categories are combined and considered, the legitimacy formula developed in this dissertation 
demonstrates that the strike on Soleimani cannot be ruled not legitimate nor effective or legal at 
face value. Should more intelligence on the Soleimani strike be released, this evaluation may 
change. However, currently, and with all available information and intelligence being considered, 




There are notable exclusions and weaknesses in the Trump administration's intelligence regarding 
the strike that killed Soleimani. These have been identified by several individuals, from high-
ranking intelligence officials to military personnel and political reporters. In the absence of 
complete information, available intelligence, findings, and government statements were used in 
substitution. Despite these gaps, the available information pointed out that the US strike on 
Soleimani did not fulfill the basic criteria of preventative self-defence.  
 
 Likewise, the condition of imminence is also left unproven. The underlying conditions for 
this, namely proportionality and necessity, are left unfounded. The strike on Soleimani cannot be 
deemed as necessary unless there is sufficient intelligence presented to suggest that he posed a 
threat that could not be addressed by any other means than a lethal drone strike. Subsequently, the 
element of proportionality cannot be definitively proven if the severity of the threat in question is 
unknown. For pre-attack self-defence to be deemed legitimate, the response undertaken to address 
the threat must be on par with the impending threat or attack's nature and severity.979 Since both 
necessity and proportionality cannot be inferred from the above categories, then the imminence of 
the threat Soleimani posed is therefore left unanswered. Moreover, further attempts to block 
investigations into the strike, deny access to intelligence, and engage in a series of government 
officials' shifting statements only further delegitimize the strike.  
 
 
979 Lubell, The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain World, p. 9. 
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Discrepancies, Delusions & Deceit 
 
Under the guise of anticipatory self-defence, the US executed a foreign government official with 
the goal, as some reports suggest, to incite regime change within Iran. Furthermore, this position 
is supported and corroborated by intelligence officials' statements, who first confirmed that another 
Iranian official was targeted as part of the Soleimani operation. This second drone strike was later 
identified as a failed assassination attempt on Shahlai in Yemen. Through the comprehensive 
examination and analysis undertaken in this chapter, one significant conclusion is reached: in a 
best-case scenario, the US only partially fulfilled the criteria of preventative self-defence.  
 
 However, this dissertation contends that this form of pre-attack self-defence should only 
be referred to as ‘preventative’ when the threat is greater than that posed by a singular individual. 
If the target is only one person, as in Soleimani and Shahlai's case, this should instead be referred 
to as execution or assassination (if the individual in question holds a significant office or position). 
Targeted killing is a deceiving label that refers to the same practice but carried out by a different 
means, namely an unmanned aerial vehicle. Execution or assassination by drone, precisely what 
the Soleimani strike was, should therefore be referred to in this way. Perhaps if this proper label 
were used instead of ‘targeted killing,’ states would be more hesitant to resort to this strategy as 
the negative connotations associated with the term might deter its use.  
 
 The US has tried to bolster a weak claim of imminence with adamant statements and 
reassurances. At this moment in time, with all available literature, scholarly contributions, 
information and intelligence having been considered, it can be reasonably understood that the 
United States government did not sufficiently fulfil the imminence criteria. The inability to do so 
means that the claim to legal legitimacy afforded by adherence to the legal parameters of pre-attack 
self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter cannot be corroborated. This conclusion has been 
supported by the fact that there has been insufficient information presented to demonstrate that the 
strike that killed the Iranian General thwarted an imminent threat or significantly impaired the 
terror organization's capabilities and functions in question.  
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 Some scholars have argued that the fallout from this strike had an adverse effect. Increasing 
political tensions, resulting in violent military operations and significant collateral damage, 
contributed to this ‘fallout.’ Should circumstances change in the future, by the introduction of new 
information and intelligence to prove the Trump administration's unwavering stance, then a 
reassessment might be necessary. In this dissertation, however, conclusions drawn herein are 
achieved by analyzing available intelligence and information—rather than conjecture and 
suppositions.  
 
 The purpose of this chapter was to determine which form of pre-attack self-defence the US 
employed when targeting Soleimani. A history of the US counterterror plan, its drone program, 
and similar assassination attempts were all examined to achieve this. In doing so, insight into the 
US’ historical (ab)use of pre-attack self-defence strategy was garnered from past practices and 
policies. Although it is already known that the targeted killing of Soleimani suffered from a 
complex of circumstances, three additional deductions have been furthermore brought to light. The 
first refers to the means used to kill Soleimani. Using a drone was most likely an error in judgement 
for the US intelligence agency. The weapon itself is highly contentious, so employing it in a 
similarly controversial strategy was unwise. Not to mention that the operation later claimed to be 
in ‘self-defence’ when the risks associated with drones are predominantly unilateral. Self-defence 
denotes that the victim state is faced with an unproportionate amount of risk, forcing action to 
preserve its survival and security. By employing an unmanned drone to kill Soleimani, the 
legitimacy of the US’ claim to such a strategy is forfeited, as Soleimani could not have possibly 
posed a more significant threat than the lethal drone assigned to kill him.  
 
 Second, the timing of the strike was also problematic. The US could have waited to kill 
Soleimani when he returned to Iran. Striking him in Iraq forced the involvement of a third-party 
state into an already tense two-party conflict. Moreover, Iraqi sovereignty was violated by the 
operation, which furthermore delegitimizes the US counterterror programme in the eyes of the 
international legal community. Publicly announcing the strike is another issue. The fallout that 
ensued following the Soleimani strike could have been avoided if the operation and the CIA’s 
involvement were kept covert. Following the assassination of Mughniyeh, the operation and its 
outcome were kept secret. No public statements or admissions to participating in a joint op was 
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ever given. This choice to keep US involvement covert could have been repeated in the case of 
Soleimani. Publicly announcing the strike gave way to criticism, challenges and a rise in tensions 
between the two states. If the US provided adequate intelligence to demonstrate the threat 
Soleimani posed or had consulted with the UN Security Council before engaging in the operation, 
the outcome could have differed. In the absence of such considerations, the strike's legitimacy is, 
therefore, difficult to ascertain.  
 
 Yet another challenge to the US narrative, and one directly related to the issue of timing, 
has been the unreported failed assassination attempt of Shahlai in Yemen, who was targeted on the 
same day, and in the same way, as Soleimani. If Soleimani posed an imminent threat that resulted 
in his immediate elimination, then it stands to reason that Shahlai must have posed the same level 
of threat—if both men were targeted simultaneously during the same operation. The last 
consideration regarding timing is drawn from the conflicting statements from the Trump 
administration. The US claimed that Soleimani posed an imminent threat, which prompted an 
immediate response to eliminate him. However, Trump authorized his execution at least seven 
months before Soleimani was eventually killed. This discovery contradicts the imminence claim 
and raises the question of whether the January strike was opportunistically undertaken. 
 
 The third issue is one of status. The US did not just kill a man. They killed an Iranian 
General who was also actively serving in a senior high-ranking official government role. Despite 
attempts to downplay his political role and accentuate his past involvement with terror groups and 
proxies, the US erred in this respect as well. By covertly executing an active government official, 
the CIA’s actions were tantamount to a war declaration. This story would have had a much 
different ending, should the tables have been turned.  
 
 Although pre-attack self-defence is a strategy afforded to states under international law, its 
relatively opaque nature requires states to independently assume responsibility for their risk 
assessment. Legitimizing the use of this strategy requires careful consideration to be paid, among 
other factors, to the suitability of the target, the choice of location and the potential of non-violent 
avenues for deterring the threat. Wherever possible, states should consider communicating their 
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concerns and intentions to an international organization capable of imparting guidance and 
support, like the UN Security Council.  
 
 In cases where pre-attack self-defence is illegitimately or illegally used, states are 
responsible for rectifying the issue. Otherwise, the use of such a strategy might have unintended 
adverse effects, like those the US sustained following the strike on Soleimani. In the end, 
Soleimani’s death has had a minimal impact on the terror organization but a maximum impact on 
























Chapter 9: Prescriptions & Suggestions 
Decapitation Will Not Work in Defeating Hezbollah 
 
Intelligence agencies have long relied on the strategy of leadership decapitation. Although the 
origins of this practice date back to antiquity, it has seen a resurgence during eras of non-state 
social, political and religious movements—becoming ever more prevalent in the last half of the 
twentieth century.980 Dr Bryan C. Price, Lt. Col. (ret.) of the US Army and former Assistant 
Professor of Social Sciences at the US Military Academy, has defined this as a counterterrorism 
strategy wherein the head of a terror group is captured, killed, or captured and eventually killed.981 
This tactic has been used in the belief that eliminating key players would subsequently weaken or 
destroy the group in question.982 During the Obama administration, it was increasingly referred to 
as the ‘counter-terrorism approach’ and was often contrasted with the ‘counter-insurgency 
approach,’ the latter being associated with hearts and minds, nation-building and other ambitious 
social projects.983   
 
 The interest in decapitation grew during the late 1990s to the early 2000s. This partly 
reflected an awareness of the difficulty of implementing alternative approaches. At the time, 
scholars like Richard J. Chasdi published findings that demonstrated how a terrorist group's 
longevity was intrinsically based on their leadership strength.984 Due to these reports, intelligence 
agencies began to rely heavily on this strategy following the 9/11 attacks.985  
 
 
980 See Jenna Jordan, Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019). 
981 Bryan C. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,’ Journal of International Security, Vol. 4. No. 36 (2012), pp. 9-46. 
982 Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, ‘Leadership Decapitation and the Impact on Terrorist Groups,’ from 
Counter-Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2019), p.7. 
983 David Kilcullen, Blood Year: The Unravelling of Western Counterterrorism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
984 Richard J. Chasdi, Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993, 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1999). 
985 See Christopher D. Kolenda, Leadership: The Warrior’s Art (New York: Stackpole Books, 
2001). 
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 Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, a Research Analyst with the International Centre of Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and expert on the Leadership Decapitation strategy, 
postulated that despite overreliance on leadership decapitation operations, the outcomes it has 
yielded have been less than reliable. He concluded that, as a result of the unpredictability of this 
strategy, ‘leadership decapitation, on its own, should not be seen as a silver bullet to defeat 
religiously-motivated terrorist groups.’986 Like Yaoren, Price also recognized the 
counterproductive potential of leadership decapitation strategies against modern terror 
organizations.987 To some extent, these critics rehearse some of the early critics of assassination to 
be found within the ranks of the CIA, typically Miles Copeland, who posited that this resulted in 
unpredictable change but often led to the rise of more energetic and able lieutenants.988 
 
 Of course, some disagree with this time-honoured position. Scholars like Steven R. David, 
Boaz Ganor, Daniel Byman, Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield are just a few such 
names in this group. Instead, these scholars have claimed that the operational capabilities of 
terrorist organizations naturally decrease after key high-ranking figures are eliminated, and 
therefore unable to plan and execute strategic or operational directives.989 Although this may be 
true in some cases, Price has found that ‘the effect of decapitation decreases with the group's age, 
even to a point where it may have no effect at all.’ Hezbollah, for instance, has been operational 
for decades and, during this time, has withstood numerous successful and failed leadership 
decapitation attempts. By Price’s evaluation, this particular terror group is now more likely to 
withstand this form of attack as it has had experience in restructuring in the past. Generally 
speaking, extremist groups have an organizational structure that leaves them more susceptible to 
 
986 Yaoren, ‘Leadership Decapitation and the Impact on Terrorist Groups,’ pp. 7-8. 
987 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,’ pp. 9-46. 
988 Miles Copeland, The Game Player: the confessions of the CIA's original political operative 
(London: Aurum Press, Limited, 1989). 
989 Steven R. David, ‘Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killings,’ Mideast Security and 
Policy Studies, No. 51 (2002), pp. 1–26; Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for 
Decision Makers (London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), p. 128; Daniel Byman, ‘Do Targeted 
Killings Work?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2006), pp. 102–104; Steven R. David, ‘Israel’s 
Policy of Targeted Killings,’ Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2003), p. 120; 
Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, ‘Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate 
Analysis of Israeli-Counter-Terrorism Effectiveness During Al-Aqsa Uprising,’ Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2006), pp. 359–382. 
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leadership decapitation strategies—since finding adequate replacements for executed leaders is 
often difficult.990 
 
 Still, as with every rule, there exist exceptions. Hezbollah has not yet exhibited any issues 
with its restructuring post-leadership decapitation operations. For instance, in 2012, Ali Alfoneh, 
a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, predicted that Esmail Qaani would 
replace Soleimani as the next Quds Force Commander.991 Qaani has more operational battlefield 
experience, a greater Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) network, and a 
strong friendship with Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. Now that Soleimani is dead, nothing is 
stopping Qaani from taking over the role. Hezbollah's durability can be attributed to their 
preparedness for unexpected restructuring; they have become hardened down the years, making 
them more likely to survive leadership decapitation attempts.  
 
 Advocates for this strategy have also claimed that leadership decapitation has resulted, in 
some cases, a weakening or destruction of a terror group’s structure. Conversely, critics have 
pointed out that leadership decapitation increased group recruitment and radicalization in the cases 
wherein this outcome was not experienced.992 This matter is perhaps most recently evidenced in 
the events which followed the Soleimani strike. Hezbollah was able to recruit a significant number 
of followers who wanted to avenge Soleimani’s death and launch additional retaliatory strikes 
against US interests and personnel in the region.993  
 
 Yaoren notes that the survival of terror groups who, by all accounts, fulfill all of the criteria 
predicting their mortality in the case of leadership decapitation can be attributed to their desire for 
 
990 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,’ pp. 8-49. 
991 Ali Alfoneh, ‘Esmail Qaani: The Next Revolutionary Guards QUDS Force Commander?’ 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), Washington D.C., January 2012, 
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992 Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban, ‘What Happened to 
Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model,’ Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2005), pp. 225–235; Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘How al-Qaida Ends: The 
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,’ International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006), p. 22. 
993 Wael Taleb and Richard Hall, ‘Hezbollah Supporters Say Revenge for Soleimani’s Death Has 
Only Just Begun,’ Independent, 17 January 2020. 
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revenge.994 Ultimately, we have to accept that responses to these attacks are partly a product of 
emotion, and political scientists find this an incredibly challenging area to introspect into. Once 
again, this demonstrates that even with the most comprehensive statistical analysis, no data set can 
predict human nature—furthermore illustrating the unpredictability and subsequent fallibility of 
the leadership decapitation strategy. For this reason, critics have maintained that leadership 
decapitation is ineffective in altering state or group behaviour, thwarting insurgencies, or even 
addressing drug cartels.995  
 
 For leadership decapitation to be successful, Price argues that two fairly-self-evident 
criteria must be fulfilled. The first is that the leaders themselves are vital to the particular 
organization. The second is that their replacement, or any unpredictable organizational 
restructuring for that matter, is difficult for the group in question to achieve. Yet even these things 
are hard to gauge, and due to this strategy's unpredictability, targeting the leaders of an extremist 
group could still have unforeseen consequences, even if the prerequisites mentioned above are 
satisfied. For years the reliance on leadership decapitation stemmed from the belief, as Price 
pointed out, that leadership succession in terror groups would be so complicated that the process 
itself would ultimately weaken the organization.996 Although this is true, there is are a range of 
additional factors that makes leaders and succession almost impossible to predict in the context of 
an extremist group.997 In some ways, decapitation is emblematic of all covert action, it is often 
high risk, and the outcomes may be somewhat unexpected. 
 
 
994 Yaoren, ‘Leadership Decapitation and the Impact on Terrorist Groups,’ p. 11. 
995 Victor D. Hyder, Decapitation Operations: Criteria for Targeting Enemy Leadership, (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004); Michael Kenney, From Pablo 
to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive 
Adaptation (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). 
996 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,’ pp. 13-17. 
997 See Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, ‘Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: 
Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think,’ International Security, Vol. 33, No. 
2 (2008), pp. 7–44; and Gordon H. McCormack, ‘Terrorist Decision Making,’ Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol. 6 (2003), pp. 473–507. Both papers posit that the clandestine nature of a 
terror group impacts its ability to engage in organizational activities, whilst ensuring that its leaders 
remain pivotal to the structure of the group—making them quite difficult to replace. 
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 According to Price, leaders and high-ranking officials in extremist organizations are 
typically charismatic. It is precisely why new members of such terror groups vow allegiance to 
both the cause and the leader. Thus, he argues, the organizational structure of terror groups is 
unique in that their leaders become engrained with the group, and therefore quite challenging to 
replace.998 Scholars have recently studied this phenomenon, concluding that a terror group's 
survival is indeed somewhat reliant on its charismatic leader's strength.999 Since such 
organizations' heads do not abide by, or respect, international rules or norms, their power is not 
derived from this typical legitimacy source. Instead, it is their charisma, sometimes even a 
personality cult, that affords them the power to recruit, radicalize and retain followers.1000 So, as 
John C. Bahnsen, a retired United States Army Brigadier General and decorated veteran of the 
Vietnam War reasoned, it is this ‘charisma [which becomes] the warrior’s basis of authority.’1001 
 
 This finding can be seemingly be confirmed with an examination of the obverse situation. 
For instance, Yaoren has statistically determined that terror groups whose leaders have been 
relatively isolated from the group's operational activities fare better after having suffered a 
leadership decapitation attack.1002 So the strategy of leadership decapitation is only effective when 
used against leaders who are heavily involved in the terror group—in essence, becoming the 
 
998 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,’ pp. 13-15. 
999 See Lorne L. Dawson, Crises of Charismatic Legitimacy and Violent Behavior in New Religious 
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(Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College Foundational Press, 2001), p. 274. 
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nucleus of the group.1003 Yet, these leaders—even if charismatic, still model traditional leadership 
styles.  
 
 In his seminal 1978 work on leadership, American political scientist James Burn identified 
two types of leaders: transactional or transformational. According to Burn, transactional leaders 
appealed to people’s self-interested nature, providing members with benefits in exchange for their 
fellowship. Conversely, transformational leaders offer their followers non-tangible benefits, like 
personal growth, religious realizations or emotional development—even vision.1004 In ideological 
groups, like terror organizations, transformational leaders are more effective as their charismatic 
nature establishes an emotional, spiritual or religious connection with their followers.1005 So, if a 
leader is both charismatic and transformational, their elimination stands a higher chance of 
weakening the terror group in question. 
 
 Nevertheless, even with these findings, there remains no abiding scholarly consensus on 
whether a leadership decapitation strike negatively impacts a terror group's organizational 
performance.1006 Some scholars report no impact, while others argue over whether it is positive or 
negative.1007 Boaz Ganor, Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 
has argued that even if leadership decapitation has no discernable effect on a terror group's 
organizational structure, it may significantly impact the psyche of its members. However, under 
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the right circumstances, this practice may serve as a deterrent—warning all high-ranking officials 
that they may suffer the same fate should they choose to assume the leader's position.1008 
 
 But we must surely ask, is the potential of deterrence worth the known risk associated with 
the strategy of leadership decapitation? This scholarly disagreement illustrates the varying 
outcomes that this strategy has had on terror groups. In some cases, the group is weakened or 
eliminated, while in other cases, the group becomes stronger by increasing the radicalization of its 
members while recruiting new ones.1009 These unpredictable outcomes demonstrate a flaw in the 
strategy as an over-arching strategy – the answer often lies in the local detail.1010  
 
 Another flaw is in the predictability of outcomes following a leadership decapitation 
operation. Scholars note that outcomes can vary from no effect to the extremist group's weakening 
or collapse (which intelligence agencies anticipate with each strike). The former is a neutral 
outcome, while the latter is positive. Overlooked in both the literature and policy on the subject is 
a third, prodigiously negative, outcome. Leadership decapitation could cause a terror group to 
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fragment into several extremist groups.1011 Instead of dealing with one non-state enemy, there is 
the potential that this strategy could propagate new threats.1012 Compounding the problem is a 
serious issue, so perhaps, given the unpredictability of this strategy and the enemy's seemingly 
mutable nature, this strategy might be retired when dealing with modern terror organizations. 
 
 According to Price and his comprehensive works on the strategy of leadership 
decapitation,1013 (i) terrorist groups that have been decapitated are more likely to perish than those 
who have not been decapitated, (ii) newer terror groups have a higher mortality rate than older 
ones, (iii) the mortality of the terror group still increases regardless of the decapitation method, be 
it capture, death, or torture and eventual death, (iv) terror group mortality increases from any form 
of leadership restructuring, not just decapitation, (v) the size and scope of a terror group do not 
affect its susceptibility to leadership decapitation, (vi) and contrary to current studies, religious 
and ideological terror groups are easier to destroy using this strategy, perhaps due to the ideological 
value of the leader and their perceived irreplaceability. One must concede that this is an important 
range of propositions—even if one instinctively disagrees with them. 
 
 Price thus recommends states who are determined to employ this strategy to strike terror 
groups under twenty years of age. After this threshold, states should consider alternative 
counterterror options. Given that we know that the practitioners comb the academic journals 
looking for indicators—perhaps we might allow oneself the marginal comment here—quantitative 
political science has something to answer for? Yet, this is not always the case. For instance, after 
the 2008 assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, there was a markable decrease in the frequency and 
intensity of Hezbollah operations and attacks, suggesting that the leadership decapitation did 
weaken the organization significantly.1014 The variance in outcomes might be attributed to 
incompatible targets, inadequate knowledge of the strategy, or both. 
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 Accordingly, greater research is needed on the subject to gauge just how effective this 
strategy is in the face of modern terror organizations. Audrey Kurth Cronin, the foremost scholar 
and expert on how terror groups expire, published important material on leadership 
decapitation.1015 Cronin postulated that, rather remarkably, leadership decapitation has only 
recently been studied systematically—and so, an understanding of its impact in a real-life context 
is quite limited.1016 Admittedly, even the most prominent, widely circulated literature on leadership 
decapitation is weak and systematic, with scholars focusing on short-term effects, irrelevant 
timelines, or particular countries and case studies to derive their conclusions.  
 
 The most widely referenced study was conducted by Lisa Langdon and her colleagues in 
the mid-2000s. Unfortunately, this study analyzed the effects of leadership decapitation on nearly 
twenty groups over 250 years.1017 Accordingly, this report suffered from several problems. The 
two most prominent included incompatibility in cases chosen and a small data set of less than 
twenty groups, making any correlations or conclusions quite weak.1018 Instead, a greater number 
of values (groups) should have been analyzed to conclusively prove that a group’s continued 
existence is not necessarily reliant on the survival or static nature of its leadership structure.1019 At 
the very least, the chosen groups should have been recognized as extremist organizations who have 
had leadership decapitation strategies used against them. The analysis period should have also 
been decreased to roughly 50 years to ensure that underlying cultural, legal and societal factors 
provide a congruent baseline from which to engage and derive statistically significant results. 
 
 
1015 This body of literature is still in its early years and still requires further consideration and 
discussion within mainstream counterterrorism literature. 
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 As Langdon before him, Aaron Mannes suffered from the same issues in his study by 
relying on a small sample, which rendered his statistical results and subsequent conclusions 
insignificant.1020 However, a year later, Jenna Jordon published a definitive, comprehensive study 
that avoided the methodological research pitfalls encountered by both Langdon and Mannes.1021 
Her research's strengths were derived from its reliance on a better metric: the terror group's 
organizational survival after a leadership decapitation attempt. If a terror group restructured due 
to a strike, then this strategy's efficacy would be empirically observed. This metric is better than 
the studies undertaken by Mannes and Langdon, which only measured immediate effects, like the 
number of strikes on a group or the resulting kill count. Moreover, Jordan drastically limited her 
period of analysis to two years. This restriction allowed for a more concentrated analysis and 
subsequent short-term results. Nevertheless, Jordan’s research was not without fault. Although she 
limited her analysis period to two years, this eliminated the possibility of measuring, or even 
observing, any long-term events resulting from these leadership decapitation attempts. So, while 
short-term results are important, long-term effects are similarly significant when considering the 
efficacy of leadership decapitation attempts on terrorist organizations. 1022 
 
 As a result, further works on leadership decapitation need to build upon earlier studies' 
findings and progress. The metric Jordan used has been useful in observing the effects of leadership 
decapitation on terror groups. Langdon was correct in realizing the need for observing long-term 
effects. And even Mannes, whose study suffered due to his limited sample, was still able to 
recognize that this strategy resulted in variable outcomes, furthermore contributing to the common 
belief that leadership decapitation can result in unpredictable outcomes.  
 
1020 Aaron Mannes, ‘Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders 
Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?’ Journal of International Policy Solutions, Vol. 9, No.1 
(2008), pp. 40–49. 
1021 Jenna Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,’ 
Security Studies, Vol. 18, No.3 (2009), p. 721. 
1022 Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,’ pp. 10-15 (Price paralleled this with the health care system and, more 
specifically, cancer treatments. If health care providers and their ‘patients disregarded 
chemotherapy and radiation treatments, two of the most popular and successful regimens for 
treating many types of cancer, because of their painfully debilitating side effects in the short term,’ 
then long-term benefits like increased life duration or even the potential to be completely cured, 
would be overlooked.) 
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 Over the last twenty or so years, terror organizations have deliberately restructured—no 
longer operating in a purely hierarchical form.1023 Aided by the advancements in technology and 
pressured by increasingly lethal counterterrorism strategies, these extremist organizations have 
begun to take on a more networked form, from which they launch guerrilla-style attacks. 
Therefore, taking out the ‘top’ of the organization is no longer an effective strategy to undertake, 
as the group's survival is no longer reliant on any individual. Therefore, killing Soleimani in an 
attempt to weaken Hezbollah and prompt regime change in Iran failed, miserably. The only 
outcomes it brought forth were adverse. Going forward, the US should recognize that leadership 
decapitation is no longer relevant, ethical, nor strategically beneficial. New options must be 
undertaken, and lessons must be learned from the past. 
 
Other Prescriptive Ideas 
 
Some scholars have even suggested strategies for dealing diplomatically with Iran.1024 The most 
notable of whom has been Bruce Riedel. In 2008, he published six suggestions for the US to 
 
1023 See for example Lewis Herrington, ‘British Islamic Extremist Terrorism: The Declining 
Significance of Al–Qaeda and Pakistan,’ International Affairs Vol.91. No.1 (2015), pp. 17-35. 
1024 See for example Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, (Yale 
University Press, 2012); John Bumbrell, The Bush Administration: US Public Diplomacy an Iran, 
(New York: Durham University Press, 2007); Steven Blockmans and Stefan Waizer, ‘E3+3 
Coercive Diplomacy Towards Iran: Do the Economic Sanctions Add Up?’ CEPS Policy Briefs, 
06 June 2013; Andrew Parasiliti, ‘Iran: Diplomacy and Deterrence, Global Politics and Strategy, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 51, No.5 (2009), pp. 5-13; Robert 
Jervis, ‘Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy,’ Foreign Affairs, Issue 
105 (January 2013); Constance Duncombe, ‘Twitter and Transformative Diplomacy: Social 
Media and Iran–US Relations,’ Oxford Journal of International Affairs, Volume 93, No.3, (2017), 
pp. 545–562; Curtis H. Martin, 'Good Cop/Bad Cop as a Model of Nonproliferation Diplomacy 
Toward North Korea and Iran,’ The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No.1 (2007), pp. 61-
88; Thomas R. Mattair, ‘The United States and Iran: Diplomacy, Sanctions and War,’ Middle East 
Review, Vol. 17, No.2, (2010), pp. 52-61; Anthony Newkirk, ‘Diplomacy and Hypocrisy: The 
Case of Iran,’ Middle East Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2008), pp. 30-45; John Tirman, ‘Diplomacy, 
Terrorism, and National Narratives in the United States–Iran Relationship,’ Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, Vol. 2, No.3, (2009), pp. 527-539; Philip Caruso, ‘Suleimani is Dead, But Diplomacy 
Shouldn’t Be,’ Foreign Press, 06 January 2020; and Brian Katulis and Peter Juul, ‘Putting 
Diplomacy First: A Strategic Alternative to President Donald Trump’s ‘Maximum 
Pressure’ Approach on Iran,’ Center for American Progress, 12 March 2020. 
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consider to better relations with Iran. This section will attempt to determine which of these six 
suggestions were infringed during and post-strike on Soleimani. The following discussion will 
gauge how these infractions resulted in a rise in tensions between the two countries. 
 
 The first suggestion addressed military action. Employing a somewhat messianic language, 
Riedel warned against violent or aggressive US military operations in the region. He claimed that 
the US should have known military action might result in war—including how unfavourable that 
outcome would be for the world.1025 According to Riedel, striking Iran or its officials would cause 
a chain reaction in the region—destabilizing more than just the target country. This is because an 
all-out war between the US and Iran would involve the entire Middle East.1026 Unfortunately, this 
calculation proved prescient during the fallout from the Soleimani strike when Iran retaliated with 
missiles against a US military base in Iraq.1027 At the time of writing, neither terrorists nor 
insurgents have avenged Soleimani’s death—but it is still too early to assert that such a threat will 
not materialize. Perhaps this is a conflict postponed? 
 
 Perhaps hindered by the lockdown sanctions imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, as of yet, 
it seems as though the aftermath of the Soleimani strike has somewhat fizzled out. Had this 
additional circumstance not existed, it could be reasonably assumed that Riedel’s expected chain 
of events could have occurred as predicted based solely upon how the fallout began. Still, the 
fallout resulted in other consequences that Riedel did not anticipate. By having been a legally (and 
somewhat ethically) ambiguous strike, the US operation also came under scrutiny by international 
law scholars and advocates.1028  
 
1025 Bruce Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming 
Dangers,’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 15. No. 1 (2008), p. 109. 
1026 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
pp. 108-110 (‘Iran would have every incentive to strike US targets across the region with missiles, 
terrorists, and insurgents.’) 
1027 David S. Cloud et. al., ‘Iran Fires Missiles at Two Bases Housing US Forces in Iraq,’ Los 
Angeles Times, 07 January 2020; and Karen Deyoung, Paul Sonne, and Dan Lamothe, ‘Iran 
Launches Ballistic Missiles at Bases Housing US Military Personnel in Iraq,’ Washington Post, 
07 January 2020. 
1028 Milena Sterio, The Legality of the United States’ Strike on Soleimani, Law Faculty Articles 
and Essays (Cleveland: Cleveland University Press, 2020); see also Agbada, ‘Is the Killing of 
Qasem Soleimani by the United States of America Legal Under International Law?’; and Nakissa 
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 Of course, Riedel could not have predicted that the United States would act in such a 
manner, but this is one serious consequence that did materialize and was not initially predicted. 
The military action against the Iranian general, launched while he was in Iraq, also offers a 
different (similarly unpredictable) dynamic. The violation of Iraqi sovereignty has resulted in 
another consequence. After being blindsided by the strike, Iraq immediately requested removing 
all US troops from its territory. The outcome of this strangely coincides with Trump’s wish to 
retreat from the region, at least in terms of overt forces. Therefore, military action against an 
Iranian general resulted in the fallout predicted by Riedel and several other repercussions due to 
the illegality of the operation. This action raised tensions in the Middle East and, most surprisingly 
(and equally unexpected), within the United States. Domestically, lawmakers, government 
officials, reporters, and citizens voiced their dissatisfaction with the US justification for the strike 
on Soleimani, its apparent incompatibility with international laws, and the inadequacies of the 
Trump administration's responses post-strike.  
 
 Concern was also raised about the potential for a major conflict between the US and the 
Iranian regime.1029 As mentioned earlier, all of the consequences illustrate how military action 
against Iran (even indirectly through the targeted killing of a high-ranking General) resulted in a 
domino-effect of mixed repercussions—some of which were predicted, but most of which were 
completely unexpected. Military action against any nation, particularly Iran, could result in adverse 
outcomes beyond even the most calculated threat assessments.  
 
 The second of Riedel’s suggestions dealt with the issue of rhetoric.1030 Words, especially 
in international politics, carry significant power. These become even more impactful when spoken 
 
Jahanbani, ‘Reviewing Iran’s Proxies by Region: A Look Toward the Middle East, South Asia, 
and Africa,’ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Vol. 13, No.5, (2020). 
1029 See Ahmed Salah Hashim, ‘Iranian General’s Killing: How Will Iran Respond?’ RSIS 
Commentaries, Vol. 005, Issue 20, 2020. 
1030 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
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by leaders and high-ranking officials.1031 A simple speech can forge alliances, alleviate tensions, 
or even provoke war. In times of uncertainty, diction plays a particularly important role when 
deciding what avenues might best be used to quell tensions. If the dialogue between involved 
parties is strained or unproductive, then engagement could escalate to armed conflict. Conversely, 
if the communication line between these parties remains open, strong and professional, then the 
threat of escalation could be curtailed by engaging in meaningful diplomatic negotiations and 
discussions. For this reason, Riedel implored the US to carefully choose its words, particularly 
when it comes to Iran.1032  
 
 Special consideration should be afforded to all communication directed at the Iranian 
regime, as there could be unforeseen elements that could misconstrue meaning, which might result 
in unintended consequences. Intended meanings lost in translation, incompatible cultural 
understandings, historical precedents, or even the current socio-economic and political affairs 
could all cause serious issues. Thus, successful diplomacy relies on the careful consideration and 
balance of the elements mentioned above to ensure that all parties involved can achieve their 
individual goals in a ‘subtle manipulative manner’ through a ‘strategy by speech.’1033  
 
 Thus, state conduct that does not abide by these considerations must be strategically 
avoided to uphold good diplomatic relations with as many states as possible.1034 Since one cannot 
control what the other party will do, the best thing to do is control one’s actions. Particularly given 
the history between the US and Iran, this recommendation should have been afforded special 
 
1031 For a classical example see Eric A. Fleury, ‘Daring and Deliberation: Virtue, Rhetoric, and 
Diplomacy in Thucydides’ Account of the Athenian Empire,’ Journal of International Political 
Theory, Vol.16, No.3 (2018), pp. 270-286 
1032 See Ameer Ali Abbasi, ‘Politics of Exclusion through Language in the Presidential Speeches 
of Donald Trump,’ SSRN, 01 October 2019. 
1033 Robert A. Burgelman, Strategy is Destiny: How Strategy‐Making Shapes a Company's Future, 
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 2002); and Matthias Wenzel and Jochen Koch, ‘Strategy as 
Staged Performance: A Critical Discursive Perspective on Keynote Speeches as a Genre of 
Strategic Communication,’ Strategic Management Journal, March 2018. 
1034 Sohrab Rezaei and Niloofar Nourali, ‘Language and Power: The Use of Persuasive Techniques 
in Iran and US President Speeches,’ Journal of Language Teaching and Research, Vol. 7, Issue 6, 
01 November 2016, pp. 1203-1209. 
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attention.1035 Alas, Trump is nothing if not direct. In both international and domestic situations, 
the US president has habitually opted for blunt, and occasionally even aggressive, dialogue.1036 In 
diplomacy, the tone of communication is almost as critical as the content. ‘Calm voices,’ Riedel 
notes, ‘and frank assessments are better than heavy breathing and threats.’1037 Aggressive 
behaviour would only escalate the situation and prove equally ineffective and counterproductive 
in the long-term (and perhaps even the short-term depending upon the nature of the 
communications in question).1038  
 
 Given the immediate fallout following the death of Soleimani, it seems as though 
aggressive tweets and threatening statements only served to make the situation worse. Iran 
reciprocated each one of Trump’s aggressive tweets, resulting in a state of affairs that was 
uncertain, hostile and overall unproductive. By disregarding the importance of rhetoric, and instead 
engaging in aggressive discourse with Iran, the US escalated the situation further—compounding 
tensions from the Soleimani strike with the Iranian regime’s outrage over Trump’s tweets. It 
proved unproductive and contributed to a gradual breakdown in diplomacy and foreign relations 
(which were already strained) with Iran. Taunting the Iranian regime through aggressive and 
 
1035 See Birol Başkan, Unsettling the Middle East: The Implications of the US Rhetoric and 
Action, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle East, (Palgrave Pivot, New 
York, 2016), pp. 15-31; Lisa ten Brinke, ‘Donald Trump's Rhetoric has only Highlighted the 
Already Growing Rift Between the EU and the US,’ LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) 
Blog, 27 January 2018; Erin Baggott Carter, ‘Diversionary Cheap Talk: Economic Conditions and 
US Foreign Policy Rhetoric, 1945-2010,’ International Interactions, Vol. 46, Issue 2, 03 March 
2020, pp. 163-198; and Daniel Byman, ‘Confronting Iran,’ Journal of Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy, Vol. 60, Issue 1, 29 January 2018, pp. 107-128. 
1036 Alexander Agadjanian and Yusaku Horiuchi, ‘Has Trump Damaged the US Image Abroad? 
Decomposing the Effects of Policy Messages on Foreign Public Opinion,’ Journal of Political 
Behavior, 27 October 2018, pp. 1-22; see also Perry Parks, Covering Trump’s ‘Carnival’: A 
Rhetorical Alternative to ‘Objective’ Reporting, Journal of Journalism Practice, Vol. 13, Issue 
10, 26 November 2019, pp. 1164-1184; and Morgan Marietta, Tyler Farley, Tyler Cote, and Paul 
Murphy, ‘The Rhetorical Psychology of Trumpism: Threat, Absolutism, and the Absolutist 
Threat,’ The Forum, Vol. 15, No. 2, (2017), pp. 313-332. 
1037 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
1038 See Shana Kushner Gadarian, ‘The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign 
Policy Attitudes,’ Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, Issue 2, (2008), pp. 469-483; and Morgan Marietta, 
The Politics of Sacred Rhetoric: Absolutist Appeals and Political Persuasion, (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2012), pp. 7-23. 
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undiplomatic tweets can escalate quickly.1039 Consequently, the US should consider its words 
carefully when dealing with Iran, as it has the power (and the influence) to retaliate in kind—
leading to greater instability in the region. For the US, its rhetoric is perhaps as equally powerful 
as its military might, yet, it has proven far more challenging to control.  
 
 Given the rapidity and ease with which information is disseminated on social media 
platforms, the US should pay special attention to the nature and content of statements made. Self-
censorship might be necessary if the US wants to address tensions and improve diplomatic 
relations with Iran. Otherwise, the US president's current rhetoric (on social media platforms like 
Twitter) will only undermine these objectives further, threatening the Middle East's peace and 
stability and the relationship between the US and its allies.1040  
 
 Riedel’s third suggestion stems from the implicit significance of diplomatic affairs within 
the international order of things. He reasoned that the US should continue to focus on improving 
its diplomatic relations.1041 This recommendation also refers to fostering a greater diplomatic 
relationship with international legal organizations and institutions. Going forward, especially when 
dealing with a dangerous adversary like Iran, the United States should seriously consider including 
the UN in discussions regarding major international military operations that might have the 
potential to become contentious.  
 
 Still, the issues between the US and Iran will not be resolved overnight. They have been 
problematic since the mid-twentieth century as the result of the 1953 coup.1042 The Soleimani strike 
certainly did not help the situation, and the fallout which ensued demonstrated the rapidity with 
which matters could escalate if unchecked by a higher authority or suppressed by diplomatic 
 
1039 See Mohammed Salah Mahmood, ‘The Impact of President Trump's Tweets on US Foreign 
Policy Towards: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel,’ Tikrit Journal for Political Science, No. 19, 
(2020), pp. 197-220. 
1040 Gabriel Rubin, Donald Trump, Twitter, and Islamophobia: The End of Dignity in Presidential 
Rhetoric About Terrorism, Presidential Rhetoric on Terrorism under Bush, Obama and Trump, 
(London: Palgrave Pivot, Cham, 2020), pp. 105-128. 
1041 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
1042 See for example Maysam Behravesh, ‘A Crisis of Confidence Revisited: Iran‐West Tensions 
and Mutual Demonization,’ Journal of Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 3, No.3 (2011), pp. 327-347. 
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means. Twelve years ago, Riedel reasoned that the US should not launch operations against Iran, 
as missions with foreseeable short-term benefits could have unknown long-term consequences. 
This observation became Riedel’s fourth suggestion. For a mission to be successful, the overall 
strategy must be viewed as superior to mere tactical wins.  
 
Thus, Riedel sagaciously asks countries like the US to consider ‘the long-term play.’ US-
Iran issues will not, and frankly cannot be quickly resolved. Perhaps now more than ever, the US 
should focus on creating a long-term foreign policy plan regarding Iran.1043 Tensions have reached 
a new level since the Soleimani strike. Any higher and the fallout would be a direct, or even proxy, 
war—an outcome neither side favours. When compared to the US, Iran is at a disadvantage, 
militarily speaking. The US is similarly at a disadvantage, politically speaking since the American 
public strongly opposes any further intervention or military operations in the Middle East.1044 It 
has been nearly two decades since the US invaded Iraq, and that conflict still has yet to see a 
peaceful resolution. Entering into yet another conflict is not something the American people, nor 
Congress, will accept.  
 
 Since the Soleimani strike has already occurred, there is no point dwelling over what could 
have been. What remains for academic analysis is to deal with the aftermath. Picking up the 
proverbial pieces and creating a long-term strategy of dealing with Iran that is sustainable, 
strategically favourable and democratically achievable. How this can be practically achieved is 
still up for political and scholarly debate.1045 Since the fallout from the strike has resulted in rising 
tensions, it is now the US government's job to deal with the consequence and ensure that it never 
again favours short-term solutions over long-term goals. By keeping this in mind during the 
creation of policy and military strategy aimed at Iran, the US can get back on track to achieving a 
viable long-term play with favourable outcomes. 
 
1043 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
1044 Kaleigh Thomas and Emma Moore, ‘The American Public Wants a Sustainable Middle East 
Policy,’ Defence One, 22 February 2020. 
1045 For a deeper discussion on US policy change with consideration for modern security 
challenges, see Rubrick Biegon and Tom F. A. Watts, ‘When Ends Trump Means: Continuity 




 Long-term, the US might want to consider working with the regime to pursue mutually 
beneficial objectives. This proposal was Riedel’s fifth suggestion. Nowhere is the ancient proverb, 
‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ more applicable than when considering Iran and al-Qaeda's 
relationship. Riedel reasoned that the US could stand to benefit by creating a new policy for dealing 
with Iran—one that broke free from the post-9/11 strategy and recognizes that Iran can be useful 
in addressing al-Qaeda, their common enemy.1046 Unfortunately, this will prove exceedingly tricky 
since, after the strike on Soleimani, the Iranian regime reached out to its proxy, Hezbollah, and 
requested that it help target the US and its interests in the region.1047  
 
 Clearly, by killing Soleimani, the US has driven the Iranian regime to forge stronger ties 
with extremist organizations. Rather than use Iran as an ally against a common enemy, US actions 
have coerced the regime into associating with them.1048 At this point, there is no logical reason to 
discuss ‘what should have been’ or ‘what could have been’ if the US did not kill Soleimani. 
Instead, the US government should pay special attention to the role Iran could potentially play in 
the greater counter-terrorism strategy. Isolating or attacking Iran will not do any good. Perhaps the 
US should, in this case, seek to keep their friends close, but their enemies closer—for including 
Iran in the global war on terror strategy would be a better option than to isolate them completely.  
 
 Riedel’s sixth suggestion builds on this exact point. He argues that it is in the US's interest 
to renew talks with Iran and invite it back into the community of nations.1049 Continuing this long-
term isolation policy against Iran will only prove detrimental to the international community.1050 
 
1046 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
1047 Sulome Anderson, ‘Iran’s Proxy Threat is the Real Problem Now,’ Foreign Policy Report, 10 
January 2020; Tom Perry et. al., ‘Hezbollah: It’s Time for Iran’s Allies to Start Working to Avenge 
Soleimani,’ Reuters, 12 January 2020; Crispin Smith, ‘After Soleimani Killing, Iran and Its 
Proxies Recalibrate in Iraq,’ Just Security, 27 February 2020. 
1048 Nakissa Jahanbani, ‘Beyond Soleimani: Implications for Iran’s Proxy Network in Iraq and 
Syria,’ Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 20 January 2020. 
1049 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
1050 See Sean Yom, ‘US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Logic of Hegemonic 
Retreat,’ Global Policy, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 28 February 2020, pp. 75-83; and Gregory F. Gause, 
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The US would also benefit from having the regime as a diplomatic partner rather than a foe. As 
Riedel so eloquently put it, the US should recognize that diplomacy is a means to an end, not a 
declaration of weakness.1051 The most significant issue now facing the US is its degraded 
diplomatic relationship with Iran due to the Soleimani strike and, in the longer term, the extended 
war in Yemen. To address this, the US should consider asking for international intervention from 
the UN or its allies to achieve a semblance of a peaceful resolution to the rise in tensions between 
itself and Iran. This discourse will play a crucial part in achieving this—but only time will tell if 
US-Iran relations will ever achieve a state of peaceful diplomacy.  
 
 This section has examined six suggestions proposed by Bruce Riedel to determine which 
of these were infringed by the US in its targeted killing of Gen. Soleimani. As this analysis has 
shown, excusing differing degrees of infringement, the US managed to breach all six of Riedel’s 
suggestions. Still, nothing is ever doom and gloom. Even considering the repercussions from the 
Soleimani strike, it is still not unreasonable to imagine that the US might one day forge a 
favourable, perhaps even a productive, relationship with the Iranian regime. After all, Iran is a 
country like any other seeking international approval, legitimacy and favour from its allies and 
populace. It may take years, or even decades, to obtain, but if the US is willing to consider and 
abide by the key suggestions Riedel proposed, there is an increased possibility that its diplomatic 
relationship with Iran might be restored, and perhaps even bettered.  
 
 
Theoretical Speed Bump? 
 
International law is by no means perfect. Yet despite its occasional limits, redundancies, 
irrelevancies and volatilities—it nonetheless holds undeniable power, capable of determining 
legality and conferring legitimacy. Still, some adamantly argue that international law is antiquated, 
thus holding a rather pessimistic view regarding its power to address contemporary matters. While 
it could be argued that some laws are somewhat unprepared to deal with these current 
 
‘The Illogic of Dual Containment,’ Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 56-
66. 
1051 Riedel, ‘America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers,’ 
p. 110. 
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circumstances, there are certain avenues which can be taken to improve the applicability and 
weight of the law. To adapt to the changing times, existing international norms, precedents and 
laws can be reformed, reworded and generally modernized to ensure that they are better prepared 
in addressing modern issues. Yet, both views of the law—one holding that it is unsalvageable, 
while another advocating for its retainment—have been regarded, by some scholars, as ‘extreme’ 
positions.  
 
Offering a moderate perspective on the issue is Jack Goldsmith, an American lawyer, 
Harvard Law School professor, co-founder of Lawfare and former Assistant Attorney General for 
the Office of Legal Counsel during the George W. Bush administration.1052 Goldsmith has held a 
long-standing belief that although international law is essential, it has been slowly rendered 
ineffectual due to various circumstances, including globalization and norm evolution. He has been 
chosen for his ‘middle of the road’ views on the matter, in addition to his widely recognized works 
in international law, particularly his discussions on realism and idealism. However, before delving 
into a discussion on Goldsmith, it would be worthwhile to briefly introduce E.H. Carr, an English 
historian and International Relations theorist who initially discussed idealism in international 
relations.  
 
 In the early twentieth century, Carr published a ground-breaking text entitled The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis 1919-1939. Despite being written nearly a century ago, many of the dilemmas and 
arguments discussed throughout the book have remained relevant today. Although Carr criticizes 
utopian theorists for disregarding the role of competition and survival in state actions, he 
nonetheless realized the importance that international law plays in regulating such activities. 
Ultimately, he concluded that international law might not be a ‘lost cause’ after all, but rather a 
starting point from which to pursue morality more broadly in international politics. Despite being 
coined a seminal work on classical realism,1053 Carr argued that viewing international law through 
 
1052 See Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘About,’ from www.jackgoldsmith.org; Goldsmith was also briefly 
introduced in Chapter three. Please refer to the literature review for a greater discussion on his 
views of pre-attack self-defence.  
1053 See Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the 'First Great Debate,’ In Tim Dunne, Michael Cox & Ken 
Booth (ed.), The Eighty Years' Crisis: International Relations 1919–1999, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. xiii–xx, 1-16. 
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a pure realist lens is unproductive. According to Carr, ‘utopia and reality are thus the two facets of 
political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both 
have their place.’1054 Hence, finding this middle ground—between realism and utopian ideals—
would render international law more effective.  
 
 Although Carr criticized idealism in international law, it was Goldsmith who later 
recognized that this view was nonetheless informing international politics. In 2005, Goldsmith and 
Stephen Krasner, an American academic and former diplomat, co-authored an article examining 
the limits of idealism in international law. They posited that considering the current era of 
globalization, international law might no longer be a sufficient constraint on state actions. 
Nevertheless, they did admit that idealism is reasonably evident in international law. There are, 
according to Goldsmith and Krasner, several developments which reflect this quite clearly, 
including ‘the rise of universal jurisdiction, the creation of a new International Criminal Court, 
and recurring demands for humanitarian intervention,’ all of which reflect this renewed 
commitment to idealism at the international level.1055  
 
This dissertation has attempted to follow Goldsmith and Krasner's line of reasoning, which 
suggests that legitimacy and justice are more readily obtained in the absence of state-level 
pressures or ongoing political interference. The authors believe that despite the potential issues 
caused by idealist or utopian views, ‘institutions and principles that minimize the influence of 
power better achieve justice than those in which power plays an important role; and decisions 
made by accountable actors, especially judges, are more likely to be just than decisions made by 
political leaders responsible for their electorate.’1056 Since international law is insulated from the 
political fervour typically found at the state level, legality and legitimacy can thus be determined 
impartially and imperturbably.  
 
 
1054 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations, 2nd ed., (London: MacMillan, 1946), p. 10. 
1055 Jack L. Goldsmith and Stephen D. Krasner, ‘The Limits of Idealism,’ from The Globalization 
of International Law, Routledge, 2005. 
1056 Goldsmith and Krasner, ‘The Limits of Idealism,’ p. 1. 
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Later that same year, Goldsmith co-authored a book with Eric A. Posner, an American law 
professor, examining the limits of international law. Using basic game theory, they examined the 
role of international law in U.S. foreign policy and concluded that although the law matters, it is 
no longer as powerful as it once was. The authors contended that international law had become a 
product of state interests, rendering the law incapable of forcing states to modify their actions in a 
way that might neglect their interests—thereby making it quite limited in this sense. While 
Goldsmith and Posner view the law as an evolving instrument of national policy, they also 
recognize that it is a volatile, mutable, and unreliable tool. Thus, they posited that all international 
law proponents are overly optimistic about its power, relevance, and current operational 
capacities.1057 If international law can no longer stand-alone, then perhaps it might have more clout 
and greater pertinence if supplemented theoretically and practically. Thus, this dissertation 
recognizes the challenges and limitations of international law but argues that when combined with 
scholarly prescriptions and strategic military policies and practices—these deficiencies can be 
addressed through a ‘patchwork’ of sorts. Hence, making it more likely for a global problem to be 
addressed, if not by law, then by scholarly prescriptions or current strategic military policy. 
 
Two years later, in 2007, Goldsmith published The Terror Presidency, in which he 
recounted his time working as legal counsel in the George W. Bush administration. Goldsmith 
addressed topics like the war on terror, the Iraq invasion, and the widely publicized Geneva 
convention violations at Guantanamo Bay. Notably, he argued that the Bush administration made 
one critical strategic error in their post-9/11 foreign policy. Instead of seeking congressional 
support and ensuring compliance with the law, they opted to act unilaterally in launching the war 
on terror. Goldsmith admitted that this focus on hard power could have come from a place of 
anxiety and fear about the potential for a future terror attack, but ultimately argued that fear had 
no place in policy. In the end, the decision to rely on hard power was, as Goldsmith reasoned, 
counterproductive in the war on terror and the perceived legitimacy of the presidential 
administration. The author ultimately concluded that the soft power of persuasion achieved 
through legal means would have been much more effective in reaching their objectives and 
 
1057 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, (Michigan: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
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maintaining legitimacy in executive actions.1058 This view is fundamental and one which has been 
similarly promulgated in this dissertation. Laws should be followed, but more importantly, soft 
power must be viewed as the first resort in foreign policy, rather than the last.  
 
Several years later, Goldsmith publishes Power and Constraint, in which he once again 
revisited the practices and policies of the Bush administration. This time, however, he examined 
the accountability and transparency of the presidency post-9/11. He concluded that, as a result of 
‘presidential synopticon,’ the executive branch was highly checked (both internally and externally) 
but Congress, policymakers, lawmakers, politicians, ethicists, journalists and even scholars. All of 
these various actors carefully monitored the executive branch's actions, ensured that they complied 
with existing law, coerced the president to change any actions that did not, and demanded 
justifications for all such activities. Contentiously, Goldsmith even argued that this made counter-
terror operations more ‘legitimate’ due to the high degree of transparency required for this 
oversight.1059 Although this may have been the case in the early 2000s, it can be argued that this 
‘presidential synopticon’ was absent during the Trump administration. Had it been operating to 
the same extent as it did during the Bush presidency, perhaps the Soleimani strike would not have 
occurred. Following the strike, domestic criticism abounded. Yet, little to no evidence was ever 
provided to Congress, policymakers, legal practitioners, or journalists to justify the Trump 
administration's actions.  
 
Goldsmith may have been correct when he claimed that the executive branch during the 
Bush administration was accountable and transparent, but this position is not perpetual. With each 
new administration and each new decade, circumstances change, rendering previous opinions or 
evaluations inapplicable. This could be observed, logically speaking, in the case of international 
law as well. What Goldsmith once brushed off as ineffectual could very much serve as an essential 
determinant of legitimacy in the future. Times change, circumstances change, and with it, so does 
international law and its supposed efficacy. 
 
 
1058 Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgement Inside the Bush 
Administration, (W.W. Norton, 2007), pp. 43-70, 99-140, 177-216. 
1059 Jack L. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, (W.W. 
Norton, 2012). 
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This dissertation has attempted to argue that international laws, even if outdated or 
inapplicable, can serve as a theoretical speedbump—slowing down states just long enough to make 
them ruminate over potentially reckless foreign policy actions. Without them, states, like the US, 
could potentially act in an increasingly self-serving manner with complete disregard for the 
international community, morality, or ethics. While international law may never fully address or 
constrain specific actions, it still serves as a worthwhile condition by inhibiting states from 
undertaking potentially dangerous, self-serving or corrupt pursuits.  
 
Why Critique the Soleimani Strike? 
 
Anything worth criticizing is worth salvaging. The US counter-terror programme is no different. 
However, its current use of UAVs in pre-attack self-defence operations further exacerbates the 
issues that each element faces separately. Drones have proven to be questionable weapons, while 
the practice of pre-attack self-defence has similarly demonstrated this contentiousness. Thus, 
putting these two elements together only compounds this contentiousness. States should not use 
drones in their pre-attack self-defence practice as both elements are highly contested, challenging 
to regulate, and widely disavowed. 
 
 Nevertheless, there are obvious benefits to using remote weapons in counterterror 
operations. When used responsibly, a drone is a remarkable weapon with unparalleled efficacy. 
However, if this weapon is not responsibly used, problematic international and domestic issues 
abound. Thus, when using covert weapons in publicly reported missions, legality needs to be 
sufficiently demonstrable to confer legitimacy in the court of public opinion. It is because, as Lee 
Atwater so eloquently noted, ‘perception is reality’1060—particularly in government-sponsored 
military operations.  
 
 This dissertation sought to identify the basic legal and scholarly conditions necessary to 
demonstrate legitimacy in such operations. The Soleimani strike then offered a contemporary case 
study that could be analyzed to determine its legitimacy according to the conditions identified 
 
1060 Quote from American Political Strategist Lee Atwater, 1951-1991. 
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above. The purpose of this was to identify any discrepancies between the US government claims 
and actual findings. However, military drone usage in US counter-terror operations is strategically 
effective at attaining its objectives. Moreover, heavy reliance on this choice of weapon 
demonstrates that calls for abandonment are both impractical and naïve.  
 
 Similarly, there is an urgent need to modernize international law in order to make them 
better able to inhibit contentious strategies, like those found in the US drone program. Likewise, 
clear policy objectives need to be further developed and implemented to ensure that future military 
operations that rely on this preemptive use of force are regulated by external objective decision-
makers and not covert intelligence agencies. Should the US counterterror programme want to 
become (or appear to become) more legitimate, particularly when relying on drones, and especially 
when these remote weapons are used in pre-attack self-defence operations—the following seven 
points should be considered. 
 
Seven Recommendations  
 
1. Stop using military UAVs in unclear pre-attack self-defence operations. 
2. Stop using pre-attack self-defence altogether. 
3. If relying on pre-attack self-defence in unclear situations, keep the operation covert—let 
the CIA direct the operation, and not publicly announce the intent, progress or outcome of 
such missions. 
4. Engage in an independent pre-strike assessment. If choosing against consultation with the 
UN Security Council, ensure that this assessment identifies to what degree the operation 
may adhere to international legal parameters of pre-attack self-defence. It is particularly 
important in operations that are not covertly undertaken. If the US wishes for the operation 
to retain legitimacy, demonstrate its legality, and maintain its overall international 
reputation, this assessment must be publicly released. 
5. Retrofit existing military UAVs with more diverse payloads, perhaps non-lethal options 
capable of engaging threats in a more proportional manner. 
6. Use proxies to ensure plausible deniability (just like the US did when relying on Israel to 
execute the Mughniyeh operation). 
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7. Diplomatic means, measures and avenues. Enlist the help and guidance of the UN Security 








































Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
The start of this decade was certainly an eventful one for the United States. In January, the US 
killed Gen. Qasem Soleimani and experienced the consequences of that drone strike. In February, 
US President Donald J. Trump became the third president in United States' history to be impeached 
by the House of Representatives on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of justice. He was 
allowed to remain in office after the Senate, which boasted a Republican majority, acquitted him. 
In March, the Covid-19 pandemic tightened its grip on the world. Perhaps the fallout from the 
Soleimani strike would have continued and escalated between the US and Iran. But with the global 
shutdowns, these plans may have been somewhat quashed or deferred as governments scrambled 
to close borders, secure their populace and focus on health care issues—putting national security, 
to some degree, on the back burner. 
 
Perhaps the US over-stepped the mark one too many times when it ordered the strike on 
Soleimani. First, the use of lethal drones made the operation look like murder. Enlisting an 
unmanned weapon in a supposed self-defence operation is problematic in that it lacks a 
proportional response—thus placing the risk solely on those targeted. Second, publicly reporting 
the Soleimani strike opened it up for domestic and international investigation, opposition, outcry, 
and condemnation. Third, the execution of the strike in a third-party state, namely Iraq, without its 
knowledge or consent resulted in a violation of its sovereignty. Fourth, the targeting of an active 
foreign government official would have, in most other cases, been considered an act of war. 
Remembering, of course, that the first world war began with the assassination of a state official, 
the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. As such, the correct label for the Soleimani strike would 
not be a targeted killing but rather an execution by drone. Fifth, the lack of presented intelligence 
and the routine shift in government statements has raised suspicions as to the credibility of the 
information presented and the true motivations behind the strike.  
 
  Also, if Soleimani were, as the US claims, a high-ranking operational member of a terror 
group at the time of his death, killing him would have an adverse effect. It would incite his 
followers to seek revenge for his death, thereby increasing recruitment and radicalization along 
with the potential for more terror plots. Available intelligence suggests that Soleimani was most 
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active in terror groups, like Hezbollah, in the first decade of the 21st century. So, by all accounts, 
Soleimani posed more of a threat in 2008, when Bush chose not to strike him (in fear it would 
‘destabilize the region’), than he did in 2020. Yes, Soleimani had been involved with terrorist 
organizations at various points in his life. But without proof of constituting an imminent threat at 
the time of his targeting, the US claim of pre-attack self-defence cannot be viewed as legitimate. 
If imminence could not be established, then why did the Trump administration not: (i) just kill him 
and admit it was revenge for his past participation in terror plots as they did for Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi and Osama bin Laden? or (ii) covertly kill him and therefore have no need to justify or 
explain the choice publicly. 
 
It is hard to escape the feeling of general anathema that underscores the public’s perception 
of the US drone counter-terror program. The targeted killing of Soleimani was not just a 
precipitating factor, but rather an amplifying event to an already contentious program. Years of 
illegal covert US drone operations, together with lax rules, norms, and procedures, allowed the 
Soleimani targeted killing to occur. The Trump administration built upon – but also competed with 
the previous administrations of Obama and Bush. Thus, the Soleimani strike has only served to 
compound the contentiousness of the US counter-terror drone program. With weak or unavailable 
intelligence, shifting statements, and threats of revenge attacks, the Trump administration managed 
to cast doubt on an already problematic program. The US response to the Soleimani strike was 
further detrimental. President Trump, in particular, was aggressive in the statements he made via 
Twitter. Instead of calming sentiments, he threatened to attack fifty-two Iranian cultural sites. The 
mere threat of doing so violated international law. Then a domino effect of unimaginable fallout 
ensued—including the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet, protests, media backlash, 
and an increase in tensions between two nuclear-capable states. Some experts even went so far as 
to warn of the potential for a third world war. 
 
Still, there were ways to curtail at least some of these issues. It might be wise for the US to 
keep a few of these in mind for similar future operations. The general conclusion is that (i) either 
drone operations remain covert to avoid the fallout experienced after the Soleimani strike, or (ii) 
pre-attack self-defence should no longer involve remote lethal weaponry. If they do, the 
intelligence must be concrete, verifiable, objective and sufficient to convince any potential critic 
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of the necessity of preemptive action. There is a risk of repeating the Soleimani strike's 
consequences if this is not kept in mind. Perhaps next time, it will go further than just a rise in 
political tensions, collateral damage or a mere threat of a world war. 
 
Moreover, in the absence of evidentiary support to prove the imminence, necessity, 
proportionality, or gravity of the supposed threat posed by Soleimani, the strike which ultimately 
killed him cannot be deemed in accordance with the law of pre-attack self-defence, as none of the 
aforementioned required criteria were sufficiently demonstrable. US President Trump alleged that 
the imminent threat was directed against several US embassies in the Middle East. However, no 
evidence nor intelligence presented in any briefing, including those given to the highest-ranking 
Congress members and the House of Representatives, has corroborated this claim. Equally 
problematic was the fact that the US chose against soliciting the input of the UN Security Council. 
Had the US sought guidance, input, or support from this international body, the overall evaluation 
of the Soleimani strike's legitimacy could have changed even if other variables did not. This is 
simply because the UN has the power to confer legitimacy in an unparalleled way. Even in the 
absence of available intelligence or proof of imminence, the US strike on Soleimani could have 
been deemed legitimate if this impartial international body had authorized the action. The Trump 
administration has adamantly claimed that there is overwhelming evidence to prove that the 
Soleimani strike was legitimate. If this were true, then the UN Security Council would have 
reached the same conclusion. Since this was not the case, this exclusive source of legitimacy 
became a thwarted opportunity. 
 
Legitimacy in state actions can be typically derived from one of two key sources—either 
the public or the law, but ideally, both. In the case of the Soleimani strike, one might argue that 
the US prematurely claimed legitimacy by citing adherence to the customary international law of 
pre-attack self-defence. A lack of evidence and intelligence disclosure to corroborate such an 
assertion led to skepticism amongst lawmakers, government officials, the media and the public 
regarding the true motivations behind the strike. So, if neither the law nor the public bestowed 
their legitimacy on the operation, then where is it derived from? Indeed, there have been cases in 
which international law was violated, but the operation was still viewed as legitimate. The US 
intervention in Kosovo is just one such example. However, this operation was undertaken with the 
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international community's support and carried out alongside an official NATO campaign. 
However, the Soleimani strike did not have international support, nor did it demonstrate adherence 
to the law. In a best-case scenario, legitimacy is derived from both adherence to the law and public 
support. The Soleimani strike had neither.  
 
Although the US has claimed that the customary law of pre-attack self-defence was 
outdated, it nonetheless attempted to justify its adherence to its parameters. For even if a law is 
inapplicable, states will attempt to concoct some justification as to why their actions abide by such 
doctrines for the sake of gaining or maintaining its perceived legitimacy. Thus, the US counter-
terror programme can be regarded as a dog with a collar but no leash. These operations may try 
and appear legitimate, but they act as though they are unconstrained by international law. At this 
point, a muzzle will not work, as there already is a general lack of transparency in the program. 
Perhaps an update to the customary law of pre-attack self-defence, or the introduction of 
amendments, might be able to constrain state-sponsored preemptive practices. At the domestic 
(state) level, governments should establish a sufficient level of accountability, transparency, and 
oversight to avoid some of the US issues following the Soleimani strike. 
 
In order to avoid the repetition of history, one must seek to learn lessons from the past. Not 
just from legal precedents like the Caroline affair, which originally informed the creation of the 
customary law of pre-attack self-defence, but also past counter-terror operations, like the Fadlallah 
affair and the Mughniyeh operation. For decades, the US had engaged, either covertly or through 
proxies, in operations to eliminate key terrorists in the middle east. A question then arises: Why 
break with the status quo and expose one’s state to international and domestic scrutiny? Perhaps 
the Trump administration was driven by the desire to publicly match the Obama administration’s 
killing of Osama bin Laden or garner support for an upcoming federal election. Whatever the true 
motivation for the strike, this dissertation has demonstrated that the US claim for legitimacy, 
derived from the imminence of a supposed threat and its presupposed adherence to customary law, 
is, in the present absence of credible intelligence, weak and unfounded.  
 
Critics might also question why the use of force should be governed on the basis of a debate 
about a diplomatic crisis in 1837. Well, first, the case was precedent-setting. It offered an example 
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of how such a law might be applied in a real-world context. However, this does not mean that this 
is the only way this law could be interpreted. It just offers one historic example capable of 
evaluation from its onset to its fallout. Second, the US was the one to publicly claim adherence to 
such a law, based on the Caroline affair. The US even went so far as to pen a letter to the UN in 
which it justified its actions in accordance with the principle. This dissertation can be understood 
as merely fact-checking such a claim, with the objective of determining whether the customary 
international law of pre-attack self-defence could lend legitimacy to the U.S. drone strike on 
Soleimani.  
  
Unsurprisingly, legal scholars, journalists and policymakers alike tried to answer this very 
question following the Soleimani strike. Unfortunately, their quick examinations only resulted in 
superficial conclusions. The reasons for this vary. However, several media sources attempted to 
conclude that the US strike violated international law by considering one or two factors: the degree 
of intelligence disclosures or the tone of presidential statements. Evidently, such conclusions were 
biased and unreliable. Additionally, existing studies and literature on the topic were somewhat 
patchy, making it difficult to assess the strike's legitimacy without a comprehensive framework. 
Therefore, it became apparent that a framework needed to be developed which would be capable 
of qualitatively assessing the legitimacy of state actions claimed as pre-attack self-defence. A 
comprehensive set of criteria was compiled from pertinent international law, scholarly 
prescriptions and existing military strategy to achieve this. The criteria included within these 
frameworks were inspired by international law and the seminal works of Abraham D. Sofaer, 
Michael W. Doyle and Michael L. Walzer, whose scholarly prescriptions were used as a point of 
comparison, confirmation and contradistinction. This project set out to determine whether the 
Soleimani strike was legitimate. A few questions posed by previous scholars were answered along 
the way, while new ones were raised. Through meticulous and systematic planning, the dissertation 
objectives and queries posed at the onset of this project were also sufficiently answered.  
 
The main inquiry sought to determine whether the US drone strike against Gen. Soleimani 
abided by the legal conditions outlined in the customary international law of pre-attack self-
defence. The simple answer is no. This conclusion was reached by comparing the known facts 
about the Soleimani strike with the requirements and criteria within the three developed 
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frameworks within this dissertation. For instance, the Trump administration’s refusal to present 
intelligence, in addition to illegal actions during the strike (including, but not limited to, the 
violation of Iraq’s air sovereignty), allowed for this conclusion to be reached. 
 
Moreover, the US made two claims following the strike on Soleimani. The first was that 
the Soleimani strike was a counter-terrorism operation. The second was that this operation was 
undertaken in accordance with the customary international law of pre-attack self-defence. The first 
assertion can be corroborated. Unquestionably, Soleimani did have a history of associating and 
aiding terrorist organizations, like Hezbollah, on numerous occasions. Since Hezbollah is 
considered a terrorist organization, Soleimani’s past actions can be seen as aiding and abetting 
terrorism. Consequently, Soleimani can be considered a terrorist. So, by extension, the operation 
which targeted him can be referred to as a counter-terror operation. However, the second claim, 
namely that the strike that killed Soleimani adhered to pre-attack self-defence requirements, cannot 
be easily determined. Thus, this dissertation sought to determine the legitimacy of the targeted 
killing of General Soleimani by examining whether the US claim to pre-attack self-defence was 
valid. 
 
Three additional questions were posed in accordance with the main research query, all of 
which were was also effectively addressed. The first of these questioned what additional criteria 
must be sufficiently demonstrable to ascertain the Soleimani strike's legitimacy. In other words, 
what did the US need to do for the Soleimani strike to be seen as legitimate? These criteria were 
identified and used within the three frameworks developed for the classification. The second 
questioned whether legitimacy relies on proof of imminence. Short answer, yes. If not publicly 
reported, at the very least high-ranking government officials should be provided with this evidence. 
In the case of the Soleimani strike, this was not demonstrated. Confusion, doubt and dissatisfaction 
with presented intelligence did not only come from the general public and the media. Several 
members from the ‘Gang of Eight’ were left unconvinced by the Trump administration’s claim 
that Soleimani posed an ‘imminent threat’ at the time of his death. It should be noted that the ‘Gang 
of Eight’ is an elite group of high-ranking US government officials who possess the security 
clearances necessary to view all available intelligence on the Soleimani strike. Even so, they called 
the intelligence they received ‘weak,’ ‘unconvincing,’ and ‘sophomoric.’  
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The third question was closely related to the second in that it pondered whether a lack of 
available intelligence would affect the perceived legitimacy of the operation, and by extension, the 
greater US counter-terror program. Again, the answer was determined to be a definite yes. Greater 
intelligence disclosures do translate into a greater degree of trust, accountability and legitimacy. 
Unfortunately, the information surrounding the strike on Soleimani remains both limited and 
unstable, especially given that government statements about the operation shifted from one day to 
the next. These shifting government statements lessened the degree of perceived legitimacy of the 
Soleimani strike. If a lack of intelligence was not enough of an issue, intelligence presented by the 
US government was now understood as opinion-based and subjective. The Trump administration 
seemingly artificially decreased the perceived legitimacy of the Soleimani operation by offering 
shifting statements on a somewhat regular basis. If anything, the fallout following the strike on 
Soleimani reaffirms the need for credible intelligence, transparency and accountability—not only 
in covert operations but in government responses to them as well. 
 
So, rather than undertake a top-down approach of evaluating the strike's legitimacy by 
considering the known facts about the operation as a central condition against which all factors are 
applied, this project took a different, bottom-up approach. International law and seminal works on 
the topic were methodically scoured for commonalities. If certain criteria found in international 
law were also prominently discussed by scholars, these were noted and later used to develop tables 
capable of systematically assessing pre-attack self-defence cases. Additionally, if scholars 
suggested the inclusion of certain factors in future research, like the nature of intelligence 
disclosures, these were also considered and included in the developed tables, whenever possible. 
Rather than attempt to discuss legitimacy through hypothetical concepts, as had been done by 
journalists and policymakers shortly after the strike, this dissertation instead opted to develop a 
definite list of criterions capable of ascertaining the legitimacy of any state actions justified per the 
law of pre-attack self-defence, not just the Soleimani strike. In this way, the focal point became 
the framework against which the strike's known factors were measured and compared. As such, 
this dissertation is an innovative attempt to apply an international law framework to a key case.  
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Developing this comprehensive framework was painstaking. Yet, without such a 
framework, conclusions about the strike's legitimacy could not have been credibly made. While 
this dissertation was initially undertaken to determine the legitimacy of the Soleimani strike, it 
became quickly evident that this would not be possible by merely referring to existing literature. 
Thus, a secondary goal quickly took form. The purpose was to develop a framework that would 
make the analysis of the Soleimani strike easier and contribute to the literature on the topic by 
providing a scholarly and strategically practical way of determining the legitimacy and legality of 
other pre-attack self-defence operations as well. Theoretically, this would benefit scholars in their 
attempts to examine state actions that have already occurred. Moreover, this framework may also 
have a practical application by providing states with a clear and concise litmus test against which 
to measure the legitimacy of proposed preemptive state actions. This would improve efficiency, 
transparency, ethicality, and legality, resulting in a greater potential for legitimacy in preemptive 
operations.  
 
Subsequently, this dissertation would be of value for policymakers, scholars, government 
officials, and even journalists—who might benefit from having a comprehensive way to analyze 
future pre-attack self-defence operations. The findings contained herein have implications not only 
in theory and practice but also for further research. As such, even the limitations identified at the 
onset of this project could serve as future research areas. The first includes an imbalance in 
perspectives due to limited English language sources representing the Iranian perspective. It might 
be worthwhile for Iranian scholars to offer their input on this topic to create a more inclusive and 
widely applicable framework. The second is an opportunity for scholars to use the frameworks 
developed in this dissertation as a starting point for quantitative assessments on the subject. At the 
onset of this project, a qualitative assessment of the strike was favourable because of the sorts of 
information available (e.g. government statements) and the lack of intelligence disclosure 
regarding the operation. However, future releases, including potential Freedom of Information Act 
requests, may result in greater disclosure, allowing for more data-driven analyses. 
 
 This dissertation has sought to find the answers to a number of pressing questions regarding 
the drone strike on the Iranian General, the US justification for the operation, and whether this did 
legitimately adhere to the customary international law of pre-attack self-defence. Several questions 
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were raised during the process of these discussions, examinations and analyses. For instance, when 
is assassination justified? Why do policymakers keep using it despite its negative consequences? 
And is secrecy a diminishing commodity in 21st century intelligence operations? It would be a 
worthwhile endeavour for future research in the area to include a discussion or analysis on these 
matters.  
 
The Soleimani strike has also provided scholars with an opportunity to gauge the present 
relevance of international law in its ability to constrain state behaviour. Perhaps legal scholars 
might seek to conduct future research on the issue, examining the points at which international law 
has weakened, to offer suggestions for potential reform or modification. This dissertation 
attempted to demonstrate that scholarly prescriptions could be used as an ‘update’ to international 
law to make it more relevant and therefore applicable. Undoubtedly, there will always be a need 
for an even more robust framework with a clearly defined set of immutable parameters and 
restrictions capable of addressing modern threats and dilemmas. Although this project does not 
claim to develop such a universal solution, it does humbly offer the first step in this direction.  
 
Moreover, this dissertation does not claim to get inside the minds of US decision-makers. 
In the case of the Soleimani strike, it is quite unnecessary, as most government officials have 
already publicly voiced their opinions (or disdain) on the quality of intelligence offered. As such, 
publicly known information was used to reach the conclusions herein and systematically determine 
the Soleimani strike's legitimacy. So, if the Trump administration considered the intelligence they 
disclosed to Congress as sufficient to justify the strike's legitimacy, then this should be sufficient 
for this project. This is especially noteworthy considering that several congress members 
confirmed that they learned more about the strike from the news than the briefings provided by the 
White House. Additionally, open-source information also enhances the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the research undertaken, aiding both replicability and verification. 
 
In the end, international law may not always be capable of applying to all cases, especially 
given the modernity of certain matters, but it will always be a source of legitimacy that states will 
attempt to claim. Although, at this point, there is no use in condemning the US for the Soleimani 
strike. Nothing productive can come of it. What is necessary, however, is for the US to learn from 
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its mistakes. To achieve this, a determination of exactly how the US erred needed to be made. 
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was not to denigrate the US counter-terror program, for 
it has garnered notable strategic benefits. Rather, the point was to demonstrate how it might be 
improved—by developing a framework capable of highlighting the issues that undermined its 
legitimacy in the Soleimani strike, to ensure that future operations can avoid such pitfalls. Still, if 
there is one takeaway from this dissertation, it is this: international law should be analyzed 
skeptically, but not cynically. Even inapplicable or outdated laws have a purpose. Some morally 
caution states from engaging in hazardous activities, while others dissuade self-serving actions. 
But by and large, laws are formed based on a collective understanding that in order to belong to 
the international community, there is a proper way of conduct that will ensure the preservation of 
one’s legitimacy. Regrettably, by striking the shadow commander, the US has plunged its counter-
terror programme into an abyss—a place where legality is subjectively construed, and legitimacy 






















As gathered from the discussion undertaken in this dissertation, there remains a certain degree of 
confusion regarding the legality of force used in self-defence.1061 When is it legal? Is the 
anticipatory use of force legitimate? Could it be counterproductive? These are just a few of the 
questions which have been debated by scholars. Conceptual clarity would help offset this issue. 
Thus, the following sections will briefly explain relevant terminology to reduce the ambiguity 
surrounding this topic considerably. 
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
 
By definition, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), often commonly referred to as a drone, is a 
remotely piloted aircraft.1062 Kerbing the need for a pilot in the cockpit has increased asymmetry 
and enabled many military operations to be carried out from afar.1063 Countless surveillance 
operations rely on such technology, but many of these successes have been overshadowed by 
consequences often attributed to lethal drone (mis)use.1064 Therefore, this high-risk weaponry's 
strategic efficacy merits further examination and scrutinization1065 when used in pre-attack self-
defence cases. As the following concepts will demonstrate, ambiguity and contention have 
 
1061 See Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p.172 (which discusses the concept of 
‘interceptive self-defence’); see also Greenwood, ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of 
Force: Afghanistan, al Qaida, and Iraq’ (describing the issues which arise from vague 
terminology); see also Matthew Waxman, ‘The Use of Force Against States the Might Have 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ Michigan Journal of International Law, 2009 (discusses 
‘precautionary self-defence’). 
1062 Markus Wagner, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,’ from the Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 1. 
1063 Thazha Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); see also Robert Tomes, ‘Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,’ Army 
War College, Parameters 34/1, Fall 2004, pp. 16-28. 
1064 United Nations, ‘Delegates Consider Deadly Use of Drone Technology as Third Committee 
Hears More Presentations by Experts on Human Rights Obligations,’ UN Sixty-eighth General 
Assembly, Third Committee, 25 October 2013. 
1065 See Vivek Sehrawat, ‘Legal Status of Drones Under LOAC and International Law,’ Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs, Volume 5, Issue 1 War in the 21st Century and Collected 
Works, April 2017 (Particularly since the use of military drones is a high-risk practice which has 
resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties—leading to international outrage stemming from 
its ‘violation of just war principles and international law’). 
 318 
contributed to divergent opinions regarding the delineation of the ‘battlefield’ and the identity of 
the ‘combatant.’  
 
Battlefield v. Battlespace 
 
The traditional legal understanding of the battlefield focuses on the geographic space within which 
armed conflict occurs.1066 International law views the battlefield as a physical space—governed 
by laws specific to that location, time or event.1067 The traditional understanding of war, and by 
extension, the battlefield, relies on two key assumptions. First, those occupying the battlefield's 
space are combatants, and second, there is direct engagement and relationship between 
belligerents.1068 This current legal definition of the battlefield is outdated and insufficient at 
addressing terror groups' evolving nature. As a result, many states have taken it upon themselves 
to infer this definition's applicability to modern armed conflicts. 
 
Following the 9/11 attacks in New York, US President George W. Bush declared that ‘the 
entire world is [now] a battlefield.’1069 This remark was made about the enemy's evolving nature, 
which has resulted in an inherently complex ‘theatre of engagement’ due to this modern 
battlefield's borderless nature. 1070 Later, Vice-President Dick Cheney echoed the same sentiment 
when he declared that ‘the only way you can deal with them is to destroy them. The reach of our 
 
1066 Fred Aja Agwu, ‘Drones, Vanishing Frontlines, and the Emergence of ‘Battlespace,’ from 
Armed Drones and Globalization in the Asymmetric War on Terror: Challenges for the Law of 
Armed Conflict and Global Political Economy, (Routledge Research in the Law of Armed 
Conflict: New York, 2018) p. 191. 
1067 Klem Ryan, ‘What’s Wrong with Drones? The Battlefield in International Humanitarian Law,’ 
from The American Way of Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses 
to Drones, (Cornell University Press: New York, 2014), p. 211; see also Carl Schmitt, ‘The Nomos 
of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum,’ Telos Press, (2006), p. 74 
(Schmitt has written extensively on how International Humanitarian Law and the 
theories/principles of Just War have led to the development of our modern laws of armed conflict.)  
1068 Ryan, ‘What’s Wrong with Drones? The Battlefield in International Humanitarian Law,’ p. 
213. 
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Counterinsurgency,’ Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the American Society of International 
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efforts must be as broad and deep as the tentacles of the terrorist networks.’1071 Drones lead the 
charge in terms of technological advancements in military strategy, and it is because of these 
developments, the proverbial limits on the battlefield are dissolving. Based on drone strike reports 
and information garnered from intelligence documents, drones ‘have significantly shaped how the 
United States defines and targets its enemies.’ 1072 
 
Unlike conventional wars, the war on terror must now navigate (and address) the ‘shifty 
nature’ of frontlines occupied by civilian forces.1073 Even in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), which is internationally recognized as the core of the war on terror, ‘the US 
is fighting against a diffused group that cannot easily be identified from the civilian population.’1074 
This shift undoubtedly means that the ‘global battlefield’ will overlap with civilian space.  
 
Markus Wagner, a Professor of Law at the University of Miami, noted that this intertwining 
of civilian and combatant spaces would result in a ‘battlespace.’1075 It is conceptually different 
from a battlefield or frontline because this arena is known to be occupied by civilians. International 
law is very much focused on territory and boundaries—especially those which delineate between 
civilian and armed conflict zones. Since an area cannot be referred to as a battlefield if civilians 
also occupy the zone in question, the ‘battlespace’ concept was developed.1076 
 
International law formally defined ‘battlespace’ as an area in which ‘armed forces of the 
adverse parties actually engaged in combat, and those directly supporting them, are located.’1077 
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The following developments were made: Article 19 of the third Geneva Convention,1078 Article 14 
of the fourth Geneva Convention,1079 and Article 15 of the 1977 Additional Protocols.1080 
Additionally, the Geneva Conventions and Articles 57 and 58 of Protocol I (1977) have safeguards 
put in place to prevent ‘civilian contaminations of the battlefield or frontlines and the attendant 
high level of civilian casualties.’1081  
 
However, international law fails to account for the omnipresent nature of terrorism—
wherein any civilian area might become, by legal standards, a battlefield (as terror attacks are 
taking place without concern for state boundaries). Nevertheless, these legal amendments 
demonstrate that international law has assumed responsibility in limiting war by developing 
articles that focus on separating civilians from armed conflict areas. 1082 Despite this progress, there 
is no international legal task force entrusted with monitoring and governing the war on terror—




Lacking a clear definition of the battlefield in international law creates an even bigger problem for 
the combatant concept. In conventional wars, wherein belligerents occupied a physical battlefield, 
Article 50 of the additional protocols was sufficient to ascertain (i) who the combatants were, (ii) 
how one might engage them, and (iii) where the parameters of the ‘battlefield’ stood. However, 
the current nature of the US’s ‘war on terror’ changes this traditional understanding of the 
battlefield, and by extension, the combatant.  
 
1078 Requires that the captured enemy fighters be removed from the active ‘combat zone’ to protect 
them from danger; see also ICRC, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Geneva, 12 August 1949, http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/375. 
1079 Allows ‘safety zones’ and ‘neutralized zones’ to be established which are separate from 
conflict areas like the frontline; see also Pictet, Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention, pp. 
120–21. 
1080 Requires the occupying power in a territory, which was formally under enemy control, to offer 
humanitarian assistance to regions occupied by civilians which have become relatively stable; see 
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1082 Ryan, ‘What’s Wrong with Drones? The Battlefield in International Humanitarian Law,’ pp. 
212-214. 
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A 2011 UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) paper discussed the issues that develop due to an 
imprecise definition of the ‘battlefield.’ The MoD was concerned with the potential reciprocal 
behaviour between combatants outside of the traditional conception of the battlefield.1084 
Questions like: is a ‘Reaper operator walking the streets of his hometown after a shift a legitimate 
target as a combatant? Would an attack by a Taliban sympathizer be an act of war under 
international law and murder under the statutes of the home state?’1085 These are some of the issues 
caused by vague or improperly addressed legal concepts and terminology in modern war.  
 
Under the Bush Administration, military drones only targeted High-Value Targets (HVTs). 
Under Obama, this programme was expanded, which subsequently broadened the understanding 
of ‘militant.’1086 According to reports, this increased signature strike operations.1087 It suggests that 
the ‘identity of those targeted is not known, but their actions or characteristics (their signature) 
suggests that they are ‘hostile’ to the United States.’1088 With the development of the ‘global war 
on terror,’ the combatant's identity has degraded under international law.1089  
 
Unsurprisingly, the United States ‘counts all military-age males in a strike zone as 
combatants…unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.’1090 
Disturbingly, it seems as though ‘estimates of extremely low or no civilian casualties appear to be 
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The US understanding of who constitutes a ‘civilian’ contradicts principles commonly 
understood under international law. Still, it does not go so far as to violate said law since a lack of 
clear definitional parameters at the international level have allowed such problematic 
interpretations to persist. As expected, this ambiguity has granted intelligence agencies a higher 
degree of operational freedom. 
 
Customary international requires that combatants be aware of their position on the 
battlefield. However, drones do not afford this consideration. By covert surveillance and remote 
killing, combatants are not aware of when and how they are being monitored or targeted. By this 
consideration, the battlefield becomes distorted and malleable.1092 These irregularities have even 
allowed US military lawyers to take advantage of the law.  
 
Leaked classified documents discussed a somewhat troubling event that took place in 2007. 
During an air mission in Iraq, two insurgents were attempting to surrender to an Apache helicopter. 
Before any action being taken, the crew consulted a military lawyer who advised that the insurgents 
‘cannot surrender to aircraft and are still valid targets.’1093 As a result, both insurgents were shot 
dead. The issue here is legality. International law dictates that an act of surrender must be 
recognized and accepted. In the strongest terms, it also indicates that a distinction should be made 
between civilians and combatants. Unfortunately, as many cases have shown—US counter-
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